Παναγιώτης Ήφαιστος

Καθηγητής, Διεθνείς Σχέσεις-Στρατηγικές Σπουδές

Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς, Τμήμα Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών

www.ifestos.edu.gr  -- www.ifestosedu.gr  --  info@ifestosedu.gr  -- info@ifestos.edu.gr

Τουρκία-Νταβούτογλου Εφαρμοσμένη στρατηγική

Στις παραπλήσιες σελίδες ►Αχμέτ  Νταβούτογλου-  Στρατηγικό βάθος, Η διεθνής θέση της Τουρκίας και ►Α. Νταβούτογλου Εναλλακτικές Κοσμοθεωρίες καταχωρώ δικές μου αναλύσεις και μερικών άλλων που θεωρώ αξιοπρόσεκτες. Εδώ, το περιεχόμενο θα έχει περισσότερη ποικιλομορφία και θα εστιαστεί σε αναλύσεις και αναφορές που περιγράφουν και ερμηνεύουν τον τρόπο με τον οποίο εξελίσσεται η εφαρμοσμένη νεο-Οθωμανική στρατηγική της πολιτικής ηγεσίας των Ερτογάν / Νταβούτογλου. 

Περιεχόμενα (για μετάβαση κλικ από και προς τον τίτλο των καταχωρήσεων)

►29.3.2010 Islamist Gülen Movement Runs U.S. Charter Schools

by Eric Walberg, Russia, Turkey and the Great Game: Changing teams

►ΥΠΕΞ ΗΠΑ – 5 Ιουνίου 2009.

►April 6, 2009 Remarks of President Barack Obama Address to Turkish Parliament Ankara, Turkey

►Τι προτείνουν (και ήδη εφαρμόζει) στον Ομπάμα οι Μπρεζίνσκι, Σκόουκροφτ και Κίσσινγκερ για την Τουρκία

►American Hellenic Institute Statement on President Obama’s Speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009

►22/05/2010 | Της Μικαέλλας Λοίζου, Η Σημερινή, Σάββατο, 19/06/2010

►Zeyno Baran and Ian O. Lesser Turkey’s Identity and Strategy –

►Πέμπτη, 10 Ιουνίου 2010, Πως έκλεψε τη παράσταση ο Ερντογάν από τον Αχμαντινετζάντ

►12-06-10, Υπ. Εξ Υποθέσεων Γαλλίας: «Δεν ευσταθούν οι φόβοι για την Τουρκία», τόνισε ο Π. Λελούς

►Μιχάλης; Ιγνατίου, Άλμα στο κενό το δόγμα Νταβούτογλου 15.6.2010

►19.6.2010. Το βραβείο Wondrow Wilson στον Νταβούτογλου.

►BHMA Κυριακή 20.6.2010, ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΤΣΙΑΡΑΣ, Νεοθωμανισμός, το πιο ισχυρό χαρτί της Άγκυρας

►Κυριακή, 20 Ιουνίου 2010, Πανηγυρική συνάντηση Νέο-οθωμανών και Οθωμανών

►Cl. Rosset, 18.6.2010, Wondrow Wilson and Davutoglou

►Ergin Yildizoglu, 22 June 2010, Danger signs in Turkey's strategic depth, Middle East

►22.6.2010. Πρωτοφανής τουρκική αεροναυτική άσκηση από την Κεφαλλονιά μέχρι την Κρήτη

►Μυστική συνάντηση για αποκατάσταση των σχέσεων Ισραήλ-Τουρκίας Hμερομηνία :  01-07-10

►Guillaume Perrier – Le Monde, 6.6.2010. Η Τουρκία γιορτάζει την άλωση της Κωνστασντινούπολης. Η απεικόνιση μιας Οθωμανικής νοσταλγίας

►Παρασκευή, 09 Ιουλίου 2010, Πιέσεις Βρετανίας – ΗΠΑ για Τουρκία - Συμφωνία στρατηγικού συνεταιρισμού Βρετανίας - Τουρκίας

►12.7.2010. «Turkey is AT the centre of everything, Davutoglou’ s speech

►14.7.2010. K. Αστον, Η Ευρώπη και η Τουρκία έχουν κοινούς στόχους

►1.8.2010 Μπουλέντ Αρίντς: Ο νέο-οθωμανισμός επισήμως στην ελληνική Θράκη

►1.8.10. Η Τουρκία προσεγγίζει την Συρία

►Σ. Καδήρ, Νέο-Αμερικανισμός και κατάκτηση μέσω θρησκείας και πολιτισμού

►Αϊκούτ Καδήρ , Davutoglu και Κουρδικό πρόβλημα

►18.8. 2010 Διαψεύδουν το τελεσίγραφο Τουρκία και ΗΠΑ

►Μάριου Ευρυβιάδη, Η Φιλανδοποίηση της Ελλάδας

►1.10. 2010, Διάλεξη Davutoğlu στο Harvard - Πρόγραμμα Κόκκαλη

►1.10.2010, Τουρκική «Διπλωματία των Επιστημών»

►1.10.2010.  Ψάχνουν να βρουν... Οθωμανική κληρονομιά

►9.10.2010 Οκτώ συμφωνίες 100 δισ. δολαρίων υπέγραψαν Ερτογαν - ουεν.

►15.10.2010. Σκόπια- Τουρκικό Συνέδριο για τον «Ισλαμικό Πολιτισμό στα Βαλκάνια»

►15. 10.2010. Oι ταλιμπάν της Θράκης. 

►24.10.2010. Του Βασίλειου Μαρκεζίνη*, Το πολιτιστικό κίνημα Γκουλέν και η Ελλάδα

►24,10.2010. ΣΑΒΒΑ ΙΑΚΩΒΙΔΗ Πώς ο Ελληνισμός εθίζεται σταδιακά σε υποταγή στη νεο-οθωμανική Τουρκία
►24.10.2010. Α. Νταβούτογλου : Οι δύο πλευρές τα συζήτησαν όλα, από το Αιγαίο μέχρι τις μειονότητες

►24.10.2010. Διαφύλαξη του εθνικού συμφέροντος

►25.10.2010. RE. Cohen Turkey Steps Out

►4.11.2010. Σιμπέλ Μουσταφάογλου, «Η Ελλάδα δεν μπορεί, θα φέρουμε βοήθεια από την Τουρκία»

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12.3.2012. nterview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt)
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you define Turkey’s strategic interests today?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s strategic interests lie in peace, stability, security, and prosperity in its neighborhood and beyond. Turkey is in a unique position in geopolitical terms, in the midst of Afro–Eurasia. This vast geography neighbors crisis-prone regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It also holds a great potential for development and prosperity, which has so far been held back due to security problems. Any crisis in these regions—be it economic or political—has direct ramifications for Turkey and the wider international community. Therefore, stability in these regions is in the best interests of Turkey. And this is why Turkey actively works to foster peace and security around it—the very idea at the heart of our ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy. Through this policy, while we try to leave behind the problems with our neighbors, we also try to help them solve any domestic, bilateral or international problems they might have—to the extent we can.

Our foreign policy is also shaped by our economic interests. Turkey has a big population, young people constituting half of it, and a vibrant economy, striving to be among the top ten economies of the world by 2023, which is the one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, the Turkish private sector is very active and has a strong entrepreneurial spirit. This requires us to widen the scope of our outreach as an economic actor. Increasing the level of economic cooperation with as many countries as possible becomes an important priority for Turkey. It compels us to reach out and enhance the scope of our relations on a global scale. This is also why we have increased cooperation and engagement with the emerging powers of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, all of which have become priority areas in terms of our strategic interests.

Turkish foreign policy is guided by our democratic values as well as our interests. This can best be seen in our support for reform efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey has always been encouraging the administrations to address the legitimate expectations of their people and undertake the necessary reforms. However, now, given the home-grown and irreversible march toward more democracy in the region, Turkey has stepped up its efforts to support this process. Consolidation of democracy in these countries in a way that will empower the people and strengthen stability is in the best interests of the entire region. This process should be advanced in a peaceful manner without leading to new divisions of ethnic or sectarian nature. This is not what people want, and we have to do all we can to avoid such a dangerous scenario. Turkey exerts every effort in this direction in cooperation with the countries in the region.

Turkey greatly values its alliance with the Euro–Atlantic community. Our membership of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and strategic relations with the U.S. and other Western countries in Europe constitute a fundamental pillar of our foreign policy. In addition, Turkey has been a negotiating country with the EU [European Union] for a long time. In this context, membership of the EU remains a strategic goal for us.

CAIRO REVIEW: What is Turkey’s role in the evolving global system, at this point in history?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: In a globalized world, countries are not isolated entities anymore. We live in a world where states, leaders, and peoples increasingly interact with each other on a daily basis. Almost anything—products, persons, capital, and ideas—can be moved and communicated across borders. Whatever happens in one part of the world can be simultaneously heard in another corner and they receive rapid reaction from countries across the globe. In light of all these, no country can exist or prosper on its own anymore. This is a new global order in the making, and Turkey is doing its best to contribute to the successful completion of this transition period. In this regard, we believe that the new system has to be:

—legitimate, just, transparent, and democratic;

—representative and fully open to participation;

—in full regard to resolve dormant or active disputes that have an impact on world stability;

—result-oriented in terms of eliminating disparities;

—based on the precept of security and freedom for all.

We also believe that we have the necessary elements of soft and hard power to help achieve that goal. And we will not shy away from using our comparative advantages in this direction. Our geostrategic location, booming economy, ability to understand different social and cultural dynamics in a vast geography, and commitment to advance democracy domestically and internationally are all important assets.

What Turkey wants to promote and achieve is: cooperation, understanding, and tolerance through dialogue and engagement. Turkey’s efforts are focused on bringing together the parties in order to solve or preempt conflicts; championing universal values and human rights; supporting those who are subjected to unfair treatment, and promoting economic and social development of the underprivileged countries.

The Alliance of Civilizations initiative we cosponsored with Spain is an example of Turkey’s active efforts in this direction. Similarly, Turkey and Finland have launched the Peace through Mediation initiative in September 2010 at the margins of the sixty-fifth United Nations General Assembly. We also tabled a resolution at the UN General Assembly on mediation, which was adopted unanimously in June 2011. Just recently, on February 24–25 of this year, Turkey organized the Istanbul Conference on Mediation, in order to provide a platform where all parties in mediation could interact with each other and share their experiences and insights, thus enhancing their understanding on different perspectives of peace building.

Likewise, Turkey has become an emerging dxonor, conducting various development projects through its own agencies. Turkey is determined to help the least developed countries with a long-term commitment. Turkey hosted the LDC Summit in Istanbul last May with a view to supporting sustainable development in these countries.

Overall, Turkey is a constructive power able to play an important role in setting the parameters of the new global order. We are conscious of our capabilities and of what needs to be done. In cooperation with our friends and partners we will continue to play a positive role in our region and beyond.

CAIRO REVIEW: Has Turkey achieved the ‘strategic depth’ that you seek?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s strategic depth rests on its geographical and historical depth. Our long history provides us with a unique set of relations with countries and communities all around us. Our geostrategic location in the midst of a vast geography, on the other hand, places us in a position to relate to and influence the developments that are key to the future of the world. So the question is not achieving the strategic depth, but using it for regional and global peace. This requires us to engage with the countries with which we share a common past and geography in a way that will promote our shared interests and create a mutually beneficial framework for cooperation and dialogue. Today, with its strong democracy, vibrant economy, and active foreign policy, Turkey has more opportunities to capitalize on its strategic depth. And we have been working very actively to this end.

Our efforts to create high-level strategic councils and visa-free travel regimes, for instance, are geared toward making this strategic depth an operational concept where all peoples and states benefit from the enhanced cooperation. The principle that lies beneath our general approach is to turn this vast area into one of stability, security, and prosperity through political dialogue, economic interdependence, and cultural understanding.
On the other hand, strategic depth also rests on creating a sense of regional ownership based on shared interests and common ideals. This can be achieved only through a more effective regional cooperation and active engagement with all regional systems in our neighborhood. This, in turn, necessitates enforcing existing regional integration structures, and forging new ones as necessary. This is why Turkey supports and seeks to promote regional cooperation in its neighborhood and to boost the profile of regional organizations for that purpose. We believe that this would help countries to find regional solutions to their regional problems, rather than waiting for other actors from outside the region to impose their own solutions.

CAIRO REVIEW: We have witnessed important shifts and changes in Turkey’s domestic politics and political life in the past decade. How have these developments affected or shaped Turkish foreign policy?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s greatest success has been consolidating its democracy and achieving a strong economy at home. These are also the driving forces behind Turkey’s proactive foreign policy. Of course, this has become possible due to the political stability, which we have been enjoying since 2002 in Turkey. As a stable, secular, and democratic country with an economy ranking sixteenth in the world, Turkey has indeed become a regional powerhouse whose friendship and cooperation is increasingly sought in the international arena. This enabled us to pursue a more independent and visionary foreign policy.

CAIRO REVIEW: How do you evaluate the success or failure of the Justice and Development Party's five new principles for a new Turkish foreign policy: balancing freedom and security; zero problems with neighbors; active rather than reactive; complementary relations with global powers; and activism in international organizations?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Our foreign policy is essentially based on the principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world” as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Over the years, it has developed and gained many layers and dimensions, always on the basis of this tradition. Building on this tradition, we have introduced five new principles with a view to injecting refreshed dynamism into our foreign policy as well as for adapting ourselves to the new realities.

I think all of these five principles have been successfully translated into concrete policies. First, in terms of balancing freedoms and security, Turkey is a living example of how important it is to expand the space of freedoms to realize the full potential of a society. Turkey has, in this regard, also managed to de-securitize its foreign policy understanding, which allows us to see our neighborhood through the prism of opportunities rather than a perception of threat. As a result, we have come a long way in improving our relations with neighbors and opening up new areas of cooperation. We have also presented an example for others to seek more freedoms, which have otherwise been constrained by security considerations, and offered a reliable partner for those who are willing to proceed in this direction. The recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa both vindicate our approach and provide us with new opportunities to extend the common area of freedoms.

Secondly, the ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy that we have adopted bears a much deeper meaning than settling our problems with each of our neighbors. It aims at the transformation of our neighborhood, where serious problems and elements of instability exist, into a friendship and cooperation basin that will serve the interests of all. In this context, we believe that our policy of zero problems with neighbors has also gained additional meaning and importance as the Middle East stands at the brink of a historical transformation. We hope that the current dynamic for reform advances in way that will meet the expectations of the people while also contributing to peace and security in the region. If this can be achieved, the spirit of cooperation that we are trying to develop on the basis of our zero problems policy will be further strengthened. We are sparing no effort toward this direction and we will continue to do so.

As to the principle of being active rather than reactive, it is obvious that Turkey today acts upon a longer-term vision, which foresees a stable and secure region within the framework of a new global order. The way Turkey has been trying to forge new and stronger mechanisms of cooperation with a vast number of countries and organizations has allowed us to be more aware of the developments in various parts of the world and take the necessary measures in advance to steer the course of events in the right direction. In fact, the reason why Turkey has been able to respond to the developments in the region much faster and more effectively than many others is because we have long established the kind of relationships with the people that will carry us to the next stage. Also, the way Turkey strives to mediate and/or facilitate the resolution of disputes in a preventive way also reflects the proactive and visionary nature of our foreign policy. Today, in a large area spanning Balkans to Southeast Asia, Turkey’s efforts are instrumental in maintaining peace and security so that we do not have to react to conflicts in their aftermath.

Finally, active Turkish foreign policy is also well reflected in the international organizations with the tasks assumed and policies pursued. Today, Turkey is an active member of many international and regional organizations ranging from the UN to the G-20 [Group of Twenty], OIC [Organization of Islamic Cooperation] to NATO, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] to ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization]. In each case we are constantly looking into ways of making these organizations more effective and lead many initiatives to this end. If I have to give one example of our renewed activism in international organizations, the UN Security Council comes to mind. Right after completing nonpermanent membership of the UN Security Council for the term 2009–2010, we have now put our candidacy for the term 2015–2016. Also, our active role within the G-20, which is now becoming the new core structure for global economic governance, is another case in point reflecting Turkey’s added value in multilateral diplomacy.

Overall, we have made great progress in operationalizing the five principles of our foreign policy. We will continue to uphold these principles and maintain our active stance in putting them into practice. This is not only a must for our own national interests, but helps create an international environment conducive to cooperation and dialogue.

CAIRO REVIEW: After remarkable economic success over the past decade—notably in attracting foreign investment and increasing trade—what are your challenges looking ahead to the next decade?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey has navigated through a serious economic crisis in the recent past, which compelled us to carry out serious economic reforms. Thanks to these reforms and the entrepreneur spirit of the Turkish private sector, today Turkey has a stronger and rapidly growing economy. In 2010 and 2011, while most European countries fought against the diverse adverse effects of the global economic crisis like recession, negative growth, unemployment, etc., Turkey recorded economic growth of 9 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. With a GDP of nearly $1 trillion, Turkey is the sixteenth biggest economy in the world and the sixth biggest in Europe. Turkey’s economic growth so far has been highly beneficial for our neighbors too, whose share in our total trade volume has increased from 8 percent to 30 percent in the last ten years. However, as European countries constitute the biggest foreign trade partner of Turkey, we see the current economic crisis in Europe as an important challenge for us too. This is why we call upon European leaders to take the necessary measures in time. In this regard, Turkey is ready to do all it can to facilitate the way out of this crisis and believes that in the long term its membership of the EU will make a great difference, enabling the EU to be a stronger global actor. Our aim is to elevate Turkey to the league of the world’s ten biggest economies by 2023, when we will celebrate the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

CAIRO REVIEW: A decade after the September 11 attacks provoked great debates about a clash of Islam and the West, what is your view about this ‘civilizational’ question?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: By mentioning the civilizational question, I presume you are referring to the “clash of civilizations” theory of Samuel Huntington. I have thoroughly reflected my observations against this theory in an article published in 1994, entitled “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis) Order.”

As revealed in my article, I think Huntington’s theory is a status quo-oriented ideological formulation to justify foreign policy measures and maneuvers adopted in the post-Cold War era. While doing so, he unfairly blames non-Western civilizations for the existing crises and conflicts and absolves the Western powers of any responsibility in this regard. Unfortunately, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Huntington’s theory has drawn even more attention and thus a distorted understanding has been further promoted which considers terrorism, radical movements, and Islam interrelated. This understanding, shaped around Islamophobia, is the main reason today for unjust reactions against Muslims, tantamount to discrimination. Over time, the presentation of the Muslim world as a potential enemy has also resulted in encouraging oppressive political tendencies in Muslim countries for the sake of preserving Western interests and thus exempting the Muslim world from enjoying the universality of democratic values.

I am not going to dwell upon the reasons behind the promotion of such civilizational clash theories, which are embedded more in political and economic considerations rather than actual social and philosophical realities. Indeed, for me the basic reason for declaring the Muslim world as a threat is the geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic potentialities of the Muslim world and the need to justify the strategic and tactical operations to have control over these potentialities.

In any case, and with the advantage of hindsight, I categorically refute the clash theories as an inter-civilizational mode of relationship. I prefer and believe in the necessity of finding peaceful ways of resolving inter-civilizational differences through consolidating dialogue among civilizations and facilitating free exchanges and stressing on the common universal values rather than emphasizing the fault lines. The fact that the history of civilizations is not composed only of clashes, and there are many examples of dynamic and peaceful cooperation and interaction among civilizations, is an encouraging proof that this is an attainable goal. With this understanding, Turkey has cosponsored the Alliance of Civilizations initiative with Spain, which lately became a UN project with more than 120 members. The success of this initiative alone is another proof of our common aspirations and ideals irrespective of our cultural and religious differences.

CAIRO REVIEW: As somebody who is known as a leading theoretician of foreign policy, which global thinkers, or which countries’ foreign policies, interest you the most?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: In today’s globalized world, all countries, big or small, have a valuable contribution to make to global peace and security. So I do not make a difference between any countries as to the importance of their roles. I am more interested in how they use their potential and how they bring their added value to the fore. It is also important to create the larger framework, or a new global order that will allow countries to assume their fair share. For me, an egalitarian, participatory, and synthesizing world order is the only viable answer in overcoming the current global challenges and problems we are faced with. Therefore, these countries that are working to bring about such a new order deserve all the credit. Today, seeing a consensus emerging within the international community on the need for such a new global order makes me more hopeful for the future.

Likewise, we also need intellectuals and theorists to help form the conceptual basis of this new order. Their work will strengthen our commitment and provide an anchor with reality. It is also extremely important to have this intellectual support from all around the world rather than leaning on certain quarters. In this regard, the quality of the analysis and assessments from Asian, African, and Latin American thinkers and scholars are quite impressive. This is yet another proof of the universality of the human’s yearning for a better world. We should thus not deprive ourselves of the contributions by anyone and any country.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did you see the Arab Spring coming?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: From our point of view, it was expected; we were aware of the urgent need for change and democratic transformation in the region. As you might remember, in my book Strategic Depth (April 2001) I have underlined that the stability and political experience in the Arab states were not based on social legitimacy, and that stability was worthless. Likewise, I have also asserted that the transformation in Arab nationalism and the political legitimacy crises in the Arab world would affect the political leadership structures of those countries. As such, from the early years of the previous decade, we started emphasizing the importance of introducing political and economic reforms and upholding dignity, human rights and freedoms, as well as universal values such as the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and gender equality in the region.

CAIRO REVIEW: Broadly, what factors led to the Arab uprisings?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Protests are home-grown and naturally ignited by years-long aspiration for freedom, transparency, accountability, democracy, and social justice. A driving force for the popular movements has been the young people who were frustrated to live under pressure and restraint while suffering from economic distress. Popular discontent gained a wider sphere of influence through social networking sites, which have been utilized by the activists to organize protests all over the region.

CAIRO REVIEW: How will the Arab uprisings fundamentally change the Middle East—or not?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The process of change will take time in the region. It won’t be linear and it could undergo many seasons. But it is irreversible. It is not possible to turn back the clock, simply because the pressure for change is driven by demography. Today, around 60 percent of Arabs are under thirty. Overwhelming numbers of them are fed-up with regimes that have not even tried to give them better lives. The Arab Spring has necessitated the establishment of a fair balance between freedom and security for the development of stability as well as unity and peace. Such a need requires a social contract to eliminate the legitimacy gap between those who govern and are governed, in view of the aspiration of the peoples for freedom, justice, and democracy. This has never been easy before, and there is no reason why it should be any easier now.

The biggest challenge is to materialize the reforms in the fields of politics, economy, and security simultaneously. On the one hand, you need to set up democratic institutions and make them function; on the other, you need to produce lasting solutions to the requirements of the peoples on employment, education, food, and health. Inevitably, the next decades will witness the struggle to turn such ossified vicious circles into virtuous circles. Perhaps some will make it, some others won’t. However, those successful ones will lead the way for their less fortunate peers. The course of the popular movements will be determined by the peoples of the region. In other words, the people will set the pace and the scope of the change in the Middle East.

CAIRO REVIEW: What is your personal perspective of how the Turkish government responded to the Arab Spring, beginning with the protests in Tunisia, and later in Egypt and elsewhere?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We have adopted a principled stance regarding the popular movements in the region. This stance is based on two pillars: to support the reforms for more transparency, legitimacy, and accountability, and to pursue them through peaceful transition. We always advocated for the regimes to carry the torch of change themselves. Since sustainable security and stability in the region is only possible through accommodating the legitimate aspirations of the people, we encouraged our regional partners to implement necessary reforms in due time to this end.

Turkey has always underlined that violence and use of force against people is unacceptable. The sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political unity of each country must be preserved and respected. It is also important not to let these processes be hijacked by radicals who seek to foment sectarian, ethnic or ideological strife across the region. Turkey also notes that the scope of change and dynamics differ from one country to the other. Therefore, a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot be applied to the countries in transition. If needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own experience with the interested countries.

CAIRO REVIEW: Do the revolts in the Arab world present a crisis for Turkey, or an opportunity?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We would like to see a democratic, constitutional system taking root in our neighborhood so that all religions and sects can coexist in harmony and peace within a multicultural setting. This is also the only way to secure peace, security, and stability in the region. If ongoing popular movements succeed in the establishment of democratic systems, this will certainly serve the interests of Turkey. Turkey will spare no effort in supporting the processes of change and transformation in the region with its democratic culture and historical experience. However, one of the biggest challenges ahead will be to thwart the likelihood of a new form of polarization emerging in the region, as sectarian identities have sharpened in the wake of popular movements. Turkey will strive, in coordination with regional and international actors, to ensure that ongoing processes of change and transformation conclude with success.

CAIRO REVIEW: How does Turkey respond to fears of neo-Ottomanism—the prospect that your ‘strategic depth’ effectively seeks Turkish hegemony over the Arab region?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Certain circles accuse us of pursuing a neo-Ottoman agenda. These allegations are baseless. Common geography and historical relations with the region certainly dictate Turkey to follow an active policy in the face of developments in the region. Turkey simply looks for the establishment of security, peace, and stability on the basis of democracy in the region. Turkey has no hidden agenda toward the region. Our goal is working toward the creation of a belt of peace, stability, security, and wealth along its borders. The key word defining Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries is not ‘hegemony,’ but ‘mutual cooperation.’ Therefore such fears are baseless.

CAIRO REVIEW: Do you regret anything about Turkey’s bilateral relations with the former regimes in the region—Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria, for example?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: History is replete with telling examples of regimes failing to survive as they lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their people. For Turkey, it is not the regimes, but the peoples that matter and it is the people that lasts, not the regimes. It is for this very reason that Turkey has consistently chosen to stand by the peoples of the region as they have charted for democracy and freedom, bringing about an Arab Spring.

CAIRO REVIEW: Does Turkey’s experience with strong military involvement in politics and government—for better or worse—contain lessons for Egypt’s transition to democracy—a ‘Turkish model’? Some observers in the West and in Israel have expressed alarm at the success of Islamic parties in Egypt’s elections—the fear of an Islamic state with a militant agenda. Do you share any of that concern?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey and Egypt are two brotherly and friendly nations, which are tied together with deep-rooted and unbreakable bonds of common history, culture, and geography. Egypt has a huge historic and cultural background. It is one of the most important civilizations in the world. It should not be forgotten that during the Ottoman times, the reform process had started in Egypt.

Promoting democratic transformation in our region for years, Turkey welcomes Egypt’s peaceful revolution and fully respects the Egyptian people’s sovereign choice. With the revolution, Egyptian people have embarked upon a historical journey that would bring greater democracy, freedom, stability, and prosperity to its future generations. We believe in Egypt’s democratic vision and we are fully confident in the Egyptian people’s ability to move forward in unity, solidarity, and determination. Democratic transition period in Egypt will have important repercussions for the entire region and Egypt’s democratic success will create an important precedent that will inspire other nations.

The progress achieved in Egypt’s democratic transformation process adds to our optimism on Egypt’s future. Egyptian people celebrated the first anniversary of the 25 January Tahrir revolution. We fully shared your joy and your pride. The conclusion of the elections for the People’s Assembly, and its inauguration on the eve of the revolution’s anniversary, represents a significant phase in this regard.

We do not underestimate the challenges ahead. We are also aware that there still remains a long way to go to complete the transitional period. There will be inevitable ups and downs. The Egyptian people have been long aspiring for a full democratic system and a better living. The process is sensitive and it’s full of difficulties. Demands and expectations are naturally very high and the time, as well as resources, are limited. The delays in realization of people’s aspirations lead to further frustration and resentment. The deadly incidents erupting in moments of high social tension remind us how fragile can be the order in society at these delicate times. In short, coping with the socioeconomic and political challenges on the one hand and advancing the transition in peace and stability on the other, is not a simple task.

Yet, we are fully confident that our Egyptian brothers will continue advancing with the understanding of compromise and dialogue and show utmost care to preserve the spirit of national unity in order to successfully conclude this historic process. We fully believe that thanks to the perseverance, resilience, and arduous efforts of the Egyptian people, Egypt will emerge from this delicate process even stronger and more prosperous than before. As displayed by the visits of President [Abdullah] Gül and Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan in March and September respectively, as well as by my six visits to Egypt last year, Turkey will remain in full solidarity with the Egyptian people in their journey to democracy.

Each and every country has its own unique characteristics shaped by its own unique historical and sociopolitical background. Therefore, as Turkey we do not want to present ourselves, nor to be seen, as a role model. It took years of democratic experimentation for Turkey to arrive at the current stage. Moreover, Turkish democratic experience is not merely about the evolution of civilian-military relations, but of an all-encompassing nature affecting the society across the board. I think, this aspect of the Turkish experience and its ability to prove the compatibility of democracy and secularism with a predominantly Muslim society could constitute an inspiration for the regional countries under transition, including Egypt. If needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own democratic experience with all interested countries.

We are now beyond such outdated prejudices and concerns against political parties with Islamic references. Starting with the free and fair elections in Palestine in 2006, we have always advocated that the democratically elected political entities should be allowed to assume and execute their governmental functions. Only through practice can democracies mature. However, the international community failed to recognize this fact in the Palestinian example and this failure continues to adversely affect the Palestinian body politic, with negative repercussions on the peace process. Therefore, in the context of the Arab Spring in general, and in the Egyptian case in particular, the international community should not repeat the same mistake.

On the other hand, ascendancy to power through democratic elections comes with responsibilities, as well as with authority to rule. These responsibilities include ensuring the rule of law, good governance, accountability, transparency, and upholding of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the protection of women’s rights and rights of the minorities. In the final analysis, in democracies what matters is the free will of the peoples. Of course, full democratization is a long and arduous process that is about institutions, as much as about free and fair elections.

CAIRO REVIEW: How has Turkish foreign policy assessed and dealt with the evolving political crisis in Syria?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: For us, Syria is not just a neighboring country. We have a common history, we share a very long land border and we are destined to live next to each other. Our societies are interwoven through the ties of kinship. This is why we could not remain indifferent to the developments taking place right on the other side of our 910-kilometer-long border.

Determined to extend a helping hand to the people in Syria, we have approached the Syrian leadership even before the outbreak of the current popular movement. We explicitly warned the Syrian leadership that Syria could be the next step of the Arab Spring unless the leadership took on board the very basic demand of its citizens for a life in dignity. We offered to share our experience and expertise in the field of democratization that could inspire the Syrian leadership to take difficult yet necessary steps for accommodating the legitimate demands of the Syrian people.

I have visited Syria sixty-two times in total since I have taken the post of special advisor to the prime minister. Just to remind the Syrian administration about the necessity of reforms, I have visited and met with President [Bashar] Assad three times. We have even presented a road map for reform in Syria in every walk of life. However, promises given to us for reform were not upheld. Despite relentless efforts by the Turkish government, the Syrian leadership chose to confront its own citizens by engaging in a dead-end policy based on the brutal repression of street protests.

The developments in Syria continue to be one of the major concerns of the international community in view of the mounting death toll in the country. The stage that has been reached in Syria poses a threat to the international peace and security. Now that it seems unlikely to see an action by the UN Security Council, the international community should reassess its options according to the new conditions in place.

Being a neighboring country to be first affected by the developments in Syria, Turkey will sustain its efforts in cooperation with regional and international actors in order to end the bloodshed and to pave the ground for a political transformation process in the country. As Turkey, we tried everything first at the bilateral level, then in coordination with the Arab League, and lastly at the UN Security Council in order to resolve the crisis in this country. We now need to work for an international platform on Syria, originating from the region and with broad participation of all related members of the international community. We hope that the Tunis meeting [of the “Friends of Syria” group of nations] on 24 February enabled the international community to send the long-overdue messages to the Syrian regime and to alleviate the sufferings of the Syrian people.

CAIRO REVIEW: How do you estimate President Assad, and his role in the crisis and the solution?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The developments in Syria have gained a tragic dimension due to the uncompromising attitude of the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime has not only disregarded the outcries of its own people, but also lent a deaf ear to international calls for abandoning violence and use of force against protestors. Against this background, President Assad and his close entourage have the primary responsibility for the current crisis, which, unfortunately, ravages the country in front of our eyes. It is again in the hands of President Assad to end the bloodshed and to initiate a peaceful transformation process in the country through full implementation of the Arab League’s initiative and roadmap.

CAIRO REVIEW: What is the most effective way for outsiders—whether it is Turkey, Arab states, or a combination of international action—to address a crisis like the one in Syria?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The most effective way of dealing with the crisis in Syria is the adoption of a unified position by the international community as a whole. It will be only then that the Assad regime will finally comprehend that persisting in its current policies will only lead to more bloodshed and nothing else. Sharing a 910-kilometer-long border with Syria, Turkey will continue to be at the center of the efforts in order to address the crisis in this country. As a regional organization, the Arab League has a pivotal role in steering the efforts of the international community. The recipe for ending the crisis should ideally originate from the region and be implemented with the support of the international community.

CAIRO REVIEW: Does the instability in Syria pose a threat to Turkish security—as a border state with potential refugees fleeing violence, or as a country with a Kurdish region?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The worsening situation in Syria has gained a potential to pose a threat not only to regional but also to international security and stability. In addition to close and deep-rooted historical and cultural ties between the peoples of Turkey and Syria, Turkey shares its longest land border with Syria. It is hard to imagine a neighboring Turkey immune to the likely negative effects of the developments in Syria. All relevant Turkish authorities watch vigilantly the situation on the ground in this country and are ready to take necessary measures against possible sources of instability originating from Syria, including a mass influx of refugees.

CAIRO REVIEW: Would you agree with analysts who speculate that Turkey’s relations with Israel will never return to the high point where they have been in the past? Has Turkish policy toward Israel become ‘emotional’—considering Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ‘walkout’ at Davos, and the anger over the ‘Flotilla incident’?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Certain positive developments in the Middle East peace process also had their reflections on Turkey’s relations with Israel. After the Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Peace Accords, Turkey upgraded its ties with Israel in the early 1990s; over the years, Turkey and Israel established better relations so that this relationship could serve the Middle East peace process. However, Israel’s acts and policies jeopardizing peace and stability in the region have had negative repercussions on our bilateral relations. The Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980, and Israel’s brutal military attacks on the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly the ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in December 2008, were among them.

The Israeli attack against the international humanitarian aid convoy on the high seas on 31 May 2010, which resulted in the killing of nine innocent civilians and the injury of many others from a host of nationalities, inevitably led to the deterioration of our relations. The attack constituted a clear breach of international law. Israel has drawn severe condemnation not only from Turkey, but also from the entire international community.
This brutal attack left an indelible mark in the hearts and minds of the Turkish people. The crime committed by Israel is not a simple offense. Israel has not only violated the international law, but also the right to life, the most fundamental human value, of innocent civilians, once again. Yet, we have acted responsibly and with prudence during the last twenty-one months. Our expectations were both judicious and realistic. Despite this fact, and contrary to the common practice in international relations, Israel failed to meet Turkey’s legitimate demands for a public apology, compensation, and an end to the blockade of Gaza, until now. No country can turn a blind eye to the killing of its citizens by foreign forces on the high seas and the subsequent maltreatment of other passengers.

Turkey’s demands are clear. Israel needs to apologize and pay compensation. The unlawful blockade on Gaza must also be lifted. The Israeli government must make a choice. Israel needs to see that it will only be possible to ensure real security by building a real peace. We hope that Israel would see the big picture and what serves best its own interests. Normalization of our relations will depend on the steps to be taken by Israel.

CAIRO REVIEW: You personally were involved in a significant Turkish initiative to mediate a peace agreement between Israel and Syria—and by some accounts it nearly succeeded. Can you provide us with insights into your mediation mission, and what happened to it? What are the prospects for an Israeli–Palestinian agreement?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is the core issue in the Middle East. Fundamental changes taking place in our region in the recent period have made the need for the settlement of this dispute more important than ever. Turkey supports the two-state solution that would lead to the establishment of an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, to live in peace and security with the state of Israel.

We welcome and support all efforts for the resumption of the negotiations between the two parties. However, meaningful negotiations can take place only on an equal footing. Israelis have been enjoying their statehood since 1948, whereas the Palestinians have been denied such an inherent right for years. The steps taken by Palestinians in order to achieve full international recognition by the UN could remove such a lopsided approach from the agenda for good. It is now high time to address this imbalance. Israel must have a counterpart on an equal footing in every sense. Palestinians must have their recognized state.

Evidently, the primary obstacle in front of the peace efforts remains to be the Israeli government’s continued intransigence on the Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. We are deeply concerned about the ongoing settlement activities of Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Settlements are not only contrary to international law and the Road Map commitments but also endanger the vision of a two-state solution. If the peace process is to be truly revitalized and concluded successfully, Israel should seriously commit itself to respecting the existing final status parameters, particularly on the 1967 borders.

Turkey strongly believes that the Middle East peace process should be advanced in all three tracks, namely the Israeli–Palestinian, Israeli–Syrian, and Israeli–Lebanese tracks. With this understanding, Turkey mediated between Israel and Syria in the past. As both parties were about to launch direct negotiations, the process was disrupted by the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip. We strongly hope that this track as well would be revived as soon as possible once the conditions in the region normalize.

CAIRO REVIEW: You were also involved in the Tehran Declaration—an effort by Turkey and Brazil to mediate a solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. Was it a success or a failure?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: I wouldn’t describe the Tehran Joint Declaration as a matter of success or failure. It was rather a missed opportunity on the part of the international community in achieving a breakthrough in the longstanding diplomatic rift with Iran. The Tehran Joint Declaration proved that a genuine diplomatic engagement with Iran could yield results. If the proposal contained in the Declaration could have been implemented, it could have been the catalyst to a constructive diplomatic process addressing the broader issue of the Iranian nuclear program. In our view, confidence-building measures are still achievable if they are put into the right context. The Tehran Joint Declaration sets a successful example for future efforts.

CAIRO REVIEW: Western countries led by the United States have expressed strong suspicions that Iran is determined to become a nuclear weapon power. What do you think?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The problem is first and foremost that of a confidence crisis. Lack of confidence on the part of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, and the security perceptions of Iran for its own part, create a big psychological barrier between the parties. Overcoming these barriers can only be possible through serious and targeted negotiations that would address the concerns and expectations of both sides.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is Iran on a collision course with the West, with no real diplomatic way out?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Based on previous experiences, Iran might have its own reasons to question the consistency of the principles and standards of its Western counterparts. Yet finding a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is in the interest of all parties. Given the impact of the psychological factor and the crisis of confidence among the parties, however, the process will not be easy. Patient but perseverant diplomacy will be needed to achieve the desired outcome. Only through a gradual process, including exploratory talks on a set of parallel actions aimed at overcoming the present impasse, will it be possible to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement of the outstanding issues.

CAIRO REVIEW: How would Turkey view an Israeli military attack on Iran to disrupt Iran’s nuclear project?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey is against any kind of military strike against Iran. The military option does not represent a solution to the challenges posed by the Iranian nuclear activities. Any military action would, on the contrary, create more problems than it would solve— particularly in terms of its unavoidable negative implications on regional and global peace, security, and stability. Determined efforts toward a peaceful solution through dialogue and cooperation, therefore, do not have any viable alternative. Negotiation remains the only way forward.

CAIRO REVIEW: Turkey was strongly skeptical of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. How do you evaluate the results nearly a decade later, and the impact of the transformation of Iraq on Turkish interests—including the Kurdish issue?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Let me begin by sharing with you the main contours of Turkey’s policy toward Iraq. Turkey wishes to see a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous Iraq at peace with its own people and its neighbors. We have strong cultural and historical links with Iraq and we attach importance to being in close relations with all segments of the Iraqi society.

We all had misgivings about the war in Iraq since we knew that the war would first and foremost affect Turkey as a neighboring country. Turkey suffered from the war and the ensuing instability in Iraq in various ways. Instability and the power vacuum turned northern Iraq into a safe haven for PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] terrorists that use this region as a base to plan and execute attacks against Turkey. Our economic and commercial interests were also seriously hampered. The PKK terrorist organization does not constitute a threat only to the security and stability of Turkey, but also to those of our neighbors including Iraq.

In recent years Turkey has significantly improved its relations with the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Turkish businessmen, contractors, and workers have made crucial contributions to the prosperity and welfare in northern Iraq. Our expectation from Iraq—including the regional authorities in northern Iraq—is to take decisive and result-oriented measures to eradicate the presence and activities of the PKK terrorist organization therein.
The withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq in December 2011 has presented the Iraqi leaders with the opportunity to prove to themselves and to the international community that they can work together to build a stable, democratic, and prosperous Iraq. However, in the wake of the U.S. troop withdrawal, Iraq has been once again plagued by political instability. We are concerned that the ongoing political crisis may lead to the recurrence of sectarian violence in the country. We therefore call on all Iraqi leaders to resolve their difficulties through compromise and negotiations with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the existing political problems.

CAIRO REVIEW: What are Turkey’s interests in Central Asia, and what are the obstacles to improving relations with the nations of this region?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Central Asia lies at the heart of Eurasia with its ample opportunities and challenges. Since gaining their independence in 1991, the countries in the region have taken significant steps in enhancing their sovereignty, consolidating their statehood as well as elevating the level of integration with the world.

Sharing common cultural, historical, and linguistic ties, Turkey is the first country to recognize the independence of these countries. Our primary objectives toward these countries are to support the efforts for a working democracy and free market economy; to promote the political and economic reform process; to advance political and economic stability and prosperity in the region; to contribute to the emergence of an environment conducive to regional cooperation; to support their vocation toward Euro-Atlantic institutions, and to assist them to benefit from their own energy resources. The Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS) was established in 2009 as a new international intergovernmental organization, with the overarching aim of promoting comprehensive cooperation among Turkic-speaking states.

In the last few months, we have witnessed two important developments in the region. First, Kyrgyzstan has made an important progress on the way to parliamentary democracy. It is the first time that a peaceful power handover took place in Central Asia. Turkey will continue to support Kyrgyzstan’s aspirations for building a full-fledged democracy. Second, Kazakhstan is also moving in the right direction toward a multiparty democratic system. We boldly encourage these efforts to yield concrete democratic results. We welcome and support these transformational efforts and developments in the region catering for the needs and aspirations of peoples.

CAIRO REVIEW: After its initial electoral success a decade ago, the AKP government seemed to be on a good track for European Union membership, yet some observers see the process at a standstill now. What happened?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s accession negotiations started in 2005 and continue. Their goal is membership on the basis of the EU’s unanimously taken decisions. Despite some negative tendencies, the EU expresses that it is committed to carry forward the enlargement process which also includes Turkey. The 2011 Enlargement Strategy Document published by the European Commission last October stresses that “Turkey’s contribution to the EU in a number of crucial areas will only be fully effective with an active and credible accession process.”

Except for a number of member states that oppose our accession negotiations for domestic political considerations, EU countries in general state that they support Turkey’s accession process. They are aware of the added value that Turkey would bring to the Union. The Strategy Document that I have mentioned underlines that Turkey is a key country for the security and prosperity of the EU, with its dynamic economy, important regional role, and its contribution to EU’s foreign policy and energy security. As a factor of stability in its region, Turkey’s membership of the EU would not only amplify the global political, economic, and sociocultural power of the Union, but would also contribute to regional and global peace and stability, the dissemination of universal values to a wider geography, and the dialogue among cultures.

Accession to the EU is our strategic goal. I consider EU membership as an integral part of Turkey’s historical efforts for further modernization and transformation. On the other hand, it is true that in spite of our tireless efforts to make further progress in the negotiations, the process is confronted with difficulties as a result of politically motivated obstacles created by some EU members. Nevertheless, we are committed to carry forward this process and our reform agenda, which is now in an irreversible course. By doing so, we aim to provide our people with the highest norms and standards in every field of their daily lives. As a matter of fact, we have already made huge strides to that end in recent years through comprehensive reforms. We will continue reform since it is first and foremost for the good of the Turkish people. The new, progressive, and comprehensive constitution which will be drafted through a broad consultation with all relevant stakeholders will constitute an important step in this respect.

CAIRO REVIEW: What concrete steps do you envision taking to move forward in closing chapters in your accession negotiations with the EU?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Since the beginning of the negotiation process, out of thirty-three chapters, thirteen chapters were opened. These chapters cover different sectors; from agriculture, fisheries, energy, and taxation to science and research, education and culture, and environment. The accession process has never been easy for any country. Unfortunately, we are facing politically motivated obstacles which undermine the technical nature of the negotiations and in fact, are against the principle pacta sunt servanda [agreements must be kept]. Despite the hurdles, Turkey is determined to carry forward the process. Turkey has adopted and started implementing a national program with a comprehensive road map to ensure a society based on high democratic and legal norms. The program foresees a great number of legislative changes in order to harmonize our legislation with the EU’s. All our relevant ministries and institutions continue to work on the negotiation chapters, blocked or not, in line with the National Program, in order to be ready to open and close all chapters as soon as the political blockages are lifted.

CAIRO REVIEW: Has the prospect of a more democratic Middle East caused Turkey to rethink its geopolitical position concerning its future alignment with Europe?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey, a candidate for accession to the EU, is a European, Mediterranean, Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern country all at the same time. All these regions harbor challenges, but also opportunities for their people. Turkey’s proactive, multidimensional, and result-oriented foreign policy aims at contributing to the strengthening of peace, stability, and prosperity in all these regions. This is in our interest. It is also in the interest of the EU. The global international environment is rapidly changing. Transformation is now the key word. The Arab Spring has, and will continue to have, an immense impact on the international system. Political transition reflecting the legitimate aspirations of the people is leading to a future based on free and democratic foundations. During this turbulent period in the Arab world, [given] our geopolitical position, as both a part of this very region and as an EU candidate country, Turkey will continue to strive to foster dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes in the region with solution-oriented approaches, to the benefit of all peoples of the region.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is Turkey serious about resolving the Cyprus problem?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Let me state this very clearly: as Turkey, we want a negotiated and mutually agreed political settlement in Cyprus, and we fully support the efforts of the Turkish Cypriots and the UN secretary-general to this end. The question you should be asking is: are the Greek Cypriots serious about resolving the Cyprus problem? Unfortunately their track record indicates that they are not.

The ongoing comprehensive negotiation process on the island was initiated in 2008 under the auspices of the UN, and within this framework the leaders have met more than 140 times to date. So far, progress in the process has largely been achieved thanks to comprehensive and constructive proposals of the Turkish Cypriots, which were also appreciated by the UN. Most recently, the fifth tripartite meeting of the leaders with the UN secretary-general was held in Greentree, New York, on 23–24 January. The international community had high expectations from these talks. As the Turkish side, we had been hoping that the Greentree meeting would usher in the high-level meeting with the participation of the two sides and the three guarantors, namely Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, which would address all remaining issues that couldn’t be agreed upon by the two sides in order to seal the settlement through a grand bargain. Regrettably, this has not been possible due to the Greek Cypriot side’s stubborn intransigence. In Greentree the Greek Cypriots sidestepped genuine talks in order to avoid a decision for a high-level meeting, and a very important opportunity was missed.

Now, with the approaching Greek Cypriot EU presidency in the second half of 2012, the window of opportunity narrowed considerably. Despite this, the Turkish Cypriot side will continue its determined efforts and we will continue to fully support them. There is still some hope: if the assessment of the process to be provided by the secretary-general’s special adviser Mr. [Alexander] Downer in March is positive, the secretary-general intends to call a high-level meeting in late April or early May. This could finally produce a settlement agreement, enabling the new partnership to be established in Cyprus to assume the EU presidency on 1 July. But these hopes will be meaningless if the Greek Cypriot side does not negotiate sincerely. The Greek Cypriots must first decide whether or not they truly want a partnership and a common future with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots proved back in 2004, in the Annan Plan referenda, that they are on the side of a settlement. It is the Greek Cypriots who must now also display the necessary political will. The secretary-general, in his report in 2004, clearly stated that if the Greek Cypriots remain willing to resolve the Cyprus problem, this needs to be demonstrated.

Without a political solution, the Cyprus issue also harbors a potential risk for trust, stability, and cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The unilateral start of offshore drilling activities by the Greek Cypriot side last September and the developments which ensued after this provocative move have demonstrated the risks which the continuation of the Cyprus issue carries both on a regional and, partly, on a global scale. These unilateral activities of the Greek Cypriot side have also compromised and prejudged the Turkish Cypriots’ inherent and legitimate equal rights over the natural resources of the island. Mr. [Dervis] Eroğlu, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), put forth a constructive proposal for a fair sharing of the island’s natural resources and for using these resources to finance the settlement, but this proposal was returned by the Greek Cypriots without any comment. This crisis clearly demonstrates the necessity for a political settlement in Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey and the TRNC will implement, by 2014, a pipeline project which involves bringing 75 million cubic meters of drinking water to northern Cyprus. This amount can be increased tenfold, and that would be equal to double the water need of the entire island. As Turkey, we would like the whole of the island to benefit from this project. This new water source could, like the hydrocarbon resources, be utilized as an incentive for the successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations with a comprehensive solution. Thus a mutually agreed settlement in Cyprus would enable not only the two sides on the island but also the entire region to benefit from the increase in prosperity made possible through the peaceful use of these new natural resources.

The Turkish side is sincerely committed to the goal of a mutually agreed political settlement in Cyprus. A just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem will not only be in the interests of the two sides on the island but also the EU and all concerned parties including Turkey, as well as contributing to peace, cooperation, and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and the wider region.

CAIRO REVIEW: The Armenia question has also been a problem in Turkey’s foreign relations. Ankara has warned the French president about signing a law criminalizing denial of ‘Armenian genocide’—are you making progress on this issue, or are things actually getting worse?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Two separate appeals were lodged with the French Constitutional Council: to annul on the grounds of unconstitutionality the draft law “to penalize the denial of the genocides recognized by law in France.” The signatories of these appeals are either French deputies or senators. The Constitutional Council of France annulled the draft law on February 28. We consider the annulment as a step in line with freedom of expression and research, the rule of law, and the principles of international law, and against the politicization of history in France. We are glad to note that a grave error was corrected by the most competent judicial authority in France. Turks and Armenians have differing interpretations over the tragic part of their long common history, where all sides suffered. We would like to resolve these differences and diverging interpretations with Armenia through dialogue and based on impartial scholarly studies. Our aim is to reach a just memory. Trying to score points in third countries is not the way to deal with this issue. Third countries should play a constructive role in this process rather than take exclusivist, one-sided positions.

CAIRO REVIEW: How do you see Turkey’s role in NATO going forward?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey is a member of NATO since 1952 and we are celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of this membership this year. The international system has changed since 1952, as well as Turkey and the Alliance, but NATO is still the cornerstone of our defense and security policy. NATO, as a unique forum for Euro–Atlantic security, provides Turkey an opportunity to put forward her views and expectations regarding international security issues and to have a strong impact on transatlantic initiatives. Turkey’s membership of NATO is also an integral part of her global identity. Turkey proceeds to take part in missions and operations on collective defense and crisis management within NATO. Turkey mobilizes its ‘soft power’ by means of using its deep historical ties with populations and countries in the wide geography where NATO acts. In view of the fact that the security and stability of the Euro–Atlantic area and the Middle East are closely linked to each other, Turkey takes the lead in the development of NATO’s relations with the countries in the Middle East through partnership mechanisms like Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). We shall continue to add value to NATO’s outreach in the future. As such, NATO maintains its relevance to respond to the risks and challenges of the new strategic environment.

CAIRO REVIEW: As historical competitors with centuries of rivalry, are Russia and Turkey establishing a fundamentally healthier partnership in the new global order—perhaps through the mutual benefits of natural gas cooperation?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We have intense relations with Russia, which go back over six centuries at a time when both countries were multiethnic empires. St. Petersburg was among the first capitals where the Ottoman Empire sent a resident ambassador. Rivalry between the two neighboring empires transformed into a cooperative nature in the aftermath of the First World War. This cooperation has continued—especially in the economic sphere—even during the Cold War.

Our relations with Russia have evolved and developed rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s. Turkish–Russian relations constitute an integral component of Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy. We maintain a sincere and open dialogue with Russia in order to preserve and strengthen the atmosphere of mutual trust and to further our cooperation to the mutual benefit of both sides.

Economic cooperation constitutes the driving force behind Turkish–Russian relations. Our trade volume reached $26.9 billion as of November 2011 and is on the rise. The leaders of both countries have set the target of a bilateral trade volume of $100 billion by the end of 2015. The volume of Turkish investments in Russia has surpassed $7 billion. Turkish companies are active in a large spectrum of areas, from food to construction to textile sectors. Our construction companies have undertaken 1,191 projects so far, worth $32 billion. The volume of Russian investments in Turkey has also reached $7 billion. We are pleased that our country continued to be the most preferred country by Russian tourists also in 2011. Last year, 3.6 million Russian tourists visited Turkey. The visa exemption agreement entered into force on 17 April 2011. We believe that the implementation of this agreement will contribute to our cooperation in the fields of trade, economy, transportation, and tourism.

Our cooperation in the energy field adds a strategic dimension to our relations. Russia is the biggest natural gas supplier of Turkey through two pipelines. While economic relations are the driving force, high-level dialogue provides for the strategic orientation of our bilateral relations. The High-Level Cooperation Council that we established in May 2010 during the official visit of President [Dmitry] Medvedev to Turkey opened a new chapter in our relations. We held the second meeting during the visit of our prime minister to Russia on 15–17 March 2011 in Moscow. This visit coincided with the ninetieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, which is the basis for our relations in the modern era. We are planning to hold the third meeting of the Council this year.

CAIRO REVIEW: Are you satisfied with Turkish–Russian cooperation in addressing regional challenges, such as the crisis Syria, the Arab uprisings generally, Iran’s nuclear program, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We believe that a stable, market-oriented, democratic, and peaceful Russia will certainly be an asset for regional peace and stability as well as for the European security architecture. We see Russia as one of our important partners and a significant actor regionally and globally. We think that a sincere and open dialogue with Russia would help transform our region in a positive direction. Russia’s contribution to the settlement of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe is necessary. Likewise, it is expected by many that Russia would play a constructive role in the Syria crisis. This was one of our main themes when I visited Russia in January.

CAIRO REVIEW: President Gül has spoken of a ‘golden age’ of relations with Washington. Ties were not so good after the AKP came to office a decade ago? What happened?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey and the U.S. currently enjoy an advanced level of cooperation. President Obama paid his first bilateral overseas visit to Turkey soon after becoming president. However, we do not always pursue identical approaches on international issues. As Turkey has traditionally strong ties with its neighborhood and beyond, sometimes there may be nuances in Turkey’s approach on issues taking place in our region. Turkey’s geography necessitates a multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, we have many issues concerning Turkey and the U.S. Turkey is ready to work with every country that embraces the goals of peace, stability, and economic development. It is not possible to accept the assumption that “ties were not so good after this government came to office a decade ago.” There is always speculation following a change in governments in all countries. Turkey’s decisive journey, encompassing comprehensive democratic and political reforms and brilliant economic performance in the last decade or so, is self-explanatory to dispel such groundless assumptions.

CAIRO REVIEW: Would you describe the relationship between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Obama, which seems to be quite good and important to Turkish–U.S. relations?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The developments in our region and beyond necessitate close consultation and coordination with our allies and partners. It is with this understanding that Prime Minister Erdoğan holds regular consultations with President Obama on international issues of common concern. You may also recall that President Obama recently named Prime Minister Erdoğan as one of five world leaders with whom he enjoys the most effective working relations.

CAIRO REVIEW: How do you evaluate American policy during the Obama administration—with regard to Turkey’s interests, to the Middle East region, and to global security as a whole?

AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey welcomes the U.S. foreign policy, which promotes multilateralism and seeks broader international support within the framework of the UNSC [UN Security Council] for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We believe in the ultimate success of principled foreign policy that is governed by the rule of law and international law. The unfolding set of events in the Middle East and North Africa highlight the indispensable feature of those principles. The calls for democratic, accountable, and sound governments in the region are equally important. I would also like to point out that the legitimate expectations of the people, regardless of wherever they emanate from, should not fall on deaf ears.

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24.9.2011. Turkey wants to revive Ottoman Empire

http://agora-dialogue.com/?p=27379

Posted on September 24, 2011 by Agora, author: Sergei Balmasov, source: Pravda.Ru

A hundred years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is re-emerging on the international arena.

Furthermore, it intends to regain the ground lost in the 19th-20th centuries, which is a direct threat to the interests of all the neighboring countries, including Russia.
 Consider the actions of the Turkish leadership during the past weeks that have caused serious concerns in Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the EU.

Particularly noteworthy are the frictions of Ankara and Tel Aviv, which raise questions about preservation of the Alliance between the two. The Turkish leadership provides a strong support to the Palestinians, and threatened to appeal to the international authorities with a demand to monitor the Israeli nuclear program and promised to prevent the development of Israeli-rich gas fields in the Mediterranean.

Finally, a serious concern in Israel was caused by the fact that on September 7, Turkey announced its intention to sign an important military agreement with Egypt during a corresponding visit of the Turkish government. Of course, this is a historic day in the history of the entire Middle East. Given the sharp rise in anti-Israel sentiment in Turkey and in Egypt, as well as the ongoing processes of evolution of power in several North African countries, the concerns of Israelis about the activity of Ankara on the Egyptian direction are quite understandable.

Worst case scenarios should be considered as one of the options for the future development in the Middle East. One possibility is the return to the days of the 1960s ad 1970s, when Israel was virtually in the siege of hostile neighbors.
However, at this time the situation in Tel Aviv will be much worse, because Ankara can turn from an ally into an enemy more dangerous than all the Arab countries put together.

Some experts call manifestations of military activity in Turkey an additional concern. Turkey threatens Israel to send a new “freedom flotilla” to Gaza under the protection of the Turkish Navy warships, as well as equip the squadron that will be on duty in the Red Sea. If we take into account the fact that Erdogan sent another squadron to the Israeli Mediterranean coast, it seems that the Turks are threatening Israel with a full naval blockade.

It should be remembered that the Israeli-Turkish complications did not occur in 2010. Gradual cooling has been observed since 2008 in parallel with strengthening of foreign policy activity of Turkish Islamists in power. In the last six months the efforts of Erdogan in this area have been more obvious.
However, anti-Israel rhetoric of the Turkish leadership cannot hide his true intentions, which extend far beyond the desire to defy Israel.

First, the emergence of the Turkish Navy in the Red Sea is largely a reaction to the appearance of the Iranian fleet in the area. In addition, Turkey intends to demonstrate a desire to show its power in the region strategically important for the West, where the oil routes from the Persian Gulf run.
Second, attention should be paid to Turkey’s policy in respect of all Arab countries. Turkey openly threatened Syria to send troops to northern Iraq, and participated in the NATO operation against Libya.

As for Egypt, under Murambak Cairo considered Ankara a dangerous competitor in terms of influence on the Middle East and Arab countries.

Of course, they remain competitors today. But then Egypt used to rely on the full support of the West. Now the situation has changed: the revolutionary changes in the country are just beginning, and Islamist sentiment out there is much worse. Turkey would not mind to use the opportunity to try to expand its influence in this country through the development of the economic ties and military-technical cooperation.

Last but not least factor has to do with the events of “Arab spring” that led to the collapse of the former authoritarian regimes. In this regard, Turkey would not mind using the opportunity to, first, divert public attention from the purely Turkish reality and increase its influence in the region.

It is significant how Islamists Erdogan and Gul support Syrian and Egyptian “Muslim Brothers”. This is mostly not an ideological affinity, but the intention to place a bet in the global game. The West supports the Liberals who have no influence on the masses of protesters who sympathize with the radicals like those “brothers.” 
As for Israel itself, its attitude towards Turkey’s behavior is rather unemotional. The Israeli leadership is well aware that strong statements by the Turkish leadership are in fact more focused on winning sympathy among Arabs.

In the discussion about the Israeli-Turkish verbal dispute, it should be emphasized that the actions of Ankara are aimed not so much against the interests of Tel Aviv, but at restoring its influence in the eastern Mediterranean and southern Europe.
The Turkish leadership is doing all it can to show that its activity is directed against Israel, to whose shores a few frigates and corvettes as well as dozens of missile boats and support vessels will soon rush.

However, it is sufficient to consider “a new naval strategy” with a great name “Operation Barbarossa – Aegean shield” adopted a few days earlier, which implies that Israeli ships would be placed between Cyprus and Israel. This will allow the latter to make an equal influence not only on the Tel-Aviv, but also Nicosia and Athens. Anti-Israel rhetoric in this case is more like a camouflage to conceal the true intentions of the South-European direction.

In the past six months, Ankara has been aggressively pursuing its policy towards Cyprus and has been trying to prevent the of oil and gas deposits at its shores going to Greek companies. Moreover, the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagysh openly declared the possibility of using military force to prevent such a scenario.

But there is more to it. Turkey has also announced its plans to increase its Navy presence in the Adriatic Sea. It is known that in the near future a new “assignment” will be given to at least some of the 14 Turkish submarines. This way Ankara intends to strengthen its influence among the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), openly declaring this to the European Union that had its own plans for the future of BiH.

In the middle of the 18th century the Ottoman Empire has steadily weakened and lost its influence in the world on all fronts, starting with the Maghreb and ending with the Balkan and Caucasus. It was evidenced by lost wars with its neighbors, including Russia.
Finally, in the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had the contemptuous name of a “sick man of Europe”. Such a characterization was fully justified considering losses in a war with Russia (1877-1878), clashes with the Balkan states, and loss of its Italian possessions in Libya1912-1913.
The defeat in World War I meant not only the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which had lost virtually all the Arab lands. The existence of Turkey in general as an independent state was at stake.

While in 1922 Kemal managed to beat Greece supported by the Entente, it seemed that the Turks have never recovered from the defeat of 1918. Yet, after 100 years of “gathering strength” Turkey seems to be going back to claim the lost. Inevitably, the Turkish activity will be more manifested in the Caucasian and Crimean directions, which cannot but worry Russia.

 

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13.9.2011. Turkey's PM rallies Arab world in Cairo with call for UN to recognise Palestine

Jack Shenker in Cairo, guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 13 September 2011 17.45 BST

 

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during the opening session of Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo

Turkey's prime minister has called for the Palestinian flag to finally be raised at the United Nations, insisting that international recognition of the state was now an obligation, not an option.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan used a much-anticipated speech to the Arab League in Cairo to rally opposition to Israel, and promised that Turkey would stand in solidarity with those struggling for political change in the Arab world.

"Freedom and democracy and human rights must be a united slogan for the future of our people," Erdogan told an audience of Arab foreign ministers and millions more watching on television across the region. "The legitimate demands of the people cannot be repressed with force and in blood."

The 57-year-old was speaking at the start of a four-day tour of revolutionary north Africa, which analysts believe is designed to strengthen Turkey's influence within the Middle East and isolate their one-time ally Israel. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, who is also in Egypt, has announced that he will be pressing ahead with Palestine's bid for full recognition from the UN security council, despite the fact that it will almost certainly be met by a US veto. The EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, said that the bloc has yet to reach a common position on the question of Palestinian statehood.

Erdogan is currently embroiled in a diplomatic crisis with Israel over the latter's refusal to apologise for the killing of Turkish activists by Israeli soldiers on a Gaza-bound ship last year. In his address he accused the state of acting like a spoiled child and building a blockade around its own people, adding: "Israel will break away from solitude only when it acts as a reasonable, responsible, serious and normal state."

He added: "We must work hand in hand with our Palestinian brothers. The Palestinian cause is the cause of human dignity. It's time to raise the Palestinian flag at the United Nations. Let's raise the Palestinian flag and let that flag be the symbol of peace and justice in the Middle East." The 33-minute speech was interrupted several times by bursts of applause from the assembled Arab dignitaries.

With the fight for democracy continuing to rumble through the Arab world and steadfast allies seemingly melting away, Israel appears to be facing an altered reality in the Middle East – where it could once count both the Egyptian and Turkish governments as close friends. Israeli foreign ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor refused to comment on Erdogan's address, or on earlier claims made by Erdogan that Israel's assault on the Mavi Marmara vessel constituted "grounds for war".

Erdogan's visit to Egypt has been a media circus, with thousands greeting the Turkish leader on his arrival at Cairo airport on Monday night. With his strong rhetoric on Turkish-Arab unity, high-profile satellite TV chatshow appearances and photogenic walkabouts in the capital – including an impromptu and warm meeting with street protesters campaigning for regime change in Syria and Yemen – Erdogan did little to hide his intention of positioning Turkey into a leadership role at the heart of the Arab spring.

"He's a media star, and he's making the Arab leaders look bad by going to their own home and criticising them," said Sultan Al Qassemi, an analyst of Arab affairs. "It feels a tad opportunist – particularly as it's only Israel's refusal to apologise [over the Gaza boat deaths] that has given him the space to do this – but he has the credibility because he's done so well in his own country, and he can talk from a position of strength. The question remains, will he prove to be a shining star, or just a comet that will crash and burn?"

Egyptians are looking to Turkey for political support and economic aid as the country begins to rebuild following the toppling of former president Hosni Mubarak in February. Erdogan arrived in the country accompanied by an army of 200 Turkish businessmen, and has announced plans to increase investment and establish a formal strategic co-operation council between the two nations. With Egypt's military junta on the back foot over recent pro-change protests and the breaching of the Israeli embassy during a protest in Cairo last week, this trip has come at a particularly sensitive time.

"Right now every country is trying to advance its own agenda in Egypt," said Al Qassemi. "Turkey can't match the billions of dollars being ploughed in by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but it can use cheap media events like this to raise Turkey's profile. The Egyptian military won't necessarily appreciate all this, but Turkey is an important ally and so they're letting him get away with it."

Erdogan also opted to make a direct intervention into some of the key internal debates currently raging over Egypt's long-term future – particularly the question of whether a forthcoming new constitution, which will be drawn up after parliamentary elections in November, should enshrine a secular or Islamic state.

"Do not be wary of secularism. I hope there will be a secular state in Egypt," Erdogan told private television channel Dream on Monday. With its combination of a secular constitution, Islamic political leadership, a strong military and relative economic prosperity, Turkey is often cited as a possible model for post-Mubarak Egypt, although the Turkish prime minister was careful not to overstate his country's role in Egyptian affairs.

Erdogan also avoided making any direct criticism of Turkey's southern neighbour Syria, where a popular uprising has been brutally repressed, leaving more than 2,500 dead

 

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8.8.2011. Ερτονγάν versus Κεμαλικό καθεστώς

 

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/192946.html

 

Court of Accounts begins auditing military, a first in Turkish history: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-253051-court-of-accounts-begins-auditing-military-a-first-in-turkish-history.html

 

The End of the Kemalist Affair: http://www.slate.com/id/2300537/

 

Turkey's contested idenity http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-252911-turkeys-contested-identity.html

 

The military gives up: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=252351

 

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-253067-israeli-deputy-pm-turkeys-demand-for-apology-rude.html

 

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17.7.2011. Bill Gates Funds Gulen Islamist Movement

Bill Gates Funds Gulen Islamist Movement

The Fethullah Gulen movement, which seeks to restore the Ottoman Empire, has found a friend and benefactor in Bill Gates of Microsoft fame. Mr. Gates is ranked the third wealthiest person on planet earth.

In 2007, through the Texas High School Project, the Gates Foundation shelled out $10,550,000 to the Cosmos Foundation, a Gulen enterprise that operates 25 publicly funded charter schools in Texas.

The Internal Revenue Service Form 990 for Cosmos shows that the Cosmos Foundation received $41,570,721 from taxpayers.

At present, there are 85 Gulan madrassahs (Islamic schools) in the United States, and all operate with public funding.

At the Gulen schools, students are indoctrinated in Turkish culture, language, and religion so that they may be of service in making Fethullah Gulan’s dream of a universal caliphate a reality. The madrassahs sponsor Turkish clubs, Turkish language societies, Turkish dance groups, and annual trips to Istanbul.

According to Stephen Schwartz of the Center for Islamic Pluralism, the 85 Gulen schools advance and promote Islamic beliefs; present the Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1299 to 1923, as a golden age; and serve to rewrite history by denying the Armenian holocaust under the Turks during World War I.

Many of the teachers at these schools are Turkish émigrés with questionable credentials. Some possess H-1B non immigrant visas which should only be granted to individuals who possess “highly specialized knowledge in a field of human endeavor.” The female faculty members appear in their classrooms wearing hijabs and traditional Islamic attire.

Critics can’t understand why the schools are staffed with imported elementary and secondary school teachers when thousands of trained and certified American educators are begging for teaching positions. But are the schools really subversive?

Rachel Sharon-Krespin writes: “His (Gulen’s) followers target youth in the eighth through twelfth grades, mentor and indoctrinate them in the ışıkevi, educate them in the Fethullah schools, and prepare them for future careers in legal, political, and educational professions in order to create the ruling classes of the future Islamist, Turkish state.”

Even more telling is a comment from Nurettin Veren, Gulen’s right hand man for 35 years, who said: “These schools are like shop windows. Recruitment and Islamization are carried out through nigh classes.

The use of the Islamic practice of taqiyya or deception to mask the true nature of the schools has been upheld by Gulen himself. In a 1999 sermon, the Turkish pasha offered the following advice to his followers:

You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers … until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. If they do something prematurely, the world will crush our heads, and Muslims will suffer everywhere, like in the tragedies in Algeria, like in 1982 [in] Syria … like in the yearly disasters and tragedies in Egypt. The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey … Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all -in confidence … trusting your loyalty and secrecy. I know that when you leave here – [just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here.

Fethullah Gulen has been called the “most dangerous Islamist” in the world. He has amassed a fortune – thanks, in part, to the CIA – of $25 billion. This money has been used to transform the secular government of Turkey into an Islamic Republic under the Justice and Democratic Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma, AKP) – a party under the Gulen’s control.

Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s first Islamist President, is a Gulen disciple along with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, the head of Turkey’s Council of Higher Education. Under the AKP, Turkey has transformed from a secular state into an Islamic country with 85,000 active mosques – one for every 350 citizens – the highest number per capita in the world, 90,000 imams, more imams than teachers and physicians – – and thousands of state-run Islamic schools.

Despite the rhetoric of European Union accession, Turkey has transferred its alliance from Europe and the United States to Russia and Iran. It has moved toward friendship with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria and created a pervasive anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, and anti-America animus throughout the populace.

Gulen has also established thousands of schools throughout central Asia and Europe. Because of their subversive nature, these schools have been outlawed in Russia and Uzbekistan. Even the Netherlands, a nation that embraces pluralism and tolerance, has opted to cut funding to the Gulen schools because of their imminent threat to the social order.

 

http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2011/07/14/gulen-movement-funded-by-bill-gates/

 

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3.7.2011. The man who wants to give Turkey global centre-stage

Erdogan and Davutoglu share a grand vision: a renascent Turkey, expanding to fill a bygone Ottoman imperial space

By James Traub, The New York Times http://www.deccanherald.com/content/131541/man-wants-give-turkey-global.html

Erdogan and Davutoglu share a grand vision: a renascent Turkey, expanding to fill a bygone Ottoman imperial space

  In the fall of 2009, relations between Serbia and Bosnia — never easy since the savage civil war of the 1990s — were slipping toward outright hostility. Western mediation efforts had failed.Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister of Turkey, offered to step in. It was a complicated role for Turkey, not least because Bosnia is, like Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country and Serbia is an Orthodox Christian nation with which Turkey had long been at odds. But Davutoglu had shaped Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy according to a principle he called ‘zero problems toward neighbours’. Neither Serbia nor Bosnia actually shares a border with Turkey. Davutoglu, however, defined his neighbourhood expansively, as the vast space of former Ottoman dominion. He helped negotiate names of acceptable diplomats and the language of a Serbian apology for the atrocities in Srebrenica. Bosnia agreed, finally, to name an ambassador to Serbia. To seal the deal, as Davutoglu tells the tale, he met late one night at the Sarajevo airport with the Bosnian leader Haris Silajdzic. The Bosnian smoked furiously. Davutoglu, a pious Muslim, doesn’t smoke — but he made an exception: “I smoked; he smoked.” Silajdzic accepted the Serbian apology. Crisis averted. Davutoglu calls this diplomatic style “smoking like a Bosnian.”

Davutoglu (pronounced dah-woot-OH-loo) has many stories like this, involving Iraq, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan — and most of them appear to be true. He is an extraordinary figure: brilliant, indefatigable, self-aggrandising, always the hero of his own narratives. In the recent batch of State Department cables disclosed by WikiLeaks, one scholar was quoted as anointing the foreign minister ‘Turkey’s Kissinger’, while in 2004 a secondhand source was quoted as calling him ‘exceptionally dangerous’. But his abilities, and his worldview, matter because of the country whose diplomacy he drives: an Islamic democracy, a developing nation with a booming economy, a member of NATO with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a canny, forward-thinking populist who has drastically altered Turkish politics. Erdogan and Davutoglu share a grand vision: a renascent Turkey, expanding to fill a bygone Ottoman imperial space.

Rising power

In a world that the US no longer dominates as it once did, President Barack Obama has sought to forge strong relations with rising powers like India and Brazil. Turkey, however, is the one rising power that is located in the danger zone of West Asia; it’s no coincidence that Obama chose to include Turkey in his first overseas trip and spoke glowingly of the ‘model partnership’ between the two countries. This fits perfectly with Turkey’s ambition to be a global as well as a regional player.

And yet, despite all the mutual interests, and all of Davutoglu’s energy and innovation, something has gone very wrong over the last year. The Turks, led by Davutoglu, have embarked on diplomatic ventures with Israel and Iran, America’s foremost ally and its greatest adversary in the region, that have left officials and political leaders in Washington fuming. Obama administration officials are no longer sure whose side Turkey is on.

Davutoglu views the idea of ‘taking sides’ as a Cold War relic. “We are not turning our face to East or West,” he said. But it is almost impossible to have zero problems with neighbours if you live in Turkey’s neighbourhood.

Davutoglu, who is 51, hails from Konya, on the Anatolian plateau; though his English is excellent, he often drops definite articles, a sign that he came to the language relatively late. He has a slight mustache from under which a gentle and bemused smile usually pokes out. He is religiously observant; his wife, a doctor, wears a head scarf. Yet he has become surprisingly popular even among Turkey’s secular elite. Turkey is not just another country, after all, but the heir of empires, classical as well as Ottoman, and the first secular republic in the Islamic world. Both in his intellectual work, which argues for the extraordinary status Turkey enjoys by virtue of its history and geographical position, and in his role as foreign minister, Davutoglu is seen as a champion of Turkish greatness.

He was an academic before he was a diplomat. His book ‘Strategic Depth’, published in Turkish in 2001, is regarded as the seminal application of international-relations theory to Turkey, though it is also a work of civilisational history and philosophy. The book was read as a call for Turkey to seize its destiny.

And in many ways, Turkey has. It is one of the great success stories of the world’s emerging powers. Shrugging off the effects of the global recession, the Turkish economy last year grew by more than 8 per cent, and Turkey has become the world’s 17th-largest economy. Turkey is the ‘soft power’ giant of West Asia, exporting pop culture and serious ideas and attracting visitors, including one and a half million Iranians a year, to gape at the Turkish miracle.

Davutoglu has climbed aboard the Turkish rocket. Turkey’s success raises his status; his achievements do the same for his country. Davutoglu has maintained close relations with both Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul — one of the few senior figures to do so. He has filled the upper ranks of the foreign-affairs ministry with worldly, pragmatic, thoughtful diplomats who share his nationalist vision. They have done an extraordinarily deft job of balancing Turkey’s regional and global ambitions, of advancing its interests without setting off alarm bells in other capitals.

Davutoglu began his career as foreign-policy adviser at a moment when Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union had become a national obsession. For Davutoglu, Erdogan and Gul, being in the EU offered Turkey crucial economic benefits but, more important, confirmation of its belonging in the club of the West. The Erdogan government pursued difficult economic and political reforms to advance its candidacy, then fumed as less-qualified but predominantly Christian countries like Cyprus — represented by the government of Greek Cyprus, an avowed foe of Ankara — zoomed past to full membership. Major European countries, above all France and Germany, seem determined to block Turkey’s accession to the EU. This past June, Defence Secretary Robert Gates even suggested that “if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward,” it was the result of having been “pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the sort of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”

The Turks received the European rebuff as a deep insult. And it is true, as Gates suggested, that in the aftermath, Turkey sought to raise its status in the immediate neighbourhood. One of Davutoglu’s greatest diplomatic achievements was the creation of a visa-free zone linking Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, thus reconstituting part of the old Ottoman space. The four countries have agreed to move toward free trade, as well as free passage, among themselves. As part of the zero-problems policy, Turkey moved to resolve longstanding tensions with Cyprus and Armenia and, more successfully, with Greece and Syria. Turkey’s decades of suppression of Kurdish demands for autonomy put it at odds with the new government of Iraqi Kurdistan, which sheltered Kurdish resistance fighters. But the Erdogan government reached out to Kurdistan, America’s strongest ally in the region. Relations with the Bush administration had been rocky since 2003, when Turkey’s parliament voted against permitting US forces to enter Iraq through southeastern Turkey. But by now the US was eager to use Turkey as a force for regional stability. The rapprochement with Kurdistan thus smoothed relations with Washington and made Turkey a major player in Iraqi affairs. Turkish firms gained a dominant position not only in Kurdistan but also, increasingly, throughout Iraq. And Iraqi Kurdish leaders had cracked down on the rebels. It was a diplomatic trifecta.

But Davutoglu’s vision extended far beyond securing the neighbourhood for Turkish commerce. One of his pet theories is that the US needs Turkey as a sensitive instrument in remote places. “The US,” he says, in his declamatory way, “is the only global power in the history of humanity which emerged far away from the mainland of humanity,” which Davutoglu calls Afro-Eurasia. The US has the advantage of security and the disadvantage of ‘discontinuity’, in regard to geography as well as history, because America has no deep historic relationship to West Asia or Asia. In Davutoglu’s terms, the US has no strategic depth; Turkey has much. It has used its web of relations, especially in the Sunni world, to advance American interests in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, where Turkey recently agreed to renew its NATO mandate as the commander of the troop contingent in Kabul.

Turkey’s interests in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and for that matter in Israel, coincided with those of the US and the West. But its run of luck ended in Iran. In September 2009, the Iranians, under pressure from the West to show that they were not seeking to build a nuclear weapon, offered to send 1,200 kilograms of uranium abroad in exchange for an equal amount to be enriched sufficiently for civilian use. Iran didn’t trust any western country to hold its uranium; but it might trust Turkey. Davutoglu sprang into action, flying back and forth to Tehran to work out the details — over which the Iranians, typically, bickered and stalled.

The cables recently disclosed by WikiLeaks vividly illustrate the tensions this produced with Washington. In a meeting with the assistant secretary of state Philip Gordon in Ankara in November 2009, Davutoglu advanced his theory of Turkish exceptionalism: “Only Turkey,” he said, “can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians.” Davutoglu was confident that Iran was ready to strike a deal — with Turkey’s help. An obviously skeptical Gordon ‘pressed’ him on his “assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon.” In what the cable’s author described as ‘a spirited reply’, Davutoglu insisted that Turkey was well aware of the risk. Gordon “pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message” to Iran; Davutoglu replied that they were doing so in private and “emphasised that Turkey’s foreign policy is giving ‘a sense of justice’ and ‘a sense of vision’ to the region.”

A surprise

The Turks had announced their diplomatic coup at precisely the moment the Obama 
administration finally induced Russia and China to vote for tough sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. Davutoglu says he never took a step without informing the Americans, but American officials said that the terms of the deal took them by surprise. 
The Turks mostly hid their hurt feelings. But in early June, the rift with the US played out in public when Turkey and Brazil voted against the sanctions resolution. Turkish officials say the last thing they wanted was to defy the US on a matter of American national security, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran said he would consider the ‘swap deal’ terminated unless Turkey and Brazil voted against the resolution. They were, they insist, voting for continued diplomacy, not for Iran or against the US and the West.

Maybe Turkey was simply protecting its regional interests, which now include not only preserving good relations with Iran but also enhancing its credibility in West Asia — even at the expense of its standing in the West. Maybe, for all Davutoglu’s protestations, Ankara doesn’t view the world the way Washington does or London does. In a meeting earlier this year at the Council on Foreign Relations, Henri Barkey observed that when you talk to Erdogan or Davutoglu about Iran, “the response is almost as if you pressed a button: the problem is not Iran; the problem is Israel; Israel has weapons; Iran doesn’t have weapons.” Or maybe the problem is that you can’t have zero problems with everybody.

For all his profound knowledge of the history of civilisations, Davutoglu misread the depth of feeling in the US about both Israel and Iran, or perhaps overestimated Turkey’s importance. This is the danger of postimperial grandiosity

 

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7.2.2011. 24 λέξεις εξηγούν όσο και ένα εκατομμύριο λέξεις

«Μας λένε, Τουρκία βγες έξω, φύγε.

Και ποιοι είστε εσείς για να λέτε

Τουρκία βγες έξω, φύγε. Έχουμε

μάρτυρες και βετεράνους εκεί.

Έχουμε στρατηγικά συμφέροντα...»

Ταγίπ Ερντογάν 3.2.2011

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3.2.2011. Sibel Utku Bila, Turkey's Egypt call reflects drive for regional power

http://middle-east-online.com/english/?id=44074

Turkey's vocal support for a regime change in Egypt reflects the country's quest for leadership in the Middle East, where it is often lauded as an example that Islam and democracy can co-exist.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Wednesday Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's pledge to stand down in September is not enough and he should go immediately, the NTV news channel reported from Kyrgyzstan.

Earlier, he urged Mubarak "to meet the people's desire for change without hesitation" and warned that "in today's world, freedoms cannot be postponed or overlooked."

He called also for democratic reform across the Middle East, saying: "We have never believed that democracy will produce chaos and radicalism. Only advanced democracy can ensure moderation, tolerance and reconciliation."

Erdogan, whose conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) is rooted in political Islam, is already a hero of the Arab street following frequent outburst against Israel.

His support for Egyptian protesters would certainly raise his popularity among Arabs in what he would likely welcome as a boost to Ankara's drive over the past several years for a greater influence in the Middle East.

 

"The Arab world has failed to produce any 'Muslim democrat' party or its own AKP. Thanks to the AKP, the Arab masses today embrace the Turkish model again," columnist Hadi Uluengin wrote in the mass-selling Hurriyet daily.

Founded as a secular republic in 1923, Turkey became a multi-party democracy in 1946. Even though its record has been marred by military coups and human rights abuses, it has stuck to elections and carried out reforms paving the way for accession talks with the European Union.

Commenting on Egypt's turmoil Wednesday, President Abdullah Gul refused to propose Turkey as a model to the Arabs but stressed he was "proud" of his country's achievements.

"We are aware of our shortcomings and we have been carrying out reforms on our own initiative... Eventually, the Turkish economy has become stronger too," Gul said.

"If our brothers in the region are monitoring this, we will be happy... But to present one's self as a model would be too ambitious," he added.

Last month, the head of Tunisia's main Islamist party, Rached Ghannouchi, argued his movement was democratic and compared it to the AKP as he sought to dispel concerns over his intentions amid the downfall of strongman Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Observers however cautioned that Erdogan's advocacy of democratic reform in the region would lack credibility if he failed to convince his own people of his commitment to pluralism.

"If he manages to rid himself of the intolerance he radiates, he may even become a 'Mandela' in an Islamic world long deprived of democracy and human rights," foreign policy commentator Semih Idiz wrote in the Milliyet daily.

Erdogan has come under mounting fire at home for growing authoritarian amid regular attacks on the media, simmering rows with the judiciary and heavy-handed police clampdowns on street protests.

Many secularists continue to suspect him of having a covert Islamist agenda, pointing most recently at regulations curbing alcohol sales.

Under the AKP, ties with the Arab world have seen a spectacular revival, leading some to suggest that Turkey is pursuing a policy of "Neo-Ottomanism" in a region its Ottoman forebears ruled for centuries.

Ankara has mediated in spats between Arab nations and signed a series of trade pacts and visa-free travel deals with regional countries.

But its drive for regional "soft power" took a major blow in May when ties with one-time ally Israel plunged into a deep crisis when Israeli forces killed nine Turks on a Gaza-bound aid ship.

Turkey's refusal to back fresh UN sanctions against Iran in June stoked concern the AKP is taking NATO's sole Muslim-majority member away from the West. The government strongly denies any policy shift

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11. January 2011, Sibel Edmonds, additional omitted points in CIA-Gulen coverage & note from the insider

 

Crucial Details Missing in the MSM Coverage of the Recent Intel Chief’s Exposé

Last week I wrote about the Washington Post’s incomplete and one-sided coverage of the recently published memoir by former Turkish Intelligence Chief Osman Nuri Gundes exposing CIA Operations via an Islamic Group in Central Asia. Since then I have gone over the same book’s review and coverage by the Turkish mainstream media, and I have interviewed reporters and sources in Turkey who have read the book, followed the coverage, and or are intimately familiar with the topic. With that I now have several additional points on this exposé which further illustrate the journalistically mind-boggling piece marketed by the Post. Writing my previous piece cost me an associate whom I like and respect. It shouldn’t have. I still believe this was a case of institution-Government-editors vs. the journalist, with the former winning. I am not going to weigh my writing, modify my facts, alter the truth, tweak, and censor based on worries of losing a source, or a friend, or even readership. With that said I’ll briefly list my points gathered from documented facts and interviews, and sources familiar with Gundes’ recent book and Gulen.
 
Extensive Coverage in the Turkish Mainstream Media

As one might expect, the Turkish mainstream media (all major newspapers, magazines, radio & TV channels) extensively (and very intensely) covered the recent publication of Gundes’ book. The following are the main points on former Turkish Intel Chief Gundes’ CIA-Gulen allegations which were documented and reported by every single media outlet in Turkey (since mid December), including this one written by one of the most prominent journalists at Milliyet:
 
1-     In Central Asia, within Gulen’s Islamic schools, the CIA operatives worked under the guise of ‘American Teachers teaching English.’

Okay, the Washington Post article, going through the exact same publications/articles forgot to add these crucial details, which would have paved the way for journalistic investigation(s) leading to either confirmation or denial. The following is the only detail the article provided:

In the 1990s, Gundes alleges, the movement “sheltered 130 CIA agents” at its schools in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan alone

In this case, as others had done already, the existence of mysterious American teachers teaching English in Gulen’s schools in Central Asia has already been confirmed.

2-     The American Teachers working at Gulen’s Islamic Schools in Central Asia possessed US Diplomatic Passports.

I contacted my source, formerly with the State Department, and he confirmed issuing diplomatic status for at least 50 Americans to teach in former Soviet republics. When I asked him whether they were employed by the State Department, he said: ‘Not officially.’ I asked him whether they were connected to the CIA, and he responded, ‘I wouldn’t know.’ I inquired about the direct foreign employer(s) of these American teachers, and this was his response: ‘Private Turkish companies in education fields and several NGOs in Turkey.’ This particular source was retired in 2004.

Again, the Washington Post article conveniently omitted this particular detail. Publishing this detail would have required seeking comments from the State Department: “Have you issued diplomatic passports to American teachers in XYZ countries.” Of course, no such inquiry was ever made by the Post.

3-     Gundes provided details of a high-level official meeting attended by MIT officials, one of Gulen’s education foundation directors, the Minister of Turkish Education Ministry Department and other high-level bureaucrats, an official from the Prime Minister’s Office, and several owners of Gulen private schools. The location for this briefing where CIA operative teachers with US Diplomatic passports were discussed was at ‘Ogretmen Evi’ and the host was the Director of Foreign Study Program at the Turkish Education Ministry. The meeting was ‘recorded,’ and an official report was prepared. The report included the following details:

1.    One of the attending Gulen school owners owned and operated 18 schools for Gulen in Uzbekistan. The CIA operation disguised under ‘Teaching English’ at these 18 schools in Uzbekistan consisted of 70 CIA operatives, operating under a project named ‘Friendship Bridge’ (Operation Code Name). The operatives also submitted reports to a certain arm of the Pentagon.

 

2.    The same operation (name not mentioned) had 60 American-CIA operatives as English teachers in Kyrgyzstan; again carrying US Diplomatic Passports.

 

3.    The meeting (briefing) and analyses were later included in an official government report (Turkish Government) on Gulen’s operations which was ‘published.’

 
Again, the Turkish media quotes and covers these detailed allegations. None of these details, and what’s alleged as evidence by Gundes, were covered by the Post. After all, how difficult would it be to follow up and check out these American ‘teachers’ with Diplomatic Passports in the named countries? Make some use of the  Post’s foreign correspondents and partners stationed/anchored  there? No; the  Post would not dare open that can of worms. So what do they do instead: Take out all the details, get lies as quotes from the implicated CIA source, and say, ‘hmmmmm, see, nothing there.’

This is consistent with Gulen’s own media networks’, such as Today’s Zaman’s, no-denial denial operation mode. Remember, these are the same groups who deny Gulen’s 100+ charter school operations in the United States (See here), and this, despite all the documentation and hundreds of witnesses’, including former and present Americans teachers who have worked at these charter schools. Today’s Zaman, one of Gulen’s propaganda machine arms, desperately denies Gunes’ exposé, and in doing so in such desperation, it ends up with a jumble of no-denial denial (see here).

Another point worth mentioning: You’d think with all the court documents and previous reports on FBI-DOJ and the Homeland Security Department vehemently opposing Gulen’s residency request in court(s), the Washington Post would contact their plentiful DOJ-FBI-DHS sources and ask for statements; right? Well, they didn’t. In the Gulen court case we had the CIA pushing big time for Gulen’s residency request, and DOJ-FBI-DHS opposing it. Why? Why did the FBI-DOJ-DHS oppose Gulen in court? I’d say this much-First Hand information, in this case: Based on FBI-DHS joint investigations of Gulen (White Collar Crime) and the involved files, they had plenty of reasons to oppose.

Finally, as a side note, the Post, at least Mr. Stein, was very familiar with my statements regarding Gulen-CIA-Central Asia operations; including the interview I gave to the American Conservative Magazine’s Phil Giraldi. Had Mr. Stein bothered to contact me he would have gotten what the Washington Post wished not to get.

I am going to end this post with a short piece provided to our BFP readers in the US by one of my sources in Turkey who has gone through Gunes’ book, and is a journalist with inside information and unique access to those closely involved in Gulen related investigations-operations:

Fethullah Gülen & the Origin of the Turkish Deep State

By ‘The Insider from Turkey’

Those who think the Turkish/Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen was introduced to the CIA after he had left Turkey and established himself in Pennsylvania are missing the point. Same with those who are under the impression that the Gülen movement is primarily of a religious nature.

The first contacts of Gülen with the CIA go back to way before, we learn from the recently published book The witness of takeovers and anarchy by Osman Nuri Gündes, a former operative of the Turkish intelligence outfit MIT. In the eighties Gülen associated himself with fierce anticommunist circles in Turkey supported by the joint CIA and the secretive stay behind network, Gladio. We are talking about the same Gladio which was responsible for a series of far right terrorist attacks in Turkey and who composed the overture of the bloody 1980 takeover.

According to Osman Nuri Gündes, Gülen began his own anticommunist organization in the city of Erzurum. He also mentions Gülen with respect to Radio Free Europe, a CIA propaganda project against the Soviet-Union where previous CIA station chief Paul Henze was working as well. Henze has been described as one of the dark forces behind the takeover in 1980. Gülen’s main contact in the CIA however, was Morton Abramowitz, who was stationed in Turkey as a CIA employee before he came there as US ambassador. As mentioned previously on this website, Abramowitz later came to defend Gülen when he ended up having trouble with the US immigration service. 

So, once upon a time Gülen was very close to structures in Turkey of which the remnants can still be recognized in Ergenekon, the network that targeted not only Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AK-party government, but also the Gülen-movement. This is due to the fact that the previous anticommunist network in Turkey turned away from the CIA in post-Cold War days, while Gülen and his supporters in the Turkish government remained loyal to it.

 

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20.1.2011. JAMES TRAUB Turkey’s Rules The New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/

In the fall of 2009, relations between Serbia and Bosnia — never easy since the savage civil war of the 1990s — were slipping toward outright hostility. Western mediation efforts had failed. Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister of Turkey, offered to step in. It was a complicated role for Turkey, not least because Bosnia is, like Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country and Serbia is an Orthodox Christian nation with which Turkey had long been at odds. But Davutoglu had shaped Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy according to a principle he called “zero problems toward neighbors.” Neither Serbia nor Bosnia actually shares a border with Turkey. Davutoglu, however, defined his neighborhood expansively, as the vast space of former Ottoman dominion. “In six months,” Davutoglu told me in one of a series of conversations this past fall, “I visited Belgrade five times, Sarajevo maybe seven times.” He helped negotiate names of acceptable diplomats and the language of a Serbian apology for the atrocities in Srebrenica. Bosnia agreed, finally, to name an ambassador to Serbia. To seal the deal, as Davutoglu tells the tale, he met late one night at the Sarajevo airport with the Bosnian leader Haris Silajdzic. The Bosnian smoked furiously. Davutoglu, a pious Muslim, doesn’t smoke — but he made an exception: “I smoked; he smoked.” Silajdzic accepted the Serbian apology. Crisis averted. Davutoglu calls this diplomatic style “smoking like a Bosnian.”

Davutoglu (pronounced dah-woot-OH-loo) has many stories like this, involving Iraq, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan — and most of them appear to be true. (A State Department official confirmed the outlines of the Balkan narrative.) He is an extraordinary figure: brilliant, indefatigable, self-aggrandizing, always the hero of his own narratives. In the recent batch of State Department cables disclosed by WikiLeaks, one scholar was quoted as anointing the foreign minister “Turkey’s Kissinger,” while in 2004 a secondhand source was quoted as calling him “exceptionally dangerous.” But his abilities, and his worldview, matter because of the country whose diplomacy he drives: an Islamic democracy, a developing nation with a booming economy, a member of NATO with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a canny, forward-thinking populist who has drastically altered Turkish politics. Erdogan and Davutoglu share a grand vision: a renascent Turkey, expanding to fill a bygone Ottoman imperial space.

In a world that the U.S. no longer dominates as it once did, President Barack Obama has sought to forge strong relations with rising powers like India and Brazil. Turkey, however, is the one rising power that is located in the danger zone of the Middle East; it’s no coincidence that Obama chose to include Turkey in his first overseas trip and spoke glowingly of the “model partnership” between the two countries. This fits perfectly with Turkey’s ambition to be a global as well as a regional player.

And yet, despite all the mutual interests, and all of Davutoglu’s energy and innovation, something has gone very wrong over the last year. The Turks, led by Davutoglu, have embarked on diplomatic ventures with Israel and Iran, America’s foremost ally and its greatest adversary in the region, that have left officials and political leaders in Washington fuming. Obama administration officials are no longer sure whose side Turkey is on.

Davutoglu views the idea of “taking sides” as a Cold War relic. “We are not turning our face to East or West,” he told me. But it is almost impossible to have zero problems with neighbors if you live in Turkey’s neighborhood.

Istanbul is full of elegant and cosmopolitan intellectuals, few of whom had heard of Ahmet Davutoglu when he was named foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister in 2002. “Outside of Islamic circles,” says Cengiz Candar, a columnist for the daily Radikal, “he was not much known at all.” The victory of the moderate Islamist AK party in the 2002 parliamentary elections was a seismic event in Turkey, culturally as well as politically. Turkey had been an aggressively secular republic since its establishment in 1923; Turkey’s Westernized intellectuals, living in the coastal cities, especially Istanbul, looked upon the Islamists as bumpkins from the Anatolian hinterland. “These people came out of nowhere,” as Candar puts it.

Davutoglu, who is 51, hails from Konya, on the Anatolian plateau; though his English is excellent, he often drops definite articles, a sign that he came to the language relatively late. He has a slight mustache from under which a gentle and bemused smile usually pokes out. He is religiously observant; his wife, a doctor, wears a head scarf. Yet he has become surprisingly popular even among Turkey’s secular elite. “Deep in the Turkish psyche,” Candar says, “there is a feeling of pride and grandeur.” Turkey is not just another country, after all, but the heir of empires, classical as well as Ottoman, and the first secular republic in the Islamic world. Both in his intellectual work, which argues for the extraordinary status Turkey enjoys by virtue of its history and geographical position, and in his role as foreign minister, Davutoglu is seen as a champion of Turkish greatness.

He was an academic before he was a diplomat. His book “Strategic Depth,” published in Turkish in 2001, is regarded as the seminal application of international-relations theory to Turkey, though it is also a work of civilizational history and philosophy. (Such is Davutoglu’s intellectual ambition that he planned to follow up with “Philosophical Depth,” “Cultural Depth” and “Historical Depth.” He hasn’t yet gotten around to the others.) The book has gone through 41 printings in Turkish and has been translated into Greek, Albanian and now Arabic. It is 600 pages long, very dense and almost certainly more known than read. One of Davutoglu’s aides describes the book as “mesmerizing.” (Henri Barkey, a Turkey scholar at Lehigh University, pronounces the work “mumbo jumbo,” adding that Davutoglu “thinks of himself as God.”) “Strategic Depth” weaves elaborate connections between Turkey’s past and present, and among its relations in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and elsewhere. The book was read as a call for Turkey to seize its destiny.

And in many ways, Turkey has. It is one of the great success stories of the world’s emerging powers. Shrugging off the effects of the global recession, the Turkish economy last year grew by more than 8 percent, and Turkey has become the world’s 17th-largest economy. Turkey is the “soft power” giant of the Middle East, exporting pop culture and serious ideas and attracting visitors, including one and a half million Iranians a year, to gape at the Turkish miracle. Paul Salem, a Lebanon-based Middle East scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, recently suggested, “It might be Turkey’s century, because it’s the only country in the Middle East actually pointing toward the future.” You increasingly hear the view that power in the Middle East is shifting away from Arab states and toward the two non-Arab powers, Turkey and Iran. Indeed, in “Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future,” Stephen Kinzer, a former New York Times reporter, describes Turkey, Iran and the U.S. as “the tantalizing ‘power triangle’ of the 21st century,” destined to replace the Cold War triangle of the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Davutoglu has climbed aboard the Turkish rocket. Turkey’s success raises his status; his achievements do the same for his country. Foreign Policy magazine ranked him No. 7 in its recent list of “100 Global Thinkers,” writing that under his leadership, “Turkey has assumed an international role not matched since a sultan sat in Istanbul’s Topkapi Palace.” Davutoglu has maintained close relations with both Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul — one of the few senior figures to do so. He has filled the upper ranks of the foreign-affairs ministry with worldly, pragmatic, thoughtful diplomats who share his nationalist vision. They have done an extraordinarily deft job of balancing Turkey’s regional and global ambitions, of advancing its interests without setting off alarm bells in other capitals.

Sometimes, it’s true, Davutoglu sees his role as more important than it actually is. He told me a wonderful anecdote about bringing Iraq’s Sunni factions together in Baghdad in the fall of 2005, letting them yell at one another for weeks and finally shaming them into joining together by reminding them of the glories of medieval Baghdad and, by implication, of Iraq itself. In this version, a thrilled Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to Iraq, rushes to Istanbul to bless the union. Actually, says a former U.S. official very familiar with the event, it wasn’t a breakthrough at all. In fact, the official says, when President Gul called Khalilzad to implore him to come, the American diplomat asked, “Why do we need to go all the way to Istanbul to talk to the same people we talk to all the time?” However, “as a favor to Gul, he said, ‘Sure.’ ”

In Davutoglu’s own endlessly unwinding narratives, he is always speaking like a Baghdadi and smoking like a Bosnian and untying all Gordian knots. Every once in a while during our conversations, Davutoglu would raise a finger and say, “This you can quote.” This meant that he was about to say something really dazzling. On the other hand, he is pretty dazzling, leaping nimbly from Mesopotamia to Alexander the Great to the Ottoman viziers to today’s consumerism, drawing unlikely parallels and surprising lessons.

Davutoglu began his career as foreign-policy adviser at a moment when Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union had become a national obsession. For Davutoglu, Erdogan and Gul, being in the E.U. offered Turkey crucial economic benefits but, more important, confirmation of its belonging in the club of the West. The Erdogan government pursued difficult economic and political reforms to advance its candidacy, then fumed as less-qualified but predominantly Christian countries like Cyprus — represented by the government of Greek Cyprus, an avowed foe of Ankara — zoomed past to full membership. Major European countries, above all France and Germany, seem determined to block Turkey’s accession to the E.U. This past June, Defense Secretary Robert Gates even suggested that “if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving Eastward,” it was the result of having been “pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the sort of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”

This is a very common refrain, which Davutoglu is at pains to refute. On a flight to Ankara from Brussels, where he had just attended a NATO meeting, Davutoglu pushed away his half-eaten dinner and recited to me what he told his fellow foreign ministers: “If today there is an E.U., that emerged under the security umbrella of NATO. And who contributed most during those Cold War years? Turkey. Therefore when someone says, ‘Who lost Turkey?’ — there was such a question, because people said Turkey was turning to the East — this is an insult to Turkey. Why? Because it means he does not see Turkey as part of ‘we.’ It means Turkey is object, not subject. We don’t want to be on the agenda of international community as one item of crisis. We want to be in the international community to solve the crisis.”

To be part of the global “we” — this was the very definition of Erdogan’s, and Davutoglu’s, ambitions. This is why the Turks received the European rebuff as such a deep insult. And it is true, as Gates suggested, that in the aftermath, Turkey sought to raise its status in the immediate neighborhood. One of Davutoglu’s greatest diplomatic achievements was the creation of a visa-free zone linking Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, thus reconstituting part of the old Ottoman space. The four countries have agreed to move toward free trade, as well as free passage, among themselves. As part of the zero-problems policy, Turkey moved to resolve longstanding tensions with Cyprus and Armenia and, more successfully, with Greece and Syria. Turkey’s decades of suppression of Kurdish demands for autonomy put it at odds with the new government of Iraqi Kurdistan, which sheltered Kurdish resistance fighters. But the Erdo­gan government reached out to Kurdistan, America’s strongest ally in the region. Relations with the Bush administration had been rocky since 2003, when Turkey’s Parliament voted against permitting U.S. forces to enter Iraq through southeastern Turkey. But by now the U.S. was eager to use Turkey as a force for regional stability. The rapprochement with Kurdistan thus smoothed relations with Washington and made Turkey a major player in Iraqi affairs. Turkish firms gained a dominant position not only in Kurdistan but also, increasingly, throughout Iraq. And Iraqi Kurdish leaders had cracked down on the rebels. It was a diplomatic trifecta.

But Davutoglu’s vision extended far beyond securing the neighborhood for Turkish commerce. One of his pet theories is that the United States needs Turkey as a sensitive instrument in remote places. “The United States,” he says, in his declamatory way, “is the only global power in the history of humanity which emerged far away from the mainland of humanity,” which Davutoglu calls Afro-Eurasia. The United States has the advantage of security and the disadvantage of “discontinuity,” in regard to geography as well as history, because America has no deep historic relationship to the Middle East or Asia. In Davutoglu’s terms, the U.S. has no strategic depth; Turkey has much. “A global power like this, a regional power like that have an excellent partnership,” Davutoglu concludes with a flourish. Turkey has used its web of relations, especially in the Sunni world, to advance American interests in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, where Turkey recently agreed to renew its NATO mandate as the commander of the troop contingent in Kabul.

In 2007, Turkey put itself forward as a Middle East peacemaker. Ottoman Turkey was a safe harbor for Jews when much of Europe was aflame with anti-Semitism. And Republican, secular Turkey was Israel’s most dependable ally in the Middle East. Many Turkish Islamists despise Israel, but Erdogan and the AK adopted a more diplomatic line. Erdogan visited Israel in 2004, and in 2007 Turkey invited Israel’s president, Shimon Peres, to address Parliament — a rare honor. Turkish leaders then sought to broker talks between Syria and Israel over the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. At the time, the Bush administration had cut off relations with Syria, which it viewed as a proxy for Iran; but Israel was eager for an interlocutor with Damascus. The role of go-between “was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor,” Davutoglu wrote in an essay in Foreign Policy. Turkey assigned the task to itself under a principle he called “proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy.” This is what it means to be part of “we.”

Davutoglu says he shuttled between the capitals 20 times in 2007, and in 2008 he brought both sides to Istanbul for five rounds of talks in separate hotels. He carried messages back and forth between the two. Israel needed to be convinced that Syria was prepared to stop sponsoring Hezbollah and to distance itself from Iran. Syria demanded that Israel clarify the territory from which it was prepared to withdraw. By late December, Davutoglu and his aides say, only disagreement over a word or two prevented the two sides from moving to direct talks. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel held a five-hour dinner at Erdogan’s home, in the course of which both men spoke to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Davutoglu had reserved a hotel room for the direct talks. An Israeli official close to the negotiations confirmed this account, saying that Davutoglu “played a very important role, a very professional role” and agreeing that face-to-face talks seemed to be in the offing. Olmert himself was quoted earlier this year as calling Erdogan “a fair mediator” and as saying, “We need negotiations with Turkish mediation.”

But it was all what might have been, for only a few days after the meeting, Israel launched its Cast Lead invasion of Gaza, inflaming the Arab world and humiliating and infuriating Erdogan. The talks collapsed. The Israeli official says, “We told the Turks that we will have to respond” to the hail of missiles coming from Gaza; Israel had not deceived the Turks, because Israel’s cabinet authorized the invasion days after the Olmert-Erdogan dinner. That’s not how Turkey saw the sequence of events. It was, Davutoglu says solemnly, “an insult to Turkey.” Certainly the Turkish public felt it as one, and Erdogan, a shrewd judge of public opinion, understood that very well. Turkey is a democracy, after all; and the public reaction to Gaza, on top of the rebuff from the European Union — and perhaps also the inherent logic of the “zero problems” policy — sent the country in a new direction.

Turkey’s interests in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and for that matter in Israel, coincided with those of the United States and the West. But its run of luck ended in Iran. In September 2009, the Iranians, under pressure from the West to show that they were not seeking to build a nuclear weapon, offered to send 1,200 kilograms of uranium abroad in exchange for an equal amount to be enriched sufficiently for civilian use. Iran didn’t trust any Western country to hold its uranium; but it might trust Turkey. Davutoglu sprang into action, flying back and forth to Tehran to work out the details — over which the Iranians, typically, bickered and stalled.

The cables recently disclosed by WikiLeaks vividly illustrate the tensions this produced with Washington. In a meeting with the assistant secretary of state Philip Gordon in Ankara in November 2009, Davutoglu advanced his theory of Turkish exceptionalism: “Only Turkey,” he said, “can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians.” Davutoglu was confident that Iran was ready to strike a deal — with Turkey’s help. An obviously skeptical Gordon “pressed” him on his “assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon.” In what the cable’s author described as “a spirited reply,” Davutoglu insisted that Turkey was well aware of the risk. Gordon “pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message” to Iran; Davutoglu replied that they were doing so in private and “emphasized that Turkey’s foreign policy is giving ‘a sense of justice’ and ‘a sense of vision’ to the region.”

Behind this tense exchange with Gordon was the fear that Turkey was cutting Iran too much slack. Davutoglu is quite open about the fact that Turkey has interests in Iran that the United States and Europe do not have. “Our economy is growing,” Davutoglu told me, “and Iran is the only land corridor for us to reach Asia. Iran is the second source of energy for Turkey.” Sanctions on Iran would hurt Turkey. But Davutoglu also insists that Turkey’s assessment of Iran’s intentions is not affected by its interests. It’s easy to see why Gordon was skeptical. Prime Minister Erdogan has dismissed fears that Iran wants to build a bomb as “gossip.” And when I asked one of Davutoglu’s senior aides about the matter, he said: “For the time being, Iran does not have a nuclear-weapons program. We don’t know whether they will go there.”

At President Obama’s nuclear summit meeting last April, Erdogan and the president of Brazil, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, proposed to Obama that they work jointly to persuade Iran to surrender the uranium — a striking example of the rising confidence of the emerging powers. Administration officials made it very clear that they feared Iran would try to hoodwink Turkey and Brazil. Davutoglu nonetheless resumed his manic routine — State Department officials call him the Energizer Bunny — flying back and forth to Tehran well into May, pushing the Iranians to make concessions. In his seventh and final session, he worked at it for 18 hours before reaching a deal. Davutoglu was so excited that he called Turkish reporters from the plane to invite them to a briefing upon his arrival. But by the time the journalists returned to their offices to write the story, they got word that the United States had rejected the deal.

The Turks had announced their diplomatic coup at precisely the moment the Obama administration finally induced Russia and China to vote for tough sanctions on Iran in the Security Council. Davutoglu says he never took a step without informing the Americans, but American officials said that the terms of the deal took them by surprise. The Turks mostly hid their hurt feelings. But in early June, the rift with the U.S. played out in public when Turkey and Brazil voted against the sanctions resolution. Turkish officials say the last thing they wanted was to defy the U.S. on a matter of American national security, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran said he would consider the “swap deal” terminated unless Turkey and Brazil voted against the resolution. They were, they insist, voting for continued diplomacy, not for Iran or against the United States and the West.

Maybe Turkey was simply protecting its regional interests, which now include not only preserving good relations with Iran but also enhancing its credibility in the Middle East — even at the expense of its standing in the West. Maybe, for all Davutoglu’s protestations, Ankara doesn’t view the world the way Washington does or London does. In a meeting earlier this year at the Council on Foreign Relations, Henri Barkey observed that when you talk to Erdogan or Davutoglu about Iran, “the response is almost as if you pressed a button: the problem is not Iran; the problem is Israel; Israel has weapons; Iran doesn’t have weapons.” Or maybe the problem is that you can’t have zero problems with everybody.

Iran, unfortunately, was only the half of it. The other half was Israel. Three weeks after the Gaza war, Erdogan angrily stalked out of a public session with Shimon Peres at Davos, Switzerland. Israel responded with equal pettiness, staging a humiliation of Turkey’s ambassador to Israel. Erdogan, long a champion of Hamas, became more vocal in his support for a group Israel viewed as a threat to its very existence. In the spring of 2010, a Turkish charitable organization, I.H.H., chartered the flotilla designed to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Davutoglu says that he tried to persuade the group not to sail and then asked the organizer of the flotilla to turn aside if Israel stopped the ships, as it was certain to do, and to offload the cargo at a port outside Gaza if necessary. In late May, the day before the flotilla set sail, a senior Turkish official called the Israelis to alert them to the ships’ embarking and to say, “Please don’t engage in violence.”

Of course, it didn’t work out that way. The flotilla refused Israel’s demands to alter course, and a helicopter-borne commando assault on the Mavi Marmara, the lead ship, turned deadly, with eight Turkish citizens and one American killed. The Gaza war had embittered Turkish public opinion; now angry crowds gathered across the country, denouncing Israel and chanting Islamic slogans. Erdogan railed against Israel and stoutly defended Hamas, denying that it was a terrorist organization. He described Israel, with which he had been earnestly negotiating a year earlier, as “a festering boil in the Middle East that spreads hate and enmity.” Turkey demanded an apology. Israel, which viewed the flotilla as a provocation abetted, and perhaps orchestrated, by Ankara, refused. Davutoglu was almost as inflammatory as his prime minister. In a statement to the Security Council the day after the assault, he said, “This is a black day in the history of humanity, where the distance between terrorists and states has been blurred.”

Turkey seemed to have made a choice among its conflicting ambitions. Steven Cook, a Middle East scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote, “Erdogan and his party believe they benefit domestically from the position Turkey has staked out in the Middle East,” and thus “the demands of domestic Turkish politics now trump the need to maintain good relations with the United States.” Turkey may be turning in a new direction, in other words, not so much because it has been rejected by the West as because it is being so ardently embraced by the East.

The net effect of Turkey’s vehement reaction to the flotilla, which by an unfortunate quirk of timing came two weeks after the nuclear deal with Iran and a week before the sanctions vote, was to wreck whatever remained of its relations with Israel and to seriously harm its standing in the U.S. “The hyperbolic and provocative rhetoric” in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident, says a senior administration official, “has interfered with what has been a historic and hugely important, positive Turkish-Israeli relationship.” And it has done real damage in the court of public opinion, where Turkey looks like the enemy of the United States’ best friend in the Middle East as well as the friend of its worst enemy. After the Mavi Marmara incident, Thomas L. Friedman asserted in The Times, perhaps hyperbolically, that Turkey had joined “the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel.”

Tempers have cooled in recent months. U.S. officials have tried to encourage a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Last June, Israel’s trade minister, Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, invited Davutoglu to speak with him quietly in Brussels. But the contents of the conversation were leaked almost immediately in Israel, presumably by hardliners opposed to any easing of tensions. Relations with Washington remain fraught. “There’s so much we want to do together,” as the official cited above puts it, “but it’s harder for us to do that if the American and Congressional perspective on Turkey is a negative one” — which right now, he added, it is.

A few months before he became Turkey’s foreign minister, Davutoglu visited Washington to meet with the incoming Obama team. He was dazzled. George W. Bush, he thought, had been America’s Caesar; Obama would be its Marcus Aurelius, its philosopher-king. “There will be a golden age in Turkish-American relations,” he predicted. It hasn’t worked out that way, and Davutoglu can barely process a setback so at odds with his grand intellectual and policy construct. He says that he was “shocked” when the U.S. opposed a United Nations Human Rights Council resolution calling for an investigation of “the outrageous attack by the Israeli forces against the humanitarian flotilla.” (The administration said such a commission seemed to be rushing to judgment, and it endorsed instead a panel convened by the U.N. secretary-general.) But the professionals Davutoglu has surrounded himself with are not deluding themselves about their plight. “We’re getting a lot of flak from the Hill,” says Selim Yenel, the official in the foreign ministry responsible for relations with Washington. “We used to get hit by the Greek lobby and the Armenian lobby, but we were protected by the Jewish lobby. Now the Jewish lobby is coming after us as well.”

The truth is that for all his profound knowledge of the history of civilizations, Davutoglu misread the depth of feeling in the U.S. about both Israel and Iran, or perhaps overestimated Turkey’s importance. This is the danger of postimperial grandiosity. “They talk as if they expect a merger between Turkey and the E.U.,” says Hugh Pope, head of the Turkish office of the International Crisis Group. “They think they’re more important than Israel.”

Perhaps the setback is just a blip, a brief reversal in the upward path of one of the world’s rising powers. On the flight home from Brussels, where he conferred privately with Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and met with his European counterparts, Davutoglu was in an ebullient mood. He feels the wind of history filling his sails. Turkey, the crossroads of civilizations, the land where East and West, North and South, converge, is pointing the way to the world’s future. “Turkey is the litmus test of globalization,” he told me. “Success for Turkey will mean the success of globalization.” The world, as Davutoglu likes to say, expects great things from Turkey.

James Traub is a contributing writer for the magazine. His most recent article was about the New York Yankees pitcher Mariano Rivera.

 

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17.1.2011.Νεο-Οθωμανισμός και τα μαύρα ελληνικά μεσάνυκτα.

Παραθέτω πιο κάτω σελίδα από τον δικτυακό τόπο του GMF, γνωστού "ιδρύματος" προτάσεων πολιτικής και περιφερειακών αναλύσεων. Απλή επίσκεψη σε μερικές δραστηριότητες που ανάπτυσσε η Τουρκία την δεκαετία του 2000 κάνουν σαφές την μεθοδικότητα της τουρκικής διπλωματίας αλλά και τα μαύρα δικά μας μεσάνυκτα καθότι το ημέτερο "ευαγές ίδρυμα" μας ξεκούφανε (όχι εμένα πάντως) με αερεολογίες περί τουρκικής ευρωπαϊκής πορείας στο τέρμα της οποίας κείται ένα ωραίο και γαλήνιο λιμάνι ελληνοτουρκικής συνύπαρξης (γιατί όχι και ένταξης, υπονοούσαν κάποιοι, για να αποκαλυφτούν στο τέλος υποστηρίζοντας ευθέως ή εμμέσως τον νεο-Οθωμανισμό. 

 

\Turkey Program

http://www.gmfus.org/program_related_events?program.id=41

Related Issues: Democracy & Civil Society / Security & Defense

Related Regions: Mediterranean

 

International Seminar on "The New International Role of Turkey" September 27, 2010 / Paris

 

International Seminar on Mediterranean and Transatlantic Cooperation June 21, 2010 / Paris, France

 

GMF Berlin Hosts Independent Commission on Turkey January 28, 2010 / Berlin, Germany

 

Erdogan: U.S. and Turkey should strive for "model" partnership December 8, 2009 / Washington, DC

 

Report from GMF's new Trilateral Strategy Group tackles economic crisis June 4, 2009 / Istanbul, Turkey

 

The new U.S. administration and the implications for the Turkish-American relationship February 19, 2009 / Ankara, Turkey

 

Turkey's image, European public debate and the future of enlargement February 13, 2009 / Ankara, Turkey

 

U.S.-Turkish relations at a time of internal and external crises: Will Obama make a difference? January 11, 2009 / Istanbul & Ankara, Turkey

 

Volker: "Important to have vision," when addressing Mediterranean policy November 15, 2007 / Washington, DC

 

Perceptions and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations November 6, 2007 / Washington, DC

 

Turkish presidency a battle between Kantians and Hobbesians May 14, 2007 / Washington, DC

 

Turkey as a Security Guard in the Middle East and Black Sea Region May 3, 2007 / Berlin, Germany

 

Turkey: Areas of Freedom, Security, and Justice March 19, 2007 / Istanbul, Turkey

 

Turkish Foreign Minister Gul: Turkey's 'silent revolution' not finished February 8, 2007 / Washington, DC

 

GMF Brussels facilitates debate on Turkey's relations with the West November 13, 2006 / Brusssels

 

GMF Ankara hosts workshop on Turkish-U.S. Relations November 9, 2006 / Ankara

 

Former U.S. Ambassador speaks on Turkish issues June 7, 2006 / Istanbul

 

Alan Makovsky discusses U.S.-Turkish Relations May 31, 2006 / Ankara

 

Turkish analysts tour transatlantic capitals May 14, 2006 / Washington, DC and Brussels

 

Wexler: Turkey critical to success with Iran April 10, 2006 / Ankara

 

Expert: Broaden U.S.-Turkey relationship December 20, 2005 / Ankara

 

TUSIAD rep assesses American-Turkish relations December 8, 2005 / Ankara

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 4.1.2011. Νταβούτογλου, Πλάτωνας και μηδενικά παιχνίδια

 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/mr_zero_problems

Mr. 'Zero Problems'

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sat down with Foreign Policy's managing editor Blake Hounshell in Doha, Qatar, this fall to discuss his side of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey triangle. Edited excerpts follow.

INTERVIEW BY BLAKE HOUNSHELL | DECEMBER 2010

 

Blake Hounshell: This year, one of the most dramatic events in world politics was when Turkey and Brazil joined up to cut a fuel-swap deal with Iran over its enriched uranium. And that was seen by many as a watershed moment: Here you have two rising powers taking matters into their own hands and trying to solve an important global problem. Obviously it hasn't succeeded yet. Why not? And what is your response to critics who say that Turkey and Brazil were naive in thinking that Iran was willing to do a serious deal?

Ahmet Davutoglu: First of all, "taking matters into their own hands" -- this phrase should be clarified. Turkey and Brazil, both of these countries are members of the United Nations Security Council. When we were being elected to the Security Council, our commitment to the world community who elected us was that we will be working hard, we will be doing everything possible in order to make sure that there is no tension in international relations, that there will be no threat of war, and we will be working for diplomatic solutions. This was our commitment, both for Turkey and Brazil. So it was not something we decided. It was our commitment.

Secondly, we did not decide alone. This idea of a swap deal was discussed between the P5+1 [the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany] and Iran before our initiative. And former IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei developed this formulation and approached us to ask whether Turkey could work with both sides in order to store Iran's 3.5 percent enriched uranium in Turkey as a confidence-building [measure]. And we consulted with our allies. All of them agreed; Iran agreed; and so we started this initiative. And we worked very hard, together with Brazil, over eight months of hectic diplomacy from October to May. At the end of the day Iran accepted the swap deal, and we announced the agreement in Tehran.

And I always said this was not the success only of Turkey and Brazil, but this is the success of President Obama's policy of engagement and multilateralism. If there was no policy of engagement and multilateralism, this agreement would not have been possible.

BH: Do you think President Obama is moving away from engagement and trying to build new relationships in the world?

AD: I don't think President Obama has abandoned the policy of engagement. Even on the day when the U.N. sanctions were passed against Iran, President Obama declared that the diplomatic track is still on and they are ready to negotiate with Iran.

 

December 2010: The Global Thinkers Issue

I always like Winston Churchill's phrase: It is not the end. It is not the beginning. It is the end of the beginning. All these processes are ends of the beginning.

BH: Who would you say has had the biggest impact on your thinking as an intellectual and as a foreign-policy practitioner?

AD: Of course as intellectuals there are many people who really had an influence on me. For example, Plato in his dialogues has interesting things to say about ideals and practice.

BH: A Turkish foreign minister citing a Greek thinker.

AD: Yes, of course! For us, he is not only a Greek thinker; he is our thinker, because if you read the works of Ottoman scholars of the 16th century, all of these Greek scholars were addressed as "our masters." So for us, they represent the history of all traditions, and theirs are the values of humanity. And of course I'm influenced by many other leaders like Gandhi, as a practitioner and as a visionary trying to use unconventional new methods to achieve political objectives. In order to achieve peace, you have to be creative. In 2003, when I became chief advisor [to the prime minister], in one of the first interviews I gave I said, "We have to have zero problems with our neighbors." Many people thought, "Typical utopian academic. How, given the reality of Turkey's relations with its neighbors, can you achieve this?" And, in the last eight years, under the leadership and political stability of Prime Minister Erdogan, it has been proven that it's not a utopian idea. It is a reality today; nobody expects any crisis between Turkey and any neighbor.

 

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3.1.2011. Erdogan and Turkey in the 21st Century

Post-Cold War era taps Turkey as the new indispensable nation

 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20110103a1.html

By RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN

ANKARA — Turkey made its imprint as one of the most influential countries not only on 2010, but on the first decade of the third millennium.

At the start of the new decade, Turkey's geopolitical position, rich historical heritage, cultural depth, well-educated young population, ever-strengthening democracy, growing economy and constructive foreign policy make it an indispensable country in a world transformed by rapid globalization.

By making use of all of its assets, Turkey is contributing to regional stability and peace and working toward a global order based on justice, equality and transparency. As an emerging power, Turkey will continue to realize its own potential and simultaneously contribute to global peace.

The chaotic conditions of the post-Cold War world have made civil wars, occupations, nuclear armament and human trafficking chronic problems. While globalization offers new opportunities, it also causes new global problems and deepens the inequalities embedded in the world order.

It is no longer possible to sustain the current world order, which, to the extent it is on a skewed notion of relations between the center and the periphery, merely produces injustice and inequality.

Turkey seeks to contribute to regional and global peace by facilitating democratic reforms domestically and implementing a principled foreign policy.

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey aims to become a full member of the European Union and establish cordial relations with all of its southern and eastern neighbors. Turkey's posture — in looking both East and West — is neither paradoxical nor inconsistent. On the contrary, Turkey's multidimensional geopolitical position is an asset for the region.

There are few countries that can play such a critical role. Turkey constitutes a new synthesis because of its ability to link such diverse qualities and backgrounds. Turkey is, therefore, capable of overcoming the dichotomies of East- West, Europe-Middle East and North-South.

This capacity is essential because we need to leave behind the Manichaean disagreements, conflicts and fears of the Cold War era. Those who see the world through those old, fearful lenses have difficulty understanding Turkey's rising profile and dynamism.

The realities of the 21st century necessitate a multidimensional and inclusive political perspective.

Acting on these principles, Turkey is following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Indeed this geography is Turkey's natural historical and cultural hinterland. Turkey's cultural and historical links with the peoples of these regions are deep and conducive to regional peace.

Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this geography, for it stands at the center of it. History clearly shows that it is impossible to establish and sustain global peace without ensuring peace and stability in the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is following a constructive and inclusive policy for these regions, which are marked by remarkable models of cohabitation, science, arts, culture and civilization.

Because of our recent efforts, the wounds of the Bosnian war are being healed, facilitating peace and stability among Balkan peoples. Turkey's efforts are also helping to prevent wars in the Middle East, and our intense efforts have helped keep a diplomatic track open on the Iranian nuclear issue.

Moreover, we are helping to facilitate political stability in Iraq and helping the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, of paramount importance, Turkey is making enormous efforts to help establish an independent and sustainable Palestinian state — efforts that are appreciated by Turkey's Western and Eastern friends alike.

Today, Turkey is following a policy that represents a sense of justice in the Middle East, and is working toward the removal of artificial borders and walls among the region's peoples.

We desire to live in a region where the dignity of every person is respected. That is why we have objected to Israel's aggression in and blockade of Gaza, and will continue to do so.

We know that it is not possible to attain global peace unless we establish sustainable peace in the Middle East, which requires resolving the Palestinian question. Therefore, we urge Israel and all other countries involved to follow constructive and peaceful policies.

Motivated by these principles, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and I showed through our "Alliance of Civilizations Initiative" in 2004 that cultural, historic and religious differences are no reason for conflict. The basis for our approach to humanity is the following principle of the famous Turkish poet Yunus Emre: "We love and respect the created because of the Creator."

As a result, we stand firmly opposed to discrimination against any society, religion, sect, culture or country. I consider anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and prejudice against Christianity crimes against humanity, whose common values and ethical rules oblige us to confront and reject all forms of discrimination.

Besides its cultural, historic and diplomatic values, Turkey's vibrant economy has become a source of stability and welfare.

When my party took office in 2002, the Turkish economy totaled around $250 billion. Today, Turkey's annual GDP has reached $800 billion, making it Europe's sixth-largest economy and the 17th- largest in the world.

Turkey has also been one of the least impacted by the global economic crisis, with growing foreign trade, a strong banking system, and diverse and prospering small and medium-size enterprises. The Turkish economy returned to its pre-crisis levels in 2010.

All of these qualities have transformed Turkey into an attractive place for business, media, artists, diplomats, students and nongovernmental organizations from around the world.

Turkey's ever-increasing soft power is becoming one of its most significant traits, which we will continue to use to enhance regional and global peace.

Not only has the impact of globalization brought about a rebalancing of power, but the demand for justice, transparency and legitimacy remains constant.

The global problems of our times necessitate cooperation, political will and sacrifice. That is why we are following a proactive policy in multilateral institutions to facilitate an equitable sharing of our world's resources.

Turkey will continue to work toward a just and equitable global order in 2011 and beyond. This is a responsibility emanating from our history, geography and the universal values that we hold.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan is prime minister of the Republic of Turkey. © 2010 Project Syndicate

The Japan Times: Monday, Jan. 3, 2011

 

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28.12.2010., Akyol M. Davutoğlu's dangerous idea

 

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Tuesday, December 28, 2010

MUSTAFA AKYOL

 

Last Saturday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu spent three hours with a few dozen journalists to give an overview of his much-debated strategic vision. The press, naturally, captured the newsiest lines: Turkey was willing to mend ties with Israel, and Ankara was willing to continue to work with Tehran to find a solution to the latter’s nuclear crisis.

The deeper side of Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth,” however, was in his remarks about the international system. Criticizing the “injustices and inequalities” within global politics, he said Turkey was willing to help formulate a better world. Noting that Turkey is often positioned between the East and the West, Davutoğlu added that now it will also work to help on issues between the north and the south.

‘Conscience of the system’

The latter term, of course, refers to the poorer countries of the world. A clear indication of Turkey’s aspirations on that front was its new leading role at the United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, which will hold its next summit in Istanbul next May. At the meeting, a 10-year action plan will be formulated, and Turkey will probably undertake new engagements in Africa and elsewhere. The ultimate goal, said Davutoğlu, will be to help underdeveloped countries “raise their voice” and to make Turkey “the conscience of the international system.”

In other words, you might soon start to read anxious commentaries arguing that Turkey is “turning its face from the north,” and opting for the south. Yet another dangerous “axis shift,” you might hear, is in the making.

Seeing that risk, Davutoğlu said this engagement with the Third World should not be seen as “Third Worldism” – the lefty current of the Cold War era, which romanticized the underdeveloped countries and sided with them against the so-called First World.

The nuance here is worth pondering. The modern global order, which is mainly an Anglo-Saxon (first British and then American) invention, is based on principles such as international law, free trade and human rights. Historian Walter Russell Mead aptly puts it as a “liberal, capitalist, and democratic world system.” And, defined as such, the Turkey that Davutoğlu represents has zero problems with that system – it even tries to advance it in its own part of the world.

But the principles of the world system is one thing, the interests and the biases of its masters is another one. With regards to the latter, we can sometimes find the those masters applying double standards to the rules of their own making – such as the United States’ customary vetoes of any U.N. Security Council resolution that forces Israel to respect international law. And Turkey does have problems with those injustices, which, in the words of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, seem to replace “the supremacy of law,” with “the law of the superiors.”

We can find the echoes of that justice-oriented thought in the words of not just Davutoğlu but also other architects of Turkey’s new foreign policy. In a recent article, İbrahim Kalın, a senior advisor to the prime minister, a post that Davutoğlu used to occupy, said, “Turkey’s new actors… demand that the global center-periphery relations turn more democratic and fair.” He emphasizes the role of “political legitimacy” in any global system and argues the current one suffers from a deficit of legitimacy.

A new narrative

Both Davutoğlu and Kalın seem to see the matter in not just political but philosophical terms. Kalın notes that “the Euro-centric conception of history and society… based on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution” is losing its dominance. A new “narrative” is emerging, which is global rather than West-centric, and which demands a less hierarchical world. The “new Turkish narrative” with its success via “soft power,” Kalın adds, should be seen as a beacon of these global aspirations.

Hearing these arguments, I couldn’t help recalling the WikiLeaks cable that referred to Davutoğlu as an “extremely dangerous” ideologue that was reformulating Turkish foreign policy in dangerous ways. The “danger,” I guess, is not totally imaginary, but is valid for only two opposing forces:

It is dangerous for those Western (especially American) policy-makers who believe that a “clash of civilizations” has already begun and that the West should use all its power — hard and soft — to fight against an “axis of evil.” Seeing zero problems in their own policies, and putting the whole blame on others, these self-righteous Westerners wish to see countries such as Turkey as loyal yes-men, which will simply be on their side at all times.

On the other hand, Turkey’s new direction is also dangerous for the Osama Bin Ladens of the world, who wish to exploit the grievances against the West in order to launch a global anti-Western crusade. Turkey blurs their black-and-white picture, and tries to solve the troubles they capitalize upon. 

For the rest of us, I believe, Davutoğlu’s vision should be more reassuring. Its prospects are debatable, but its goals seem to be clear: the building of a more just and peaceful world.

 

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21.12.2010. From Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Israel with love

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=from-lebanon-egypt-syria-and-israel-with-love-2010-12-21

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Tuesday, December 21, 2010

BURAK BEKDİL

I confess! I was wrong when I doubted the wisdom of Ahmet “Strategic Depth” Davutoğlu’s ambitious peace plans for the always chaotic Middle East. The Turkish foreign minister’s vision has already created what was unthinkable only a few years ago: Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon are agreeing on borders – well, not their own, but Cyprus’s offshore borders.

About three years ago, Cyprus launched a plan to draw, through bilateral agreements, the borders of its Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, with the aim of controlling all economic resources within this specified zone including fishing, mining and oil and natural gas exploration.

Naturally, the Cypriots needed offshore “partners” in order to map their EEZ, and started talks with their offshore neighbors. That unnerved Ankara since an internationally-ratified Cypriot EEZ could have unwanted economic and political implications for Turkey. Hence, the repeated Turkish objections to Cyprus’s oil and gas exploration in eastern Mediterranean.

Luckily, the first doors the Cypriots knocked on were the Turks’ Muslim friends. All the same, before Ankara could move a finger, Orthodox Cyprus ratified an offshore border deal with Islamic Egypt. Bah… Egypt is Egypt. But Turkey’s neo-Ottoman vision would surely work with Lebanon where Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a folk hero.

In 2007, Turkey warned Lebanon about maritime agreements with Cyprus. Ankara said it would not recognize the delimitation of the EEZs and alleged that Lebanon should ask for Turkey’s opinion before signing any agreement with Cyprus. With the failure of that friend-to-friend warning, a year later Cyprus protested to the United Nations and the European Union over what it called Turkish harassment of ships conducting exploration surveys in its EEZ.

In early October 2010, Cyprus and Lebanon agreed to delimit their EEZs, pending parliamentary ratification at the Lebanese parliament. The same month, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri visited Cyprus and said Lebanon would soon define offshore boundaries with Cyprus and Syria. During the same visit, Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias thanked Mr Hariri for reconfirming “the principled position of Lebanon on the Cyprus problem for a solution.”

Apparently, Cypriot policy, through the strategic EEZ campaign, has done more than Turkish mediation efforts in bringing together major Middle Eastern adversaries. Last week, Cyprus announced that an agreement with Israel had been signed on the two countries’ sea border that will allow the offshore neighbors to press ahead in their search for energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean. Experts agree the demarcation is an important step for oil and gas exploration.

The Cypriot campaign looks like the real interfaith dialogue the Turks have been thriving for over the past several years: it unites one Jewish, three Muslim and one Orthodox state around common offshore borders, without a single bullet shot, a suicide bomb exploded or a rocket launched. The dialogue even stretches across the Aegean.

Greece, which in the 1980s was widely considered the European country most hostile to Israel –the two countries, in fact, did not have any formal diplomatic relationship until 1992 – today has soaring bilateral ties with Israel, thanks to Mr Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems with neighbors” policy.

Apart from being on a Turkish list that bans land sales to their citizens, Jewish Israel and Orthodox Greece enjoy spectacularly improving ties. According to Arye Mekel, Israel’s ambassador to Athens, “Greece and Israel have opened a new chapter in their ties [following] a decision to develop multifaceted cooperation in the fields of politics, security, economy and culture.”

Meanwhile, the Turkish diplomats in Ankara are increasingly worried that a critical dispute is spinning out of control, and in a direction they would hate the most: an internationally-recognized EEZ for the internationally-recognized, EU member state of Greek Cyprus. Mssrs Erdoğan and Davutoğlu would certainly propose a faith-based explanation if the Cypriots had signed offshore maritime agreements with Israel only. Ironically, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria are Turkey’s “Muslim friends” in the region.

The world owes a lot to Turkey’s Israel policy since it is making the eastern Mediterranean a genuine sea of peace. Hats off to Mr Strategic Depth! But wait a minute…

Wire services reported Monday that Turkey summoned the Israeli envoy to convey its unease over the deal with Cyprus. The services said Ambassador Gaby Levy was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on Thursday, a day before the agreement was signed. According to Anatolia news agency, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu warned Levy the agreement would have an adverse impact on efforts between Cyprus’ Greek and Turkish communities to end the 36-year division of the island.

I have no idea if Ambassador Levy asked Undersecretary Sinirlioğlu why the 36-year division remained for 36 years prior to, or without, the Cypriot-Israeli offshore border deal, or whether the Turkish Foreign Ministry was equally upset when Cyprus signed the same deals with Lebanon or Egypt.

But let’s look at the bright side of life: the Lebanese cheers over Mr Erdoğan’s visit last month calls for the revival of the Ottoman Caliph – in the personality of Mr Erdoğan – and the memorable moments during the prime minister’s public rally in the former Ottoman lands are still fresh memories.

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18.12.2010."Mr. Strategic Depth": “The only target we have is to normalize the trajectory of history.”

 

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=strategic-depth----self-aggrandizing-version-2010-12-14

 

Strategic depth - the self-aggrandizing version

BURAK BEKDİL

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu may be proudly boasting of his jewel doctrine of “strategic depth” wherever and whenever possible, yet in contrast, United States embassy cables illustrate him as a dangerously deluded man at the helm of Turkish foreign policy. Whether “strategic depthist” or “delusionist,” Mr. Davutoğlu’s vision is certainly self-aggrandizing – and apparently contagious.

The Europeans must have sighed with enormous relief – and probably blushed – when EU Minister Egemen Bağış told them in Denmark: “Hold on Europe, Turkey is coming to rescue you!” Having read Mr. Bağış’s remarks, a European friend joyfully wrote to this columnist: “We beleaguered Europeans are indeed grateful that Mr. Bağış has come to rescue us.” But the same friend was equally gloomy with a punishing feeling of guilt: “…that we are unable to respond in kind is only a measure of our ingratitude!”

Give it a few more years and further WikiLeaks dumps and we shall probably learn how EU diplomats must have cheered over the good – no, wonderful! – news Mr. Bağış heralded. Not so hard to imagine a cable quoting Minister X from a major European capital as telling his American counterpart, in shy tears: “We are saved! For centuries we waited for the Turks to come and rescue us!” Not so hard to imagine, either, the American minister cabling to Washington that he watched his colleague with poisonous envy.  

In the same near future, Mr. Bağış (or his successor) could be inviting the EU to join the “Middle Eastern Steel and Coal Union” which his boss, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is thriving in building. Turkey in the EU may be passé, but EU nations seeking to join a Turkish-led Muslim bloc may sound more interesting. 

Speaking of WikiLeaks, self-aggrandizing Turks must have done more self-aggrandizing when they read with pride that President Barack Obama’s first WikiLeaks call of apology was to their beloved prime minister – of all world leaders! The Turks may currently hate America, but they always look to America for a few pats on the shoulder.

For most Turks, the “news” is that President Obama called Prime Minister Erdoğan for an apology. In fact, wire services quoted Mr. Obama as “expressing his regrets for the deplorable action by WikiLeaks...” The real “news” in that story was the fact that “Mr. Obama did not apologize for the “content.”” It is a disturbing fact that Mr. Erdoğan and his men were not annoyed because WikiLeaks leaked the documents, but that they were annoyed by the content of the documents. And in Mr. Obama’s apology, there was no apology for the content.

But that gives an idea for a potential rapprochement. If Mr. Erdoğan is prepared to embrace apologies of “this kind,” why not apply the same logic to the flotilla crisis with Israel? At the moment, as Ankara and Jerusalem are testing the water to normalize ties – but with Mr. Erdoğan insisting on an apology for the deadly attack on the Mavi Marmara – why do we not think of an Obama-style way out?

In this Obama-apology-inspired model, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls Prime Minister Erdoğan to apologize and “expresses his regrets for the deplorable events that strained Turkish-Israeli relations.” And that should suffice to ensure a graceful exit from the crisis. But would it? The answer is no – for obvious reasons.

But WikiLeaks leaks did not kill any Turks, whereas the flotilla raid of May 31 did. That’s true. All the same, the difference does not justify selective Turkish perception of foreign apologies. In both cases, there will be apologies, and in both cases the apologies will be for the sake of apologizing rather than for what really annoyed the Turks. But never mind, as soon as these lines appear on the page Mr. Erdoğan’s fans will remind us – at best – that hypocrisy is part of politics and – at worst – anyone criticizing Mr. Erdoğan is either a traitor or an enemy of Islam.

All the same, it is fabulous that after having saved the Palestinians and brokered peace in all corners of the world’s disputed geographies, the Turks are now coming to rescue Europe. But why all this Turkish benevolence and generosity? According to Mr. Strategic Depth: “The only target we have is to normalize the trajectory of history.” So, the foreign minister is saying the trajectory of history is abnormal and therefore has to be normalized – by the Turks. In what sense? Why is it abnormal? How would it have been normal? How can it be normalized? What/who made it abnormal? And why can it be normalized by the Turks?

I am not sure if Minister Davutoğlu would care to answer those questions – he would probably not, even if our newspaper offered a generous donation to human rights champions İHH in return for an interview. Fortunately, we have a sense of what the “normalization of history” might mean in self-aggrandizing language. If we understand incorrectly we’ll learn the truth from another wave of very important leaks.

 

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7.12.2010. By Jackson Diehl, The Turkish 9/11
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/05/AR2010120503739.html

 

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu smiled cheerfully as he reiterated: Yes, the clash between Israeli commandos and Turkish Islamic activists off the coast of the Gaza Strip in May can be fairly compared with al-Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington.
"It was the Turkish 9/11 - I repeat it!" he exclaimed during a visit to Washington last week. "I don't mean the numbers," he added when it was pointed out that 2,900 people died on Sept. 11 and nine in the flotilla fight. "I am trying to express the psychological shock in Turkey. Our citizens were killed by a foreign army."

Actually, it wasn't quite that simple. The Turks were not innocent civilians but militants who sought a confrontation; they were killed not by suicidal terrorists but by professional soldiers whose first weapons were mace and paintballs.

So it's a little jarring to hear Davutoglu make his main point: that there is no real reason for discord between his government and the Obama administration. "For more than 20 months we had excellent relations," he said. "And as strategic allies we have to protect those relations."
Turkey is a member of NATO, a host of U.S. military bases vital to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a major purchaser of American weapons. But is it still really an ally? As some of the more interesting of the WikiLeaked State Department documents show, that is a question that two consecutive U.S. administrations have struggled with. During eight years of rule by the mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party, Turkey has become something of a model of the tricky 21st-century relationships the United States will have to manage.

Turkey used to be an authoritarian state that reliably lined up with the West. Now it is a democracy with a booming economy - and big geopolitical ambitions. The power of popular support has given Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the confidence to undercut U.S. policy in Iran, cultivate anti-American Muslim dictators in Sudan and Syria, and make Israel a near-enemy - all while deploying Turkish troops in Kabul and counting on the United States to help his army fight Kurdish insurgents.

The Middle East still has rulers such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, a sullen strongman who quietly supports U.S. strategic interests but refuses to modernize his rotting autocracy. Erdogan sees that as an opportunity to become the region's power broker. "Turkey, building on the alleged admiration among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and power and willing to stand up for the interests of the people, reaches over the [undemocratic] regimes to the 'Arab street,' " explains one cable dispatched by the U.S. Embassy in Ankara this year. Thus the overheated rhetoric about Israel, delivered with calculation as well as passion.

Davutoglu is something of an antihero of the WikiLeaks cables, described as "exceptionally dangerous" and "lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies." Having arrived in Washington a few hours after those descriptions were released, he accepted an apology from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, played down the damage - and embraced at least part of the embassy's analysis. "Britain has a commonwealth" with its former colonies, he reminded me. Why shouldn't Turkey rebuild its leadership in former Ottoman lands in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia?

It's fascinating to follow the emotional swings in U.S. analysis of this rapidly changing partner. Erdogan is acidly described by former ambassador Eric Edelman as having "an authoritarian loner streak"; Edelman's successor, James F. Jeffrey, concludes that Erdogan "simply hates Israel" and that his drive for regional authority "has not achieved any single success of note." Yet the dispatches also include admiration for Erdogan's political skills and for Turkey's role in Lebanon, Pakistan and even Syria.

In fact, as a would-be leader of the "Arab street," Erdogan looks much more attractive than competitors such as Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah. In the end Turkey depends on European trade and investment; it wants a democratic Iraq, a non-nuclear Iran and NATO's success in Afghanistan. It still recognizes Israel. It is, in essence, a genuine Muslim democracy - which means that it is both more difficult and, in a way, more of an ally than it used to be.

"At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey whose population is propelling much of what we see," Jeffrey wrote in a penetrating dispatch. "This calls for an issue-by-issue approach and recognition that Turkey will often go its own way." "The current cast of political leaders," he noted, have a "special yen for destructive drama and rhetoric. But we see no one better on the horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world class 'Western' institutions, competencies and orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion."

No wonder Davutoglu was grinning. In the end, State's reporting had captured the new Turkey rather well.

 

 

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2.12.2010.  Wikileaks και Αχμέτ Νταβούτογλου, Εναλλακτικές Κοσμοθεωρίες

 

Π.Ήφ. Το βιβλίο στο οποίο παραπέμπει το άρθρο που ακολουθεί κυκλοφορεί σε μερικές εβδομάδες και πάλιν από τις Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα. Έχει και αυτό προταθεί από εμένα πριν από δύο χρόνια. Αποτελεί το επιστημονικό κείμενο που βρίσκεται πίσω από το "Στρατηγικό βάθος". Τώρα, εκτιμώ ότι θα πρέπει να τύχει πολύ προσεκτικής μελέτης. Όχι μόνο από τους ειδήμονες που σίγουρα θα το βρουν ως ίσως το πιο πρωτότυπο βιβλίο σύγκρισης της Ισλαμικής με την μοντερνιστική πολιτική σκέψη και κοσμοθεωρία. Θα πρέπει να διαβαστεί και από όσους είναι καλόπιστοι και όχι εντεταλμένοι να καταπολεμούν μανιακά την ελληνική αποτρεπτική στρατηγική και με ακόμη μεγαλύτερη μανία να επιχειρούν μαζί με ξένους να επιβάλουν στους ελληνοκύπριους και τουρκοκύπριους ένα παρά φύση γάμο. Όπως έγραψα  και στον ίδιο τον Νταβούτογλου σε προσωπική επιστολή που του έστειλα και που θα δημοσιοποιήσω κάποια στιγμή, ο λόγος για τον οποίο πρότεινα τα βιβλία του για δημοσίευση στα ελληνικά είναι επειδή οι διακρατικές σχέσεις στερούμενες πολιτικό ορθολογισμό οδηγούνται σε πόλεμο. Και μπορεί, του έγραψα, να κάνετε πλιάτσικο εις βάρος της Ελλάδας κατά παράβαση της διεθνούς νομιμότητας και των ζωτικών της συμφερόντων, αλλά, με ζεϊμπέκικα και κουμπαριές των Παπανδρέου και Καραμανλή (και τις ανοησίες των Κυπρίων), η Τουρκία και Ελλάδα θα οδηγηθούν σε πόλεμο και δεν πρέπει να υποτιμά τι σημαίνει κάτι τέτοιο (και) για την Τουρκία. Για να το πω και διαφορετικά, εκτιμώ από καιρό ότι εμείς πάσχουμε πνευματικά ανίατα και διολισθαίνουμε στο τέλμα. Αυτό που έγραψα στον Νταβούτογλου και εκτιμώ ότι είναι βάσιμη πρόβλεψη, είναι πως συμφέρει την Τουρκία να μην κάνει πλιάτσικο εις βάρος των Ελλήνων. Κάποια στιγμή θα βρεθούν με την ράχη στον τοίχο και κανείς ας μην υποτιμά τι συμβαίνει σε αυτές τις περιπτώσεις. Τι παθαίνουν δηλαδή ο ηττημένος αλλά και "νικητής" και ο αμυνόμενος και επιτιθέμενος.  

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/02/hiding_in_plain_sight?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

 

Hiding in Plain Sight

You don't need to get your hands on secret cables to learn that Turkey's foreign minister has a radically different view of the world than American diplomats. Just read his dissertation.

BY MICHAEL KOPLOW | DECEMBER 2, 2010

As the explosive, ongoing release of hundreds of thousands of State Department diplomatic cables shows, official Washington is anxious about the direction that Turkey's government is taking the country -- and particularly the influence of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, long credited as the architect of its foreign policy. And judging by the academic-turned-international-strategist's doctoral dissertation, they have good reason to worry.

 

The first batch of cables, published by self-described whistle-blower organization WikiLeaks on Nov. 28, express the unvarnished concerns of U.S. diplomats regarding the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has recently improved Turkey's ties to Iran and Syria and engaged in a high-profile war of words with Israel following the botched Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla in May. One November 2009 cable says that U.S. officials were "wondering if it could any longer count on Turkey to help contain Iran's profound challenge to regional peace." Another cable quotes a Turkish government official saying that Davutoglu exerts an "exceptionally dangerous" Islamist influence on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

 

But the U.S. diplomatic corps shouldn't have had to wait for recent events to reveal to them the transformations that Davutoglu had in store for Turkish foreign policy. His doctoral dissertation, completed in 1990 at Istanbul's Bogazici University and later revised and published under the title "Alternative Paradigms," yields some important clues about his intellectual influences and guiding political philosophy.

 

The dissertation, written in English and buried in a neglected corner of the university library's reference collection, is esoterically titled "The Impacts of Alternative Weltanschauungs on Political Theories: A Comparison of Tawhid and Ontological Proximity." It is a dense, 298-page tome regarding the different ways in which Western and Islamic political thought justify political authority and conceive of political institutions and actors. Foreshadowing Samuel Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" thesis, its main argument is that the divisions between the Western and Islamic world stem from an irreconcilable chasm between the philosophical and political traditions of the two civilizations, and that both sides can justifiably view the other as being ideologically intransigent.

 

As Davutoglu writes in his introduction: "The fundamental argument of the thesis is that the conflicts and contrasts between Islamic and Western political thought originate mainly from their philosophical, methodological and theoretical background rather than from only institutional and historical differences."

 

Islamic revivalism in the Middle East, Davutoglu contends, cannot be explained through sociological or economic reasoning. His work systematically lays out the vastly divergent paths taken by the two intellectual traditions, which he believes lead to important differences concerning both state and society.

 

Davutoglu traces the arc of Western thought on secularism, demonstrating that secularism is not a modern characteristic of Western civilization, but a persistent element in Western thought and institutions dating back to the pre-Westphalian era that has simply been reshaped in the modern age.

 

Similarly, Davutoglu shows that the Islamic idea of tawhid, or the oneness of God, is not only a theological concept, but informs a practical theory of the unity of all aspects of life, as opposed to the secular division of matters belonging to "church" and "state." In Islamic political theory, according to Davutoglu, it is "almost impossible to find a political justification without reference to absolute sovereignty of Allah."

 

The bulk of Davutoglu's dissertation is a dispassionate analysis of political theory. However, there are a number of places where he tellingly reveals his thoughts on the irreconcilability of Western norms and institutions within Muslim societies. In one chapter, for example, Davutoglu asserts that Muslim societies historically have not accepted Western-style procedural or institutional state legitimacy, which depends on a nontheological view of morality and legitimacy, because they are firmly entrenched in a political culture centered on religiously driven values.

 

Similarly, Davutoglu also dissects the differences between Western economic models, which he characterizes as seeking to distribute resources with maximum efficiency, and Islamic religious-cultural views, which he argues are more concerned with using economics to establish social stability and justice. He observes that Muslim societies will not be transformed by "imposed institutional transformation strategies directed by a Westernized political elite" and argues that Islamic cultures segmented by religious identity could not coexist with the socioeconomic class divisions that are inherent to Western institutions and societies.

 

Davutoglu is more explicit about his views on the compatibility of Muslim societies and Western state institutions in his concluding chapter. He describes the Muslim world as a "very impressive and consistent civilizational experience," and asserts in the very next sentence that an "Islamic all-inclusive weltanschauung [worldview] … is absolutely alternative to the Western weltanschauung rather than complementary."

 

Davutoglu attributes Muslim societies' resistance to secularism to this fundamental difference, arguing that "scholars and politicians who omit these fundamental differences will continue to be puzzled by the increasing critical response of Muslim societies." In the dissertation's concluding paragraph, addressing the Western challenge to the Muslim worldview, he warns that "the oppressive institutional transformation strategies being exercised against Muslim societies cannot overcome this irreconcilability."

 

Davutoglu doesn't make any specific reference to Turkey throughout his dissection of Western institutions and Muslim societies. However, the recent history of his country -- where a Westernized political and military elite imposed Western institutions by force, going so far as to launch multiple successive coups when it perceived a threat to the secular order -- could not be far from his mind.

Of course, like any foreign minister, Davutoglu is now driven more by his country's strategic concerns than by philosophy. Turkey's foreign policy makes sense from the standpoint of its national interest without having to resort to ideological explanations, and a non-AKP government would likely continue many of the same policies -- from seeking to expand Turkish influence in its near abroad to increasing economic ties with oil-rich Iran.

 

Nevertheless, Davutoglu, while primarily aiming for the realist goal of turning Turkey into a regional hegemon, is clearly pessimistic on the ability to bring Muslim societies in harmony with Western institutions -- and there is every reason to expect that this belief influences his views on Turkey's stalled accession bid to the European Union and its relationships with Iran, Israel, and Syria. As long as Davutoglu is still directing things in Ankara, there are likely to be many more distressed cables from U.S. diplomats in our future.

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Π.Ήφ. Συνήθως εδώ παραθέτω την ειδησιογραφία ή άλλες πληροφορίες χωρίς σχόλια. Η καταπληκτική θέση του Νταβούτογλου, όμως, ότι "η ένταξη της Τουρκίας στη ΕΕ θα έχει τον χαρακτήρα εξέτασης για την Ευρώπη είναι πολύ σημαντική για την ελληνική διπλωματία. Αυτό γιατί η σπαρακτικά και κραυγαλέα λανθασμένη παραφιλολογία που καλλιέργησε το γνωστό ίδρυμα εδώ και δύο δεκαετίες ότι η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να ενθαρρύνει την ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ για να τη εξευρωπαίσει μας οδήγησε σε αυτή την κωμικοτραγική κατάσταση. Βέβαια, ο πανέξυπνος Νταβούτογλου αποδεικνύεται ότι εκτός από σημαντικός αναλυτής είναι και πρώτης τάξης διπλωμάτης που φέρνει βόλτα τους άλλους, παραμυθιάζει τους ακροατές του και επισκιάζει την αλήθεια περίτεχνα. Ο Hans Morgenthau, ο κορυφαίος αμερικανός Πολιτικός Ρεαλιστής έγραψε ότι χωρίς καλή θεωρία διπλωματίας ένα κράτος θα πάθει μεγάλες ζημιές. Δεν μπορεί να προβλεφτεί τι έπεται, αλλά ο δημόσιος διάλογος κατέβηκε πολύ χαμηλά. Τα αποτελέσματα της κακής θεωρίας εξωτερικής πολιτικής με την οποία βομβάρδισαν την ελληνική κοινή γνώμη επί δύο δεκαετίες οδηγεί σε αστειότητες περί "συνεκμετάλευσης" που θα φέρουν την Ειρήνη. Αντί να εφαρμοστεί το διεθνές δίκαιο και η Ελλάδα να συνομιλήσει -αν χρειαστεί και μόνο αν χρειαστεί μετά την εφαρμογή της διεθνούς νομιμότητας- με τους γείτονες για επίλυση αντικειμενικών προβλημάτων (πχ την κοινή συμφωνημένη άντληση μιας υπόγειας δεξαμενής πετρελαίου) σε κάποια σημεία, συζητάμε προγραμματικά με τον απειλούντα και επιτιθέμενο για το που θα είναι τα δικά μας σύνορα πριν τεθούν τέτοια ζητήματα. 

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29.3.2010 Islamist Gülen Movement Runs U.S. Charter Schools

by Stephen Schwartz
American Thinker
March 29, 2010

http://www.meforum.org/2628/islamist-gulen-movement-charter-schools

A secretive foreign network of Islamic radicals now operates dozens of charter schools — which receive government money but are not required to adopt a state-approved curriculum — on U.S. soil. The inspirer of this conspiratorial effort is Fethullah Gülen, who directs a major Islamist movement in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora, but lives in the United States. He is number 13 among the world's "50 most influential Muslims" according to one prominent listing.

Gülen has been criticized as the puppet master for the current Turkish government headed by the "soft Islamist" Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish initials as the AKP, in its slow-motion showdown with the secularist Turkish military. But Gülen is also known in Muslim countries for his network of 500-700 Islamic schools around the world, according to differing sources favorable to his movement. A more critical view of Gülen's emphasis on education asserts that his international network of thousands of primary and secondary schools, universities, and student residences is a key element in solidifying an Islamist political agenda in Turkey.

But in startling news for Americans, the Gülen movement operates more than 85 primary and secondary schools on our soil. A roster of the Gülen schools and of the numerous foundations that support them has been released to the public by the patriotic group Act! for America. The Gülen schools are often designated as "science academies" and are concentrated in Texas, Ohio, and California — with others scattered across the rest of the country.

Two states that host Gülen charter schools are Arizona and Utah. In the former, the Daisy Education Corporation (the Gülen movement loves friendly sounding institutional names) operates three schools in Tucson: one serving kindergarten through the eighth grade, another designated as an elementary school, and a middle-high school, all under the rubric of the Sonoran Science Academy. In Phoenix it runs a satellite kindergarten-to-10th-grade campus with the same name.

The appearance of Gülen charter schools in Tucson has produced critical attention in local media. The Tucson Weekly published a report at the end of 2009 noting that the Sonoran Science Academy in the southern Arizona town had been named "charter school of the year" by the Arizona Charter School Association. But writer Tim Vanderpool reported that according to one dismayed parent, who declined identification while pointing out the Gülen movement's history of intimidating critics, "the Sonoran Academy seems constantly to be bringing Turkish educators into the United States, and subjecting students to substitute teachers while the teachers await work visas. … She says several Sonoran Academy parents believe the school has a hidden agenda to promote Gülen's brand of Turkish nationalism, advance sympathy for that country's political goals such as winning acceptance into the European Union, and discourage official acknowledgment of Turkey's genocide against the Armenians during World War I." Such issues are exotic, to say the least, for Tucson parents.

Earlier in 2009, the Beehive Science and Technology Academy, a high school in Salt Lake City, came under similar critical scrutiny from the Salt Lake Tribune. That major daily's writer, Kirsten Stewart, reported that the Utah State Charter Board had begun an investigation of the Beehive school, following complaints from a former teacher and an alarmed parent. The complainants asserted that while "Beehive advertises itself as a public charter school offering college-bound seventh through 12th graders a foundation in math and science … the school has another mission: to advance and promote certain Islamic beliefs. They point to questionable financial transactions and hiring practices as proof of the school's covert ties to Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen."

But while Fatih Karatas, principal of the Sonoran Science Academy middle school in Tucson, flatly denied any connection with the Gülen movement, Beehive principal Muhammet "Frank" Erdogan in Salt Lake City admitted such links in the case of his school. The Salt Lake Tribune quoted his admission that, along with him, "many of Beehive's teachers and founders also support Gülen's ideals." The paper also described how "Adam Kuntz, a first-year history teacher at Beehive, was fired [in spring 2009], he alleges, for taking academic freedom concerns to the state board. Earlier in the school year, Kuntz had a run-in with Erdogan over a lesson plan on World War II and the Holocaust. Erdogan wanted Kuntz to revise the plan and during a tape-recorded meeting, questioned conventional accounts of the genocide."

Kelly Wayment, a parent of three children in the school, was removed from his post on the Beehive administrative board after he emailed other parents about Gülen movement influence in the school. Wayment told the Salt Lake Tribune that, as in the Tucson case, teachers "tend to be from Turkey and central Asian republics living here on work visas."

Americans should ask both why and how the Islamist Gülen movement has managed to establish such a large presence for Turkish religious political indoctrination in publicly financed education — and should unite to oppose it.

Stephen Suleyman Schwartz is executive director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism in Washington, D.C. This article was sponsored by Islamist Watch.

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5.5.2009 Υπέξ Κλίντον

5.5.2009 ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ: Καλό απόγευμα. Ο υπaουργός Νταβούτογλου και εγώ μόλις είχαμε μια πολύ παραγωγική και σε πνεύμα αμοιβαίας κατανόησης συζήτηση. Και είναι μεγάλο προνόμιο να τον καλωσορίζουμε εδώ, στο υπουργείο εξωτερικών, λίγες μόλις εβδομάδες μετά την ανάληψη εκ μέρους του του υπουργείου εξωτερικών. Είχα τη μεγάλη τιμή να επισκεφτώ την Τουρκία πολύ νωρίς κατά τη θητεία μου ως υπουργός εξωτερικών και ο πρόεδρος Ομπάμα έκανε μια θαυμάσια επίσκεψη στην Τουρκία.

Και όλα αυτά λέγονται για να επιβεβαιωθεί η ισχύς και η σπουδαιότητα της συνεργασίας και της συμμαχίας μας. Έχουμε να κάνουμε πολλή δουλειά μαζί. Η Τουρκία, οι ΗΠΑ και ολόκληρη η παγκόσμια κοινότητα αντιμετωπίζουν οπωσδήποτε μεγάλο αριθμό προκλήσεων, αλλά επίσης βλέπουμε ευκαιρίες. ‘Ετσι, το μήνυμά μας που βγαίνει από τη σημερινή μας συνάντηση και από τις προηγούμενες συναντήσεις μας είναι ότι πρόκειται να βαθύνουμε και να ενισχύσουμε τη συνεργασία μας σε μια προϊούσα βάση, επειδή πιστεύουμε ότι και οι δύο χώρες, Τουρκία και ΗΠΑ έχουν μοναδικούς ρόλους να παίξουν.

Τώρα, προφανώς, ήδη συνεργαζόμαστε. Όχι μόνο είμαστε και οι δύο μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ, αλλά και εργαζόμαστε, με τους G – 20 να απαντήσουμε στην παγκόσμια οικονομική κρίση, αναζητούμε τρόπους να αυξήσουμε τις συναλλαγές και το εμπόριο ανάμεσα στις δύο χώρες μας, εργαζόμαστε ώστε να βελτιώσουμε τις ενεργειακές μας πηγές, συμπεριλαμβάνοντας πηγές πρώτων υλών από τον Καύκασο και την Κεντρική Ασία. Είμαστε σύμμαχοι στον αγώνα ενάντια στη διεθνή τρομοκρατία. Συμμεριζόμαστε το στόχο να υπάρχει ένα σταθερό Πακιστάν και Αφγανιστάν, και αρνούμαστε στην Αλ – Κάϊντα ένα ασφαλές καταφύγιο, απ` όπου θα μπορεί να απειλεί τις χώρες μας αλλά και πολλές άλλες. Υπερασπιζόμαστε την Τουρκία στον αγώνα της ενάντια στις τρομοκρατικές δραστηριότητες του ΠΚΚ, συνεργασία που έχει αποδειχτεί πολύ σημαντική.

Και επαναλαμβάνω σήμερα την ισχυρή υποστήριξη των ΗΠΑ στην προσπάθεια της Τουρκίας να γίνει μέλος της ΕΕ. Η Τουρκία έχει κάνει σημαντική πρόοδο προς την ένταξη. Έχει υπάρξει μια διαδικασία μεταρρυθμίσεων που έχει γεννηθεί από τις ίδιες της τις εσωτερικές αποφάσεις, αλλά επίσης απαντά σε πολλές από τις απαιτήσεις που σχετίζονται με την ισχυροποίηση αυτής της προσπάθειας. Και έτσι, επικροτούμε αυτό που ήδη έχει καταφέρει η Τουρκία και εντείνουμε τις προσπάθειές μας για να συνεχίσουμε να εργαζόμαστε με την Τουρκία.

            Και έτσι, συζητήσαμε ένα ευρύ αριθμό θεμάτων και θέλω απλώς να επισημάνω κάτι ιδιαίτερα. Όπως είπε χθες στο Κάϊρο ο πρόεδρος Ομπάμα, οι ΗΠΑ επιδιώκουν μια ευρεία ανάπτυξη σχέσεων με τους μουσουλμάνους σε ολόκληρο τον κόσμο, στηριγμένων στο αμοιβαίο συμφέρον και στον αμοιβαίο σεβασμό. Πιστεύουμε σθεναρά στην ελευθερία της θρησκείας και της έκφρασης, σε ζωντανές τοπικές κοινωνίες και γνωρίζουμε ότι αυτές τις αξίες τις συμμερίζεται και η Τουρκία.

Και θέλω να ευχαριστήσω τον υπουργό και την κυβέρνησή του για το ρόλο που παίζει η Τουρκία, ως δύναμη ειρήνης και σταθερότητας. Αυτό είναι σημαντικό και έχει ήδη επιδειχτεί στη δουλειά που η Τουρκία έχει κάνει για πολλά χρόνια και συνεχίζει να κάνει με σεβασμό στην  ειρήνη και την αλληλοκατανόηση στη Μέση Ανατολή. Και υποστηρίζουμε σθεναρά τις προσπάθειες της Τουρκίας να εξομαλύνει τις σχέσεις της με την Αρμενία και επίσης υποστηρίζουμε σθεναρά τις προσπάθειες να επιλυθεί η σύγκρουση στο Ναγκόρνο – Καραμπάχ.

Συζητήσαμε το Κυπριακό, θέμα με το οποίο επίσης ασχολήθηκε ο πρόεδρος, όταν ήταν στην Τουρκία, τον Απρίλιο. Οι δύο κύπριοι ηγέτες έχουν μία ευκαιρία, μέσω της δέσμευσής τους για διαπραγματεύσεις, υπό την αιγίδα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και οι ΗΠΑ είναι πρόθυμες να βοηθήσουν τις πλευρές. Θέλουμε να εργαστούμε στην κατεύθυνση μιας ρύθμισης που θα επανενώνει την Κύπρο, σε μια διζωνική και δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία.

Συζητήσαμε πάρα πολλά θέμα και είμαι απλώς ευγνώμων για τη δέσμευση του υπουργού και της κυβέρνησής του να παίξουν έναν ενεργό ρόλο στο δυναμικό μας κόσμο. Η σχέση μας δεν αφορά μόνο την ασφάλεια, αλλά και την αξιοποίηση αυτών των ευκαιριών και προσβλέπω στη συνεργασία μαζί σας.

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΝΤΑΒΟΥΤΟΓΛΟΥ: Σας ευχαριστώ πάρα πολύ, υπουργέ Κλίντον. Είναι για μένα μεγάλη τιμή και ευχαρίστηση το ότι συνάντησα σήμερα την υπουργό Κλίντον σε μια εντελώς ιστορική στιγμή, μετά το χθεσινό λόγο του προέδρου Ομπάμα και τη νέα δέσμευση των ΗΠΑ για περιφερειακή και παγκόσμια ειρήνη παντού. Γνωρίζουμε τη σοφία, τις προσεγγίσεις της, και πάντα εκτιμάμε και θαυμάζουμε την προσέγγισή της στα θέματα που αφορούν τα διμερή, περιφερειακά και παγκόσμια ζητήματα.

Βασικά, ο σκοπός της επίσκεψής μου ήταν να ανταποδώσω την ιστορική της επίσκεψη στην Τουρκία, αμέσως μετά τη συγκρότηση της νέας διοίκησης το Μάρτιο, και την ιστορική επίσκεψη του προέδρου Ομπάμα τον Απρίλη. Έτσι, αυτές οι ιστορικές επισκέψεις δείχνουν τη δύναμη των διμερών μας σχέσεων. Έτσι ήρθα εδώ μόλις τον πρώτο μήνα μετά την ανάληψη των καθηκόντων μου, ως υπουργού εξωτερικών, ώστε να συμπεριλάβω όλα τα περιεχόμενα, όλα τα ζητήματα που αφορούν τις σχέσεις μας. Είχαμε μια πολύ εποικοδομητική συνάντηση. Είμαι ευγνώμων γι` αυτό. Και ασχοληθήκαμε με όλα τα ζητήματα, αντιμετωπίζοντας το βάθος και τους στόχους της ατζέντας μας. Αποφασίσαμε να έχουμε πολύ πιο πλατειά και με μεγαλύτερη κατανόηση προσέγγιση στις διμερείς μας σχέσεις, όχι μόνο όσον αφορά τα ζητήματα ασφάλειας, αλλά και την οικονομία, την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια, τα πολιτιστικά ζητήματα. Επίσης, στα κύρια περιφερειακά ζητήματα (Μέση Ανατολή, Ιράκ, Αφγανιστάν, Πακιστάν, Καύκασος) και όλα τα σχετικά θέματα που έχουμε σε κοινή ατζέντα, προχωρήσαμε. Και είμαι πολύ ευτυχής που έχουμε ταυτόσημες, όμοιες προσεγγίσεις σε πολλά από αυτά τα ζητήματα.

Όσον αφορά τις παγκόσμιες υποθέσεις, συμφωνήσαμε μαζί ότι η συνεργασία μας δεν θα έπρεπε να περιοριστεί μόνο σε περιφερειακές προσπάθειες, αλλά υπάρχει ένα μεγάλο δυναμικό μεταξύ Τουρκίας και ΗΠΑ, για να δουλέψουν μαζί πάνω σε παγκόσμια ζητήματα, όπως είναι οι σχέσεις ανάμεσα στους πολιτισμούς. Συμμαχία των Πολιτισμών, όπως οι G – 20 και οικονομική – η κατάσταση μετά την οικονομική κρίση, όπως η συνεργασία μας στο Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ. Όπως γνωρίζετε, η Τουρκία πήρε την προεδρία πριν από λίγες μέρες. Και ήμουν χθες στη Νέα Υόρκη για την πρώτη τακτική συνεδρίαση του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ.

            Ως Τουρκία – ως υπουργός εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας και ως τουρκική κυβέρνηση, είμαστε έτοιμοι να συνεργαστούμε με τος ΗΠΑ σε αυτά τα σημαντικά ζητήματα, για να επιτύχουμε περιφερειακή και παγκόσμια ειρήνη. Αυτή είναι η συνεισφορά μας στο (... δεν ακούστηκε – σημ. δική μου: είναι προφανώς απομαγνητοφώνηση). Σας ευχαριστώ πάρα πολύ.

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ: Πολύ καλά υπουργέ.

ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ: Είμαι ο Γιουμίτ Ενγινσόϊ από το τουρκικό κανάλι NTV. Κυρία υπουργέ, μετά τις τουρκικές, αρμενικές και ελβετικές δηλώσεις του Απριλίου, σε σχέση με την κοινή πρόθεση για την εξομάλυνση των σχέσεων, έχετε παρατηρήσει καμμία πρόοδο προς αυτό το σκοπό και επίσης προς το σκοπό της επίλυσης του προβλήματος του Ναγκόρνο – Καραμπάχ; Και ελπίζετε ότι αυτά τα ζητήματα θα μπορούσαν να λυθούν στο όχι πολύ μακρινό μέλλον; Σας ευχαριστώ.

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ: Λοιπόν, πήρα πολύ θάρρος από την πρόοδο που έχει γίνει και από τη δέσμευση των κυβερνήσεων που εμπλέκονται. Οπωσδήποτε, η Τπυρκία και η Αρμενία, με τη συνδρομή της ελβετικής κυβέρνησης, έχουν δεσμευτεί σε μια διαδικασία εξομάλυνσης. Έχουμε απολύτως υπ` όψη μας ότι αυτό είναι δύσκολο. Απαιτεί υπομονή και επαγρύπνηση. Αλλά δεν έχουμε δει ταλάντευση της δέσμευσης.

Ο υπουργός και εγώ το συζητήσαμε επί μακρόν. Με οδήγησε να δω τις βελτιώσεις. Και συνεχίζουμε να ενθαρρύνουμε τις πλευρές, ώστε να προχωρήσουν στο μονοπάτι που οι ίδιες χάραξαν. Είμαστε υποστηρικτικοί, αλλά είναι στο χέρι των κυβερνήσεων και των λαών της Τουρκίας και της Αρμενίας να συνειδητοποιήσουν τη μεγάλη ευκαιρία που προσφέρεται. Η εξομάλυνση των σχέσεων όχι μόνο συνεχίζει αυτό που έχω δει από την τουρκική κυβέρνηση, που είναι μια επιθυμία να λυθούν αυτή τη στιγμή προβλήματα, πράγμα που επικροτώ, αλλά νομίζω ότι αυτό θα επιφέρει μεγάλα οφέλη στην περιοχή.

            Επίσης, με τις συνεχιζόμενες διαπραγματεύσεις για το Ναγκόρνο – Καραμπάχ, οι κυβερνήσεις του Αζερμπαϊτζάν και της Αρμενίας προχωρούν και δουλεύουν από κοινού. Μόλις βγήκαν από μια πρόσφατη συνάντηση στην Αγία Πετρούπολη. Έτσι, πιστεύουμε ότι μεγάλη πρόοδος έχει γίνει σε ένα σχετικά σύντομο διάστημα, ως προς την επίλυση προβλημάτων που υπήρχαν επί μακρόν.

            Το σημαντικό είναι η δέσμευση να φτάσουμε σε ένα σημείο επίλυσης αυτών των συγκρούσεων και τη βλέπω αυτή τη δέσμευση. Τώρα, υπάρχουν τρέχοντα προβλήματα; Οπωσδήποτε. Υπάρχουν σε κάθε δύσκολη διαδικασία. Αλλά δεν αμφισβητώ τη δέσμευση και οπωσδήποτε εκτιμώ την πολύ ισχυρή θέση που έχει πάρει η τουρκική κυβέρνηση. Και, ίσως, υπουργέ, θα θέλατε να προσθέσετε κάτι σ` αυτό;

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΏΝ ΝΤΑΒΟΥΤΟΓΛΟΥ:  Θα ήθελα επίσης να εκφράσω τις ευχαριστίες μου στην υπουργό Κλίντον, για την προσωπική της υποστήριξη και την υποστήριξη της κυβέρνησης των ΗΠΑ σε αυτές τις δύο διαδικασίες. Θέλουμε να επιτύχουμε μία πλούσια και ειρηνική Καυκασία. Και, κατά την έννοια αυτή, είμαστε πλήρως δεσμευμένοι στη διαδικασία εξομάλυνσης των σχέσεών μας με την Αρμενία και επίσης, είμαστε πλήρως δεσμευμένοι και έτοιμοι να δουλέψουμε με τις ΗΠΑ και άλλους ομοτράπεζους της Ομάδας Μινσκ για την επίλυση των αρμενοαζερικών προβλημάτων.

            Και ήμουν πολύ εντυπωσιασμένος και θέλω να επαναλάβω τις ευχαριστίες μου για τη δέσμευση της κυρίας υπουργού Κλίντον σε αυτό το πνεύμα και θα δουλέψουμε μαζί. Υπάρχει μια ισχυρή πολιτική βούληση από την τουρκική πλευρά να συνεχίσουμε τις προσπάθειες ώστε να επιτευχθεί ο κοινός σκοπός μιας πλούσιας και ειρηνικής Καυκασίας.

ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ: Υπουργέ εξωτερικών Νταβούτογλου, πως εκτιμάτε το λόγο του προέδρου Ομπάμα προς το μουσουλμανικό κόσμο στο Κάϊρο; Και, υπουργέ Κλίντον, μετά την επίσκεψη του προέδρου Ομπάμα στην Τουρκία, ποια είναι η κατάσταση των τουρκοαμερικανικών σχέσεων;

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΝΤΑΒΟΥΤΟΓΛΟΥ: Σας ευχαριστώ πάρα πολύ. Η χθεσινή ομιλία του προέδρου Ομπάμα στο Κάϊρο είναι μια ομιλία σοφίας, μια ομιλία με όραμα και μια ομιλία ειρήνης. Και μοιραζόμαστε εξ ίσου την άποψη της υπουργού Κλίντον. Συμμεριζόμαστε αυτή την οπτική γωνία και είμαστε έτοιμοι να συνεργαστούμε. Είμαι βέβαιος ότι θυμόσαστε την επίσκεψη του προέδρου Ομπάμα και την ομιλία του στο τουρκικό κοινοβούλιο. Και όταν κοιτάξετε την ουσία των δύο ομιλιών, θα μπορέσετε να δείτε μια βαθμιαία προσέγγιση, τη συνέχιση και εξέλιξη πολλών θεμάτων που είναι πολύ σημαντικές αρχές για τα περιφερειακά προβλήματα αλλά και για την παγκόσμια τάξη γενικά. Και είναι ένα καλό μήνυμα, ένα καθαρό μήνυμα στο μουσουλμανικό κόσμο ότι οι μελλοντικές σχέσεις ανάμεσα στις ΗΠΑ και το μουσουλμανικό κόσμο, όπως και ανάμεσα σε διαφορετικές κουλτούρες, θα είναι λαμπρές, στηριγμένες σε μία αμοιβαία κατανόηση της συνύπαρξης, της κοινής ζωής, στο μοίρασμα όλων των ανθρώπινων αξιών σε όλα τα μέτωπα. Και, ως εκ τούτου, συμμεριζόμαστε αυτό το όραμα και θα συνεχίσουμε να δουλεύουμε ώστε να υλοποιηθεί αυτό το όραμα, ως πρόγραμμα και σχέδιο μαζί.

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΚΛΙΝΤΟΝ: Λοιπόν, εκτιμώ τα προηγούμενα σχόλια του υπουργού, για το χθεσινό λόγο του προέδρου Ομπάμα. Σαφώς, ο πρόεδρος εκθέτει ένα όραμα και είναι ένα όραμα που καλεί όλους τους ανθρώπους καλής πίστης να ενωθούν, να δουλέψουν μαζί, να αναγνωρίσουν ότι μπορεί να έχουμε διαφορές ως προς τις εμπειρίες, ως προς τα περιβάλλοντα, ως προς τη θρησκεία και τη φυλή, αλλά είμαστε όλοι τμήμα της κοινής ανθρωπότητας. Και έχουμε μια ευκαιρία τον 21^ο αιώνα να δουλέψουμε με σκοπό την υλοποίηση αυτού του οράματος. Και επικροτώ την τουρκική κυβέρνηση που είχε μια πρακτική, έμπρακτη προσέγγιση για να λύσει προβλήματα, να ξεκαθαρίσει τα εμπόδια που αποτρέπουν τους ανθρώπους από το να ζήσουν σύμφωνα με το δυναμικό που τους έδωσε ο δικός τους θεός, από χώρες που σπάνε τα δεσμά του παρελθόντος ώστε να μπορούν να έχουν ένα καλύτερο μέλλον.

            Και νομίζω ότι η σχέση ανάμεσα στην Τουρκία και τις ΗΠΑ είναι εξαιρετικά ισχυρή. Έχουμε ένα διαρκή δεσμό που πηγαίνει πολλές δεκαετίες πίσω, αλλά ερευνούμε νέους τρόπους για να διευρύνουμε και να βαθύνουμε αυτή την ισχυρή σχέση. Και αυτός ήταν ο σκοπός της σημερινής μας συνάντησης: να αρχίσουμε να κοιτάμε πώς μπορούμε να συνεχίσουμε το μοιρασμένο μας όραμα για το τι μπορούν η Τουρκία και οι ΗΠΑ να προσφέρουν στην περαιτέρω απαίτηση της ανθρωπότητας για ειρήνη, ευημερία και πρόοδο, αναγνωρίζοντας και σε πνεύμα σεβασμού των εύλογων διαφορών μας ως προς τον πολιτισμό και τη θρησκεία, αλλά καθιστώντας σαφές ότι θα μοιραστούμε αυτόν τον διαρκώς αλληλεξαρτώμενο κόσμο. Και μπορεί να υπάρχει είτε θετική είτε αρνητική αλληλεξάρτηση. Και η Τουρκία και οι ΗΠΑ πιστεύουν σε ένα θετικό μέλλον.

            Έτσι, δεν θα μπορούσα να είμαι ευτυχέστερη και πιο αισιόδοξη για τις σχέσεις μας και για το τι μπορούμε να κάνουμε μαζί στο μέλλον.

Σας ευχαριστώ όλους πάρα πολύ.

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Δευτέρα, 6 Απρίλιος 2009 ΣΤΗΡΙΞΤΕ ΠΑΝΤΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΑΓΚΥΡΑ

Τι προτείνουν (και ήδη εφαρμόζει) στον Ομπάμα οι Μπρεζίνσκι, Σκόουκροφτ και Κίσσινγκερ για την Τουρκία

-“ΠΙΕΣΤΕ ΣΘΕΝΑΡΑ” ΤΟΝ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΦΙΑ
-ΣΤΗΡΙΞΤΕ ΠΑΝΤΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΑΓΚΥΡΑ και
-Πάρτε αέριο από τους Τούρκους, please
H έκθεση του CSIS για Τουρκία και αμερικανοτουρκικές σχέσεις

Του Δημήτρη Κωνσταντακόπουλου
Παραμονές της επίσκεψης Ομπάμα στην Τουρκία, το Κέντρο Στρατηγικών και Διεθνών Σπουδών των ΗΠΑ (CSIS) ολοκλήρωσε την πολύμηνη σύνταξη έκθεσης για την “Εξελισσόμενη Δυναμική της Τουρκίας” και τις “Στρατηγικές Επιλογές για τις σχέσεις ΗΠA-Τουρκίας”, που αποσκοπεί εμφανώς στον προσανατολισμό της αμερικανικής πολιτικής στην περιοχή.
Η έκθεση του CSIS (στη διεύθυνση του συμμετέχει ο αρχιτέκτων του 1974 Κίσσινγκερ) υπογραμμίζει τον ρόλο της Τουρκίας και τη στήριξη που πρέπει να της προσφερθεί σε μια σειρά ζητήματα, και ζητήματα ζωτικού ελληνικού συμφέροντος. Αποδίδει κεντρικότατη
σημασία στο κυπριακό, ως το σημαντικότερο εμπόδιο για την τουρκική ενταξιακή πορεία που θα κριθεί εν πολλοίς φέτος. Συνιστά απερίφραστα άσκηση «σθεναρών πιέσεων» στη Λευκωσία. Εξισώνει την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία με το ψευδοκράτος. Θεωρεί ότι η εκλογή Χριστόφια και η παρουσία Ταλάτ προσφέρουν την καλύτερη ευκαιρία για επίτευξη λύσης, “πιθανώς μιας παραλλαγής του σχεδίου Ανάν με άλλο όνομα”, αλλά εκφράζει ανησυχία για το τι θα γίνει αν καθυστερήσει η λύση και αλλάξει το κλίμα.
Η έκθεση στηρίζει τη σημασία της Τουρκίας ως ενεργειακής γέφυρας και των αντίστοιχων σχεδίων (ανταγωνιστικών των ελληνορωσικών Σάουθστρημ και Μπουργκάς-Αλεξανδρούπολη). Ζητά να μη ψηφισθεί το νομοσχέδιο για την αρμενική γενοκτονία.
Η έκθεση, πολλές από τις συστάσεις της οποίας εφαρμόζονται ήδη, αντανακλά τη σημασία που αποδίδει η στον τουρκικό ρόλο, αλλά και την πολυετή, πολυδάπανη και αποτελεσματικότατη τουρκική δραστηριότητα σε διπλωματικό και «λομπίστικο» επίπεδο. Αυτά συμβαίνουν παρόλα τα πολλά προβλήματα που δημιουργεί κατά καιρούς η Άγκυρα στην Ουάσιγκτον (ή μήπως εξαιτίας αυτών;).
Μόνο θλίψη προκαλεί στον Έλληνα αναγνώστη η πλήρης απουσία, κυριολεκτικά, της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου, ως παραγόντων των οποίων τα εθνικά συμφέροντα και η ασφάλεια κάπως πρέπει να ληφθούν υπόψιν! Είναι σαν να μην υπάρχουμε ως κράτη. Μια απουσία που αντανακλά πολυετή “παράλυση” της ελληνικής διπλωματικής και “λομπικής” δράσης, εκτίμησης ότι Αθήνα-Λευκωσία είναι “πιέσιμες”, ακόμη και σε ζωτικά θέματα, απουσίας εν τέλει ευκρινών στρατηγικών στόχων μιας ελληνικής διπλωματίας που έχει εξελιχθεί κυρίως σε συνήγορο της τουρκικής ένταξης! Είναι προφανές στον αναγνώστη, ότι δεν υφίσταται κανενός είδους και επιπέδου στρατηγικός διάλογος Αθήνας-Ουάσιγκτον, ανάλογος του αμερικανοτουρκικού.

ΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΟ CSIS
Το CSIS έχει ιδρυθεί από τον Μπρζεζίνσκι και είναι ένα από τα σοβαρότερα συντηρητικά θινκ τανκ της Ουάσιγκτον με μεγάλη επιρροή στην αμερικανική πρωτεύουσα. Το διευθύνει ο Σαν Ναν, μια μεγάλη μορφή της αμερικανικής στρατηγικής και διπλωματίας, ενώ στο συμβούλιό του συμμετέχουν σημαίνοντες παράγοντες, που έχουν παίξει αποφασιστικό ρόλο στην αμερικανική στρατηγική τον τελευταίο μισό αιώνα, όπως ο Κίσσινγκερ, ο επίτιμος Πρόεδρος της Μέριλ Λιντς, ο Πρόεδρος της Κόκα’Κόλα, οι Σλέσινγκερ, Νάι, Κοέν, Καρλούτσι, Χαλιλζάντ και πολλοί άλλοι, μεταξύ τους και ο Τζωρτζ Αργυρός. Τη σύνταξη της έκθεσης επέβλεψε ομάδα υπό τον Μπρζεζίνσκι, από τους κύριους διαμορφωτές της αμερικανικής στρατηγικής και σύμβουλος του Ομπάμα και τον πτέραρχο Σκώουκροφτ, Σύμβουλο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας του πατρός Μπους. Στην ομάδα συμμετείχαν οι Πρέσβεις Αμπράμοβιτς και Χολμς (που είναι και Πρόεδρος του Αμερικανοτουρκικού Συμβουλίου), ο πρώην υποδιοικητής των αμερικανικών δυνάμεων στην Ευρώπη, πτέραρχος Τζέιμερσον και ο Τζων Λόγκλιν του Πωλ Νίτσε Σκούλ στο Πανεμιστήμιο Τζων Χόπκινς. Μεταξύ των συγγραφέων της έκθεσης είναι ο Μπουλέντ Αλιριζά, συγγενής του Ντενκτάς. Συντάκτης του τμήματος της έκθεσης που αοφρά την Κύπρο είναι ο Ίαν Λέσσερ, συνεργάτης της Ραντ Κορπορέισιον, στον οποίο το ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ είχε “συναναθέσει” στο παρελθόν τη σύνταξη ενός εγχειριδίου για την ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική! Τον συντονισμό της σύνταξης είχε η Κάλεϊ Λέβιτ, ειδική βοηθός της έδρας Κίσσινγκερ στο CSIS, πρώην μαθητευόμενη του Νιού Ισραελ Φαντ.

Κυπριακό και ΕΕ
Η έκθεση δίνει μεγάλο βάρος στο κυπριακό, λόγω της ανάγκης προώθησης της τουρκικής ένταξης στην ΕΕ, που η Ουάσιγκτον εξακολουθεί να στηρίζει πάση θυσία, παρά τις προφανείς δυσκολίες, αλλά και της όλης σχέσης Τουρκίας-Δύσης. Η Κύπρος έπαυσε πλέον να είναι κεντρική στην αμερικανοτουρκική σχέση (λόγω της ελληνοτουρκικής ύφεσης), επηρεάζει πολύ όμως την ενταξιακή πορεία της Άγκυρας, υπογραμμίζει η έκθεση, προσθέτοντας ότι “ο ερχομός της κυβέρνησης Χριστόφια, με τον Ταλάτ στην εξουσία της ΤΔΒΚ, συνιστά την καλύτερη προοπτική για λύση του κυπριακού μετά την αποτυχία του σχεδίου Αννάν”, μια λύση που «θα είναι πιθανώς μια εκδοχή του σχεδίου Ανάν υπό άλλη ονομασία». Ακόμη και αυτό θα είναι πρόβλημα, αφού οι συντάκτες εκτιμούν ότι ο τουρκικός στρατός δύσκολα θα ξανααποδεχθεί το σχέδιο Ανάν χωρίς “σοβαρά ανταλλάγματα” σε κάποιον άλλο τομέα και δεν θα του αρέσει η ιδέα μιας σύντομης αποχώρησης από την Κύπρο. Επιπλέον η «απέλαση των εποίκων από την Ανατολία θα προκαλέσει ισχυρή αντίδραση από την Τουρκία», όπως και οποιαδήποτε ενίσχυση των αμυντικών δυνατοτήτων της Κύπρου (στρατιωτικές στο κείμενο, λες και είναι πιθανή κυπριακή εισβολή στην Τουρκία!)
Η έκθεση εκφράζει εμμέσως πλην σαφώς ανησυχία για την “εμπλοκή (involvement) της ρωσικής κυβέρνησης με ελληνοκυπριακά κυβερνητικά, εμπορικά και εγκληματικά στοιχεία” (!), για την “παραδοσιακή συμπάθεια της Ρωσίας για τα ελληνικά συμφέροντα”, ενώ καταγράφει τις ανησυχίες των Τούρκων σχεδιαστών για τον εξοπλισμό της Κύπρου με ρωσικά όπλα και την εν γένει ρωσική παρουσία στο νησί, σημειώνοντας ότι “αν η επικρατούσα ύφεση της Τουρκίας με την Ελλάδα διαλυθεί, υπάρχει κάποια δυνατότητα για την Κύπρο να επανεμφανισθεί ως στοιχείο της περιφερειακής στρατιωτικής ισορροπίας με την Αθήνα, ως πλεονέκτημα για την προβολή τουρκικής ισχύος στο Αιγαίο ή ως μειονέκτημα σε μια μελλοντική διένεξη”.

Με βάση αυτά προτείνει:
1. “Ησυχη αλλά επίμονη αμερικανική διπλωματία με τις ευρωπαϊκές κυβερνήσεις, ως τον αποτελεσματικότερο τρόπο υποστήριξης των ενταξιακών συζητήσεων της Τουρκία”.
2. Ως το “πιο αποτελεσματικό βραχυπρόθεσμο μέτρο“ για να βοηθηθεί η ένταξη της Τουρκίας να προσφερθούν (“αμερικανικά) διπλωματικά μέσα και επιρροή για να επιτευχθεί λύση”, περιλαμβανομένου διορισμού ανώτερου επίσημου για να δουλέψει με τον ειδικό απεσταλμένο του ΟΗΕ.
3. “Η διπλωματία της Ουάσιγκτον προς την Τουρκία πρέπει να συνδυασθεί με σθεναρή (firm) πίεση στην ελληνοκυπριακή κυβέρνηση να έρθει σε συνεννόηση με την εκλεγμένη κυβέρνηση της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας της Βόρειας Κύπρου (ΤΔΒΚ) και στην ΕΕ να τερματίσει την οικονομική απομόνωση της ΤΔΒΚ και στην τουρκική κυβέρνηση να κάνει ανταποδοτικές χειρονομίες, συνεπείς προς τις δεσμεύσεις της προς την ΕΕ για ομαλοποίηση των σχέσεων με τη Λευκωσία” (οι υπογραμμίσεις δικές μας).

Ο σχολιασμός ιδίως της τρίτης από τις προτάσεις περιττεύει. Τριάντα πέντε χρόνια μετά την τουρκική εισβολή και κατοχή τμήματος της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, υπάρχει πλέον από τη μια “ελληνοκυπριακή κυβέρνηση”, επί της οποίας πρέπει να ασκηθούν πιέσεις, παρόλο που προχώρησε ήδη σε πολύ μεγάλες παραχωρήσεις στις διαπραγματεύσεις και η ίδια η έκθεση αναγνωρίζει την προθυμία της για λύση και από την άλλη Τουρκική Δημοκρατία της Βόρειας Κύπρου, άνευ λοιπόν εισαγωγικών. Και προφανώς οι συντάκτες δεν θα χρησιμοποιούσαν αυτή τη γλώσσα σε ένα δημόσιο κείμενο, αν εκτιμούσαν ότι θα κινδύνευε να είναι «αντιπαραγωγική». Για κάποιο λόγο, υποθέτουν ότι θα είναι αποτελεσματικότερη η πίεση από τον κίνδυνο να προκαλέσουν αντίδραση.

Κυπριακό και ελληνοτουρκικά
Η έκθεση υπογραμμίζει επίσης με ελάχιστα συγκαλυμμένη ικανοποίηση τις προόδους της «αποσύζευξης» (decoupling) Ελλάδας και Ελληνοκυπρίων και την σημασία της «ελληνοτουρκικής ύφεσης που μετασχημάτισε το στρατηγικό περιβάλλον στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο», με αποτέλεσμα να παύσει η Κύπρος να είναι «σημαντικό σημείο για τις διμερείς σχέσεις». Η έκθεση υπογραμμίζει την υποστήριξη της Αθήνας στην ενταξιακή πορεία της Άγκυρας και την απογοήτευσή της από την απόρριψη του σχεδίου Ανάν και εκτιμά ότι το κυπριακό θα εξαρτηθεί κυρίως από τις εσωτερικές δυναμικές στο νησί και ότι «είτε μια κυβέρνηση ΝΔ, είτε μια κυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ» θα αποδεχθούν οποιοδήποτε αποτέλεσμα διαπραγμάτευσης.
Γιατί πρέπει να γίνουν αυτά όλα; Γιατί, κατά τους συντάκτες της έκθεσης, μια αποτυχία να κρατηθούν ζωντανές οι διαπραγματεύσεις και να επιτευχθεί αμοιβαία αποδεκτή λύση στην Κύπρο, θα είχε μείζονες συνέπειες για το μέλλον της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ και, ως αποτέλεσμα, για την σχέση της Τουρκίας με τη Δύση ευρύτερα» .

Προνομιακή Σχέση Τουρκίας
Παρά την εντονότατη υποστήριξή της προς την ενταξιακή προοπτική της Άγκυρας, η έκθεση αναγνωρίζει τα τεράστια εμπόδια. Υποστηρίζει ότι η ιδέα μιας “ειδικής σχέσης” παραμένει ασαφής και μη αποδεκτή από την Άγκυρα. Τονίζει τη μεγάλη σημασία να συνεχίσουν οι ΗΠΑ να βοηθούν, αν όχι να καθοδηγούν το όλο σχέδιο, με πολύ “ντελικάτες”, διακριτικές μεθόδους. Αν παρόλα αυτά αποτύχει, ελπίζουν ότι μια ενδεχόμενη μετεξέλιξη της ΕΕ σε “πολλών ταχυτήτων” θα επιτρέψει μια κάπως ομαλή προσγείωση.

Τουρκία-Ρωσία ενέργεια
Η έκθεση σημειώνει, όχι χωρίς κάποια απόχρωση ανησυχίας, ως ιστορική εξέλιξη τη ρωσοτουρκική προσέγγιση του τελευταίου εξαμήνου (που συμπίπτει με την περίοδο σχετικού “παγώματος” της ελληνορωσικής προσέγγισης) και τους αυξανόμενους εμπορικούς, επενδυτικούς και ενεργειακούς δεσμούς, όπως και την προσωπική σχέση Ερντογάν-Πούτιν. Καταγράφουν τις τουρκικές διαβεβαιώσεις για πλήρη ένταξη στο δυτικό στρατόπεδο, δεν επαρκούν όμως αυτές για να εξαφανίσουν κάθε ανησυχία για το θέμα.
Οι συντάκτες δείχνουν κατανόηση στην τουρκική απροθυμία για περισσότερες δυνάμεις στο Αφγανιστάν, στηρίζουν τον ενεργό ρόλο της Άγκυρας στον Καύκασο και τον ναυτικό ρόλο της, με Βουλγαρία, Ρουμανία και Ουκρανία στη Μαύρη Θάλασσα, ως αντιστάθμισμα της ρωσικής παρουσίας. Τονίζουν με μεγάλη έμφαση την ανάγκη να στηριχθεί περαιτέρω ο ρόλος της Τουρκίας και του νότιου διαδρόμου ως ενεργειακής γέφυρας, κι αυτό παρόλο που αναγνωρίζουν τις τεράστιες αντικειμενικές και πολιτικές δυσκολίες (ο νότιος διάδρομος είναι ευθέως ανταγωνιστικός προς τα ελληνορωσικά σχέδια). Στα πλαίσια αυτά υπογραμμίζεται η σημασία του αγωγού Τουρκίας-Ιταλίας-Ελλάδας και εκφράζεται σκεπτικισμός για την πιθανότητα κατασκευής σύντομα του Μπουργκάς-Αλεξανδρούπολη.

Αναρτήθηκε από skal στις 8:24 μμ

Ετικέτες Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική, ΗΠΑ, Τουρκία

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April 6, 2009 Remarks of President Barack Obama Address to Turkish Parliament Ankara, Turkey

3:30 P.M. (Local)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Mr. Speaker, Madam Deputy Speaker, distinguished members, I am honored to speak in this chamber, and I am committed to renewing the alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people.

This is my first trip overseas as President of the United States. I've been to the G20 summit in London, and the NATO summit in Strasbourg, and the European Union summit in Prague. Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet -- yes. (Applause.) Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time.

This morning I had the great privilege of visiting the tomb of your extraordinary founder of your republic. And I was deeply impressed by this beautiful memorial to a man who did so much to shape the course of history. But it is also clear that the greatest monument to Ataturk's life is not something that can be cast in stone and marble. His greatest legacy is Turkey's strong, vibrant, secular democracy, and that is the work that this assembly carries on today. (Applause.)

This future was not easily assured, it was not guaranteed. At the end of World War I, Turkey could have succumbed to the foreign powers that were trying to claim its territory, or sought to restore an ancient empire. But Turkey chose a different future. You freed yourself from foreign control, and you founded a republic that commands the respect of the United States and the wider world.

And there is a simple truth to this story: Turkey's democracy is your own achievement. It was not forced upon you by any outside power, nor did it come without struggle and sacrifice. Turkey draws strength from both the successes of the past, and from the efforts of each generation of Turks that makes new progress for your people.

Now, my country's democracy has its own story. The general who led America in revolution and governed as our first President was, as many of you know, George Washington. And like you, we built a grand monument to honor our founding father -- a towering obelisk that stands in the heart of the capital city that bears Washington's name. I can see the Washington Monument from the window of the White House every day.

It took decades to build. There were frequent delays. Over time, more and more people contributed to help make this monument the inspiring structure that still stands tall today. Among those who came to our aid were friends from all across the world who offered their own tributes to Washington and the country he helped to found.

And one of those tributes came from Istanbul. Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid sent a marble plaque that helped to build the Washington Monument. Inscribed in the plaque was a poem that began with a few simple words: "So as to strengthen the friendship between the two countries." Over 150 years have passed since those words were carved into marble. Our nations have changed in many ways. But our friendship is strong, and our alliance endures.

It is a friendship that flourished in the years after World War II, when President Truman committed our nation to the defense of Turkey's freedom and sovereignty, and Turkey committed itself into the NATO Alliance. Turkish troops have served by our side from Korea to Kosovo to Kabul. Together, we withstood the great test of the Cold War. Trade between our nations has steadily advanced. So has cooperation in science and research.

The ties among our people have deepened, as well, and more and more Americans of Turkish origin live and work and succeed within our borders. And as a basketball fan, I've even noticed that Hedo Turkoglu and Mehmet Okur have got some pretty good basketball games. (Applause.)

The United States and Turkey have not always agreed on every issue, and that's to be expected -- no two nations do. But we have stood together through many challenges over the last 60 years. And because of the strength of our alliance and the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger and the world is more secure.

Now, our two democracies are confronted by an unprecedented set of challenges: An economic crisis that recognizes no borders; extremism that leads to the killing of innocent men and women and children; strains on our energy supply and a changing climate; the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons; and the persistence of tragic conflict.

These are the great tests of our young century. And the choices that we make in the coming years will determine whether the future will be shaped by fear or by freedom; by poverty or by prosperity; by strife or by a just, secure and lasting peace.

This much is certain: No one nation can confront these challenges alone, and all nations have a stake in overcoming them. That is why we must listen to one another, and seek common ground. That is why we must build on our mutual interests, and rise above our differences. We are stronger when we act together. That is the message that I've carried with me throughout this trip to Europe. That is the message that I delivered when I had the privilege of meeting with your President and with your Prime Minister. That will be the approach of the United States of America going forward.

Already, America and Turkey are working with the G20 on an unprecedented response to an unprecedented economic crisis. Now, this past week, we came together to ensure that the world's largest economies take strong and coordinated action to stimulate growth and restore the flow of credit; to reject the pressures of protectionism, and to extend a hand to developing countries and the people hit hardest by this downturn; and to dramatically reform our regulatory system so that the world never faces a crisis like this again.

As we go forward, the United States and Turkey can pursue many opportunities to serve prosperity for our people. The President and I this morning talked about expanding the ties of commerce and trade. There's enormous opportunity when it comes to energy to create jobs. And we can increase new sources to not only free ourselves from dependence of other energies -- other countries' energy sources, but also to combat climate change. We should build on our Clean Technology Fund to leverage efficiency and renewable energy investments in Turkey. And to power markets in Turkey and Europe, the United States will continue to support your central role as an East-West corridor for oil and natural gas.

This economic cooperation only reinforces the common security that Europe and the United States share with Turkey as a NATO ally, and the common values that we share as democracies. So in meeting the challenges of the 21st century, we must seek the strength of a Europe that is truly united, peaceful and free.

So let me be clear: The United States strongly supports Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union. (Applause.) We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of both Turkey and Europe. Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions. Turkey is bound to Europe by more than the bridges over the Bosphorous. Centuries of shared history, culture, and commerce bring you together. Europe gains by the diversity of ethnicity, tradition and faith -- it is not diminished by it. And Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe's foundation once more.

Now, of course, Turkey has its own responsibilities. And you've made important progress towards membership. But I also know that Turkey has pursued difficult political reforms not simply because it's good for EU membership, but because it's right for Turkey.

In the last several years, you've abolished state security courts, you've expanded the right to counsel. You've reformed the penal code and strengthened laws that govern the freedom of the press and assembly. You've lifted bans on teaching and broadcasting Kurdish, and the world noted with respect the important signal sent through a new state Kurdish television station.

These achievements have created new laws that must be implemented, and a momentum that should be sustained. For democracies cannot be static -- they must move forward. Freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthens the state, which is why steps like reopening Halki Seminary will send such an important signal inside Turkey and beyond. An enduring commitment to the rule of law is the only way to achieve the security that comes from justice for all people. Robust minority rights let societies benefit from the full measure of contributions from all citizens.

I say this as the President of a country that not very long ago made it hard for somebody who looks like me to vote, much less be President of the United States. But it is precisely that capacity to change that enriches our countries. Every challenge that we face is more easily met if we tend to our own democratic foundation. This work is never over. That's why, in the United States, we recently ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. That's why we prohibited -- without exception or equivocation -- the use of torture. All of us have to change. And sometimes change is hard.

Another issue that confronts all democracies as they move to the future is how we deal with the past. The United States is still working through some of our own darker periods in our history. Facing the Washington Monument that I spoke of is a memorial of Abraham Lincoln, the man who freed those who were enslaved even after Washington led our Revolution. Our country still struggles with the legacies of slavery and segregation, the past treatment of Native Americans.

Human endeavor is by its nature imperfect. History is often tragic, but unresolved, it can be a heavy weight. Each country must work through its past. And reckoning with the past can help us seize a better future. I know there's strong views in this chamber about the terrible events of 1915. And while there's been a good deal of commentary about my views, it's really about how the Turkish and Armenian people deal with the past. And the best way forward for the Turkish and Armenian people is a process that works through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive.

We've already seen historic and courageous steps taken by Turkish and Armenian leaders. These contacts hold out the promise of a new day. An open border would return the Turkish and Armenian people to a peaceful and prosperous coexistence that would serve both of your nations. So I want you to know that the United States strongly supports the full normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. It is a cause worth working towards.

It speaks to Turkey's leadership that you are poised to be the only country in the region to have normal and peaceful relations with all the South Caucasus nations. And to advance that peace, you can play a constructive role in helping to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has continued for far too long.

Advancing peace also includes the disputes that persist in the Eastern Mediterranean. And here there's a cause for hope. The two Cypriot leaders have an opportunity through their commitment to negotiations under the United Nations Good Offices Mission. The United States is willing to offer all the help sought by the parties as they work towards a just and lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus into a bizonal and bicommunal federation.

These efforts speak to one part of the critical region that surrounds Turkey. And when we consider the challenges before us, on issue after issue, we share common goals.

In the Middle East, we share the goal of a lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. Let me be clear: The United States strongly supports the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. That is a goal shared by Palestinians, Israelis, and people of goodwill around the world. That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the road map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as President of the United States.

We know the road ahead will be difficult. Both Israelis and Palestinians must take steps that are necessary to build confidence and trust. Both Israelis and Palestinians, both must live up to the commitments they have made. Both must overcome longstanding passions and the politics of the moment to make progress towards a secure and lasting peace.

The United States and Turkey can help the Palestinians and Israelis make this journey. Like the United States, Turkey has been a friend and partner in Israel's quest for security. And like the United States, you seek a future of opportunity and statehood for the Palestinians. So now, working together, we must not give into pessimism and mistrust. We must pursue every opportunity for progress, as you've done by supporting negotiations between Syria and Israel. We must extend a hand to those Palestinians who are in need, while helping them strengthen their own institutions. We must reject the use of terror, and recognize that Israel's security concerns are legitimate.

The peace of the region will also be advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambitions. Now, as I made clear in Prague yesterday, no one is served by the spread of nuclear weapons, least of all Turkey. You live in a difficult region and a nuclear arm race would not serve the security of this nation well. This part of the world has known enough violence. It has known enough hatred. It does not need a race for an ever-more powerful tool of destruction.

Now, I have made it clear to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the United States seeks engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We want Iran to play its rightful role in the community of nations. Iran is a great civilization. We want them to engage in the economic and political integration that brings prosperity and security. But Iran's leaders must choose whether they will try to build a weapon or build a better future for their people.

So both Turkey and the United States support a secure and united Iraq that does not serve as a safe haven for terrorists. I know there were differences about whether to go to war. There were differences within my own country, as well. But now we must come together as we end this war responsibly, because the future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of the broader region. As I've already announced, and many of you are aware, the United States will remove our combat brigades by the end of next August, while working with the Iraqi government as they take responsibility for security. And we will work with Iraq, Turkey, and all Iraq's neighbors, to forge a new dialogue that reconciles differences and advances our common security.

Make no mistake, though: Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. That includes the al Qaeda terrorists who have sought to drive Iraqis apart and destroy their country. That includes the PKK. There is no excuse for terror against any nation. (Applause.) As President, and as a NATO ally, I pledge that you will have our support against the terrorist activities of the PKK or anyone else. These efforts will be strengthened by the continued work to build ties of cooperation between Turkey, the Iraqi government, and Iraq's Kurdish leaders, and by your continued efforts to promote education and opportunity and democracy for the Kurdish population here inside Turkey.

Finally, we share the common goal of denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The world has come too far to let this region backslide, and to let al Qaeda terrorists plot further attacks. That's why we are committed to a more focused effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. That is why we are increasing our efforts to train Afghans to sustain their own security, and to reconcile former adversaries. That's why we are increasing our support for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, so that we stand on the side not only of security, but also of opportunity and the promise of a better life.

Turkey has been a true partner. Your troops were among the first in the International Security Assistance Force. You have sacrificed much in this endeavor. Now we must achieve our goals together. I appreciate that you've offered to help us train and support Afghan security forces, and expand opportunity across the region. Together, we can rise to meet this challenge like we have so many before.

I know there have been difficulties these last few years. I know that the trust that binds the United States and Turkey has been strained, and I know that strain is shared in many places where the Muslim faith is practiced. So let me say this as clearly as I can: The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam. (Applause.) In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject, but also to strengthen opportunity for all its people.

I also want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree. We will convey our deep appreciation for the Islamic faith, which has done so much over the centuries to shape the world -- including in my own country. The United States has been enriched by Muslim Americans. Many other Americans have Muslims in their families or have lived in a Muslim-majority country -- I know, because I am one of them. (Applause.)

Above all, above all we will demonstrate through actions our commitment to a better future. I want to help more children get the education that they need to succeed. We want to promote health care in places where people are vulnerable. We want to expand the trade and investment that can bring prosperity for all people. In the months ahead, I will present specific programs to advance these goals. Our focus will be on what we can do, in partnership with people across the Muslim world, to advance our common hopes and our common dreams. And when people look back on this time, let it be said of America that we extended the hand of friendship to all people.

There's an old Turkish proverb: "You cannot put out fire with flames." America knows this. Turkey knows this. There's some who must be met by force, they will not compromise. But force alone cannot solve our problems, and it is no alternative to extremism. The future must belong to those who create, not those who destroy. That is the future we must work for, and we must work for it together.

I know there are those who like to debate Turkey's future. They see your country at the crossroads of continents, and touched by the currents of history. They know that this has been a place where civilizations meet, and different peoples come together. They wonder whether you will be pulled in one direction or another.

But I believe here is what they don't understand: Turkey's greatness lies in your ability to be at the center of things. This is not where East and West divide -- this is where they come together. (Applause.) In the beauty of your culture. In the richness of your history. In the strength of your democracy. In your hopes for tomorrow.

I am honored to stand here with you -- to look forward to the future that we must reach for together -- and to reaffirm America's commitment to our strong and enduring friendship. Thank you very much. (Applause.) Thank you. Thank you.

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American Hellenic Institute Statement on

President Obama’s Speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009

April 9, 2009

Prior to President Obama’s visit to Turkey, the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) wrote to the President on March 26, 2009 in order to bring to his attention the core issues of concern to the Greek American community as he prepared to embark on his trip.  The background and arguments presented were based in support of the rule of law, U.S. laws, international law and in the best interests of the United States.
Ever since President Obama was elected in November and up until the time of his inauguration, there were several reports issued from think-tanks in Washington, D.C.  They advocate that one of the top priorities for President Obama is to engage Turkey in order to repair the “strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey…”  One of the reports goes on to say “…this vital alliance has suffered through serious strains in recent years, mostly due to ill will generated by the 2003 Iraq War.  Today, this neglected alliance is in critical need of repair.”  Further, the report called on the new President to make “…Turkey one of the first stops on [the President’s] first European trip…such a visit to Turkey [should be made] within the context of a European as opposed to a Middle Eastern trip to demonstrate that the United States considers Turkish membership in the EU and stronger ties to the West to be an important strategic objective.”
The report, which is titled “The Neglected Alliance – Restoring U.S.-Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenges” (December 2008) was produced by the Center for American Progress whose President and CEO is John D. Podesta.  This is the same John Podesta who was the Head of President Obama’s transition team and the former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton.
The other reports had a similar message.
The impact of the foreign policy centered Washington think-tank establishment should never be underestimated as to their ability to influence and set forth the foreign policy agenda of any administration.
However, many times, these reports have their own hidden agenda and do not always serve to guide our policy makers in what’s in the best interest of the United States.
We understand that the United States, as a major world power, has a diverse agenda and we don’t view his trip to Turkey within the context of a “zero sum game,” just because he didn’t also visit Greece.  However, we look forward to monitoring future developments as to when the President might see it appropriate to visit Greece and if there are any invitations lurking in the horizon for Prime Minister Karamanlis and President Christofias to visit the United States.
The President’s agenda in Turkey was to go there in order to seek support for Afghanistan and Iran, and for an exit corridor for our U.S. troops out of Iraq.  Within this context he also looked to try and heal the strain in U.S. relations with Turkey.
However, this trip also provided the president with a great opportunity to send a strong message to Turkey as it relates to stability and U.S. interests in the region within the context of outstanding issues relating to Greece and Cyprus.
How did he do?
We commend him for raising two very important issues, that of Cyprus and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Regarding the Patriarchate he said: 

“Freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthen the state, which is why steps like reopening the Halki Seminary will send such an important signal inside Turkey and beyond.  An enduring commitment to the rule of law is the only way to achieve the security that comes from justice for all people.”

We would have appreciated a more definitive comment along the lines of his pre-campaign statement and not one that implies it will be a good “step” to re-open Halki. In his October 2008 statement, he said:

“[He was] one of 73 Senators who signed a letter to President Bush in 2006 urging him to press Turkey to restore the full rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Orthodox Christian Church in Istanbul. [And he had sent] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice a personal letter on the same matter. [He  called on] Turkey to respect the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s rights and freedoms, including its property rights.  Turkey should allow the reopening of the Patriarchate’s school of theology on Halki Island and guarantee the right to train clergy of all nationalities, not just Turkish nationals.”

As pointed out by this statement, there are a number of serious issues facing the Ecumenical Patriarchate, not just Halki.  He should have also called on Turkey to address them as well. Turkey should immediately:

• recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its nonpolitical religious mission;

• ensure the continued maintenance of the institution’s physical security needs, as provided for under Turkish and international law, including the Treaty of Lausanne, the 1968 Protocol, the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris;

• provide for the proper protection and safety of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Patriarchate personnel;

• reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki Patriarchal School of Theology;” and

• return 7,000 plus church properties illegally taken.

We hope that the President addressed these issues during his private meetings with the Turkish leaders.
Further, it would have sent a stronger message to Turkey if he had visited with the Ecumenical Patriarch at the Patriarchate itself rather than in his hotel.  We are certain that if he was in Rome, the President would not have had the Pope visit him in his hotel.  We must remember that the Ecumenical Patriarch is the spiritual leader of close to 300 million Orthodox Christians throughout the world, including approximately 5 million in the United States!
Regarding Cyprus he said:

“Advancing peace also includes the disputes that persist in the Eastern Mediterranean.  And here there’s a cause for hope. The two Cypriot leaders have an opportunity through their commitment to negotiations under the United Nations Good Offices Mission.  The United States is willing to offer all the help sought by the parties as they work towards a just and lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus into a bizonal and bicommunal federation.”

Here again, we commend the President for raising these issues within the context of a “bizonal and bicommunal federation.”
However, he equates President Demetrios Christofias, who is internationally recognized as the President of the Republic of Cyprus, except by Turkey, with that of the leader of the 18% Turkish Cypriot minorit, Mehmet Ali Talat, when he refers to both as being the “two Cypriot leaders.”
And it is important to note that the president did not make any mention of the continuing ongoing Turkish occupation on Cyprus the way he did in his October 2008 campaign statement.  At that time he said in part:

“…A negotiated political settlement on Cyprus would end the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus and repair the island’s tragic division while paving the way to prosperity and peace throughout the entire region.”

It would have been extremely useful to the negotiations process had he reiterated this in his speech.
Further, if the United States is truly “willing to offer all the help sought by the parties as they work towards a just and lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus” it can begin by calling on Turkey to:

• demilitarize Cyprus now;

• withdraw its 43,000 occupation troops illegally in Cyprus (Turkey’s troops can be more useful if deployed in Afghanistan);

• return to Turkey the 180,000 illegal settlers/colonists from Turkey in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949;

• tear down the green line barbed-wire fence across the face of Cyprus which, together with Turkey’s 40,000 occupation forces, is the real cause of the alleged isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in the occupied northern part of Cyprus; and

• warn Turkish leaders not to manipulate the current talks or restrict Mr. Talat at the bargaining table.

Advocating these policy decisions would underscore support for the rule of law and respect for international law.  This would illustrate that the United States truly wishes to advance the cause of solving the 35-year-old Cyprus problem. Continuing former failed policies that promote a double standard in applying the rule of law to Turkey and the continuing appeasement of Turkey does not serve U.S. interests.
Finally, Turkey continues to create serious problems in the Aegean by almost on a daily basis violating Greece’s territorial integrity.  This is a very important issue as it also relates to the stability of the region and by extension U.S. interests there.  Yet President Obama did not refer to this issue or make any reference to the importance of continuing to advance the cause of strengthening Turkish relations with Greece-two NATO allies.
While we understand that the President’s main focus in Turkey was to receive support for our military operations in Afghanistan and other outstanding issues referred to earlier, there are no indications that would prove that the Turks promised us anything.
And what’s worse, the President, in an effort to appease Turkey, referred to Turkey as being a “…resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions.”  How?  By occupying a European Union country?  By continuing to threaten Greece, a NATO ally, with war (casus belli) and promote claims that are unfounded and devoid of any legal basis? By not allowing our soldiers to advance into northern Iraq during the Iraqi War unless we gave them 32 billion dollars?  We could continue.
 Be that is it may, it is still appreciated that the President at least raised a number of our core issues in a public setting and that he did meet with the Ecumenical Patriarch. For this, we once again commend and thank him.
However, we now look forward to the President following through and to monitor Turkey to see if she will heed his suggestions.
To do this, would give further sustenance to the President’s commitment to advancing his Administration’s agenda within the rule of law and transparency, not only at home but abroad.
The AHI makes these comments and recommendations for the successful resolution of the above mentioned issues as embodied within the fundamental principles of democracy and founded on the rule of law as in the best interests of the United States. 
 

1220 16th Street, NW | Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone 202-785-8430 | Fax 202-785-5178 | www.ahiworld.org  

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22/05/2010 | Της Μικαέλλας Λοίζου, Η Σημερινή, Σάββατο, 19/06/2010

Από ιστορική αμνησία πρέπει να πάσχει ο Μπαν Κι Μουν. Δεν εξηγείται αλλιώς πώς ο κατ’ εξοχήν εκπρόσωπος της διεθνούς νομιμότητας θεώρησε ορθό να προβεί σε τόσο εγκωμιαστικά σχόλια για μια κατοχική δύναμη, εμφανίζοντας την, λίγο ή πολύ, ως μέγιστο ειρηνευτή στην ευρύτερη περιοχή! Και τι δεν είπε ο Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ σε ομιλία του, χθες, στο Πανεπιστήμιο Μπογάζιτσι στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. «Η διπλωματία σας είναι ενεργητική, δημιουργική και με αρχές!», ανέφερε στους Τούρκους. Το πιο σημαντικό, πρόσθεσε, είναι πως φέρνει αποτελέσματα. Σημείωσε ότι η Τουρκία είναι μεταξύ των 25 κορυφαίων χορηγών στον προϋπολογισμό των ΗΕ, ενώ έκανε ιδιαίτερη αναφορά στις ειρηνευτικές της αποστολές. Μίλησε, επίσης, για την ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια της τουρκικής κοινωνίας των πολιτών σε όλον τον κόσμο.

Αναφερόμενος στον Τούρκο Πρωθυπουργό, ο κ. Μπαν θαύμασε τις ηγετικές ικανότητές του, λέγοντας ότι οι προσπάθειές του, για τη δημιουργία μίας σταθερής γειτονιάς, μιας περιοχής κοινής ευημερίας στη Μεσόγειο, θα προχωρήσουν βοηθώντας ιστορικούς αντιπάλους ν' αδράξουν κοινές ευκαιρίες.

Ασπάζεται τα τουρκικά οράματα!

Η Τουρκία, τόνισε ο κ. Μπαν, είναι μέρος του ΣΑ του ΟΗΕ και έχει γίνει «δύναμη προόδου στην περιοχή και πέρα από αυτήν. Ας δουλέψουμε μαζί, στο όνομα του διαλόγου και της ειρήνης, Τουρκία και ΗΕ», είπε. Χαρακτήρισε θετικό το γεγονός πως η κατοχική δύναμη έχει φιλόδοξη ατζέντα, λέγοντας ότι «αφήστε να ασπαστούμε το όραμα του ΥΠΕΞ της Τουρκίας: ας υπάρχουν μηδενικά προβλήματα στη γειτονιά».

Σε σχέση με τα εσωτερικά θέματα της Τουρκίας, ο Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ ανέφερε ότι «η δύναμη της όποιας κοινωνίας, τελικά, μετριέται στην ανοχή, την ισότητα, τις εγγυήσεις για ελεύθερη έκφραση και πολιτιστική ποικιλομορφία, ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και το κράτος δικαίου. Περισσότερο είναι ο ακρογωνιαίος λίθος των ευχών των ανθρώπων, όπως εκφράζονται μέσω της κάλπης. Ο δρόμος που διαλέξατε, μπορεί να μην είναι πάντοτε εύκολος, είναι όμως ο σωστός. Δεν τον βαδίζετε μόνοι σας».

Τέλος, ο κ. Μπαν θυμήθηκε τους 5000 Τούρκους στρατιώτες που πολέμησαν στην Κορέα κατά τον β’ παγκόσμιο πόλεμο, καθώς επίσης και το γεγονός πως όταν έπαιξαν οι δύο χώρες στο Παγκόσμιο Κύπελλο πριν από 8 χρόνια, οι παίκτες των δύο χωρών ένωσαν τα χέρια για να κυματίσουν και τις δύο σημαίες, κάτι που θεωρεί «συμβολικό».

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Zeyno Baran and Ian O. Lesser Turkey’s Identity and Strategy –

A Game of Three-Dimensional Chess

With a reaction by Hűseyin Bağci

This essay was prepared for the Stanley Foundation’s Powers and Principles project. The contributors’ affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.

About the Contributors

Zeyno Baran is Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy (CEP) and a Senior Fellow with Hudson’s Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World. Baran previously directed the International Security and Energy Programs at The Nixon Center; and before then, the Georgia Forum and the Caucasus Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has published numerous studies, articles and book chapters on issues ranging from European and Eurasian energy security and stability to Muslim integration in the West.

Ian O. Lesser is Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs and international security issues. Dr. Lesser has been Vice President and Director of Studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a senior analyst and research manager at the RAND Corporation. From 1994-1995, he was a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff.

Hűseyin Bağci is Professor of International Relations at Middle East Technical Universtiy in Ankara. He was previously a guest researcher at the German Society for Foreign Affairs and Senior Fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn. He has published several books and large number of articles on Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-German relations. Bagci was a visiting professor at Bonn University and at La Sapienza University in Rome in 2007 and Lublin University (Poland) in 2008.

About the Project

The aim of the Stanley Foundation’s project on Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World is to identify plausible actions and trends for the next ten years by which the international community could become more unified. The foundation asked contributing authors to describe the paths by which nine powerful nations, a regional union of 27 states, and a multinational corporation could all emerge as constructive stakeholders in a strengthened rules-based international order. For each case, the writers discuss how their given country might deal with the internal and external challenges posed by international norms for the global economy, domestic governance and society, and global and regional security.

Each essay in the series represents an assessment of what is politically possible (and impossible), supported by a description of the associated pressures and incentives. Unlike other future-oriented projects, there were no calculations of probability; we were interested in a particular global future—an international community with broad respect and support for norms—and how it might take shape. Authors were expected to address the particular challenges, pressures both for change and continuity, as well as natural leadership roles pertinent to their actor’s geostrategic position, economy, society, history, and political system and culture.

The project did not apply a checklist or rating system to the question of stakeholdership. A responsible stakeholder can be an upholder, critic, and shaper of the rules-based order all at the same time. But while stakeholdership is not a matter of accepting the entire set of norms, if a powerful nation opts out of too many rules, it will undermine rather than uphold the order. To provide a perspective from the inside and counterweight to each essay, a commentator from the given country (or other actor) has been enlisted to provide critical reactions to the coauthors’ piece.

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Modern Turkey sees itself as a responsible stakeholder, keen to adhere to international norms. Indeed, republican Turkey’s national experience has been closely entwined with the issue of the country’s identity, and with the explicit aim of becoming fully part of the West, including its norms and institutions. This drive for convergence with Western attitudes and practices in fact began well before Atatürk’s secular revolution and the establishment of the modern republic. Turkey has been part of the European system for centuries, and this geopolitical “membership” has had significant internal and external policy implications. The Turkish case is compelling in the context of the “stakeholdership” debate because these issues of identity, affinity and behavior remain unsettled, and because the country has entered a period of pronounced social and political flux.

A few factors and dynamics are discernible as constants in the Turkish experience with regard to norms, stakes, and behavior on the global scene First, the interplay of domestic and external factors is critical. The more problematic aspects of the Turkish case arise mainly in the internal arena, where questions of incomplete democratization, human rights, and identity politics are central to Turkey’s own debate about norms. And these are even more central to the Western debate about Turkey in light of the country’s troubled EU candidacy. With a few notable exceptions—such as the Cyprus intervention of 1974 and periodic cross-border operations in northern Iraq—Ankara’s foreign policy behavior has been considerably less controversial.

Second, there is a continuous tension between Turkey’s desire for full integration with leading institutions on the one hand, and an extraordinary sensitivity to any infringement on national sovereignty on the other. Turks across the political spectrum tend to be highly patriotic, and their notion of Turkish nationalism is often of an unreconstructed variety. Most Turks, including those in official circles, remain uneasy with the weaker, post-modern concept of national sovereignty popular within the EU. Where Turks see risks to national interest, especially in the area of national security, the ideal of multilateral action can be cast aside. In this and other aspects of Turkish strategic culture, there are some notable similarities with the United States. This sovereignty-consciousness sometimes manifests as a wary, highly legalistic approach to international affairs in Ankara. Even sophisticated Turks can be hyper-suspicious about Western intentions toward their country, and an abiding fear of threats to that Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity lies just below the surface.

Third, the question of responsible stakeholdership for Turkey is only partly about the Turks themselves. Many Turks believe that for all of the country’s interest in adherence to international norms and institutions, it is unclear that the West is prepared to accept Turkey as a full member of the club. Europe is deeply ambivalent about Turkey, and many Europeans see Turkey as emblematic of the historic “other.” Muslim opinion, especially in the Arab world, is just as mixed. Russia may see practical value in closer relations with Turkey, but in geostrategic terms, the two countries are traditional competitors. The US also takes a strategic interest in Turkey, but hardly a trustworthy sponsor from the Turkish perspective. So where does Turkey really fit? Should we even expect it to fit? After all, the sense of distinctiveness (evident in another famous Kemalist slogan, “we resemble ourselves”) is an important theme in Turkish discourse.

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Measured against the full spectrum of international behavior, Turkey is a conservative, status quo actor: slow to move unilaterally and firmly attached to international norms. Turkey belongs to leading Western organizations, including NATO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe, and is a candidate for EU membership. Yet, in recent years there has been a perceptible shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, toward what some call a “neo-Ottoman” approach, in which Islamic identity and Middle Eastern interests play a greater role. According to this vision, which is popular across the ideological spectrum, Turkey should draw on its special cultural, historic, and religious links to its former possessions and rise to major power status through deeper involvement across this vast geography. This view calls for Turkey to act independently in accordance with Islamic or Turkic culture and norms—not necessarily Western ones. The widespread support for this approach has, for instance, pushed Turkey toward a more active role in non-Western institutions such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which brings together 57 mostly Muslim-majority countries.

As part of this self-confident vision, Ankara aims to take part in the full panoply of intergovernmental institutions. For example, Turkey has put itself forward as a candidate for a two-year elected seat on the UN Security Council in 2009 (it succeeded). In its associated diplomatic campaign, Turkey has established unprecedented government, business, and civil society relations with countries in Africa, South Asia and Latin America, including Caribbean and Pacific states with few if any previous ties to Ankara.

Looking ahead, we believe the key areas to watch are Turkey’s internal evolution, the related consequences for Ankara’s foreign and security policies, and the completeness of Turkey’s integration in the West, and possible alternative postures.

Kemalist Turkey and the Pressures for Change

Ever since its founding, the Turkish state defined Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism as existential threats to the Republic. The Kemalist establishment has swung into action—at times with military force—when any perceived “red lines” were crossed on either of these issues. These two issues are also at the heart of the Turkish debate on political and human rights, including freedom of speech and minority rights, as well as general reform initiatives.

The reforms that began with Turgut Özal in the 1980s were interrupted when an Islamist party came to office in 1996 in a coalition and then was ousted by a “post-modern” coup a year later. The 2002 elections brought to power its more moderate successor, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which garnered enough seats to rule without coalition partners. The AKP owes its success partly to other parties’ loss of legitimacy as well as to its own pro-EU, pro-reform, and pro-economic liberalism platform. The AKP received strong support from reform-minded democrats and from the business community, which had suffered greatly during the economic crisis of 2001. Turkey had endured a string of no fewer than seven tumultuous coalition governments stretching back to 1983. This degree of political instability is deadly to investment; as a result, the Turkish economy

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tottered along a roller coaster track—though on average, in the decade between 1991 and 2001 annual real GDP growth averaged 3.7 percent. The AKP heavily promoted and then successfully implemented the economic recovery program introduced in March 2001 by former World Bank vice-president and later economy minister Kemal Dervis. In 2004, inflation fell to single digits for the first time since 1976. Average growth during the AKP’s first five years in office was 7.4 percent. Following a fairly strong five-year record of economic performance, the AKP was returned to office in July 2007 with an unprecedented 47 percent of the vote.

Most importantly, the AKP campaigned on themes of hope and optimism for the future. Clearly, the opening of EU accession talks made Turkey attractive to foreign investment, and overall global market trends certainly helped. But what is most significant is that the AKP government showed unprecedented openness to privatization. Business interests were pleased with the AKP’s pro-EU policies and the boost that they gave to international investment. Liberal democrats also looked to EU norms and saw Turkey’s future rightful place as being within the EU. Even though the EU’s favorability rating among Turks has wavered—going from some 58 percent in 2004 to 27 percent in 2007, and roughly 41 percent in late 2008—businesspeople, liberals, and Islamists still consider the EU one of their best levers against what they see as the rigid Kemalist establishment.1

The AKP has also been most eager to integrate the traditionally marginalized Kurds and Islamists into the mainstream—as part of what the government has declared to be a much-needed process of “normalization.” Following the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, there were attempts at extending wider political and cultural rights to ethnic Kurds. Then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz went so far as to declare “the road to the EU goes through Diyarbakır.” During a landmark August 2005 visit to Diyarbakır, Prime Minister Erdogan broke further ground in forthrightly stating that Turkey has a “Kurdish problem” which could only be solved by “more democracy, more civil rights, and more prosperity.” Kurds were pleased by the premier’s apparent recognition that the issue transcended the terrorism and national security concerns with which it was usually framed. Many of them voted for the AKP in 2007 elections. In addition, for the first time since 1991, a pro-Kurdish party (Kurdish Democratic Society Party-DTP) was able to gain a position in the Grand National Assembly—at a time when Turkish patience with PKK terrorism had reached its limits.

The third and most important support base for the AKP has come from a nexus of devout Muslims and Islamists. Disappointed in the AKP’s first term, they wanted “one of their own” to be elected president, and expected the party during its second term to deliver on unfulfilled promises—above all, constitutional changes to permit women to wear the Islamic headscarf. As concerns arose about AKP having a “hidden Islamist agenda,” mass demonstrations took place against the election of an AKP president that would extend the party’s power to full control over the executive and the legislature along with the ability to influence the judiciary, effectively putting an end to the separation of powers. Following the military’s so-called “e-coup,” which backfired, the soldiers took a low profile. The most memorable slogan of these rallies, “No shari’a, no coup!” perfectly

¹ See German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends, 2008.

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summed up the two poles pulling the country apart and the desire of the majority for a democratic consensus. In 2007, the main split was between those whose greatest fear was the threat to democracy (from a military coup) and those whose greatest fear was the threat to secularism (from the Islamists).2

² Zeyno Baran, “Turkey Divided,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2008

The Islamist base was emboldened after the July election results and chose confrontation instead of compromise on a number of issues. A president with an Islamist past, Abdullah Gul, was chosen right after the parliamentary elections—thus opening a new chapter in Turkey’s democratic evolution. For the first time, the Turkish Republic has both a president and a prime minister from Islamist backgrounds whose wives wear the Islamic headscarf. With no time to digest such a major change, the AKP commissioned the drafting of a new constitution. While many people wanted to see a new “civilian” constitution eventually replace the one drafted by the military after its 1980 coup, the timing and the process aroused concerns about a religious agenda. In the event, AKP focused heavily on the headscarf issue, neglecting other significant reform proposals, including on issues of concern to liberal Muslims. For example, the Alevi community, some 20 percent of Turkey’s population, has been mostly ignored; Alevi children still have no choice but to follow the Sunni religious curriculum. Civil liberties such as freedom to dissent came under increasing attack from nationalist circles, civil service promotions appeared to be based increasingly on piety rather than merit, and more and more establishments stopped serving alcohol to prove their Islamic credentials—an anathema for secular Turks.

In March 2008, Turkey’s chief prosecutor filed a case with the Constitutional Court, charging that AKP had become “a center of anti-secular activities” and asking that AKP be shut down and 71 of its members banned from elected office for five years. In June the Court overturned the controversial headscarf law. But contrary to domestic and international expectations, on July 30, 2008 the court opted to sanction rather than close AKP. A further closure case is pending against the Kurdish DTP, accused of praising and aiding the PKK and also of serving as “a center of activities aimed at damaging the independence of the state and the indivisible integrity of its territory and nation.” The threat of an AKP closure provoked a complex debate inside and outside Turkey about norms and practices, especially in the context of Turkey’s EU candidacy. The consensus among observers across the spectrum is that the deeper social and political divisions behind the political crises of 2007-2008 are unlikely to be resolved by the July 2008 verdict. The potential for further political and legal clashes over secularism remains very real.

In recent years, the nationalists and the AKP have found themselves on opposite sides of almost all of Turkey’s most sensitive issues. As the AKP’s position has often been aligned with that of the West, anti-AKP groups evolved into anti-Western ones. Some key points of contention have included the AKP’s willingness to reopen the Greek Orthodox seminary in Halki (secular nationalists fear this will set a precedent for opening new Islamic institutions outside the control of the state); and the AKP’s acceptance of the Annan Plan for Cyprus—a deal that nationalists view as a “sellout” of Turkish interests.

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³ One example is the fate of Article 301, criminalizing the denigration of Turkishness, the Republic, and the foundation and institutions of the State. It is a major concern for freedom of expression, and one the EU and the US have urged AKP to amend. In the face of nationalist opposition and priorities elsewhere, the reforms to Article 301 introduced by AKP have been haphazard, and more cosmetic than real.

⁴ http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=260

⁵Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik. Ankara: Küre Yayınları, 2001; “An eminence grise,” The Economist, Nov 15 2007, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10146653

As ethnic and religious identities become bigger drivers of politics (and conflict) the world over, Turkey is in the midst of a clash of its multiple identities; the outcome of this battle will shape the nature of its international “stakeholdership”. One clash is between Western and Islamic identities, with the Islamic periphery coming to the center, and Islamists gaining influence in many Muslim societies. In addition, Turkey’s strong state is also challenged by forces of globalization, which benefit transnational Islamist groups among others. In the short term, there is likely to be a continued backlash from the secular and nationalist establishment, and this will certainly not lead to a more liberal political culture. 3

The prevailing mood of Turkish nationalism and xenophobia is reflected in the latest Pew poll results.4 Those with a positive view towards the US stand at 12 percent—up from 9 percent in 2007, but still the lowest in the world. Those with a negative with towards the US stand at 77 percent. The percentage of Turks who consider the US an “enemy” stands at 70 percent, and only 8 percent consider it to be “partner”. By way of comparison, 60 percent of Pakistanis, 39 percent Egyptians, and 34 percent Russians consider the US to be an “enemy.” These figures, worrisome in their own right, take on added significance in light of the steadily growing role of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy—a point of convergence with Western societies.

Geostrategy with a Diversified Portfolio

With relatively few exceptions, Turkish foreign policy has been essentially moderate, predictable, and multilateral. A highly professional and well-respected diplomatic service has also enabled Turkey to “punch above its weight” in many settings. Outside of some rarefied liberal circles, the notion of international relations as a source of public goods is not central to the Turkish debate. Turkish foreign policy is much closer to the realist approach, with a healthy dose of suspicion and ambivalence toward the other players thrown in. But even these concerns about identity and orientation have prompted Turks to keep an eye on the country’s international reputation and on opportunities to play a constructive regional role. This component of Turkish foreign policy has expanded in recent years—a process that started with the Özal government’s forward-leaning stance in the 1990-1991 Gulf War coalition.

The AKP government took this approach several steps further by broadening the scope of Turkish foreign policy to build closer relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds, and Eurasia. Leading advisors in the AKP government, notably Ahmet Davutoglu, have argued for a policy of “strategic depth,” balancing relations with the West and immediate neighbors with new relationships, mainly economic and political, further afield. ⁵ This

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policy has had its controversial aspects, most notably in Ankara’s close contacts with Hamas and Iran. In August 2008, Iranian President Ahmadinejad made a controversial, high-profile visit to Istanbul. The visit had little tangible significance, but the symbolism of the event was trumpeted by AKP supporters and detractors alike. Other steps have been more positively received, including Turkey’s ongoing role as a facilitator in negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus, and between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Sometimes, though, this desire to act as interlocutor can seem ill-considered or haphazard, as in the widely criticized visit of the Sudanese president to Ankara in January 2008.

Turkey values its self-described role as a “bridge” between continents and cultures, and within limits, seeks a leadership role in international initiatives around this theme. Turkey co-chairs, with Spain, the UN-sponsored Alliance of Civilizations, and the AKP government has been more eager than its predecessors to embrace the country’s Islamic, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian identities, alongside engagement with the West. Without question, the Turkish public has become more interested in international questions affecting Muslim interests—most notably the Palestinian issue, but also in Chechnya and the Balkans.

While officials in Washington and Europe have generally been keen to see Turkey play the role of civilizational interlocutor, it is a role that makes many members of Turkey’s secular foreign policy establishment profoundly uncomfortable. For these traditional elites, a new emphasis on relations to the south and east can only come at the expense of Turkey’s western orientation.

Turkey’s Immediate and Extended Neighborhoods

Since 2002, Turkey has also embarked on a policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” More a slogan than a fully operational policy, it nonetheless captures a trend toward relaxation traditionally tense relations with neighbors such as Bulgaria and Syria. Even more significant has been the rapprochement between Ankara and Athens, break with a long history of confrontation stretching back to the birth of modern Greece and Turkey. The détente followed a period of dramatic brinksmanship over the Aegean and Cyprus in the 1990s. The initial political opening was engineered by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and his Greek counterpart Andreas Papandreou following the “earthquake diplomacy” of 1999, and has been reinforced by successive governments in both countries. The internationally minded Greek and Turkish business communities have also played an important role, alongside military leaderships keen on risk reduction and, in the case of Turkey, eager to focus on threats from other quarters. The backdrop for this Aegean détente has been Turkey’s European candidacy, and observers now worry that rising nationalism and friction in relations between Ankara and Brussels could erode the progress of recent years.

Turkish external policy beyond the Aegean shows a combination of tendencies—generally cautious and favoring the preservation of the territorial and political status quo, but with some persistent frictions and occasional forays into intervention and unilateralism. To Western eyes, Cyprus has, for instance, been the setting for some of the most problematic Turkish behavior. Turkey’s 1974 military intervention may have

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protected the Turkish population of the island from absorption and abuse, as Ankara has asserted, but it also left in its wake a permanent Turkish military presence and a political entity, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” recognized (and subsidized) only by Turkey. Other repercussions of this show of force included the imposition of UN sanctions, a US arms embargo, and decades of Congressionally-mandated scrutiny.

Cyprus has been a nationalist cause par excellence for Turks, and the Cyprus problem continues to bedevil Turkish relations with Europe. Indeed, notwithstanding an improved situation on the island itself, the costs of the Cyprus issue have arguably grown, rising to a strategic scale, particularly as Turkey has become a candidate for EU membership. Cyprus is now a political rather than a security question for Turkey and others. It is also a focal point for the tension between Turkish nationalism and the requirements of integration with Europe. Ankara may regard the accession talks with Europe as a negotiation, a search for a mutually agreeable solution, but in fact, Turkish accession is contingent on the assent of other EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus—in other words, a non-negotiable item and a sine qua non for membership. As it seeks the proper balance between national interest and international responsibility, Turkey is still burdened with the costly legacy of 1974. Ankara’s willingness to make further compromises in the interest of a Cyprus settlement will thus be a key specific “milepost” for Turkey over the next decade.

Other neuralgic aspects of Turkish policy concern relations with Armenia, Syria, and Iraq. Together with the Cyprus dispute, the debate over the history of the Armenian “genocide” has been among the most problematic points of friction between Turkish policy and international opinion. The Turkish narrative regarding the events of 1915 and the years following still contrasts strongly with perceptions in Europe and Canada, where several parliaments have adopted Armenian genocide resolutions, some with legal force. In the US, the annual Congressional debate over the issue has strategic as well as normative dimensions. While successive US presidential administrations have been sensitive to the threat such resolutions pose toward bilateral relations, there is growing awareness within Congress of what is at stake, given Turkey’s vital logistical contribution to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in assistance to Georgia.

On the ground, the border with Armenia remains closed, if rather porous. Bilateral political dialogue between Ankara and Yerevan has been vociferously opposed by the Armenian diaspora—even as Turkey’s own debate over the Armenian question actually has become more active and open. Turkish President Gul even visited Yerevan in September 2008 at the invitation of his counterpart, officially to watch the soccer match of their national teams. This first ever visit to Armenia by a Turkish president has created optimism among the liberals who hope for the establishment of bilateral relations. Yet the Armenian issue, in both its historical and contemporary dimensions, remains a leading obstacle to the liberalization of Turkey’s international posture, and will be another test of Turkey’s evolution in the coming years.

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⁶ This point has been emphasized by Alan Makovsky in various analyses, and is captured in Soli Ozel’s writings about the perils of a unilateral Turkish policy in the Middle East (“on not being a lone wolf”).

Until very recently, Turkey has tended to see the Middle East more as an area of risk than opportunity.6 The Kurdish issue remains the principal lens for Turkish perceptions of the region, particularly for policy toward Iraq, Syria, and, to an extent, Iran. The PKK insurgency and counter-insurgency led to some 40,000 deaths on all sides in the 1990s, and the displacement of large numbers of people. This searing experience contributes to the continued focus on PKK violence and the existence of safe havens for insurgent activity across the border in northern Iraq.

In the 1990s, Syria was the leading supporter of the PKK, whose leadership was based in Damascus. In 1998, at the height of Turkey’s confrontation with Syria over the PKK, Ankara openly threatened large-scale military operations if the Assad regime did not close down the PKK presence (it did). This episode illustrated Turkey’s willingness to act unilaterally where its security, and especially internal security, was at stake. Since 2003, northern Iraq has been the focal point for Turkish concerns about the PKK and Kurdish separatism. Despite the large-scale Turkish economic presence in northern Iraq, the idea of an independent Kurdistan remains a “red line” issue for Turkey, at least as a matter of declared policy. The international community’s stance toward the future fate of Kirkuk is therefore seen as critically important. In the 1990s, Turkish forces launched a series of ground and air operations across the border to create a security zone to fend off PKK infiltrations (Israeli strategy in southern Lebanon was a model). In 2007-2008, Turkey has conducted further cross border strikes—although on a smaller scale, and with the tacit approval of the US.

Ankara is well aware of the negative reaction these operations have sparked in Europe and the US, but the high stakes for Turkey’s internal security and the neuralgic Kurdish issue has placed the government and the military establishment under strong pressure to act, regardless of international sentiment. Looking ahead, it is hard to imagine that Turkey’s sensitivity to security risks emanating from northern Iraq will diminish, barring a comprehensive approach to the Kurdish problem in Turkey and the region—the sort of grand bargain advocated by some Western and a few Turkish analysts. Arrangements of this kind could well involve international guarantees, and possibly a role for NATO or other institutions in monitoring the border: all representing significant sovereignty compromises for Ankara.

It is worth stressing the singular nature of Turkish policy where the Kurdish issue is concerned. These are issues on which Turkish nationalism and national interest are at their most intense. The Kurdish dimension is perceived as “existential” for the Turkish state and society (Cyprus, while still an emotive issue, is no longer in this category for most Turks. This may be because the issue has been frozen for some time. Cyprus could once again become a major issue, if for example, NATO accession talks begin)

The Iraq War illustrates other aspects of Turkey’s perspective on international stakeholdership as well. Turkey’s failure to agree with Washington on the opening of a northern front in Iraq in 2003 stemmed from a combination of political mismanagement

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in Ankara, a clash of negotiating styles, and American failure to convince strategic elites in Turkey. It is also clear that Turkish public opinion, as in Europe, played a part; both were deeply opposed to the war. The absence of a UN or NATO mandate further complicated Turkish decision-making. Turkish thinking and behavior might have been quite different against the backdrop of a solid international mandate (as in 1990). For Turkey as a regional stakeholder, American efforts to “shake things up” in the Middle East, through regime change or vigorous democratization efforts run contrary to Ankara’s interest in stability and the territorial status quo in the neighborhood.

The Turkish perspective on Iran reflects similar concerns. Turkish security elites are concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and some observers worry about the export of Iran’s revolutionary Islamic ideology. But regime change is far from the Turkish mind, and Ankara has a long tradition of peaceful relations with Iran, including significant economic ties. While Ankara is concerned about the rising Iranian influence in the region, Turks often mention that their long border with Iran has remained unchanged since 1639. Ankara is also increasingly inclined to cooperate directly with Tehran in Kurdish matters, including coordinated strikes against the PKK (and PJAK). Therefore Turkish policy toward Iran is likely to remain firmly in the European mainstream—with a strong preference for engagement over confrontation.

In the Balkans, the Turkish approach will probably continue to be shaped by affinity politics and cautious multilateralism. During the 1990s, and through successive Balkan crises, Turkey emerged as a far more prudent and constructive actor than many in the US and Europe imagined. In the Bosnian crisis, where Turkish affinities with Bosnian Muslims were involved, American policymakers were especially concerned that conflict along religious lines could pull Greece and Turkey into the fray. In the event, no such spillover occurred. Both Athens and Ankara demonstrated a marked preference for working within an international framework, and both contributed to multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This remains the Turkish approach to the region, with Ankara playing a leading role in NATO and regional security initiatives. Notably, Ankara extended diplomatic recognition to Kosovo, despite the associated precedent with regard to borders and self-determination—a sensitivity Turkey shares with Russia and others. Affinity with the Muslim Kosovars is part of the explanation; the existence of a general European and Western consensus on the issue is another. Here again, international opinion plays an important role in Turkish thinking.

Energy Security and a Modern “Silk Road”

A similar calculus operates with regard to the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia, tempered by even sharper sovereignty concerns. Turkey has been a leader in supporting the development of strong regional organizations in this area, most notably Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC, headquartered in Istanbul), and in Black Sea Harmony, a maritime collaboration with Russia and others. Ankara has been firmly resistant, though, to any expanded role for extra-regional powers, for instance opposing the extension of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor (in the Mediterranean) to the Black Sea. Looking ahead, Turkey could be quite open to a Turkish-Russian condominium for the region, with strict attention to the existing legal regime governing passage through the Turkish

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⁷ In late August 2008, Turkey approved the passage of American vessels through the Turkish Straits to deliver humanitarian assistance to Georgia. The possible delivery of military assistance will pose more difficult dilemmas for Ankara.

Straits. That said, Turkey has welcomed, even sought, international opinion and organizations as part of is campaign to limit the environmental consequences of increased tanker traffic through the Bosporus.

In the Caucasus, Turkey has a longstanding special relationship with Azerbaijan. The two countries share so many historic, cultural, religious and ethnic links that they often refer to each other as “one nation, two states.” Turkey closed its Armenian border during the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993, and is unlikely to open it until the conflict progresses toward resolution.

Bilateral relations with Azerbaijan were really solidified with cooperation on two new major oil and gas pipelines to carry Azeri hydrocarbons to Turkey via Georgia. Turkey looks toward expansion and extension of regional energy pipelines, especially penetrating further into European markets, in order to become a major energy hub. The Russian invasion of Georgia, and the prospect of heightened Russian-Western friction, certainly clouds the prospects for new projects of this kind.

These pipelines are but one element of a wider vision for an east-west “new Silk Road” corridor including highway, railway and pipeline connections from Central Asia to Europe via Turkey. The transportation of Azeri and Central Asian (mainly Kazakh and Turkmen) energy to Europe is nonetheless at the core of this vision. There is already a line connecting Turkey with Greece, and it will be further extended to Italy in the coming years. There is also a massive gas pipeline project called Nabucco that would stretch from Turkey to Austria, passing through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. This pipeline could contribute significantly toward the EU’s energy diversification strategy and would reinforce Turkey’s interdependence with Europe. Georgian stability and sovereignty – now in question – have been seen as critical for the east-west corridor, and Turkey has supported the notion of Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO.7

Nor Turkey does want to limit its efforts to east-west pipelines; it is also actively cooperating with Russia, Iran, Iraq and Egypt to transport their gas to European markets. While Turkey’s increased energy cooperation with Iraq (especially the Kurdish region) is widely praised, its burgeoning partnership with Iran and Russia raises eyebrows in both Europe and the US.

The Turkish approach to relations with Moscow is complex and informed by a long history of geopolitical competition and mutual wariness. The economic relationship with Russia, both energy and non-energy, has burgeoned over the last 15 years—Russia is now Turkey’s largest trading partner—and this has been accompanied by an expanded political relationship. Some Turkish strategists even argue for a strategic relationship with Moscow as preferable to what they view as hollow and unpredictable ties to the West. It should be quickly added that this is still a minority, even eccentric, view. Turkey has a long-term stake in reassurance and deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow, especially given current uncertainties regarding relations between Russia and the West. In the wake of the Russian

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operations in Georgia, a more confrontational Russian posture would only reinforce the Turkish need for a predictable NATO guarantee, as any new east-west competition would likely unfold in Turkey’s immediate vicinity this time around.

The Turkey-Russia relationship actually offers prospects for convergence in their posture toward “stakeholdership,” on the grounds of their common nationalist/realist approach and the search for an alternative to Western liberalism on the one hand, and unfettered globalization on the other. As a matter of shared historical roots and evolution, the Leninist and Kemalist systems emerged at roughly the same time, with some similar characteristics, including a statist policy bent and a tough-minded approach to sovereignty questions. The potential combination of a hollow EU candidacy, estrangement from the US, and a continued rise of nationalist sentiment in Turkey (and elsewhere) could propel a drift away from Western values and institutions, and even a growing affinity for Moscow. A more confrontational relationship between Russia and the West could pose difficult dilemmas for Turkey, with growing tension between the country’s economic and security interests, and sharply competing visions of Turkish identity and orientation.

The two already share concern about US-backed “color revolutions” across Eurasia and the broader Middle East. Both are traditionally status quo powers and dislike change—especially if change runs counter to their interests or promotes instability of a more general kind. At the same time, leaders in both countries (Putin and Erdogan) have shown new activism in their neighborhood. Russia would like Turkey, for instance, to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer. While Ankara has stayed away from the SCO thus far, a growing number of Turks seem to view the SCO countries as more aligned with Turkey’s interests than either the US or the EU is. They call for a close partnership with Russia coupled with a strong but pragmatic policy in Eurasia, giving priority to economic ties over pan-Turkic sentiment. This new Russo-Turkish rapprochement and partnership in Eurasia holds an appeal for some conservative Islamist groups, secular nationalists, and as well as members of the millitary leadership. In this vein, retired General Tuncay Kilinc, a former Secreatary General of the National Security Council, even said that “Turkey should quit NATO” and he singled out Russia as Turkey’s most logical strategic partner. The Turkish discussion on these questions is set to become more pointed and difficult after the August 2008 Georgia crisis—and in light of looming debates about NATO’s strategic concept, relations with Russia, and the costs and benefits of further enlargement.

The West, Turkey, and Its Alternatives

The overwhelming thrust of Turkish strategy since the end of the Second World War has been to align with the West, via membership in NATO, a close strategic relationship with Washington, and aspiration to full membership in the EU. The durability of these ties over the next decade will be a key factor determining Turkey’s commitment to responsible international stakeholdership, informed by Western norms. Turkey’s EU prospects may well be the most critical factor. The long-term and open-ended nature of the accession path offered to Turkey, and growing ambivalence on all sides cast real doubts over Turkey’s to full membership. The pace and extent of reform in Turkey is one

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⁸ See Ian O. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking US-Turkish Relations (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007).

⁹ See GMF, Transatlantic Trends, 2007 and 2008

factor in the equation. The evolution of the EU is another. A tighter, more integrated Europe—tired of costly new enlargements and with close attention to norms and behavior—will be a tough Europe for Turkey to join. A looser, multi-speed EU tolerant of a range of political practices will be an easier fit for Ankara. Overall, the future of Turkish convergence with Europe in key sectors (norms, practices, policies) may be more important than the question of membership per se. Few observers in Turkey or the West would disagree that “Europe” has been a key incentive for change in Turkey’s internal and external behavior.

Europe’s critique of Turkish behavior will likely continue to focus on internal developments and deviations from accepted European norms. The AKP closure case episode illustrated this concern, as does the controversy over the infamous Article 301 on insults to “Turkishness.” With the notable exception of Cyprus, Europe is much less inclined to criticize Turkey’s foreign policy behavior. On the contrary, periodic European Commission reviews underscore the close alignment between Turkish and European policies. On Iran, the Middle East peace process, Iraq, the Balkans, and other issues, Turkey is very much in the European mainstream, and often far closer to Brussels than to Washington.

The relationship with the US, seen as strategic on both sides, has experienced marked but not unprecedented strain since 2003. These strains have been extensively analyzed and debated in Turkey and the US.8 They are the product of proximate policy disagreements, most notably on Iraq, as well as structural problems in a relationship predicated on security and strategic real estate rather than true partnership based on affinity and shared values. Public opinion has been another key element. Public sentiment matters in contemporary Turkish policymaking, and as noted above, this sentiment has turned starkly anti-American in recent years. As striking, and perhaps more consequential, has been the deterioration in elite attitudes toward US leadership, and the deepening suspicion among Turks of diverse background.

What has filled this vacuum of alliance and affinity? Polling and much anecdotal evidence suggests that this “space” has been filled in part by rising Turkish nationalism and a more inward-looking disposition. Turks have become more suspicious of the international community as a whole: Americans, Israelis, and Europeans, above all, but also Russians, Iranians, and even Palestinians.9 Turks are intently focused on their own questions of identity, religion, class, and power, and these long-simmering tensions are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. The result may be a distracted and less engaged Turkey—a less active and responsible stakeholder by default rather than inclination.

Since 9/11, and especially after the Iraq war, the Islamic coloration of Turkish perceptions and policy has increased. There is a widespread awareness now among Turks of their Islamic identity, culture, and norms. With the US increasingly seen by Turks as a negative and less influential force, and with the EU focused on its own identity and enlargement issues, Turkey has stepped up its diplomacy across the former lands of the

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¹⁰ Cengiz Çandar. “Yeni Ortadoğu denklemi, Lübnan'daki Türkiye, Türkiye'deki Türkiye.” Referans, 27 May 2008. http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=97873&YZR_KOD=15

¹¹ Going Their Own Way in The Mideast, David Ignatius, June 1 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/30/AR2008053002517.html

Ottoman Empire. Almost all the ethnic groups of the Middle East, Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are also significantly represented within Turkey’s own population. Davutoglu and other AKP advisors argue that any instability in these regions is consequential for Turkey, requiring Ankara’s active commitment to regional security and development. The underlying objective is to boost Turkey’s influence as an “independent” actor and recognized interlocutor for the Muslim east and south. Turkey’s recent activism in the OIC and other Islamic groups is a clear element of this strategy (in 2005, the OIC elected its first Turkish secretary general).

One prominent Turkish foreign policy analyst has characterized Turkey’s entrepreneurial diplomacy with Lebanon, Hezbollah, Syria, and Israel as “the return of the Ottomans.”10 For Davutoglu and other members of the neo-Ottoman school, the main argument against joining directly in the Iraq war was that Turkey should not be aligned with powers that would inevitably be perceived as occupiers. He considers this strategy to have paid off. Similarly, Turkey’s initiative to bring Israel and Syria together has shown that at a time when the US is not able to exert effective influence in the region, countries like Turkey can go their own way to good effect.11 Influential Turks close to AKP as well as nationalist circles are becoming convinced that the norms and institutions defined by the West during the Cold War are no longer working and outmoded for an emerging international order in which Asia, the Muslim world, and the global south are gaining much greater influence. In other words, Turks who aspire to a leading role in this new—less Western than before—geopolitical order will be working with a different concept of stakeholdership.

How Ankara Looks At Threat Assessment

Turkey is a security-conscious state, and the security dimension weighs heavily in Turkey’s international calculus. As noted above, Turkey does not shrink from using its substantial military strength unilaterally in the Middle East, but has adopted a much more cautious and multilateral posture elsewhere. The Turkish approach to the use of force carries broad international significance, though, not least because Turkey’s ability to project power and the breadth of its diplomatic reach extend its influence across several critical regions.

Turkey will continue to value its NATO membership, including the nuclear guarantee and Article V commitments. Nonetheless, Turks worry about the credibility of the NATO commitment in relation to the extra-European and non-traditional risks they confront. The slow NATO response to Turkish requests for air defense reinforcements in both Iraq wars has, however, left a bitter residue of doubt and mistrust. Because Turkish contingencies are so prominent in contemporary NATO planning, and most of these contingencies have focused on the country’s Middle Eastern borders, Ankara has favored revisions to the NATO strategic concept to enhance the Alliance’s ability to act rapidly outside Europe. After initial ambivalence, Turkey has also emerged as a supporter of NATO enlargement, in the belief that a wider NATO will stabilize areas on the periphery of Europe—i.e.

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Turkey’s neighborhood. The experience of Russian military intervention in Georgia could serve as a spur to renewed emphasis on core NATO Article V commitments and the capacity for territorial defense.

Turkey is also the NATO member most affected by proliferation trends in the Middle East, with Iranian and Syrian missile programs a particular concern. Most Turkish population centers are within reach of Syrian and Iranian missiles. Turkey’s well-developed strategic relationship with Israel, expanded in earnest in the 1990s, was aimed largely at the containment of Syria, then a major backer of the PKK. Turkish-Israeli cooperation has included intelligence sharing and air defense coordination in relation to Iranian WMD risks as well as extensive defense industrial cooperation. Absent a direct threat to Turkish territory, Ankara is highly unlikely to help with any Israeli or American strikes against Iranian WMD facilities, but Turkish strategists might quietly favor such an action.

For decades, Turkey has lived with nuclear weapons on its borders, and the Turkish reaction to the prospect of a nuclear or near-nuclear Iran tends to be restrained. But Turkish concern is mounting, not least because of the potential for one or more new nuclear powers in the region to profoundly alter the strategic equation, with cascading effects on military perceptions and balances in multiple directions. Turkey is unlikely to respond to a nuclear Iran by pursuing a nuclear capability of its own—as long as the NATO guarantee remains credible—even though the country possesses the technical wherewithal to pursue a weapons program.

Détente with Athens has eased a major challenge for Alliance cohesion in the eastern Mediterranean, and Ankara retains a strong stake in NATO membership as a hedge against high-end threats emanating from Russia and the Middle East. Turkey has also been a good NATO “citizen” with regard to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. In other respects, Turkey’s position is more complex and less helpful to Alliance objectives. Most notably, Ankara continues to obstruct closer defense coordination between NATO and the EU in protest over Turkey’s exclusion from European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) decision-making. It is also strongly opposed to Cyprus becoming a NATO member without prior resolution of the island’s status. These situations are added signs of Turkey’s incomplete integration, and its effect on Turkey’s own strategic perceptions and behavior. The vexed matter of Turkey’s EU candidacy, and the potential for further estrangement from Europe, suggest that the standoff over NATO-ESDP cooperation will persist for some time to come.

Over the next decade, Turkey’s security priorities are likely to be driven by more tangible concerns such as counter-terrorism and irregular warfare. Turkey has not been immune to the threat of Islamic extremism, as bombings and assassinations in Istanbul and elsewhere attest (most notably the 2003 bombings of the British consulate, a synagogue, and the headquarters of HSBC in Istanbul). Homegrown groups such as Turkish Hizbollah, as well as networks with Al-Qaeda links are active within Turkey, although heavily monitored and contained by the Turkish security services. The return of jihadists from Iraq and Afghanistan in the coming years could also affect the security situation in Turkey and elsewhere. Turkey continues to face a low level terrorist threat from extreme

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leftist and nationalist networks as well. More serious, especially in terms of Turkey’s European ties, has been the growth of diverse criminal networks involved in drug smuggling and human trafficking.

Foremost, the absence of a comprehensive approach to the Kurdish problem suggests that Turkey will continue to face a threat from the PKK or related groups. This threat is unlikely to be eradicated without the close cooperation of Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, where the local Kurdish leadership has shown little inclination to incur the costs of closing down PKK operations on their side of the border. As a result, Turkey will likely be in the counter-insurgency business for some time to come, and the containment of the PKK and its offshoots will be difficult or impossible without substantial help from Turkey’s allies. The EU will be critical to curtailing PKK fundraising and organization, much of which takes place in Europe. The US will be key on the intelligence and operations side of the equation in Iraq. Iran, too, will be an important partner for Ankara. In short, the leading security challenges facing Turkey over the next decade will require a considerable degree of engagement with international partners. National approaches by themselves are unlikely to suffice.

Turkey and Globalization

Despite strong opposition from nationalist rivals, the AKP government has advanced Özal’s program of large-scale privatization, and has generally emphasized economic engagement in regional and global settings. In addition to a steady flow of European investment, in recent years Turkey has attracted unprecedented levels of investment from Arab states, especially from Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

The groups that have benefited most visibly from AKPs liberal economic policies are those from Anatolia, and small and medium-size enterprises from Turkey’s heartland have forged partnerships with companies all over the world—Africa, Latin America, Japan and China. This can also be seen as a risk diversification strategy: if talks with the EU come to a halt, then Turkey may reconsider the Customs Union agreement, which has served as a constraint on Turkish business outreach and strategic partnerships. In addition to forming regional free trade zones and joining existing organizations, there is also talk of Turkish participation in a proposed TAFTA (trans-Atlantic free trade agreement).

Turkish small and medium scale businesses, and new NGOs, have all taken full advantage of globalization to help build Turkey’s soft-power. Through economic and cultural links, Turkey’s influence and standing is growing throughout many parts of the world. Turkish television draws audiences across Eurasia and the Middle East and in the Turkish diaspora in Europe. The schools that Islamic cultural groups such as the Gulen movement have established throughout the world focus on the spread of a Turko-Islamic worldview. In 2008, the 6^th Turkic Olympics were held in Istanbul with participation from 110 countries. Students, mostly from Gulen schools, demonstrated their Turkish language skills and their knowledge of Turkish folk culture.

This new soft power is reverberating, above all, through South and Central Asia. Turkey is taking a lead role in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and helping improve Pakistan-

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¹² Turkey: ‘Silent but Effective’ Partner, Speech by Foreign Minister Ali Babacan at The Atlantic Council of the United States. http://www.acus.org/about-news-Turkish-PM.asp

Afghanistan relations via economic cooperation along the border. Turkish troops are not deployed in combat zones like Helmand province, instead focusing on building infrastructure and supporting health and administrative services. Turkey and Pakistan are close political partners, often taking common positions in international platform such as the UN and OIC. With India, too, Turkey recently established a strategic partnership—and there is growing Indian investment in the Turkish energy sector. The possibility of sending oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan via the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or the planned Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and onward via Ashkalon to India is being discussed.

Under AKP, Turkey is opening entirely new frontiers of economic partnership. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan explained to an American audience that in 2007 became an official “Strategic Partner” to the African Union, and Turkey is planning to open 15 new embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa.12

Turkish businesses see Brazil as a gateway for increased ties with the rest of Latin America. Ankara hopes that its support Brazil’s bid for permanent UN Security Council membership will be repaid with Brazil’s support for its own campaign for a rotating seat. A similar gambit is being tried in East Asia with Japan. In all these regions obtaining support for its UN Security Council membership bid also played a significant role in expanding business and cultural links.

In the years since the AKP assumed power in 2002, economic growth has averaged 7.5 percent. Inflation has fallen from 70 percent to just below 10 percent. The net public debt ratio has been cut in half, and banking system indicators have improved. Turkey’s GNP is now around $400bn. Sustained growth boosted the country’s per capita income to an impressive $5,000. A successful privatization program not only reduced government spending, but also brought additional revenues, significantly shrinking the budget deficit and public debt. Foreign investment also rose from $6 billion to over $100 billion during the AKP government’s tenure. These results are mostly the product of aggressive reforms anchored to Turkey’s application for European Union membership and its loan program with the IMF. Like other emerging markets, Turkey has benefited from a strong world economy and favorable external financing conditions—both questionable in the years ahead.

All that said, any future economic stability and growth will be closely linked to continuing political stability, progress in EU accession talks, and keeping a lid on domestic and foreign debt during a downward global cycle. Rising oil and food prices, a return of inflation, and slower growth could pose the most serious threats to the Turkish economy. The global economic slowdown that began in the summer of 2007 has already affected the Turkish economy negatively: GDP growth dropped to 4.5 percent in 2007 and is forecast to dip further, to 3 percent, in 2008. The rapidly growing current account deficit, which ballooned due to the expansionary fiscal policy of the past few years, as well as the mounting trade deficit, have heightened Turkey’s vulnerability to global shocks. Turkey continues to attract large inflows of “hot” money, but given the nature of this capital, any elevation of political risk and deteriorating external conditions could

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trigger a quick liquidation of assets held in Turkish lira. Such conditions could bring the boom in Turkish prosperity and globalization to a screeching halt.

The Diverging Roads Ahead

Looking ahead, Turkey will likely remain a responsible international stakeholder, however flawed and ambivalent on occasion. Turkey’s foreign and security policy outlook strikes a careful balance between an essentially national and realist approach and a longstanding concern for the country’s Western identity and reputation, along with a basic commitment to international norms. At the same time, Turkey seeks to update these norms to reflect the interests of the Muslim world and the “south” more broadly. Regardless of its orientation, Turkey will almost certainly continue as an essentially conservative, status quo nation rather than a revolutionary actor in international affairs.

The most problematic aspect of the Turkish case concerns the country’s internal evolution and governance, rather than its foreign and security policy. With the exception of Cyprus and northern Iraq, it is Turkey’s internal social and political struggle, and the haphazard progress toward European standards of democratization and governance, that inhibit Turkey’s full participation in an international liberal order. More narrowly, these same factors will determine the European and American response to Turkey, and potentially limit Turkish integration within Western institutions such as the EU. Many of the key “mileposts” over the next decade will, thus, be internal—including civil-military relations, the Kurdish issue, and resolution of the country’s deepening religious-secular divide. Externally, Turkish policy on Cyprus, Armenia, and northern Iraq will be the key tests. On Russia, Turkey is apt to be wary and ambivalent toward any harsher NATO policies. On energy, Turkey will pursue its interest in becoming a hub and transit country for Caspian and Middle Eastern energy.

In a grand strategic sense, possible further convergence with the EU, and ultimately, the outcome of the membership process, will have the most profound effect on Turkey’s posture with regard to international norms. Depending on the evolution of Turkish politics and identity over the next decade, Ankara could be drawn to alternative norms and international alignments, possibly centered on Eurasia or the Muslim world. If the country’s essentially secular orientation holds, Turkey will almost certainly remain part of the transatlantic community, with external policies informed by Western norms—notwithstanding a balanced Turkish foreign policy with deeper Eurasian engagement. Yet, growing Islamic identity in Turkish society and politics could point the country in a different direction, in which case, the neo-Ottoman impetus, and its associated values, could become more entrenched and significant in determining external behavior. A more serious risk stems from potentially virulent Turkish nationalism, estrangement from the West, and the emergence of a more sovereignty conscious, inward-looking Turkey—in short, a fundamental difficulty in undertaking international cooperation and less responsible stakeholdership by default.

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HŰSEYIN BAĞCI’S REACTION

Indeed, Turkey sees itself as a responsible stakeholder, as Baran and Lesser rightly emphasize. Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan said as much in a July 2008 major policy speech in which he offered the carefully crafted formulation that Turkey aims to become a global player using her soft power capabilities as a regional hard power.

Turkey’s geographic location has always offered strategic advantages, but in the last 20 years it has been particularly effective at making the most of its position as a bridge country in every direction; in the process, it has enhanced its reputation as an internationally responsible actor to a higher level than ever in its modern history. It’s true that Turkey is a country faced with complex questions of identity, alignment, and governance, but within these issues also lie significant opportunities.

The pursuit of Turkey’s maximal integration internationally remains a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, and it is unlikely that any Turkish government in the coming decades will renounce this traditional goal. Turkey’s supposedly “urgent” candidacy for the EU is no longer really expected to succeed, and in a sense is irrelevant since the associated democratic and economic reforms have succeeded enough to acquire their own momentum. The process may have left Turkey in the position of “the other” with regard to Europe, as Baran and Lesser put it, but it is also clear that for the foreseeable future, the EU needs Turkey as much, if not more, than Turkey needs the EU. The EU debate over Turkey’s candidacy certainly arouses concerns among Turks—and prompted a dramatic decline in Turkish public support for EU membership—but that does not change the fact that Turkey is firmly on a course of convergence with Europe. In the words of an old Turkish proverb, the EU caravan still goes on with Turkey behind it despite the belling dogs.

The authors portray Turkey as a conservative, status quo actor, but that isn’t quite accurate. In fact, Turkey is a fast changing, liberal and active player, especially in recent years. The idea of “neo-Ottomanism” in Turkish foreign policy remains more of a fantasy than a real policy option. Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions have indeed found a conducive environment, or larger playground, due to regional and global changes, but Turkey’s Western drive continues unchanged contrary to expectations that Turkey would adopt more “Islamist” policies. Turkey is not Iran, and with her involvement in western institutions from Council of Europe to NATO and many others, will not become like Iran. And while Turkey’s new orientation after the end of the Cold War prompted concern among western countries, Turkey’s democratic process made it a model to be emulated rather than feared. Today’s Turkey is much more reliable, manageable, and responsible than 30 or 20 or even ten years ago.

It is not an exaggeration to say that there is a new Turkey and new Turks with more management capabilities in domestic as well as in foreign policy matters. Turkey’s domestic and economic reforms since early 1980’s under Turgut Özal had a deep impact on the country, engendering strong self-esteem and self-confidence. In the 1990s, Turkey

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had a series of coalition governments, but the political stability since 2002 under AKP government has borne fruit, in the economic field particularly. Turkey’s exports exceed 136 billion dollars, with a total GDP of more than 600 billion dollars. In a few years Turkey will reach a 1 trillion dollar economy. Globally Turkey is already the world’s 15th largest economy, and in sixth place in the EU.

The second term of AKP government will be much harder than the first term. Baran and Lesser highlight the problems which AKP will face and, in the process, overestimate the dangers. Turkey’s domestic reform and likewise its economic reforms will continue. And whatever role emerges for Islam, Turkey is nowhere near anything resembling Sharia, which, given the country’s social composition would be impossible. Even the debate on a new constitution has run aground and thus doomed prospects for a new constitution in foreseeable future. The AKP government is highly pragmatic and is bound to recognize that pressing a religious agenda will only threaten its domestic political survival. The religious views of AKP government will more likely be “secularized” by the pressure from a strengthening opposition The 2007 election giving the AKP government a 47 percent plurality was deemed by some observers as a social revolution, but instead of revolution there are more tensions—brought on by terrorism, corruption cases, and the Constitutional Court’s verdict on the AKP’s Islamist policies (a ruling that, as the Turkish public suspects, was political rather than juridical).

As to other threats and factors, PKK terrorism remains as the most important problem, with no solution in sight. The current spike in anti-Americanism is superficial and not as deeply rooted as in other countries. There is no enduring tradition of hatred toward the US, but rather a fluctuation from one US administration to the next (President Clinton was, after all, quite popular). Turkish nationalism is still limited and poses no danger for neighboring countries. Indeed, contrary to expectations or perceptions, Turkish nationalism is not on the rise. That said, however, Turkish nationalism is a given and could at any moment be aroused by PKK terrorism or other provocation.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Turkey’s foreign policy confronts a wide range of challenges at multiple international levels and from various geographic directions. On the other hand, Turkey’s role as a “civilizational bridge” has contributed to Turkey’s positive image worldwide; indeed Washington and Europe consider this role essential for Western-Islamic relations. Baran and Lesser rightly emphasize Turkey’s new policy “zero problem with neighbors”, which has significantly changed Turkey’s image in the region. Its efforts to serve as an honest broker in several regional conflicts have also enhanced Turkey’s image as a peacemaker. Another indication of Turkey’s enhanced international stature was its election into the United Nations Security Council as a non permanent member after a 47-year wait.

Even so, a number of concerns linger. Turkey’s relations with its neighbors are not yet resolved permanently and likely to remain so for some time. Time will tell whether the Cyprus issue, Armenian issue and Syrian—Turkish relations will remain relatively calm or flare up. If nothing else, the uncertain situation in Iraq and the future of the middle East is increasing Turkey’s international stakeholdership. Turkish-Iranian relations are

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quite good at the moment despite the nuclear issue. Iran is second only to Russia as a source of oil and gas imports. This does not mean the most Turks agree with Iranian policies, but in broad terms, Iran enjoys the highest level of political sympathy since the heyday of former president Hatami’s reform push. Also, Turkey and Iran face PKK terrorism as common threat and it will continue to do so.

In the wider region, the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasia and Central Asia will enjoy increased focus in Turkish foreign policy. President Gül is de facto foreign minister and he will develop presidential foreign policy to those regions as the former presidents with the exception of previous one Ahmet Necdet Sezer, like Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel have followed. Indeed there is a strong back-to-the-future element to Turkish policy in those regions—part of a more broadly ambitious geostrategic posture since the end of the Cold War of increased cultural, economic and political influence and an attempt to be the leading power in that regional arc. This ambition only makes Turkish-Russian relations more attractive as an area of opportunity. For the first time in contemporary Turkish perceptions, Russia has a very positive image, and is in fact Turkey’s top trading (conversely, Turkey is Russia’s fourth largest trade partner).

That said, the relationship with Russia is not an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. The essay authors portray Russia and West as an either/or dilemma for Turkey. Yet despite the minority view of some intellectuals that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is an alternative alignment, Turkey will not be forced to choose between good relations with Russia and its rock-solid overall alliance with the West. As a NATO member and integrated in nearly all the Western institutions, Turks consider the EU and US as absolutely fundamental, and the AKP government itself has repeatedly reaffirmed that EU membership remains Turkey’s ultimate goal. And from a security point of view, the United States and Turkey remain, despite ups and downs in their relationship, bound to each other. From a responsible stakeholder standpoint, Turkey has long been an important peacekeeping troop contributor country both for NATO and the UN—deploying its forces in several missions since 1990s, from Somalia to Afghanistan. This is very much a neglected area where Turkey’s contribution is overlooked or underestimated.

It is true that since September 11 Turkey discovered the “Islamic card” and has played it very successfully. All the talk about a new Ottomanism, however, proved to be more amusing speculation than operational Turkish diplomacy. No doubt, AKP has strong connections with all Islamic states and organizations, and prime minister Erdogan enjoys the most political sympathy any Turkish foreign minister ever enjoyed. Therefore, it does not qualify Turkey as a “neo-Ottoman state” on the contrary; Turkey is a democratic state with realistic aims.

Despite the continuing extended delay in Turkey’s accession to the EU, Turkey’s relevance fort EU security is on the rise. Therefore, both the US and Europe remain Turkey’s security pillars, particularly, the US security umbrella, including Turkey’s security and fight against terrorism.

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Turkey as a Global Player

Turkey’s international economic and social activities are key drivers of its growing prominence. Its success in attracting foreign investments is thus an important quantifier of its regional and global and global impact. Baran and Lesser are correct that Turkey’s economic and political reforms will enhance it as a global player and soft power. Turkish nongovernmental organizations, small and medium size business, and even recently the TV and film industry are all contributing to Turkey’s international image. In the scientific and technological fields, Turkey has made huge strides in recent years and is one the few Islamic countries with satellites in the orbit, which will be added to significantly in coming years.

Turkey became also a donor country in recent years, providing technological and economic help to Third World countries. As an emerging market and soft power, Turkey is considered in the “second circle,” just below the G7 countries, of economies with strong prospects. Given Turkey’s strong economic performance, one can say that Turkey is one of globalization’s principal winners. The recent global financial crisis has only confirmed the wisdom of the economic and banking reforms of the last eight years. In the context of the EU process Turkey, will certainly continue these reforms. Since 2005, Turkey has been a relatively expensive country for foreign investment, but at the same has been a real center of attraction for foreign capital. And as the privatization process in Turkey continues to progress, this will only encourage further investment, which has already broken all the records in her economic history.

Turkey’s challenges are daunting, but with her strong liberal economic and political system and record, Turkey remains a responsible international stakeholder. Turkey will remain squarely on a path to the West, but it will also retain significant influence in the South and in the Islamic world, as well as in Africa in particular. Turkey’s role as a Mediterranean power will also help make the Mediterranean Union a strategic success.

In sum, Ankara’s policies are not splintering but rather the continuation of “traditional realistic policies” of the Turkish Republic. Far from undergoing an Islamization of its foreign policy, Turkey is preserving a realistic and pragmatic one. In the final analysis, Turkey aspires to become a global player, but she continues to juggle all its advantages as well as limitations.

Turkey seeks more democracy, more prosperity and more security in a world that each day seems to get more and more insecure. Turkey absorbs her fair share of these negative developments, but still remains indispensable for the EU and the US—not to mention the neighboring countries, which seem very happy with the soft power Turkey and her new policy of “zero problems with the neighboring countries.”

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