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ÐáíåðéóôÞìéï Ðåéñáéþò, ÔìÞìá Äéåèíþí êáé Åõñùðáúêþí Óðïõäþí
www.ifestos.edu.gr -- www.ifestosedu.gr -- info@ifestosedu.gr -- info@ifestos.edu.gr
Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ
Ôï âéâëßï Óôñáôçãéêü âÜèïò ôïõ Ôïýñêïõ Õðïõñãïý Åîùôåñéêþí Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ êõêëïöüñçóå óôçí åëëçíéêÞ áãïñÜ ôïí ÌÜéï 2010. ¼óïí ìå áöïñÜ Ý÷ïíôáò Þäç äéáâÜóåé ôï âéâëßï èåùñþ üôé ç äçìïóßåõóÞ ôïõ óôá åëëçíéêÜ (ôï åéóçãÞèçêá åãþ ãéá ìåôÜöñáóç ðñéí äýï ÷ñüíéá) áðïôåëåß ü÷é ìüíï Ýíá ðïëéôéêü ãåãïíüò áëëÜ êáé Ýíá åðéóôçìïíéêü ãåãïíüò. Ïé óåëßäåò åäþ ãéá ôçí Ôïõñêßá èá ôý÷ïõí ðåñéóóüôåñçò åðéìÝëåéáò êáé ôá ó÷üëéÜ ìáò ãéá ôïí Íôáâïýôïãëïõ èá ðõêíþóïõí. Ãéá ðñïäçìïóéåýóåéò êáé åðéöõëëßäåò âë. http://www.ifestosedu.gr/109%20Íôáâïýôïãëïõ%20Óôñáôçãéêü%20âÜèïò.htm
13.12.2010. Óýíäåóìïé ïìéëéþí ôïõ Ôïýñêïõ ÕÐÅÎ Íôáâïýôïãëïõò
12.3.2012. interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt)
29.11.2010. Address to the THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
AHMET DAVUTOGLU MAY 20, 2010 Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy
18.1.2010. Ïìéëßá Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ óôïõò Ôïýñêïõò ÐñÝóâåéò
2.1.2008. Davutoglou' s vision
ÓõíÝíôåõîç Íôáâïýôïãëïõ óôçí Le Monde 7.11.2009
Turkey's Transformers Foreign Affairs Nov.Dec. 2009.
Óýíäåóìïé ïìéëéþí Ôïýñêïõ ÕÐÅÎ Íôáâïýôïãëïõ
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13.12.2010. Óýíäåóìïé ïìéëéþí ôïõ Ôïýñêïõ ÕÐÅÎ Íôáâïýôïãëïõò
Ãéá ìéá ðëÞñç ðáñÜèåóç ôùí óõíäÝóìùí ôùí ïìéëéþí ôïõ Ôïýñêïõ Õðïõñãïý Åîùôåñéêþí âë. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?e02fbae4-66f5-4813-96b7-40986c71f171
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12.3.2012. nterview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt)
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you define Turkey’s strategic interests today?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s strategic interests lie in peace, stability, security,
and prosperity in its neighborhood and beyond. Turkey is in a unique position in
geopolitical terms, in the midst of Afro–Eurasia. This vast geography neighbors
crisis-prone regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It
also holds a great potential for development and prosperity, which has so far
been held back due to security problems. Any crisis in these regions—be it
economic or political—has direct ramifications for Turkey and the wider
international community. Therefore, stability in these regions is in the best
interests of Turkey. And this is why Turkey actively works to foster peace and
security around it—the very idea at the heart of our ‘zero problems with
neighbors’ policy. Through this policy, while we try to leave behind the
problems with our neighbors, we also try to help them solve any domestic,
bilateral or international problems they might have—to the extent we can.
Our foreign policy is also shaped by our economic interests. Turkey has a big
population, young people constituting half of it, and a vibrant economy,
striving to be among the top ten economies of the world by 2023, which is the
one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, the Turkish
private sector is very active and has a strong entrepreneurial spirit. This
requires us to widen the scope of our outreach as an economic actor. Increasing
the level of economic cooperation with as many countries as possible becomes an
important priority for Turkey. It compels us to reach out and enhance the scope
of our relations on a global scale. This is also why we have increased
cooperation and engagement with the emerging powers of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, all of which have become priority areas in terms of our strategic
interests.
Turkish foreign policy is guided by our democratic values as well as our
interests. This can best be seen in our support for reform efforts in the Middle
East and North Africa. Turkey has always been encouraging the administrations to
address the legitimate expectations of their people and undertake the necessary
reforms. However, now, given the home-grown and irreversible march toward more
democracy in the region, Turkey has stepped up its efforts to support this
process. Consolidation of democracy in these countries in a way that will
empower the people and strengthen stability is in the best interests of the
entire region. This process should be advanced in a peaceful manner without
leading to new divisions of ethnic or sectarian nature. This is not what people
want, and we have to do all we can to avoid such a dangerous scenario. Turkey
exerts every effort in this direction in cooperation with the countries in the
region.
Turkey greatly values its alliance with the Euro–Atlantic community. Our
membership of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and strategic relations
with the U.S. and other Western countries in Europe constitute a fundamental
pillar of our foreign policy. In addition, Turkey has been a negotiating country
with the EU [European Union] for a long time. In this context, membership of the
EU remains a strategic goal for us.
CAIRO REVIEW: What is Turkey’s role in the evolving global system, at this point
in history?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: In a globalized world, countries are not isolated entities
anymore. We live in a world where states, leaders, and peoples increasingly
interact with each other on a daily basis. Almost anything—products, persons,
capital, and ideas—can be moved and communicated across borders. Whatever
happens in one part of the world can be simultaneously heard in another corner
and they receive rapid reaction from countries across the globe. In light of all
these, no country can exist or prosper on its own anymore. This is a new global
order in the making, and Turkey is doing its best to contribute to the
successful completion of this transition period. In this regard, we believe that
the new system has to be:
—legitimate, just, transparent, and democratic;
—representative and fully open to participation;
—in full regard to resolve dormant or active disputes that have an impact on
world stability;
—result-oriented in terms of eliminating disparities;
—based on the precept of security and freedom for all.
We also believe that we have the necessary elements of soft and hard power to
help achieve that goal. And we will not shy away from using our comparative
advantages in this direction. Our geostrategic location, booming economy,
ability to understand different social and cultural dynamics in a vast geography,
and commitment to advance democracy domestically and internationally are all
important assets.
What Turkey wants to promote and achieve is: cooperation, understanding, and
tolerance through dialogue and engagement. Turkey’s efforts are focused on
bringing together the parties in order to solve or preempt conflicts;
championing universal values and human rights; supporting those who are
subjected to unfair treatment, and promoting economic and social development of
the underprivileged countries.
The Alliance of Civilizations initiative we cosponsored with Spain is an example
of Turkey’s active efforts in this direction. Similarly, Turkey and Finland have
launched the Peace through Mediation initiative in September 2010 at the margins
of the sixty-fifth United Nations General Assembly. We also tabled a resolution
at the UN General Assembly on mediation, which was adopted unanimously in June
2011. Just recently, on February 24–25 of this year, Turkey organized the
Istanbul Conference on Mediation, in order to provide a platform where all
parties in mediation could interact with each other and share their experiences
and insights, thus enhancing their understanding on different perspectives of
peace building.
Likewise, Turkey has become an emerging dxonor, conducting various development
projects through its own agencies. Turkey is determined to help the least
developed countries with a long-term commitment. Turkey hosted the LDC Summit in
Istanbul last May with a view to supporting sustainable development in these
countries.
Overall, Turkey is a constructive power able to play an important role in
setting the parameters of the new global order. We are conscious of our
capabilities and of what needs to be done. In cooperation with our friends and
partners we will continue to play a positive role in our region and beyond.
CAIRO REVIEW: Has Turkey achieved the ‘strategic depth’ that you seek?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s strategic depth rests on its geographical and
historical depth. Our long history provides us with a unique set of relations
with countries and communities all around us. Our geostrategic location in the
midst of a vast geography, on the other hand, places us in a position to relate
to and influence the developments that are key to the future of the world. So
the question is not achieving the strategic depth, but using it for regional and
global peace. This requires us to engage with the countries with which we share
a common past and geography in a way that will promote our shared interests and
create a mutually beneficial framework for cooperation and dialogue. Today, with
its strong democracy, vibrant economy, and active foreign policy, Turkey has
more opportunities to capitalize on its strategic depth. And we have been
working very actively to this end.
Our efforts to create high-level strategic councils and visa-free travel regimes,
for instance, are geared toward making this strategic depth an operational
concept where all peoples and states benefit from the enhanced cooperation. The
principle that lies beneath our general approach is to turn this vast area into
one of stability, security, and prosperity through political dialogue, economic
interdependence, and cultural understanding.
On the other hand, strategic depth also rests on creating a sense of regional
ownership based on shared interests and common ideals. This can be achieved only
through a more effective regional cooperation and active engagement with all
regional systems in our neighborhood. This, in turn, necessitates enforcing
existing regional integration structures, and forging new ones as necessary.
This is why Turkey supports and seeks to promote regional cooperation in its
neighborhood and to boost the profile of regional organizations for that purpose.
We believe that this would help countries to find regional solutions to their
regional problems, rather than waiting for other actors from outside the region
to impose their own solutions.
CAIRO REVIEW: We have witnessed important shifts and changes in Turkey’s
domestic politics and political life in the past decade. How have these
developments affected or shaped Turkish foreign policy?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s greatest success has been consolidating its democracy
and achieving a strong economy at home. These are also the driving forces behind
Turkey’s proactive foreign policy. Of course, this has become possible due to
the political stability, which we have been enjoying since 2002 in Turkey. As a
stable, secular, and democratic country with an economy ranking sixteenth in the
world, Turkey has indeed become a regional powerhouse whose friendship and
cooperation is increasingly sought in the international arena. This enabled us
to pursue a more independent and visionary foreign policy.
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you evaluate the success or failure of the Justice and
Development Party's five new principles for a new Turkish foreign policy:
balancing freedom and security; zero problems with neighbors; active rather than
reactive; complementary relations with global powers; and activism in
international organizations?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Our foreign policy is essentially based on the principle of
“Peace at home, peace in the world” as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the
founder of the Turkish Republic. Over the years, it has developed and gained
many layers and dimensions, always on the basis of this tradition. Building on
this tradition, we have introduced five new principles with a view to injecting
refreshed dynamism into our foreign policy as well as for adapting ourselves to
the new realities.
I think all of these five principles have been successfully translated into
concrete policies. First, in terms of balancing freedoms and security, Turkey is
a living example of how important it is to expand the space of freedoms to
realize the full potential of a society. Turkey has, in this regard, also
managed to de-securitize its foreign policy understanding, which allows us to
see our neighborhood through the prism of opportunities rather than a perception
of threat. As a result, we have come a long way in improving our relations with
neighbors and opening up new areas of cooperation. We have also presented an
example for others to seek more freedoms, which have otherwise been constrained
by security considerations, and offered a reliable partner for those who are
willing to proceed in this direction. The recent developments in the Middle East
and North Africa both vindicate our approach and provide us with new
opportunities to extend the common area of freedoms.
Secondly, the ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy that we have adopted bears a
much deeper meaning than settling our problems with each of our neighbors. It
aims at the transformation of our neighborhood, where serious problems and
elements of instability exist, into a friendship and cooperation basin that will
serve the interests of all. In this context, we believe that our policy of zero
problems with neighbors has also gained additional meaning and importance as the
Middle East stands at the brink of a historical transformation. We hope that the
current dynamic for reform advances in way that will meet the expectations of
the people while also contributing to peace and security in the region. If this
can be achieved, the spirit of cooperation that we are trying to develop on the
basis of our zero problems policy will be further strengthened. We are sparing
no effort toward this direction and we will continue to do so.
As to the principle of being active rather than reactive, it is obvious that
Turkey today acts upon a longer-term vision, which foresees a stable and secure
region within the framework of a new global order. The way Turkey has been
trying to forge new and stronger mechanisms of cooperation with a vast number of
countries and organizations has allowed us to be more aware of the developments
in various parts of the world and take the necessary measures in advance to
steer the course of events in the right direction. In fact, the reason why
Turkey has been able to respond to the developments in the region much faster
and more effectively than many others is because we have long established the
kind of relationships with the people that will carry us to the next stage. Also,
the way Turkey strives to mediate and/or facilitate the resolution of disputes
in a preventive way also reflects the proactive and visionary nature of our
foreign policy. Today, in a large area spanning Balkans to Southeast Asia,
Turkey’s efforts are instrumental in maintaining peace and security so that we
do not have to react to conflicts in their aftermath.
Finally, active Turkish foreign policy is also well reflected in the
international organizations with the tasks assumed and policies pursued. Today,
Turkey is an active member of many international and regional organizations
ranging from the UN to the G-20 [Group of Twenty], OIC [Organization of Islamic
Cooperation] to NATO, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]
to ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization]. In each case we are constantly
looking into ways of making these organizations more effective and lead many
initiatives to this end. If I have to give one example of our renewed activism
in international organizations, the UN Security Council comes to mind. Right
after completing nonpermanent membership of the UN Security Council for the term
2009–2010, we have now put our candidacy for the term 2015–2016. Also, our
active role within the G-20, which is now becoming the new core structure for
global economic governance, is another case in point reflecting Turkey’s added
value in multilateral diplomacy.
Overall, we have made great progress in operationalizing the five principles of
our foreign policy. We will continue to uphold these principles and maintain our
active stance in putting them into practice. This is not only a must for our own
national interests, but helps create an international environment conducive to
cooperation and dialogue.
CAIRO REVIEW: After remarkable economic success over the past decade—notably in
attracting foreign investment and increasing trade—what are your challenges
looking ahead to the next decade?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey has navigated through a serious economic crisis in the
recent past, which compelled us to carry out serious economic reforms. Thanks to
these reforms and the entrepreneur spirit of the Turkish private sector, today
Turkey has a stronger and rapidly growing economy. In 2010 and 2011, while most
European countries fought against the diverse adverse effects of the global
economic crisis like recession, negative growth, unemployment, etc., Turkey
recorded economic growth of 9 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. With a GDP
of nearly $1 trillion, Turkey is the sixteenth biggest economy in the world and
the sixth biggest in Europe. Turkey’s economic growth so far has been highly
beneficial for our neighbors too, whose share in our total trade volume has
increased from 8 percent to 30 percent in the last ten years. However, as
European countries constitute the biggest foreign trade partner of Turkey, we
see the current economic crisis in Europe as an important challenge for us too.
This is why we call upon European leaders to take the necessary measures in time.
In this regard, Turkey is ready to do all it can to facilitate the way out of
this crisis and believes that in the long term its membership of the EU will
make a great difference, enabling the EU to be a stronger global actor. Our aim
is to elevate Turkey to the league of the world’s ten biggest economies by 2023,
when we will celebrate the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic.
CAIRO REVIEW: A decade after the September 11 attacks provoked great debates
about a clash of Islam and the West, what is your view about this
‘civilizational’ question?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: By mentioning the civilizational question, I presume you are
referring to the “clash of civilizations” theory of Samuel Huntington. I have
thoroughly reflected my observations against this theory in an article published
in 1994, entitled “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)
Order.”
As revealed in my article, I think Huntington’s theory is a status quo-oriented
ideological formulation to justify foreign policy measures and maneuvers adopted
in the post-Cold War era. While doing so, he unfairly blames non-Western
civilizations for the existing crises and conflicts and absolves the Western
powers of any responsibility in this regard. Unfortunately, after the September
11 terrorist attacks, Huntington’s theory has drawn even more attention and thus
a distorted understanding has been further promoted which considers terrorism,
radical movements, and Islam interrelated. This understanding, shaped around
Islamophobia, is the main reason today for unjust reactions against Muslims,
tantamount to discrimination. Over time, the presentation of the Muslim world as
a potential enemy has also resulted in encouraging oppressive political
tendencies in Muslim countries for the sake of preserving Western interests and
thus exempting the Muslim world from enjoying the universality of democratic
values.
I am not going to dwell upon the reasons behind the promotion of such
civilizational clash theories, which are embedded more in political and economic
considerations rather than actual social and philosophical realities. Indeed,
for me the basic reason for declaring the Muslim world as a threat is the
geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic potentialities of the Muslim world
and the need to justify the strategic and tactical operations to have control
over these potentialities.
In any case, and with the advantage of hindsight, I categorically refute the
clash theories as an inter-civilizational mode of relationship. I prefer and
believe in the necessity of finding peaceful ways of resolving inter-civilizational
differences through consolidating dialogue among civilizations and facilitating
free exchanges and stressing on the common universal values rather than
emphasizing the fault lines. The fact that the history of civilizations is not
composed only of clashes, and there are many examples of dynamic and peaceful
cooperation and interaction among civilizations, is an encouraging proof that
this is an attainable goal. With this understanding, Turkey has cosponsored the
Alliance of Civilizations initiative with Spain, which lately became a UN
project with more than 120 members. The success of this initiative alone is
another proof of our common aspirations and ideals irrespective of our cultural
and religious differences.
CAIRO REVIEW: As somebody who is known as a leading theoretician of foreign
policy, which global thinkers, or which countries’ foreign policies, interest
you the most?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: In today’s globalized world, all countries, big or small, have
a valuable contribution to make to global peace and security. So I do not make a
difference between any countries as to the importance of their roles. I am more
interested in how they use their potential and how they bring their added value
to the fore. It is also important to create the larger framework, or a new
global order that will allow countries to assume their fair share. For me, an
egalitarian, participatory, and synthesizing world order is the only viable
answer in overcoming the current global challenges and problems we are faced
with. Therefore, these countries that are working to bring about such a new
order deserve all the credit. Today, seeing a consensus emerging within the
international community on the need for such a new global order makes me more
hopeful for the future.
Likewise, we also need intellectuals and theorists to help form the conceptual
basis of this new order. Their work will strengthen our commitment and provide
an anchor with reality. It is also extremely important to have this intellectual
support from all around the world rather than leaning on certain quarters. In
this regard, the quality of the analysis and assessments from Asian, African,
and Latin American thinkers and scholars are quite impressive. This is yet
another proof of the universality of the human’s yearning for a better world. We
should thus not deprive ourselves of the contributions by anyone and any country.
CAIRO REVIEW: Did you see the Arab Spring coming?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: From our point of view, it was expected; we were aware of the
urgent need for change and democratic transformation in the region. As you might
remember, in my book Strategic Depth (April 2001) I have underlined that the
stability and political experience in the Arab states were not based on social
legitimacy, and that stability was worthless. Likewise, I have also asserted
that the transformation in Arab nationalism and the political legitimacy crises
in the Arab world would affect the political leadership structures of those
countries. As such, from the early years of the previous decade, we started
emphasizing the importance of introducing political and economic reforms and
upholding dignity, human rights and freedoms, as well as universal values such
as the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and gender equality in the
region.
CAIRO REVIEW: Broadly, what factors led to the Arab uprisings?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Protests are home-grown and naturally ignited by years-long
aspiration for freedom, transparency, accountability, democracy, and social
justice. A driving force for the popular movements has been the young people who
were frustrated to live under pressure and restraint while suffering from
economic distress. Popular discontent gained a wider sphere of influence through
social networking sites, which have been utilized by the activists to organize
protests all over the region.
CAIRO REVIEW: How will the Arab uprisings fundamentally change the Middle East—or
not?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The process of change will take time in the region. It won’t be
linear and it could undergo many seasons. But it is irreversible. It is not
possible to turn back the clock, simply because the pressure for change is
driven by demography. Today, around 60 percent of Arabs are under thirty.
Overwhelming numbers of them are fed-up with regimes that have not even tried to
give them better lives. The Arab Spring has necessitated the establishment of a
fair balance between freedom and security for the development of stability as
well as unity and peace. Such a need requires a social contract to eliminate the
legitimacy gap between those who govern and are governed, in view of the
aspiration of the peoples for freedom, justice, and democracy. This has never
been easy before, and there is no reason why it should be any easier now.
The biggest challenge is to materialize the reforms in the fields of politics,
economy, and security simultaneously. On the one hand, you need to set up
democratic institutions and make them function; on the other, you need to
produce lasting solutions to the requirements of the peoples on employment,
education, food, and health. Inevitably, the next decades will witness the
struggle to turn such ossified vicious circles into virtuous circles. Perhaps
some will make it, some others won’t. However, those successful ones will lead
the way for their less fortunate peers. The course of the popular movements will
be determined by the peoples of the region. In other words, the people will set
the pace and the scope of the change in the Middle East.
CAIRO REVIEW: What is your personal perspective of how the Turkish government
responded to the Arab Spring, beginning with the protests in Tunisia, and later
in Egypt and elsewhere?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We have adopted a principled stance regarding the popular
movements in the region. This stance is based on two pillars: to support the
reforms for more transparency, legitimacy, and accountability, and to pursue
them through peaceful transition. We always advocated for the regimes to carry
the torch of change themselves. Since sustainable security and stability in the
region is only possible through accommodating the legitimate aspirations of the
people, we encouraged our regional partners to implement necessary reforms in
due time to this end.
Turkey has always underlined that violence and use of force against people is
unacceptable. The sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and
political unity of each country must be preserved and respected. It is also
important not to let these processes be hijacked by radicals who seek to foment
sectarian, ethnic or ideological strife across the region. Turkey also notes
that the scope of change and dynamics differ from one country to the other.
Therefore, a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot be applied to the countries in
transition. If needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own experience with the
interested countries.
CAIRO REVIEW: Do the revolts in the Arab world present a crisis for Turkey, or
an opportunity?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We would like to see a democratic, constitutional system taking
root in our neighborhood so that all religions and sects can coexist in harmony
and peace within a multicultural setting. This is also the only way to secure
peace, security, and stability in the region. If ongoing popular movements
succeed in the establishment of democratic systems, this will certainly serve
the interests of Turkey. Turkey will spare no effort in supporting the processes
of change and transformation in the region with its democratic culture and
historical experience. However, one of the biggest challenges ahead will be to
thwart the likelihood of a new form of polarization emerging in the region, as
sectarian identities have sharpened in the wake of popular movements. Turkey
will strive, in coordination with regional and international actors, to ensure
that ongoing processes of change and transformation conclude with success.
CAIRO REVIEW: How does Turkey respond to fears of neo-Ottomanism—the prospect
that your ‘strategic depth’ effectively seeks Turkish hegemony over the Arab
region?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Certain circles accuse us of pursuing a neo-Ottoman agenda.
These allegations are baseless. Common geography and historical relations with
the region certainly dictate Turkey to follow an active policy in the face of
developments in the region. Turkey simply looks for the establishment of
security, peace, and stability on the basis of democracy in the region. Turkey
has no hidden agenda toward the region. Our goal is working toward the creation
of a belt of peace, stability, security, and wealth along its borders. The key
word defining Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries is not ‘hegemony,’ but
‘mutual cooperation.’ Therefore such fears are baseless.
CAIRO REVIEW: Do you regret anything about Turkey’s bilateral relations with the
former regimes in the region—Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria, for example?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: History is replete with telling examples of regimes failing to
survive as they lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their people. For Turkey,
it is not the regimes, but the peoples that matter and it is the people that
lasts, not the regimes. It is for this very reason that Turkey has consistently
chosen to stand by the peoples of the region as they have charted for democracy
and freedom, bringing about an Arab Spring.
CAIRO REVIEW: Does Turkey’s experience with strong military involvement in
politics and government—for better or worse—contain lessons for Egypt’s
transition to democracy—a ‘Turkish model’? Some observers in the West and in
Israel have expressed alarm at the success of Islamic parties in Egypt’s
elections—the fear of an Islamic state with a militant agenda. Do you share any
of that concern?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey and Egypt are two brotherly and friendly nations, which
are tied together with deep-rooted and unbreakable bonds of common history,
culture, and geography. Egypt has a huge historic and cultural background. It is
one of the most important civilizations in the world. It should not be forgotten
that during the Ottoman times, the reform process had started in Egypt.
Promoting democratic transformation in our region for years, Turkey welcomes
Egypt’s peaceful revolution and fully respects the Egyptian people’s sovereign
choice. With the revolution, Egyptian people have embarked upon a historical
journey that would bring greater democracy, freedom, stability, and prosperity
to its future generations. We believe in Egypt’s democratic vision and we are
fully confident in the Egyptian people’s ability to move forward in unity,
solidarity, and determination. Democratic transition period in Egypt will have
important repercussions for the entire region and Egypt’s democratic success
will create an important precedent that will inspire other nations.
The progress achieved in Egypt’s democratic transformation process adds to our
optimism on Egypt’s future. Egyptian people celebrated the first anniversary of
the 25 January Tahrir revolution. We fully shared your joy and your pride. The
conclusion of the elections for the People’s Assembly, and its inauguration on
the eve of the revolution’s anniversary, represents a significant phase in this
regard.
We do not underestimate the challenges ahead. We are also aware that there still
remains a long way to go to complete the transitional period. There will be
inevitable ups and downs. The Egyptian people have been long aspiring for a full
democratic system and a better living. The process is sensitive and it’s full of
difficulties. Demands and expectations are naturally very high and the time, as
well as resources, are limited. The delays in realization of people’s
aspirations lead to further frustration and resentment. The deadly incidents
erupting in moments of high social tension remind us how fragile can be the
order in society at these delicate times. In short, coping with the
socioeconomic and political challenges on the one hand and advancing the
transition in peace and stability on the other, is not a simple task.
Yet, we are fully confident that our Egyptian brothers will continue advancing
with the understanding of compromise and dialogue and show utmost care to
preserve the spirit of national unity in order to successfully conclude this
historic process. We fully believe that thanks to the perseverance, resilience,
and arduous efforts of the Egyptian people, Egypt will emerge from this delicate
process even stronger and more prosperous than before. As displayed by the
visits of President [Abdullah] Gül and Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan in
March and September respectively, as well as by my six visits to Egypt last year,
Turkey will remain in full solidarity with the Egyptian people in their journey
to democracy.
Each and every country has its own unique characteristics shaped by its own
unique historical and sociopolitical background. Therefore, as Turkey we do not
want to present ourselves, nor to be seen, as a role model. It took years of
democratic experimentation for Turkey to arrive at the current stage. Moreover,
Turkish democratic experience is not merely about the evolution of civilian-military
relations, but of an all-encompassing nature affecting the society across the
board. I think, this aspect of the Turkish experience and its ability to prove
the compatibility of democracy and secularism with a predominantly Muslim
society could constitute an inspiration for the regional countries under
transition, including Egypt. If needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own
democratic experience with all interested countries.
We are now beyond such outdated prejudices and concerns against political
parties with Islamic references. Starting with the free and fair elections in
Palestine in 2006, we have always advocated that the democratically elected
political entities should be allowed to assume and execute their governmental
functions. Only through practice can democracies mature. However, the
international community failed to recognize this fact in the Palestinian example
and this failure continues to adversely affect the Palestinian body politic,
with negative repercussions on the peace process. Therefore, in the context of
the Arab Spring in general, and in the Egyptian case in particular, the
international community should not repeat the same mistake.
On the other hand, ascendancy to power through democratic elections comes with
responsibilities, as well as with authority to rule. These responsibilities
include ensuring the rule of law, good governance, accountability, transparency,
and upholding of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the protection of
women’s rights and rights of the minorities. In the final analysis, in
democracies what matters is the free will of the peoples. Of course, full
democratization is a long and arduous process that is about institutions, as
much as about free and fair elections.
CAIRO REVIEW: How has Turkish foreign policy assessed and dealt with the
evolving political crisis in Syria?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: For us, Syria is not just a neighboring country. We have a
common history, we share a very long land border and we are destined to live
next to each other. Our societies are interwoven through the ties of kinship.
This is why we could not remain indifferent to the developments taking place
right on the other side of our 910-kilometer-long border.
Determined to extend a helping hand to the people in Syria, we have approached
the Syrian leadership even before the outbreak of the current popular movement.
We explicitly warned the Syrian leadership that Syria could be the next step of
the Arab Spring unless the leadership took on board the very basic demand of its
citizens for a life in dignity. We offered to share our experience and expertise
in the field of democratization that could inspire the Syrian leadership to take
difficult yet necessary steps for accommodating the legitimate demands of the
Syrian people.
I have visited Syria sixty-two times in total since I have taken the post of
special advisor to the prime minister. Just to remind the Syrian administration
about the necessity of reforms, I have visited and met with President [Bashar]
Assad three times. We have even presented a road map for reform in Syria in
every walk of life. However, promises given to us for reform were not upheld.
Despite relentless efforts by the Turkish government, the Syrian leadership
chose to confront its own citizens by engaging in a dead-end policy based on the
brutal repression of street protests.
The developments in Syria continue to be one of the major concerns of the
international community in view of the mounting death toll in the country. The
stage that has been reached in Syria poses a threat to the international peace
and security. Now that it seems unlikely to see an action by the UN Security
Council, the international community should reassess its options according to
the new conditions in place.
Being a neighboring country to be first affected by the developments in Syria,
Turkey will sustain its efforts in cooperation with regional and international
actors in order to end the bloodshed and to pave the ground for a political
transformation process in the country. As Turkey, we tried everything first at
the bilateral level, then in coordination with the Arab League, and lastly at
the UN Security Council in order to resolve the crisis in this country. We now
need to work for an international platform on Syria, originating from the region
and with broad participation of all related members of the international
community. We hope that the Tunis meeting [of the “Friends of Syria” group of
nations] on 24 February enabled the international community to send the long-overdue
messages to the Syrian regime and to alleviate the sufferings of the Syrian
people.
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you estimate President Assad, and his role in the crisis
and the solution?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The developments in Syria have gained a tragic dimension due to
the uncompromising attitude of the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime has not only
disregarded the outcries of its own people, but also lent a deaf ear to
international calls for abandoning violence and use of force against protestors.
Against this background, President Assad and his close entourage have the
primary responsibility for the current crisis, which, unfortunately, ravages the
country in front of our eyes. It is again in the hands of President Assad to end
the bloodshed and to initiate a peaceful transformation process in the country
through full implementation of the Arab League’s initiative and roadmap.
CAIRO REVIEW: What is the most effective way for outsiders—whether it is Turkey,
Arab states, or a combination of international action—to address a crisis like
the one in Syria?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The most effective way of dealing with the crisis in Syria is
the adoption of a unified position by the international community as a whole. It
will be only then that the Assad regime will finally comprehend that persisting
in its current policies will only lead to more bloodshed and nothing else.
Sharing a 910-kilometer-long border with Syria, Turkey will continue to be at
the center of the efforts in order to address the crisis in this country. As a
regional organization, the Arab League has a pivotal role in steering the
efforts of the international community. The recipe for ending the crisis should
ideally originate from the region and be implemented with the support of the
international community.
CAIRO REVIEW: Does the instability in Syria pose a threat to Turkish security—as
a border state with potential refugees fleeing violence, or as a country with a
Kurdish region?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The worsening situation in Syria has gained a potential to pose
a threat not only to regional but also to international security and stability.
In addition to close and deep-rooted historical and cultural ties between the
peoples of Turkey and Syria, Turkey shares its longest land border with Syria.
It is hard to imagine a neighboring Turkey immune to the likely negative effects
of the developments in Syria. All relevant Turkish authorities watch vigilantly
the situation on the ground in this country and are ready to take necessary
measures against possible sources of instability originating from Syria,
including a mass influx of refugees.
CAIRO REVIEW: Would you agree with analysts who speculate that Turkey’s
relations with Israel will never return to the high point where they have been
in the past? Has Turkish policy toward Israel become ‘emotional’—considering
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ‘walkout’ at Davos, and the anger over the ‘Flotilla
incident’?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Certain positive developments in the Middle East peace process
also had their reflections on Turkey’s relations with Israel. After the Madrid
Peace Conference and the Oslo Peace Accords, Turkey upgraded its ties with
Israel in the early 1990s; over the years, Turkey and Israel established better
relations so that this relationship could serve the Middle East peace process.
However, Israel’s acts and policies jeopardizing peace and stability in the
region have had negative repercussions on our bilateral relations. The Suez
Canal crisis of 1956, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980, and
Israel’s brutal military attacks on the occupied Palestinian territories,
particularly the ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in December 2008, were among them.
The Israeli attack against the international humanitarian aid convoy on the high
seas on 31 May 2010, which resulted in the killing of nine innocent civilians
and the injury of many others from a host of nationalities, inevitably led to
the deterioration of our relations. The attack constituted a clear breach of
international law. Israel has drawn severe condemnation not only from Turkey,
but also from the entire international community.
This brutal attack left an indelible mark in the hearts and minds of the Turkish
people. The crime committed by Israel is not a simple offense. Israel has not
only violated the international law, but also the right to life, the most
fundamental human value, of innocent civilians, once again. Yet, we have acted
responsibly and with prudence during the last twenty-one months. Our
expectations were both judicious and realistic. Despite this fact, and contrary
to the common practice in international relations, Israel failed to meet
Turkey’s legitimate demands for a public apology, compensation, and an end to
the blockade of Gaza, until now. No country can turn a blind eye to the killing
of its citizens by foreign forces on the high seas and the subsequent
maltreatment of other passengers.
Turkey’s demands are clear. Israel needs to apologize and pay compensation. The
unlawful blockade on Gaza must also be lifted. The Israeli government must make
a choice. Israel needs to see that it will only be possible to ensure real
security by building a real peace. We hope that Israel would see the big picture
and what serves best its own interests. Normalization of our relations will
depend on the steps to be taken by Israel.
CAIRO REVIEW: You personally were involved in a significant Turkish initiative
to mediate a peace agreement between Israel and Syria—and by some accounts it
nearly succeeded. Can you provide us with insights into your mediation mission,
and what happened to it? What are the prospects for an Israeli–Palestinian
agreement?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is the core issue in the
Middle East. Fundamental changes taking place in our region in the recent period
have made the need for the settlement of this dispute more important than ever.
Turkey supports the two-state solution that would lead to the establishment of
an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as
its capital, to live in peace and security with the state of Israel.
We welcome and support all efforts for the resumption of the negotiations
between the two parties. However, meaningful negotiations can take place only on
an equal footing. Israelis have been enjoying their statehood since 1948,
whereas the Palestinians have been denied such an inherent right for years. The
steps taken by Palestinians in order to achieve full international recognition
by the UN could remove such a lopsided approach from the agenda for good. It is
now high time to address this imbalance. Israel must have a counterpart on an
equal footing in every sense. Palestinians must have their recognized state.
Evidently, the primary obstacle in front of the peace efforts remains to be the
Israeli government’s continued intransigence on the Jewish settlements in the
occupied Palestinian territories. We are deeply concerned about the ongoing
settlement activities of Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Settlements
are not only contrary to international law and the Road Map commitments but also
endanger the vision of a two-state solution. If the peace process is to be truly
revitalized and concluded successfully, Israel should seriously commit itself to
respecting the existing final status parameters, particularly on the 1967
borders.
Turkey strongly believes that the Middle East peace process should be advanced
in all three tracks, namely the Israeli–Palestinian, Israeli–Syrian, and Israeli–Lebanese
tracks. With this understanding, Turkey mediated between Israel and Syria in the
past. As both parties were about to launch direct negotiations, the process was
disrupted by the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip. We strongly hope that
this track as well would be revived as soon as possible once the conditions in
the region normalize.
CAIRO REVIEW: You were also involved in the Tehran Declaration—an effort by
Turkey and Brazil to mediate a solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear
program. Was it a success or a failure?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: I wouldn’t describe the Tehran Joint Declaration as a matter of
success or failure. It was rather a missed opportunity on the part of the
international community in achieving a breakthrough in the longstanding
diplomatic rift with Iran. The Tehran Joint Declaration proved that a genuine
diplomatic engagement with Iran could yield results. If the proposal contained
in the Declaration could have been implemented, it could have been the catalyst
to a constructive diplomatic process addressing the broader issue of the Iranian
nuclear program. In our view, confidence-building measures are still achievable
if they are put into the right context. The Tehran Joint Declaration sets a
successful example for future efforts.
CAIRO REVIEW: Western countries led by the United States have expressed strong
suspicions that Iran is determined to become a nuclear weapon power. What do you
think?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The problem is first and foremost that of a confidence crisis.
Lack of confidence on the part of the international community in the exclusively
peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, and the security perceptions of
Iran for its own part, create a big psychological barrier between the parties.
Overcoming these barriers can only be possible through serious and targeted
negotiations that would address the concerns and expectations of both sides.
CAIRO REVIEW: Is Iran on a collision course with the West, with no real
diplomatic way out?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Based on previous experiences, Iran might have its own reasons
to question the consistency of the principles and standards of its Western
counterparts. Yet finding a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is in
the interest of all parties. Given the impact of the psychological factor and
the crisis of confidence among the parties, however, the process will not be
easy. Patient but perseverant diplomacy will be needed to achieve the desired
outcome. Only through a gradual process, including exploratory talks on a set of
parallel actions aimed at overcoming the present impasse, will it be possible to
arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement of the outstanding issues.
CAIRO REVIEW: How would Turkey view an Israeli military attack on Iran to
disrupt Iran’s nuclear project?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey is against any kind of military strike against Iran. The
military option does not represent a solution to the challenges posed by the
Iranian nuclear activities. Any military action would, on the contrary, create
more problems than it would solve— particularly in terms of its unavoidable
negative implications on regional and global peace, security, and stability.
Determined efforts toward a peaceful solution through dialogue and cooperation,
therefore, do not have any viable alternative. Negotiation remains the only way
forward.
CAIRO REVIEW: Turkey was strongly skeptical of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
2003. How do you evaluate the results nearly a decade later, and the impact of
the transformation of Iraq on Turkish interests—including the Kurdish issue?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Let me begin by sharing with you the main contours of Turkey’s
policy toward Iraq. Turkey wishes to see a stable, secure, democratic, and
prosperous Iraq at peace with its own people and its neighbors. We have strong
cultural and historical links with Iraq and we attach importance to being in
close relations with all segments of the Iraqi society.
We all had misgivings about the war in Iraq since we knew that the war would
first and foremost affect Turkey as a neighboring country. Turkey suffered from
the war and the ensuing instability in Iraq in various ways. Instability and the
power vacuum turned northern Iraq into a safe haven for PKK [Kurdistan Workers’
Party] terrorists that use this region as a base to plan and execute attacks
against Turkey. Our economic and commercial interests were also seriously
hampered. The PKK terrorist organization does not constitute a threat only to
the security and stability of Turkey, but also to those of our neighbors
including Iraq.
In recent years Turkey has significantly improved its relations with the Kurdish
region in northern Iraq. Turkish businessmen, contractors, and workers have made
crucial contributions to the prosperity and welfare in northern Iraq. Our
expectation from Iraq—including the regional authorities in northern Iraq—is to
take decisive and result-oriented measures to eradicate the presence and
activities of the PKK terrorist organization therein.
The withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq in December 2011 has presented the
Iraqi leaders with the opportunity to prove to themselves and to the
international community that they can work together to build a stable,
democratic, and prosperous Iraq. However, in the wake of the U.S. troop
withdrawal, Iraq has been once again plagued by political instability. We are
concerned that the ongoing political crisis may lead to the recurrence of
sectarian violence in the country. We therefore call on all Iraqi leaders to
resolve their difficulties through compromise and negotiations with a view to
finding mutually acceptable solutions to the existing political problems.
CAIRO REVIEW: What are Turkey’s interests in Central Asia, and what are the
obstacles to improving relations with the nations of this region?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Central Asia lies at the heart of Eurasia with its ample
opportunities and challenges. Since gaining their independence in 1991, the
countries in the region have taken significant steps in enhancing their
sovereignty, consolidating their statehood as well as elevating the level of
integration with the world.
Sharing common cultural, historical, and linguistic ties, Turkey is the first
country to recognize the independence of these countries. Our primary objectives
toward these countries are to support the efforts for a working democracy and
free market economy; to promote the political and economic reform process; to
advance political and economic stability and prosperity in the region; to
contribute to the emergence of an environment conducive to regional cooperation;
to support their vocation toward Euro-Atlantic institutions, and to assist them
to benefit from their own energy resources. The Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking
States (CCTS) was established in 2009 as a new international intergovernmental
organization, with the overarching aim of promoting comprehensive cooperation
among Turkic-speaking states.
In the last few months, we have witnessed two important developments in the
region. First, Kyrgyzstan has made an important progress on the way to
parliamentary democracy. It is the first time that a peaceful power handover
took place in Central Asia. Turkey will continue to support Kyrgyzstan’s
aspirations for building a full-fledged democracy. Second, Kazakhstan is also
moving in the right direction toward a multiparty democratic system. We boldly
encourage these efforts to yield concrete democratic results. We welcome and
support these transformational efforts and developments in the region catering
for the needs and aspirations of peoples.
CAIRO REVIEW: After its initial electoral success a decade ago, the AKP
government seemed to be on a good track for European Union membership, yet some
observers see the process at a standstill now. What happened?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey’s accession negotiations started in 2005 and continue.
Their goal is membership on the basis of the EU’s unanimously taken decisions.
Despite some negative tendencies, the EU expresses that it is committed to carry
forward the enlargement process which also includes Turkey. The 2011 Enlargement
Strategy Document published by the European Commission last October stresses
that “Turkey’s contribution to the EU in a number of crucial areas will only be
fully effective with an active and credible accession process.”
Except for a number of member states that oppose our accession negotiations for
domestic political considerations, EU countries in general state that they
support Turkey’s accession process. They are aware of the added value that
Turkey would bring to the Union. The Strategy Document that I have mentioned
underlines that Turkey is a key country for the security and prosperity of the
EU, with its dynamic economy, important regional role, and its contribution to
EU’s foreign policy and energy security. As a factor of stability in its region,
Turkey’s membership of the EU would not only amplify the global political,
economic, and sociocultural power of the Union, but would also contribute to
regional and global peace and stability, the dissemination of universal values
to a wider geography, and the dialogue among cultures.
Accession to the EU is our strategic goal. I consider EU membership as an
integral part of Turkey’s historical efforts for further modernization and
transformation. On the other hand, it is true that in spite of our tireless
efforts to make further progress in the negotiations, the process is confronted
with difficulties as a result of politically motivated obstacles created by some
EU members. Nevertheless, we are committed to carry forward this process and our
reform agenda, which is now in an irreversible course. By doing so, we aim to
provide our people with the highest norms and standards in every field of their
daily lives. As a matter of fact, we have already made huge strides to that end
in recent years through comprehensive reforms. We will continue reform since it
is first and foremost for the good of the Turkish people. The new, progressive,
and comprehensive constitution which will be drafted through a broad
consultation with all relevant stakeholders will constitute an important step in
this respect.
CAIRO REVIEW: What concrete steps do you envision taking to move forward in
closing chapters in your accession negotiations with the EU?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Since the beginning of the negotiation process, out of thirty-three
chapters, thirteen chapters were opened. These chapters cover different sectors;
from agriculture, fisheries, energy, and taxation to science and research,
education and culture, and environment. The accession process has never been
easy for any country. Unfortunately, we are facing politically motivated
obstacles which undermine the technical nature of the negotiations and in fact,
are against the principle pacta sunt servanda [agreements must be kept]. Despite
the hurdles, Turkey is determined to carry forward the process. Turkey has
adopted and started implementing a national program with a comprehensive road
map to ensure a society based on high democratic and legal norms. The program
foresees a great number of legislative changes in order to harmonize our
legislation with the EU’s. All our relevant ministries and institutions continue
to work on the negotiation chapters, blocked or not, in line with the National
Program, in order to be ready to open and close all chapters as soon as the
political blockages are lifted.
CAIRO REVIEW: Has the prospect of a more democratic Middle East caused Turkey to
rethink its geopolitical position concerning its future alignment with Europe?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey, a candidate for accession to the EU, is a European,
Mediterranean, Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern country all at the same
time. All these regions harbor challenges, but also opportunities for their
people. Turkey’s proactive, multidimensional, and result-oriented foreign policy
aims at contributing to the strengthening of peace, stability, and prosperity in
all these regions. This is in our interest. It is also in the interest of the EU.
The global international environment is rapidly changing. Transformation is now
the key word. The Arab Spring has, and will continue to have, an immense impact
on the international system. Political transition reflecting the legitimate
aspirations of the people is leading to a future based on free and democratic
foundations. During this turbulent period in the Arab world, [given] our
geopolitical position, as both a part of this very region and as an EU candidate
country, Turkey will continue to strive to foster dialogue and peaceful
settlement of disputes in the region with solution-oriented approaches, to the
benefit of all peoples of the region.
CAIRO REVIEW: Is Turkey serious about resolving the Cyprus problem?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Let me state this very clearly: as Turkey, we want a negotiated
and mutually agreed political settlement in Cyprus, and we fully support the
efforts of the Turkish Cypriots and the UN secretary-general to this end. The
question you should be asking is: are the Greek Cypriots serious about resolving
the Cyprus problem? Unfortunately their track record indicates that they are not.
The ongoing comprehensive negotiation process on the island was initiated in
2008 under the auspices of the UN, and within this framework the leaders have
met more than 140 times to date. So far, progress in the process has largely
been achieved thanks to comprehensive and constructive proposals of the Turkish
Cypriots, which were also appreciated by the UN. Most recently, the fifth
tripartite meeting of the leaders with the UN secretary-general was held in
Greentree, New York, on 23–24 January. The international community had high
expectations from these talks. As the Turkish side, we had been hoping that the
Greentree meeting would usher in the high-level meeting with the participation
of the two sides and the three guarantors, namely Turkey, Greece, and the United
Kingdom, which would address all remaining issues that couldn’t be agreed upon
by the two sides in order to seal the settlement through a grand bargain.
Regrettably, this has not been possible due to the Greek Cypriot side’s stubborn
intransigence. In Greentree the Greek Cypriots sidestepped genuine talks in
order to avoid a decision for a high-level meeting, and a very important
opportunity was missed.
Now, with the approaching Greek Cypriot EU presidency in the second half of
2012, the window of opportunity narrowed considerably. Despite this, the Turkish
Cypriot side will continue its determined efforts and we will continue to fully
support them. There is still some hope: if the assessment of the process to be
provided by the secretary-general’s special adviser Mr. [Alexander] Downer in
March is positive, the secretary-general intends to call a high-level meeting in
late April or early May. This could finally produce a settlement agreement,
enabling the new partnership to be established in Cyprus to assume the EU
presidency on 1 July. But these hopes will be meaningless if the Greek Cypriot
side does not negotiate sincerely. The Greek Cypriots must first decide whether
or not they truly want a partnership and a common future with the Turkish
Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots proved back in 2004, in the Annan Plan referenda,
that they are on the side of a settlement. It is the Greek Cypriots who must now
also display the necessary political will. The secretary-general, in his report
in 2004, clearly stated that if the Greek Cypriots remain willing to resolve the
Cyprus problem, this needs to be demonstrated.
Without a political solution, the Cyprus issue also harbors a potential risk for
trust, stability, and cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East. The unilateral start of offshore drilling activities by the Greek Cypriot
side last September and the developments which ensued after this provocative
move have demonstrated the risks which the continuation of the Cyprus issue
carries both on a regional and, partly, on a global scale. These unilateral
activities of the Greek Cypriot side have also compromised and prejudged the
Turkish Cypriots’ inherent and legitimate equal rights over the natural
resources of the island. Mr. [Dervis] Eroğlu, president of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), put forth a constructive proposal for a fair sharing
of the island’s natural resources and for using these resources to finance the
settlement, but this proposal was returned by the Greek Cypriots without any
comment. This crisis clearly demonstrates the necessity for a political
settlement in Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey and the TRNC will implement, by
2014, a pipeline project which involves bringing 75 million cubic meters of
drinking water to northern Cyprus. This amount can be increased tenfold, and
that would be equal to double the water need of the entire island. As Turkey, we
would like the whole of the island to benefit from this project. This new water
source could, like the hydrocarbon resources, be utilized as an incentive for
the successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations with a comprehensive
solution. Thus a mutually agreed settlement in Cyprus would enable not only the
two sides on the island but also the entire region to benefit from the increase
in prosperity made possible through the peaceful use of these new natural
resources.
The Turkish side is sincerely committed to the goal of a mutually agreed
political settlement in Cyprus. A just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus
problem will not only be in the interests of the two sides on the island but
also the EU and all concerned parties including Turkey, as well as contributing
to peace, cooperation, and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and the wider
region.
CAIRO REVIEW: The Armenia question has also been a problem in Turkey’s foreign
relations. Ankara has warned the French president about signing a law
criminalizing denial of ‘Armenian genocide’—are you making progress on this
issue, or are things actually getting worse?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Two separate appeals were lodged with the French Constitutional
Council: to annul on the grounds of unconstitutionality the draft law “to
penalize the denial of the genocides recognized by law in France.” The
signatories of these appeals are either French deputies or senators. The
Constitutional Council of France annulled the draft law on February 28. We
consider the annulment as a step in line with freedom of expression and research,
the rule of law, and the principles of international law, and against the
politicization of history in France. We are glad to note that a grave error was
corrected by the most competent judicial authority in France. Turks and
Armenians have differing interpretations over the tragic part of their long
common history, where all sides suffered. We would like to resolve these
differences and diverging interpretations with Armenia through dialogue and
based on impartial scholarly studies. Our aim is to reach a just memory. Trying
to score points in third countries is not the way to deal with this issue. Third
countries should play a constructive role in this process rather than take
exclusivist, one-sided positions.
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you see Turkey’s role in NATO going forward?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey is a member of NATO since 1952 and we are celebrating
the sixtieth anniversary of this membership this year. The international system
has changed since 1952, as well as Turkey and the Alliance, but NATO is still
the cornerstone of our defense and security policy. NATO, as a unique forum for
Euro–Atlantic security, provides Turkey an opportunity to put forward her views
and expectations regarding international security issues and to have a strong
impact on transatlantic initiatives. Turkey’s membership of NATO is also an
integral part of her global identity. Turkey proceeds to take part in missions
and operations on collective defense and crisis management within NATO. Turkey
mobilizes its ‘soft power’ by means of using its deep historical ties with
populations and countries in the wide geography where NATO acts. In view of the
fact that the security and stability of the Euro–Atlantic area and the Middle
East are closely linked to each other, Turkey takes the lead in the development
of NATO’s relations with the countries in the Middle East through partnership
mechanisms like Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
We shall continue to add value to NATO’s outreach in the future. As such, NATO
maintains its relevance to respond to the risks and challenges of the new
strategic environment.
CAIRO REVIEW: As historical competitors with centuries of rivalry, are Russia
and Turkey establishing a fundamentally healthier partnership in the new global
order—perhaps through the mutual benefits of natural gas cooperation?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We have intense relations with Russia, which go back over six
centuries at a time when both countries were multiethnic empires. St. Petersburg
was among the first capitals where the Ottoman Empire sent a resident ambassador.
Rivalry between the two neighboring empires transformed into a cooperative
nature in the aftermath of the First World War. This cooperation has continued—especially
in the economic sphere—even during the Cold War.
Our relations with Russia have evolved and developed rapidly since the beginning
of the 1990s. Turkish–Russian relations constitute an integral component of
Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy. We maintain a sincere and open
dialogue with Russia in order to preserve and strengthen the atmosphere of
mutual trust and to further our cooperation to the mutual benefit of both sides.
Economic cooperation constitutes the driving force behind Turkish–Russian
relations. Our trade volume reached $26.9 billion as of November 2011 and is on
the rise. The leaders of both countries have set the target of a bilateral trade
volume of $100 billion by the end of 2015. The volume of Turkish investments in
Russia has surpassed $7 billion. Turkish companies are active in a large
spectrum of areas, from food to construction to textile sectors. Our
construction companies have undertaken 1,191 projects so far, worth $32 billion.
The volume of Russian investments in Turkey has also reached $7 billion. We are
pleased that our country continued to be the most preferred country by Russian
tourists also in 2011. Last year, 3.6 million Russian tourists visited Turkey.
The visa exemption agreement entered into force on 17 April 2011. We believe
that the implementation of this agreement will contribute to our cooperation in
the fields of trade, economy, transportation, and tourism.
Our cooperation in the energy field adds a strategic dimension to our relations.
Russia is the biggest natural gas supplier of Turkey through two pipelines.
While economic relations are the driving force, high-level dialogue provides for
the strategic orientation of our bilateral relations. The High-Level Cooperation
Council that we established in May 2010 during the official visit of President [Dmitry]
Medvedev to Turkey opened a new chapter in our relations. We held the second
meeting during the visit of our prime minister to Russia on 15–17 March 2011 in
Moscow. This visit coincided with the ninetieth anniversary of the conclusion of
the Moscow Agreement, which is the basis for our relations in the modern era. We
are planning to hold the third meeting of the Council this year.
CAIRO REVIEW: Are you satisfied with Turkish–Russian cooperation in addressing
regional challenges, such as the crisis Syria, the Arab uprisings generally,
Iran’s nuclear program, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: We believe that a stable, market-oriented, democratic, and
peaceful Russia will certainly be an asset for regional peace and stability as
well as for the European security architecture. We see Russia as one of our
important partners and a significant actor regionally and globally. We think
that a sincere and open dialogue with Russia would help transform our region in
a positive direction. Russia’s contribution to the settlement of the frozen
conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe is necessary. Likewise, it is
expected by many that Russia would play a constructive role in the Syria crisis.
This was one of our main themes when I visited Russia in January.
CAIRO REVIEW: President Gül has spoken of a ‘golden age’ of relations with
Washington. Ties were not so good after the AKP came to office a decade ago?
What happened?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey and the U.S. currently enjoy an advanced level of
cooperation. President Obama paid his first bilateral overseas visit to Turkey
soon after becoming president. However, we do not always pursue identical
approaches on international issues. As Turkey has traditionally strong ties with
its neighborhood and beyond, sometimes there may be nuances in Turkey’s approach
on issues taking place in our region. Turkey’s geography necessitates a
multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, we have many issues concerning
Turkey and the U.S. Turkey is ready to work with every country that embraces the
goals of peace, stability, and economic development. It is not possible to
accept the assumption that “ties were not so good after this government came to
office a decade ago.” There is always speculation following a change in
governments in all countries. Turkey’s decisive journey, encompassing
comprehensive democratic and political reforms and brilliant economic
performance in the last decade or so, is self-explanatory to dispel such
groundless assumptions.
CAIRO REVIEW: Would you describe the relationship between Prime Minister Erdoğan
and President Obama, which seems to be quite good and important to Turkish–U.S.
relations?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: The developments in our region and beyond necessitate close
consultation and coordination with our allies and partners. It is with this
understanding that Prime Minister Erdoğan holds regular consultations with
President Obama on international issues of common concern. You may also recall
that President Obama recently named Prime Minister Erdoğan as one of five world
leaders with whom he enjoys the most effective working relations.
CAIRO REVIEW: How do you evaluate American policy during the Obama
administration—with regard to Turkey’s interests, to the Middle East region, and
to global security as a whole?
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU: Turkey welcomes the U.S. foreign policy, which promotes
multilateralism and seeks broader international support within the framework of
the UNSC [UN Security Council] for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes. We believe in the ultimate success of principled foreign policy that
is governed by the rule of law and international law. The unfolding set of
events in the Middle East and North Africa highlight the indispensable feature
of those principles. The calls for democratic, accountable, and sound
governments in the region are equally important. I would also like to point out
that the legitimate expectations of the people, regardless of wherever they
emanate from, should not fall on deaf ears.
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29.11.2010. Address to the THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1129_turkey/20101129_turkey.pdf |
TURKEY-2010/11/29 1
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
PERSPECTIVES ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
AN ADDRESS BY H.E. AHMET DAVUTOĞLU, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY
Washington, D.C. Monday, November 29, 2010
PARTICIPANTS:
Welcome and Moderator:
ÖMER TAŞPINAR
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
Introduction:
MARTIN INDYK
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution
Featured Speaker:
H.E. AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey
* * * * *
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P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. INDYK: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. I am Martin Indyk, the director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings.
We are greatly honored today to have the opportunity to host Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, for a statesmen’s forum here this evening under the auspices of the Center for the United States and Europe. I think that the foreign minister is very well known to all of you. In fact, he has established a reputation around the world now as a global thinker No. 7 with a bullet, as we say now, on the foreign policy list of a hundred -- the leading thinkers in foreign policy. Just the most recent example of the kind of swath that he is cutting on the world stage for Turkey as it emerges as a power with influence both in its region and beyond its region.
So, we’re very honored to have you here this evening to address us.
Dr. Davutoğlu has a distinguished academic career at a variety of Turkish universities. He worked most recently at Beykent University in Istanbul before becoming, after the November 2002 elections, chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan and the ambassador-at-large for the government of the Republic of Turkey. On May 1, 2009, he was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 60th Government of the Republic of Turkey.
After Dr. Davutoğlu speaks to you this evening, he will join in a conversation with Ömer Taşpinar. Ömer is a senior fellow in the Center for U.S. and Europe focusing on Turkish affairs and a professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College and director of our Turkey project here at the Center for the U.S. and Europe. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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So, Mr. Minister, thank you very much for joining us, and the podium is yours.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you very much, Martin, for this excellent introduction.
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor for me to be here at Brookings Institute. Again it became like a tradition. I give several speeches. I had chance to attend many meetings in this very esteemed institution, and it’s always great pleasure, and whenever I meet with the esteemed audience in this institution I always learn something new. I hope today I will have this chance again.
The topic is Turkish Foreign Policy. But are you not focused on foreign policy only, because -- let me start with a methodological critic. When we speak on foreign policy, usually we may do two methodological mistakes. One is we may -- if we only concentrate on foreign policy, ignoring other elements -- like domestic politics, like economics, like cultural developments -- you may not understand what is going on in foreign policy. So, you cannot isolate foreign policy from the general transformation of a society. This is about the content of foreign policy. Therefore, I will try to present Turkish foreign policy within such a context of transformation rather than just focusing on certain detailed individual cases and issues.
Secondly, if this is about the substance, about the time framework -- if you just concentrate on only one year, one incident, one month, or even one decade and try to understand the transformation of a foreign policy paradigm, you may do another mistake. Unfortunate today, when I read some of the articles published in Washington, in Brussels, or sometimes, you know, in the Middle East, about Turkish foreign policy, I realize that these two methodological mistakes. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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For example, some might say the foreign policy paradigm of the poor Islamic AK party government, even itself, gives an impression that it is just a foreign policy choice of one group based on some ideology or a foreign policy based on new Ottomanism.
For those who do not know anything on Ottoman history, they may think that Turkey is trying to revive Ottoman state, and this literature now emerging does not reflect the picture.
In my book, when I wrote Strategic Depth, in the introduction I made a methodological analysis, and I said the most dangerous methodological mistake of foreign policy analysis is picture analysis. You have a picture in your mind and you develop a theory based on your picture in your mind -- just one picture -- while the correct methodological approach in foreign policy analysis is process analysis, not picture analysis.
If you want to have a healthy or a comprehensive analysis, you will need to have several pictures, in your mind -- several. It will be as comprehensive as possible if you have many pictures from different time frame in your mind and try to understand the process how this foreign policy has been transformed. Turkish nation has an old history, but I will not go back to 1,000 year ago. I will make an analysis of 200 years of Turkish transformation, transformation of modernization, and I promise to do this in half an hour, not more than that, so you can see my difficulty.
I can see what we are having today is a restoration. This concept is important. Restoration, not paradigm shift. Not revolution, but a restoration of Turkish society, economics, politics, and foreign policy. And I can mention four important restorations -- three important restorations in the past and this, the fourth restoration, in ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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our modern history.
The first -- and I will make some analogies with the American restoration in my presentation as well.
The first big restoration is a response to the challenges of industrial revolution and colonialism, which are two bones -- back bones -- of the rise of European hegemony, European order. The first restoration occurred in the beginning of the 19th century in Ottoman society, which was Tanzimat -- which was called Tanzimat. It was such a restoration that Turkish politics has been reformed, and many people do not know, and they may think that Turkish democracy -- at least not multi-party democrats but participation, politics, elections -- is something of a new phenomenon in Turkey. In Turkey, elections in local administration go back to the early decades of 19th century. 1820s, ’30s we started to have elections in local administration.
And there was a constitutional monarchy, and the first Turkish constitution was adopted in 1876. And the transformation of the society was -- especially important transformation was to include non-Muslim population of Ottoman state to the system as citizens, not in the modern sense, but equal to Muslims. Therefore, we had several reforms. And the foreign policy orientation was Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy as a reflection to the balance of power in Europe.
The purpose of this restoration was -- after the congress of Vienna, we became part of the European system -- the purpose of this restoration was to defend Ottoman state and to prevent the decline of Ottoman state. This is purely an academic approach, which I don’t want to give an impression -- don’t give an impression that I am talking on new Ottomanism and trying to be wise, but this is the background.
And the first time we had a multi-party election in 1912 -- real multi-party ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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election. Not in 1950s -- 1912, 1911. We had many parties, political parties, throughout the Ottoman territories, not only in Anatolia and Istanbul, but in Balkans, in Iraq, or in Lebanon.
The second big restoration was the establishment of Turkish Republic. It was parallel to the developments in Europe, the end of the traditional imperial structures in Europe and Turkey after the War of Liberation -- First World War and War of Liberation. We had another restoration. A new system did emerge: Republic of Turkey, republicanism. And a new concept of citizen emerged.
Because of the migrations from Balkans, from Caucasia, from Middle East, from Yemen, a new nation even emerged, and this concept of nation comprised not only ethnically Turkish people but Bosniaks from -- Albanians, Bosniaks from Balkans, Chechens, Abkhazians, Georgians, Azeris from Caucasia, Kurds, some Arabs from the Middle East. This second restoration had its own economic dimension, national economy. This is the second restoration.
The third restoration was after the second world war. The international environment had changed and Turkey responded with a new restoration, multi-party democracy, free-market economy, and membership to NATO. What we can call is security-oriented democratization in Turkey.
The first incentive was security, because there was a threat from Soviet Union, and we tried to protect military integrity of Turkey. And Turkey became member of NATO, had a strong strategic alliance with the United States and other members of Europe, and we had a huge transformation of economics from the villages to the cities -- a new democratic wave that was economic, political transformation -- and the new North Atlantic -- Transatlantic Alliance, which emerged. We became part of it. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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The fourth restoration was needed after the collapse of the Gulf War. In fact, what we have today was supposed to be done in 1990s. And economic reformation was ended in 1990s. And political democratization was needed, and new foreign policy orientation was needed. We were not able to do it, because of basically coalition governments, political instability, economic crisis -- Mr. Derviş knows it very well by his own practice -- and terrorist activities.
Now, just keep this in mind, and I will make a short comparison with the American restoration. Turkish restoration in the 19th century was parallel to the American restoration after the Civil War, the consolidation of United States.
Turkish restoration during the Republican Era was parallel to the Wilsonian principles and the emergence of United States as a new global power. But not bi-polar yet. But the Wilsonian principles, which let power to the establishment of Turkish Republic -- before Turkish Republic -- was in fact the emergence of the new American consolidation restoration.
Mahan strategy, geopolitical strategy, and all this -- when you look at it -- the United States started to become not a continental power but a player in the global scene. And Turkish third restoration was parallel to the formation of the bipolar international structure, and the United States was the leader of one pole. Therefore, these restorations were parallel to each other and, in fact, after end of Cold War, both United States and us -- we needed a new restoration, and therefore we are still in this process.
United States is a global power of course. That redefinition of the foreign policy during Clinton administration afterwards 9-11 and many other. Still, this search is continuing. But in our sense, we are living in the center of Afro-Eurasia, and we need to ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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have a new restoration.
What did we try to do in eight years with this process analysis during AK party governments?
First, we wanted to consolidate our democracy as this time not security-oriented democracy but freedom-oriented democracy. After every military intervention during the Cold War, the new military regime are saying we are loyal to NATO, and we will restore democracy. These two things work together. This time, of course, we are strong member of NATO, but we want our democracy -- freedom-oriented democracy. Therefore, we have reference to European Union parallel to NATO, because European Union reforms are the only guarantees to have more democracy, more freedom, more liberty, more open society.
The second aspect of this restoration is economic development. In last eight years, Turkey had an economic change. In 2001, when we had economic crisis, Turkish economy became 26th biggest economy in the world in 2002. And now Turkey is 16th biggest economy. In 8 years, we passed 10 countries, and today we are 16th. After the economic crisis, we are sorry that some of our friendly countries faced problems, but Turkish economy showed this strength starting with Mr. Derviş reforms. Then our government took over and continued these reforms in a very strong, political way, political power, and therefore today we have a strong financial system, a dynamic economy, a rising entrepreneurship. There’s an economy.
Without economic restoration, political restoration cannot be successful. These two restorations, like two legs of a strategic restoration. Strategic restoration is our foreign policy orientation. Nobody should link our foreign policy to another reason. But we need to have a restoration in domestic, regional, and global environment because ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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we are paying the bill if there is any instability or cause in our surrounding regions.
Now, this is the framework. How can we connect this political and economic restoration with a new foreign policy paradigm? That was the challenge. And we formulated a new foreign policy. Yes. But this new foreign policy is neither turning face to east. We don’t mind to have this. I’m not trying to be apologetic here. Of course we would have Eastern background. Or not shift -- paradigm shift. But what we want is what we need for political economic consolidation, which type of foreign policy orientation we need.
For example, we need to have zero problems with our neighbors. When I became chief advisor in my first one of the first terms, I declared this policy. I remember those days. Many observers and artists. They made joke from -- regarding my background. They said, “Typical utopic academician.” Poetic language, “zero problems with neighbors,” that cannot be translated into a foreign policy -- realistic foreign policy.
Why did we declare this? Why did I declare? I know, knowing human history, even knowing family history. Brothers and sisters, they may have problems. I mean, human want history -- of course there are problems with the neighbors. But what I tried to do is to make a transformation of mentality, because throughout the Cold War the basic teaching we learned in our schools were Turkey has three sides of seas, four sides of enemies. All this was around us -- were taught to us as enemy. Russians, because we had so many wars in the past, Greece they are archenemy: Bulgarians, enemy; Arabs, of course, ideological enemy; Iran is historical rivalry. As if you are living in a neighborhood and you are being isolated. Now we had to make a transformation. They are saying -- some people are saying this is an indication that Turkey -- this government being given an suspicious -- I mean emotion -- wants to develop -- wants the -- let’s talk ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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to me. You are very clever. You are hiding your agenda, secret agenda, through this type of terminology “zero problems with neighbors”. In fact, you want to develop your relations with Iran and Syria, the axis of evil, and in order to cover this, you are using this terminology. This question was asked and I said do you know Turkish geography? Anybody who knows Turkish geography knows very well we have four Muslim neighbors and eight non-Muslim neighbors, including Black Sea. And in last eight years our relation with Georgia, a Christian neighbor, developed much more than our relation with Iran. Or our relation with Greece has developed as our relation with Syria. Our relation with Russia has developed like our relation with Iraq.
And today I don’t want to give details if there are questions I can give, only just one example. Turkey and Greece in 87 years of our relations signed only Turkey five agreements until last May. Last May, in one day we signed 23 agreements. In one day. And if it is Neo-Ottoman policy, first Greek friends would rebel, because they didn’t accept this. They wouldn’t accept this. Or if it is pro-Islamic, then Orthodox Serbs would be -- would not accept it, but today we have excellent relations with Serbia. Yes, we abolished visa with Syria, with Azerbaijan we are trying, with Libya, with Lebanon, but we abolish with Serbia, with Russia.
So, why do we need these? Because we need a restoration, consolidation of peace and stability around us.
Yes, about regional politics let us continue. Why Turkey’s proactive really ambitious foreign policy we are following? And they’re even saying, can you continue this policy with this dynamism? I am saying this is a necessity. It is not a matter of choice. But we are living in a neighborhood that every day we have to take care of all events around us in Balkans, in Middle East, in Caucasia, in Central Asia. We need to ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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have political order. We need to have stability, because -- therefore I mention Republican restoration. Because of the First World War, although we left Balkans, Balkans has been Anatolized -- let me say this is a new concept -- Anatolized, because many Balkan nations migrated to Anatolia.
Although we left Caucasia, Caucasia became Anatolized because Caucasian peoples migrated to Turkey. Whatever happens in Caucasia is our domestic issue. Therefore, I know WikiLeaks in these days -- there was -- I was asked just now in Washington Post about my speech in Sarajevo last year. It was called as a bit of indication that we are following Ottoman -- new Ottoman policy. Yes, I made a speech. There I said Bosnian issue is like our domestic issue. Why did I say this? Why? Because there are more Bosnians living in Bosnia than in -- in Turkey than in Bosnia. There are more Bosniaks living in Turkey than in Bosnia. There are more Albanians living in Turkey than in Albania. And if something happens in Sarajevo, we cannot say it is far away. Next day there will be a big demonstration in Istanbul asking our government to help Bosniak brothers and sisters.
Last year there was unrest in Shenzhen in Runchi far away. And it was not part of Ottoman territory anyway. But 300,000 -- we were living in Turkey. There were demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul and in other cities and asking government to help. And we have very good relations with China. How can you do this?
What do we want? Nothing more, nothing less: equal relations with all nations around us and political stability and security around us. And therefore we have to have an assertive -- therefore, we said from the first day we said proactive peace diplomacy. Proactive peace diplomacy is needed in order to prevent crisis. Therefore, we are active in Iraq, because if Iraq is divided, if Iraq is in chaos, Turkey will pay the ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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price. Therefore, before coming here, a few days ago we were in Lebanon, and our prime minister met with all the leaders of Lebanese politics just to control the crisis there. We don’t have any national interest there, and I talked once to one Bosnian Serb politician. I said -- you may criticize us, but we don’t have any national interest in Bosnia. Bosnia doesn’t have a -- we are not here to -- what we need is just political strategy. Do not repeat the same mistakes of 1990s. Then we will help. We have now excellent relations with Serbia, and we have trilateral relations with Serbia, Bosnia, Turkey -- Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia.
Therefore, we were really active in order to restart -- in order to have indirect talks between Syria and Israel. Therefore, we are vocal in regarding Palestine, because without solving Palestinian question, there cannot be political stability in the Middle East. There cannot be democratization in the Middle East as well. Because of that political crisis. All Middle Eastern societies are in a psychology of extraordinary situation.
When my book was translated into Arabic a few months ago, Strategic Depth, in the launching, I made this -- they asked me to give a speech. I gave a speech, and I said what is -- the question was, what is the purpose of the book? I said the purpose of the book is normalization of history. Just this is the simple formula of our foreign policy. Normalization of history. Because Cold War was abnormality. Abnormality. Because of Cold War statical polarization, we became isolated from Syria. Our border at Syria is not natural. Our border with Georgia is not natural. Our border with Iraq is not natural. What we want to do without changing the borders, with full respect to the borders, we want to have full integration with all the neighbors, with all the surrounding regions. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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What is the economic reflection of this policy? The economic reflection is clear. Let me say, just imagine map in your mind and put in the West, in Europe in the West, Germany, France, Italy; in the North, Russia; in the East, China and Japan and India. In the rest of all Afro-Eurasia, the biggest economy is Turkish economy. The most dynamic economy is Turkish economy. We don’t want to have sanctions, isolations, trade barriers, visa barriers in these regions. We want our economy to be integrated with all.
Last year one of my colleagues from Europe, minister, asked me a question. You can imagine even debts is becoming an issue. He said we are in international economy crisis, and we are thinking to close our embassies in Africa in order to make some saving. And when we are doing this, you are opening 18 embassies in Africa in one year. Eighteen? yes. In 8 years, we opened 12 embassies in Africa; in last 2 years -- in 1-1/2 year we opened and even completing next 6 months, 18 embassies. He said, why? The question is what Turks want to do in Africa. Turks want to do something very simple, because in Africa -- in Cameroon, for example -- Turkish business industrialists -- industries, entrepreneurs are working there, and they are demanding us that they want to have an embassy in order to do their business.
This is economic relation. Wanting one more thing we want to do, that Africa is our continent. We are not far away from Africa. And this is the global dimension of our foreign policy. Today there is a transformation in global politics, global economy, global culture; and we don’t want to have global divides between East and West in cultural sense, between North and South in economic sense, and between transatlantic and others in geopolitical sense. Because in all these divides, Turkey’s in the middle, and we are suffering. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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After 9-11, if there is a tension, a global cultural tension like clash of civilizations between East and West, Turkey will be affected negatively. We would have to make a choice. We don’t want to. We have a choice that we want to integrate with all the environment. If there is a clash between North and South, Turkish economy will be affected. We want to defend the rights -- economic rights of African people.
Therefore, next year in May we will be hosting the least developed country summit in Turkey. Around 6,000 people will come to Istanbul. We are a member of OECD, yes. We are from the North, yes. But at the same time, we are from the South because of our historical links, because of our big demography, huge demography, and because of our economic characters. And as a global power, we are a member of NATO, yes. We are a member of Transatlantic Alliance, yes. But we don’t want NATO to have any confrontation with other nations or group of nations or other regions.
Therefore, we were very careful in NATO summit not to declare an enemy front, because we suffered enough during Cold War because of this polarization. You don’t want a new geopolitical polarization in our world, so this restoration what we need. Economic-political-strategy restoration needs a foreign policy formulation based on regional and global peace, and Turkey is a force of peace. We will not be a party or side of any conflict. We will be pioneering of the peace around us, peace at home as it was declared by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Peace at home, peace in the world. This is the field of our foreign policy.
Thank you very much. (Applause)
I prefer to stay here. Yeah. Throughout of my life, academic life, I never give lectures when -- I don’t want to give lecture but -- when I am sitting. I prefer to have eye contact here. Yes. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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MR. TAŞPINAR: Minister, we now know why they refer to you --
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: But you can sit if you want.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Okay, I’ll prefer to sit.
We now know why they refer to you as professor all the time, and you have a very lecturing style, and I think you gave us a very rich summary of Turkey’s strategic vision. However, mortals in this city usually think about Turkey in the framework of three major polarizing issues, and they have nothing to do, unfortunately, with the larger strategic vision and the historical depth that you provided us.
The image of Turkey in Washington I think is being shaped by the divergence that we have currently with the United States on the question of Iran and the nuclear agenda, especially the fact that Turkey voted no in the United Nations Security Council. That, I think, fueled the image of Turkish foreign policy’s axis shift so to speak.
The other one is basically Turkey’s relations and the deterioration with Israel. So, Turkish-Israeli relations also fuel a certain negativity in Turkey’s image.
And, finally, relations with Armenia.
So, those are the three areas where I would kindly ask if you could say a few words before we open it up to the Q & A.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: I didn’t mention enough these issues during my presentation, because I was sure that this question would come. (Laughter) So, I didn’t want to waste my time in presentation about this.
These -- all these three let me implement the same methodology which I made in my presentation. If you made a picture analysis -- for example, in your question -- of course, you didn’t have this intention. You said no words in your answer to the context . Typical picture analysis. There’s a picture, Turkish permanent representative is ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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voting no to sanctions against Iran. What happened before? What happened afterwards? It is not being discussed. This is again --
MR. TAŞPINAR: That’s why we have WikiLeaks. (Laughter)
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Yes, not -- not you, but this is very -- you didn’t mean that, of course.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Of course not. (Laughter)
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: But today I was telling in another meeting -- I said if all the official cables and other dictums are being disclosed, we will be very happy. Really. Turkey will be very happy, because we follow the foreign policy of principles. We didn’t use broad language. We didn’t say something in Tehran and different in Washington and other different in New York or in another place. We already is challenged. Open all these archives. Our foreign policy was sincere, principle oriented, honest, candid. Therefore, we follow it. Because of these principles, we wanted to suggest a country which -- to region and global peace.
In all these three issues, let us implement not the picture analysis but process analysis. About Iran -- from the very first day, we declared that from the basic principles of Iranian policy four years ago that Turkey’s against any nuclear proliferation, wherever it is. By which country is not important. We are against it. Turkey’s against any nuclear power in our region. Whichever country has war, we are against it. And Turkey’s in favor of nuclear peaceful capacity if that country is a partner or a party in NPT and IAEA. These are important, and Turkey has been, yes, very active.
Just to make a picture analysis again, in 2007, the most successful meeting between P5+1 and Iran was held in Ankara. Last year, 1st October, another successful meeting by Jalili and Solana was arranged by us on 12th of September during ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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my visit to Tehran. I called from Tehran, so -- and Mr. Solana said first of October was fixed.
In the first of October meeting, there was a suggestion that there is an exchange proposal of uranium TRR, for TRR, the Tehran reactor. This was not our idea. We didn’t produce -- creatively produce such a policy just to defend Iran. No. It was the idea of Mr. ElBaradei consulting with P5+1. Since there was no mutual trust for each other by both parties, he bought this idea to us that since both parties trust you, can you help us. Therefore, we started the democratic process. And until May, we worked very closely with our allies. And whether they were in agreement I don’t want to go into because it’s a long history. Maybe one day WikiLeaks will make this all public. (Laughter) But we worked in a very close coordination with our allies, and at the end we had a Tehran declaration.
So, that’s the background of everything. And as I said, to be frank and we are telling this here, because of this restoration, of economic restoration, we don’t want to have sanctions or tensions -- military tensions -- around Turkey. We want stability and security, because sanctions against Iraq harm Turkey more than Saddam regime. Therefore, we work very hard not to defend Iran or another country or to act in another country. We try to defend our national interests, that to prevent any source of tension or isolation or sanction. So, this the background, that ’no’ did not occur one day in one hour. In order to keep Iran on the ground, on the negotiation ground, we had to vote no in order to keep that negotiation continued. Because Iran declared that if Turkey and Brazil has abstained or yes, then it missed the end of TRR deal. It means the end of negotiation.
Therefore, we continue to work very hard, and 15th of July this year ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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Iranian -- Iran, Istanbul -- Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that they are ready to freeze, to stop enrichment if Tehran agreement is being implemented. So, these are all process -- part of the process. Even still now, today, unless two, three months.
Turkey has been working very hard. Together with our allies, P5+1, and our neighbor, Iran, in order to restart the talks and we will continue to work very hard. So, nobody can blame because of just one incident. This is a long process we need to understand.
About Israel. Same thing. If somebody reads a critic from Prime Minister Erdoğan or from me regarding Israeli policies and just take that picture and say Turkey -- Turkish authorities are attacking Israel, okay, did it happen? And, again, the same terminology is coming: pro-Islamic government in Ankara is attacking because they’re allied with Iran against Israel. If this was true, why in 2008 Turkey was mediating between Syria and Israel? Why Prime Minister Olmert four days before the attack against Gaza stayed in Prime Minister’s Erdoğan’s house, room, six hours. There is only one person who stayed in Prime Minister’s Erdoğan’s house six hours. It is Prime Minister Olmert. Just to make fifth round of talks by phone, and I was translating. I was carrying the message between President Bashar al-Assad and Olmert in another room through Prime Minister Erdoğan. Why did we work if we had this intention to be against Israel or just to attack? Why did we work so hard? Again, make it process analysis. Yes, we were upset. We were angry, because that Monday the direct talks would have started. We agreed. We saw that only one part was missing to the agreement. Saturday, when there was a planned telephone conversation between Prime Minister Olmert and Prime Minister Erdoğan at 11:00, they, in order to finalize and just to specify the venue to start direct talks, 10:30 Israel attacked us. Who is supposed to be blamed? ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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Again, afterwards, they -- against all the civilized protocols and manners, conduct, code of conduct, they insulted our ambassador. Despite of this, we had -- we tried to restore the relations. But the most shocking event came when Israel attacked and killed eight Turkish, one American civilian in international waters. Although this did not violate Israeli territories, did not harm any Israeli interest, they killed these people. That’s the first time Turkey citizens were killed by a regular army of another country.
Throughout history, nobody can say that Turkey had an anti-Semitic background. No one. Again, looking at the process analysis. Turkish history is so clean regarding to relations with Jews, the Jewish people. There are four categories of nations regarding to this issue: some countries who oppress Jews in history: ghettos, genocide. Some countries, second, had war against Israel after the establishment of Israel. Some countries didn’t have such a close relation with them. But there is only one country didn’t have any history of oppression. Just the opposite, became safe haven for all Jews throughout history and didn’t make any war against Israel as a state, it is Turkey, and a close relation. And Israel has alienated itself from such a country through these policies. We are not -- we -- therefore, it should be understood properly. And if there was no attack that 31st of May, 1st of June, we would have a meeting, an appointment here with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss what could be the next stage of Syrian-Israeli talks.
But we cannot tolerate. Of course, we are working zero problems with neighbors, with all these ideas. We want to have political stability in the Middle East. Of course, the rights of Palestinian people should be respected. We cannot tolerate civilians -- women, ladies, children -- being killed by such attacks using some special weapons. This is unacceptable. We cannot tolerate any country to violate international law, killing innocent civilians in international waters. This should be understood properly. If you look ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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at this process analysis, you can read that this is not a policy against Jewish people or a policy against people of Israel, citizens of Israel. Even not with all the Israeli governments, but it is -- we are criticizing the existing government because of the policies which are -- which is not compatible with our regional peace and stability.
On Armenia, okay you can raise what about the protocols? Again, make a picture and I will process that. Ten years ago in Turkey you wouldn’t have an environment to discuss Armenian issue in a free manner. Today we have. Everybody is talking, and -- but you don’t have that freedom in France or in some European countries. As a Turkish intellectual, you cannot defend your version of history.
Again, five years ago there was no protocol which was signed. Today we have this. There is a gradual improvement of our relations and we are optimistic. We are hopeful. That we will improve our relations with Armenia, with Armenians wherever they are, and also we’ll be able to establish a political order in Caucasia through peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These are compatible. And we are optimistic and we will continue to work. One day we will start -- re-start Israel-Syrian direct talks. We will try to help Middle Eastern peace process, but that should be done only if we see the respect from Israel to the rights of our citizens. And that’s -- the way it’s clear, apology and compensation. Thank you.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Thank you, Foreign Minister.
What we’ll do now is to open up to questions. Please wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and instead of making a statement please ask a question.
SPEAKER: Arsen Khaturian from Voice of America’s Armenian Service.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Armenian Service.
SPEAKER: As you just finished with Armenia, let’s go with Armenia ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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again.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Okay, go ahead.
SPEAKER: Do you -- while your lecture and speech manifested the duality of your personality, the identity of academician and politician, so my first question will be to the academician. I will talk to, and second to the politician.
You mentioned two important transformations in Ottoman history: Tanzimat in 1912 or 1908 revolution, later republic creation. What was the impact of Armenians on that creation, if at all, because you didn’t talk actually about Armenians of that period.
And the second question will be about the protocols. You, as well as President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan have been constantly mentioning importance of progress in the Minsk Group negotiations. And just today, earlier in Bern, President Gül announced that unless there is progress there, there is not going to be a progress in the protocol site. Now, many in Washington, D.C., have been speculating that the protocols will go forward in Turkey after the elections. You as a politician -- do you see that as an obstacle and will they go forward after the elections, and what do you exactly mean under the progress in the Nagorno Karabakh issue? Thank you.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you. Again, look at this long transformation. Turks and Armenians live together ten centuries, from 10th century until 20th century. Even 21st century now we are together. And if we have a long-term analysis, nine centuries plus nine and a half centuries there was not any tension between Armenians and Turks in Anatolia or anywhere. We have all Ottoman archives. If you look at, for example, the tensions between two common tribes in Anatolia, are much more frequent than any tension between Turks and Armenians. So, therefore, this is the difference ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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between Jews having genocide in Europe, because Jews were -- had this oppression because of an original sin, let me say. Being Jew was something -- not -- I don’t mean now, but in Europe, in Spain, or in 14th, 15th century or later. Therefore, they were oppressed in ghettos, lived in different places, and then genocide. They were not seen like equals. But I had many Ph.D. students. I asked them to study shared existence, especially about the inheritance, and there you can see the most rich people in all the neighbors in Istanbul, whichever century you can take, whichever neighborhood you can take -- in any city. The richest people are either Armenian or Greek. And they didn’t tell you -- you don’t tell any Armenian or Greek quarter isolated from this. They live together. They live together. In all the cities. This is our history.
Why did we have problem? It was not because of Armenians, because of Turks. It was the solution of Ottoman empire -- an imperial structure where people were living, but the new rising sense of belonging was nationalism. And only after 1870s, not even beginning of 19th century, we had these tensions. Even despite of that, Armenians in 1914, one year before, there were Armenian ministers in Ottoman’s government. There were Armenian ambassadors in European capitals. And Armenians in Ottoman archives were called as (inaudible), which means the loyal nation which live together peacefully with the Turkish people.
Why I am giving you these details. If we want to restore Turkish-Armenian relation, what I call, we need to have a just memory. Not just -- not memory of one small part of our history and not only from Armenian or Turkish perspective. We are ready to share our pains. 1915 is symbolic year for Armenians, yes, but we need to know 1915 is the year of Gallipoli, as well, where only in one front in Çanakkale 250,000 Turks were killed, and one of them was my grandfather. In Yemen, in Balkans, this is like the -- ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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an organic society was divided, like you are taking the body out of the context. I don’t want to justify any mistake. If there are mistakes, we need to share. We need to discuss and share these. But if you ignore nine centuries and just focus on time when there was no political order anywhere in Ottoman territories, then we may face problem. If this is a starting point of all dialogue, then all nations will ask revenge from another nation. I can -- I don’t want to give, but, for example, I mentioned how many thousand -- hundred thousand Bosnians, Albanians, Turks had to migrate from Balkans, were killed in Balkans. How many Caucasian Turks -- I mean Abkhazians, Chechens, Georgians were killed and had to migrate to Anatolia? This is an unfortunate event. Did we, all of us, did we remind each other this painful part of our history, or did we remind the good side?
Now, before there was one-sided -- maybe from our side as well -- we were denying -- I mean, denying -- nothing happened -- no, something happened. But something happened to us as well, to all of us. Now it is time to restore. Therefore, it is a just memory. Ready to discuss everything. Otherwise, all nations will accuse each other of genocide: red Indians here, Mexico for Spain. Oh, there are -- there is -- unfortunately, there was no zero problem at that time. (Laughter) Now we need to restore my dear friend. This is our approach. Therefore, we sign protocol with this understanding.
SPEAKER: Elections?
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Hmm?
SPEAKER: Elections?
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: I’ll come. I will come. Don’t worry about it. I don’t forget anything. I am ready for any challenge. (Laughter)
And I signed myself and I prepared a speech. Unfortunately, later my ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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counterpart, Mr. Nalbandian, didn’t want. We didn’t make it. I was referring to this just memory. We want to start a new history.
Unfortunately, the Constitution Court of Armenia made an interpretation about these protocols and nullified the content of the Historical Commission. The Historical Commission is important. We don’t want to have just two -- it was a policy, a strategy of three objectives: normalize our relations between Turkey and Armenia as two nation states neighboring; normalize our relations between Turks and Armenians wherever they are -- here in Washington, California, Boston, wherever, Paris; and bringing original stability in Caucasia. These were three legs of our approach. And all these three should be together. They are still defending protocols. They are not giving up. I never give up. And one day Turkish-Armenian relation will be having a new paradigm. But I know from our experience between Syria and Israel -- we learn in practice -- if you don’t have regional context of the peace, that peace cannot be sustainable. When Syrian-Israeli indirect talks started one week before that, I had meetings with two delegations and I put just one condition. I said to both that during our negotiations Gaza and Lebanon must be quiet, because I was knowing very well that if there’s a tension in Gaza that process cannot continue, or in Lebanon. Lebanon was for Syria; Gaza was for Israel. And although everything was going very well, a crisis in Gaza collapsed all the process between Syria and Israel. Similarly, even if there is a normalization between Turkey and Armenia, if the Armenian occupation in Azerbaijani territory continues -- I don’t mean only Karabakh, I mean also the other similar regions -- and if there is a tension there, next day we have to close that border again. Therefore, what we did to have a comprehensive vision of Caucasian peace. Therefore, you need to have a simultaneous process between Turkey and Armenia and Armenian-Azerbaijan ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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so that we can achieve both original peace and a full and sustainable normalization between Turkey and Armenia. It is not a matter of election. It is more a matter of intention. Our intention is to achieve both. But if Armenia says we want to normalize our relations with Turkey only, we don’t want to normalize our relations with Azerbaijan, and we keep Azeri territories under occupation, that intention cannot be prevailing. Here I don’t question the intention of our Armenian colleague. I know that they also want peace. We hope that one day we will achieve these together. And I am optimistic. You will see we will achieve this together with Armenians and other as it is together, and that will be restoration of our relation as well for each country of 9 century without any problem.
MR. TAŞPINAR: What we’ll do is to take two questions. I know we’ll have to wrap because you have another speech, so we’ll have to finish basically in 10 to 15 minutes maximum. So, two more questions.
One there and then there.
SPEAKER: Foreign Minister, it’s a privilege to listen to you here. Thanks so much for your presentation.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Could you identify yourself please?
SPEAKER: Sorry. (inaudible) for Hürriyet Daily News (inaudible).
MR. TAŞPINAR: Hürriyet Daily News.
SPEAKER: Hürriyet Daily News.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Hürriyet Daily News.
SPEAKER: Yes.
MR. TAŞPINAR: I was expecting a question from Greek. (Laughter) Yes, okay.
SPEAKER: Sir, you talk about restoration process, different restorations ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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in your speech, and you talk that traditional democracy actually goes back to early decades of 19th century, and also as a final restoration process you talk about the last decade when your administration started to rule Turkey. Economic and political component or development of the latest restoration is obvious made Turkey much more democratic than before, and most of the areas. Turkey became, first of all, start accession talks at the EU, and thanks to your administration for that. My question is there is one area that Turkey seems that its ranks increase sharply in the freedom of the press. When your administration started, Turkey was 99th place and now it’s 138th out of 175 countries. My question is why is freedom of the press a problem that cannot solve in Turkey or could you please elaborate on that why we just cannot catch up with the Western countries in this (inaudible). Thank you.
MR. TAŞPINAR: And we’ll take one more question over there. Yes.
MR. MAHMETLI: Badir Mahmetli with U.S. Azeris Network. I have a quick question. Mr. Davutoğlu, how concerned are you with the most recent transfer of uranium from Armenia to be sold to an Al-Qaeda representative? I’m not sure you heard about the recent arrest that was made in Georgia, in the capital Tbilisi. There Armenian citizens were trying to sell uranium to undercover Georgian special agent, but they were discovered --
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: To which special agent?
MR. MAHMETLI: Georgian special agent.
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Georgian.
MR. MAHMETLI: Special officer. No, it was never on the news, so they were trying to sell uranium. It was exported from Armenia to -- was designed to be sold to Al-Qaeda representative but that was an undercover Georgian special officer. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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DR. DAVUTOĞLU: Okay.
MR. MAHMETLI: Are you concerned about this news?
DR. DAVUTOĞLU: About freedom of press. Freedom of press is one of the basic character of any modern democratic society. And if we need to do more, we need to say that we need this more, and there is no perfectability in the process of democratization. There is always some room for improvement. But at the same time, many of this press -- freedom-of-press issues are two sided, and the press also needs to improve the standards of media ethics. But we need both, and we have to be open minded to discuss this. If we have a question of media ethics or a question of freedom of press, this will deteriorate the situation on both sides and a decline in freedom of press will deteriorate the situation of media ethics and vice versa. We are ready to discuss, but if you look at the -- in last eight years, we made several reforms in freedom of press. The press law -- I think it was in 2004 -- has enlarged the freedom of expression. And you can take any critical issue and those statistics that are different criteria, but in your daily practice in Hürriyet or in academic life, today you cannot compare the situation with 10-year cycle. There is no taboo anymore. There is a huge discussion on many very sensitive issues. But it depends how you deal with this.
I can give you now tons of examples how we need to -- how we face the problems of media ethics. I don’t want to mention, but there are many.
They are a dynamic society, and we have many challenges. Freedom of press and media ethics are two important challenges at the same time, and we need to deal with both. If there is more established media ethics, there will be less discussion on -- and less restrictions. I don’t mean -- I don’t try to justify any restriction, but the actions and the discussion on media -- even in foreign policy issues, it is surprising. For ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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example, recently, there was a press report regarding a statement of Iraqi president -- President Talabani -- which created some problems in foreign policy between Turkey and Iraq. It was taken to the press as a headline in one very respected Turkish newspaper. After a few days, President Talabani made a statement saying that this is not correct, it was not correct quotation of my speech, that it was not headlined, it was a small note in 20 or 21st page. You see? Then you lose respect of the press. And we are freezing so many problems regarding it. This is when foreign policy on individual respect as well.
You know, the columnist -- the most experienced person in Turkish press -- which type of phrase type of phrase he used for leading Turkish politicians, and he had to resign from Europe journalist. Then of course he created tension, a discussion on press. I don’t blame -- I don’t say that this -- we are perfect. There are many things to be done, but there are many things to be done in both fronts. Once we have established code of conduct, we will be having also, once we have established principles of freedom of express, we will have a much better situation than today. We need to work together. I don’t say we don’t have any problem, but we have to understand the source of the problem as well in all sense.
About these, of course, if the second I don’t have intelligence report in my hand and we doubt any such report or verification, that it is difficult for us to make any comment. But assume that without any report, just say in principle, if somebody from country B sells or gives uranium or anything dangerous to a terrorist organization in country C, we think that it’s a threat. We don’t accept that. But without a verification of these, it is difficult to accuse, but if there is such verification, of course we have serious concern and in Caucasia especially we have to be very careful not to create new problems. ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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Okay, thank you very much.
MR. TAŞPINAR: Foreign Minister, you are a busy man, and thank you very much for making time for us at Brookings. Thank you very much for a great lecture. Will the audience please remain seated as the official party departs? This will take only 60 seconds.
* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.
/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III
Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2012
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BY AHMET DAVUTOGLU MAY 20, 2010 Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy
Throughout modern history, there has been a direct relationship between conflict and the emergence of new ways of arbitrating world affairs. Every major war since the 17th century was concluded by a treaty that led to the emergence of a new order, from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that followed the Thirty Years' War, to the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815 that brought an end to the Napoleonic Wars, to the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles that concluded the first World War, to the agreement at Yalta that laid the groundwork for the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Yet the Cold War, which could be regarded as a global-scale war, ended not with grand summitry, but with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was no official conclusion; one of the combatant sides just suddenly ceased to exist.
Two decades hence, no new international legal and political system has been formally created to meet the challenges of the new world order that emerged. Instead, a number of temporary, tactical, and conflict-specific agreements have been implemented. From the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Cyprus, and even the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a series of cease-fire arrangements have succeeded in ending bloodshed but have failed to establish comprehensive peace agreements. Overall, the current situation has quantitatively increased the diversification of international actors and qualitatively complicated the foreign-policy making process.
The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks made it clear that this situation is not sustainable. Immediately after the attacks, the United States began attempting to establish an international order based on a security discourse, thus replacing the liberty discourse that emerged after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It is in this context that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq can best be understood. The intent was to transform an unstable international environment by targeting crisis-prone zones that were considered to be the sources of insecurity. But in the process, predictions about the end of history and the expansion of civil rights and liberties have largely lost their appeal.
U.S. President Barack Obama challenged the security-based perspective of the post-Sept. 11 era as soon as he assumed the presidency in 2009. He has actively attempted to restore America's international image, and has made considerable efforts to adopt a new vision that embraces a multilateral international system and fosters close cooperation with regional allies.
Still, we are faced with an incredibly difficult period until a new global order is established. Many of today's challenges can only be resolved with broader international involvement, but the mechanisms needed to meet fully those challenges do not exist. It will therefore fall largely to nation-states to meet and create solutions for the global political, cultural, and economic turmoil that will likely last for the next decade and beyond.
In this new world, Turkey is playing an increasingly central role in promoting international security and prosperity. The new dynamics of Turkish foreign policy ensure that Turkey can act with the vision, determination, and confidence that the historical moment demands.
Turkey in the post-Cold War era
Turkey experienced the direct impact of the post-Cold War atmosphere of insecurity, which resulted in a variety of security problems in Turkey's neighborhood. The most urgent issue for Turkish diplomacy, in this context, was to harmonize Turkey's influential power axes with the new international environment.
During the Cold War, Turkey was a "wing country" under NATO's strategic framework, resting on the geographic perimeter of the Western alliance. NATO's strategic concept, however, has evolved in the post-Cold War era -- and so has Turkey's calculation of its strategic environment. Turkey's presence in Afghanistan is a clear indication of this change. We are a wing country no longer.
Turkey is currently facing pressure to assume an important regional role, which admittedly has created tensions between its existing strategic alliances and its emerging regional responsibilities. The challenge of managing these relationships was acutely felt in recent regional crises in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Turkey remains committed to establishing harmony between its current strategic alliances and its neighbors and neighboring regions.
Turkey's unique demographic realities also affect its foreign-policy vision. There are more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more Albanians than in Kosovo, more Chechens than in Chechnya, more Abkhazians than in the Abkhaz region in Georgia, and a significant number of Azeris and Georgians, in addition to considerable other ethnicities from neighboring regions. Thus, these conflicts and the effect they have on their populations have a direct impact on domestic politics in Turkey.
Because of this fact, Turkey experiences regional tensions at home and faces public demands to pursue an active foreign-policy to secure the peace and security of those communities. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy is also shaped by its own democracy, reflecting the priorities and concerns of its citizens. As a result of globalization, the Turkish public follows international developments closely. Turkey's democratization requires it to integrate societal demands into its foreign policy, just as all mature democracies do.
The European Union and NATO are the main fixtures and the main elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has achieved more within these alliances during the past seven years under the AK Party government than it did in the previous 40 years. Turkey's involvement in NATO has increased during this time; Turkey recently asked for, and achieved, a higher representation in the alliance. Turkey also has advanced considerably in the European integration process compared with the previous decade, when it was not even clear whether the EU was seriously considering Turkey's candidacy. EU progress reports state that Turkish foreign policy and EU objectives are in harmony, a clear indication that Turkey's foreign-policy orientation aligns well with transatlantic objectives.
As we leave behind the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey has been able to formulate a foreign-policy vision based on a better understanding of the realities of the new century, even as it acts in accordance with its historical role and geographical position. In this sense, Turkey's orientation and strategic alliance with the West remains perfectly compatible with Turkey's involvement in, among others, Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, the Middle East peace process, and Afghanistan.
Our principles
Over the past seven years, Turkey has been able to formulate a systematic and cohesive methodological approach to world affairs because its political party has been able to govern, resulting in real political stability at home.
Three methodological and five operational principles drive Turkey's foreign policy today. The first methodological principle is its "visionary" approach to the issues instead of the "crisis-oriented" attitude that dominated foreign policy during the entire Cold War period.
For example, Turkey has a vision of the Middle East. This vision encompasses the entire region: It cannot be reduced to the struggle against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), the radical Kurdish separatist group that for decades has waged a campaign of terror against Turkey, or efforts to counterbalance specific countries. Turkey can use its unique understanding of the Middle East, and its diplomatic assets, to operate effectively on the ground. Turkey's Lebanon policy, its attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel and achieve Palestinian reconciliation, its efforts to facilitate the participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and its constructive involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue are integral parts of Turkey's foreign-policy vision for the Middle East.
The second methodological principle is to base Turkish foreign policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework around the world. Turkey's vision for the Middle East is not in opposition to its approach in Central Asia or in the Balkans; our approach to Africa is no different from our approach to Asia. Turkey is also actively trying to improve relations with nearby countries like Greece, Iraq, the Russian Federation, and Syria.
The third methodological principle is the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. Although Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do not make threats. Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey's civil-economic power.
From these three methodological approaches, five operational principles guide Turkey's foreign policy-making process. The first principle is the balance between security and democracy. The legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security and freedom together to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country. Since 2002, Turkey has attempted to promote civil liberties without undermining security. This is an ambitious yet worthy aim -- particularly in the post-Sept. 11 environment, under the threat of terrorism, in which the general tendency has been to restrict liberties for the sake of security.
Turkey has made great strides in protecting civil liberties despite serious domestic political challenges to such freedoms over the past seven years. This required vigorously carrying out the struggle against terrorism without narrowing the sphere of civil liberties -- a challenge Turkey successfully overcame. In the process, we've found that Turkish soft power has only increased as our democracy has matured.
Second, the principle of zero problems towards neighbors has been successfully implemented for the past seven years. Turkey's relations with its neighbors now follow a more cooperative track. There is a developing economic interdependence between Turkey and its neighboring countries. In 2009, for example, we achieved considerable diplomatic progress with Armenia, which nevertheless remains the most problematic relationship in Turkey's neighborhood policy.
Turkey's considerable achievements in its regional relationships have led policymakers to take this principle a step further and aim for maximum cooperation with our neighbors. Since the second half of 2009, Turkey established high-level strategic council meetings with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia. These are joint cabinet meetings where bilateral political, economic, and security issues are discussed in detail. There are also preparations to establish similar mechanisms with Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Ukraine as well as other neighboring countries. Turkey abolished visa requirements with, among others, Syria, Tajikistan, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya and Russia. Turkey's trade with its neighbors and nearby regions has substantially increased in recent years.
The third operative principle is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, which aims to take measures before crises emerge and escalate to a critical level. Turkey's regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence. Consider Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria, a role that was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor. Other examples of pre-emptive diplomacy include Turkey's efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, reconciliation efforts in Lebanon and Palestine, the Serbia-Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia.
The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition. Such a policy views Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States through the two countries' bilateral strategic ties and through NATO. It considers its EU membership process, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complement each other. This means that good relations with Russia are not an alternative to relations with the EU. Nor is the model partnership with the United States a rival partnership against Russia.
The fifth principle in this framework is rhythmic diplomacy, which aspires to provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations. This principle implies active involvement in all international organizations and on all issues of global and international importance. Turkey became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and is chairing three critical commissions concerning Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fight against terror. Turkey undertook the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is also a member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. Turkey has also launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa and two in Latin America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. These developments show a new perspective of Turkey, one that is based on vision, soft power, a universal language, and implementation of consistent foreign policies in different parts of the world.
A new vision
Today, Turkey has a great deal of say in the international arena. More importantly, there is a critical group of countries that lends a careful ear to Turkey's stance on a myriad of regional and international issues. At this point, the world expects great things from Turkey, and we are fully aware of our responsibility to carry out a careful foreign policy.
Our "2023 vision," to mark the Turkish Republic's centennial, is a result of this necessity. The first step of this vision is to integrate Turkey's foreign-policy discourse into its national discourse. Any possible contradiction, gap or contrast between these two will make it difficult to carry out an active, responsible, and successful foreign policy. In the coming era, Turkey plans to deepen and strengthen its democracy, place relations between Turkish society and Turkey's governing institutions on firm ground, and show the world the strength of its own domestic balance. There is a continuous need to integrate domestic political accomplishments into the vision of foreign policy (i.e. democratization and cultural respect) and to inject foreign-policy activism and self-confidence back into the domestic political scene.
Thanks to the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's relations with the US are being built on firmer ground. Turkish-U.S. relations have reached a point where they can ensure bilateral cooperation and work toward global stability. Put into a framework of "model partnership" described by President Obama when he visited Turkey on his first overseas trip, bilateral relations are of vital importance for both countries. The term "model partnership" emphasizes the importance of high-level cooperation between Turkey, with its multiple regional identities and an increasing say in global affairs, and the United States, which has long-lasting ties with regional countries and direct responsibility for global stability. The partnership is guided by a set of shared values and principles aimed at bringing peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity to the zones of conflict in various regions.
Meanwhile, relations with the EU are also being bolstered. It is no longer possible to think of the EU and Turkey independent of one another when considering Turkey's foreign policy. EU integration is undoubtedly a process that is favorable to Turkey. But this process brings great benefits to the EU itself, both regionally and globally.
Turkey's foreign-policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.
These goals aim to build a strong and respectable Turkey that is able to make an original contribution to the world community. To achieve them, Turkey must make progress in all directions and in every field, take an interest in every issue related to global stability, and contribute accordingly. This collective effort will make Turkey a global actor in this century. Turkey's actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace.
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18.1.2010. Ïìéëßá Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ óôïõò Ôïýñêïõò ÐñÝóâåéò
Ô/ÕÐÅÎ Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ
ÄåõôÝñá, 18 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2010
Ôïõñêßá – ÓõíÝäñéï ôùí ÐñÝóâåùí – Ïìéëßá Íôáâïýôïãëïõ
ÐñáãìáôïðïéÞèçêå áðü ôéò 4 ùò ôéò 10.01.2010 ôï 2ï ÓõíÝäñéï ÐñÝóâåùí ôïõ Ôïõñêéêïý Õðïõñãåßïõ Åîùôåñéêþí õðü ôçí ðñïåäñßá ôïõ Ô/ÕÐÅÎ Á÷ìÝô Íôáâïýôïãëïõ (ôï 1ï åß÷å óõãêëçèåß áðü ôïí ôüôå Ô/ÕÐÅÎ Áëß ÌðáìðáôæÜí ôïí ÉáíïõÜñéï 2008). Ôï ìåãáëýôåñï ìÝñïò ôïõ Óõíåäñßïõ ðñáãìáôïðïéÞèçêå óôï Óõíåäñéáêü ÊÝíôñï ôïõ Ðáíåðéóôçìßïõ Ìðßëêåíô óôçí ¢ãêõñá êáé ç óýíïäïò áîéïëüãçóçò óôéò 9 êáé 10 Éáíïõáñßïõ óôçí ðüëç ÌÜñíôéí ôçò íïôéïáíáôïëéêÞò Ôïõñêßáò. Óôï ÓõíÝäñéï óõììåôåß÷áí ðåñß ôá 200 Üôïìá -ðñÝóâåéò ôçò Ôïõñêßáò ðïõ õðçñåôïýí óôï åîùôåñéêü êáé óôåëÝ÷ç ôïõ Ô/ÕÐÅÎ.
«Êýñéå ÍïìÜñ÷á, êýñéïé âïõëåõôÝò, êýñéå ÄÞìáñ÷å, êýñéå ðñýôáíç, áîéüôéìïé óõíÜäåëöïé, ößëïé êáèçãçôÝò êáé öïéôçôÝò,
Ðñùôßóôùò, èá Þèåëá íá ðù üôé åßíáé ìåãÜëç ôéìÞ ãéá ìÝíá íá âñßóêïìáé åäþ óôï ÐáíåðéóôÞìéï Áñôïõêëïý ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí ìáæß ìå ôá óôåëÝ÷ç ôïõ Õðïõñãåßïõ ìáò ôùí Åîùôåñéêþí êáé ôïõò áîéüôéìïõò ðñÝóâåéò ìáò ðïõ õðçñåôïýí óôï åîùôåñéêü. Èåùñþ ÷ñÝïò ìïõ íá åõ÷áñéóôÞóù ãéá Üëëç ìéá öïñÜ ãéá ôçí ðñüóêëçóç êáé ôç öéëïîåíßá ðïõ ìáò ðñïóöÝñïõí óôï ÌÜñíôéí, ôïí ÍïìÜñ÷ç, ôïí ÄÞìáñ÷ï, ôïõò âïõëåõôÝò êáé ôïí ðñýôáíç ôïõ Ðáíåðéóôçìßïõ Áñôïõêëïý.
ÁõôÞ åäþ åßíáé ç ðéï äéåõñõìÝíç óõíÜíôçóç ðïõ Ýêáíå ðïôÝ ôï Õðïõñãåßï ìáò åêôüò ¢ãêõñáò. Ãéáôß, ó÷åäéÜæïíôáò ôç óõíÜíôçóç áõôÞ óêåöôÞêáìå ôï ÌÜñíôéí, áõôü ðñÝðåé íá ôï åîçãÞóù –Ý÷åé óçìáóßá.
Ó÷åäéÜæïíôáò ôï ðñüãñáììá, ìïõ ðñïôÜèçêáí äéÜöïñïé ôßôëïé ãéá ôçí ïìéëßá ìïõ, üðùò ‘ÌåóáíáôïëéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ’ Þ ‘Ïé äéåèíåßò ìáò ó÷Ýóåéò». Ôïõò åßðá üôé äåí ìðïñåß óå ìéá ðüëç óáí ôï ÌÜñíôéí íá ãßíåé ìéá ïìéëßá ìå ôüóï óõãêõñéáêü ôßôëï. Ôï ÌÜñíôéí åêöñÜæåé áö’ åáõôïý ôïõ ôï éóôïñéêü âÜèïò. ÅêöñÜæåé åðßóçò Ýíá öéëïóïöéêü êáé äéáíïçôéêü âÜèïò. ×ñåéáæüôáí, ëïéðüí, Ýíáò ôßôëïò ôáéñéáóôüò ìå ôï ÌÜñíôéí. Ãé’ áõôü êáé åðÝëåîá ôçí åðéêåöáëßäá «Áðü ôïí áñ÷áßï ðïëéôéóìü óôçí ðáãêïóìéïðïéçìÝíç ôÜîç».
Áñ÷áßïò ðïëéôéóìüò êáé ÌÜñíôéí – äåí õðÜñ÷ïõí, íïìßæù, äýï Üëëåò ëÝîåéò ðïõ íá åßíáé, ç ìéá äßðëá óôçí Üëëç, ôüóï óùóôÝò êáé ôüóï áëëçëïêáëõðôüìåíåò.
Ãéáôß áñ÷áßïò, ãéáôß ÌÜñíôéí;
Áí ôï áíôéëçöèïýìå áõôü, èá êáôáëÜâïõìå ôï ‘ãéáôß ç Ôïõñêßá’ êáé ôï ãéáôß èá ãßíåé ç Ôïõñêßá êåíôñéêüò ðáßêôçò óôçí ðáãêüóìéá ôÜîç ðïõ ôþñá ìïñöïðïéåßôáé óôïí êüóìï. Äéüôé, üôáí ïé ñßæåò êÜðïéïõ äåí ðÜíå ôüóï âáèåéÜ ìÝóá óôç ãç üóï ôïõ ðëÜôáíïõ, äåí ìðïñåß íá êÜíåé óêéÜ. Äéüôé, ñç÷Þ åßíáé ç óêéÜ áõôïý ðïõ ïé ñßæåò ôïõ åßíáé áâáèåßò, äåí åßíáé óêéÜ ðõêíÞ.
Ãéáôß äéÜëåîáí ïé ðñüãïíïß ìáò ùò óýìâïëü ôïõò ôï ðëáôÜíé, åðåéäÞ ïé ñßæåò ôïõ åßíáé âáèéÝò êáé äåí ìðïñåß åýêïëá íá îåñéæùèåß. Ç óêéÜ ôïõ ðëÜôáíïõ åßíáé ðñáãìáôéêÞ óêéÜ. Êé üôáí ãßíïíôáé óêéÜäé ôá ðëáôÜíéá ìáò äåí êÜíïõí äéÜêñéóç áíÜìåóá óå äüãìá, öõëÞ êáé èñçóêåßá. Ìå ôçí Ýííïéá áõôÞ ôï ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé ìéá ðüëç ìå ñßæá âáèéÜ êáé ìÝëëïí ëáìðñü -ßäéá ìå ôç ÷þñá ìáò.
×ñüíéá ðñéí, üôáí áêüìá Þìïõí óôïí áêáäçìáúêü ÷þñï, åß÷á êÜíåé ìéá ïìéëßá ó÷åôéêÜ ìå ôçí éóôïñßá ôùí ðüëåùí, óôçí ïðïßá ôáîéíïìïýóá ôéò ðüëåéò –ç éóôïñßá ðüëåùí Þôáí Ýíá áðü ôá ìáèÞìáôá ðïõ ðáñÝäéäá óôï ðáíåðéóôÞìéï êáé ðéóôåýù üôé ôï Áñôïõêëïý èá ðñÝðåé íá ãßíåé Ýíá áðü ôá äéáëå÷ôÜ áíþôáôá éäñýìáôá ôïõ êüóìïõ óôïí ôïìÝá áõôü, ãéáôß ðüëç óçìáßíåé ÌÜñíôéí. Äåí èá ìðù åäþ ìå ëåðôïìÝñåéåò óôçí ôáîéíüìçóç åêåßíç. Èá áíáöÝñù ìüíï ìéá êáôçãïñßá, ðïõ åìðßðôåé óôç ó÷Ýóç ìåôáîý ðüëçò êáé ðïëéôéóìïý: ‘ôéò ðüëåéò ðïõ öôéÜ÷íïõí ðïëéôéóìïýò’. ÕðÜñ÷ïõí ôÝôïéåò ðüëåéò. Åßíáé ç ÁèÞíá, åßíáé ç Ìåäßíá. ÕðÜñ÷ïõí åðßóçò ïé ðïëéôéóìïß ðïõ öôéÜ÷íïõí ðüëåéò -ç ÂáãäÜôç áíÞêåé ó’ áõôÞ ôçí êáôçãïñßá. ÕðÜñ÷ïõí ïé ðüëåéò åêåßíåò ðïõ ôéò äéáìïñöþíïõí ðïéêßëïé ðïëéôéóìïß êáé ôéò áðïäßäïõí óôï ìÝëëïí. Ç Éóôáìðïýë åßíáé ìéá áðü áõôÝò. Ôç ÍÝá Õüñêç èá ìðïñïýóáìå åðßóçò óÞìåñá íá ôçí óõãêáôáëÝîïõìå áíÜìåóá óôéò ðüëåéò ðïõ äéáìïñöþèçêáí áðü ðïëéôéóìïýò. ÅðéðëÝïí üìùò õðÜñ÷ïõí ïé ðüëåéò ðïõ áðïôåëïýí ‘óýíïøç ôùí ðïëéôéóìþí’. Éóôïñßá ôïõ ðïëéôéóìïý, éóôïñßá ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò, óõìðõêíþóôå ïëüêëçñç ôçí éóôïñßá ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò êáé ôïðïèåôåßóôå ôç óå Ýíáí ôüðï, Ýôóé ùóÜí ìéá óõíåéäçôÞ âïýëçóç íá Ý÷åé ðåé ‘íá åßíáé áõôÞ ìéá ôÝôïéá ðüëç ðïõ íá áðïôåëåß óýíïøç ïëüêëçñçò ôçò éóôïñßáò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò êé üóïé ôçí êïéôïýí, óáí íá êïéôïýí Ýíá ìðéìðåëü, íá ìðïñïýí íá äïõí ó’ áõôÞ ôçí êÜèå áðü÷ñùóç ôçò éóôïñßáò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò, íá áêïýíå ôïõò ùñáßïõò Þ÷ïõò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò, íá íéþèïõí ôçí áñìïíßá ôçò’. Áí ìðïñïýóáìå ëïéðüí íá óêåöôïýìå ìéá ôÝôïéá ðüëç ‘ìðéìðåëü ôùí ðïëéôéóìþí’, áõôÞ óßãïõñá èá Þôáí ôï ÌÜñíôéí.
Ôï 2001, óå ìéá áðü ôéò óðÜíéåò ïéêïãåíåéáêÝò ìáò åêäñïìÝò , öôÜóáìå åäþ âñÜäõ áðü ôçí Ïýñöá ìÝóù Êéæßëôåðå. Åñ÷üìáóôáí ðñþôç öïñÜ. Ï Þëéïò êüíôåõå íá âáóéëÝøåé. Ôï ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé ùñáßï áðü üðïéï óçìåßï êé áí ôï êïéôÜîåéò, üðùò ç Éóôáìðïýë. Êáèþò üìùò ðñï÷ùñïýóáìå êé áðü ôï Êéæßëôåðå öÜíçêå ôï ÌÜñíôéí, ìåßíáìå åíåïß, ôé èÝá Þôáíå áõôÞ, åß÷áìå áíôéêñýóåé ôç Ìåóïðïôáìßá êáé ôï ÌÜñíôéí ðïõ ëåò êé Ý÷åé Ýíá áðüêïóìï ìÜôé ðïõ âëÝðåé ôç Ìåóïðïôáìßá. Ôï öùò ðïõ áíôáíáêëïýóå áðü ôï êÜèå óðßôé Ýðåöôå ìå ôÝôïéï ôñüðï ðÜíù óôçí ðåäéÜäá ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò, ðïõ èáññåßò ôï êáèÝíá áíÞêå óå ìéá âïýëçóç åêôüò ôïõ êüóìïõ ôïýôïõ, ç ïðïßá ðáñáôçñïýóå íá äåé ðþò ÷ñçóéìïðïéïýí Üñáãå ïé Üíèñùðïé ôéò ïìïñöéÝò ðïõ åõáñåóôïýìåíç ôïõò ðñüóöåñá… ÓêÝöôçêá ðùò ôï êÜèå ôæáìß, ç êÜèå åêêëçóßá, ï êÜèå ôüðïò ëáôñåßáò, ï êÜèå ìåíôñåóÝò, åêåßíç ôç âïýëçóç áíôáíáêëïýóå.
¼ðùò áêñéâþò ç ÉåñïõóáëÞì… Ðçãáßíåôå óôï ¼ñïò ôùí Åëáéþí êáé êïéôÜîôå áðü åêåß ôçí ÉåñïõóáëÞì, äåí èá ÷ïñôáßíåôáé íá êïéôÜôå. Óôçí ÉåñïõóáëÞì åßíáé ôï Ìåóôæßíôé ÁêóÜ, åßíáé åêêëçóßåò, åßíáé óõíáãùãÝò, áëëÜ ç ÉåñïõóáëÞì åßíáé ç áíèñùðüôçôá. ºäéá üðùò ôï ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé ç óýíïøç ôçò éóôïñßáò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò.
ÓõíÝâçóáí ðñÜãìáôá ðïõ ÷þñéóáí ôçí áíèñùðüôçôá, ðïõ äß÷áóáí ôéò êïéíùíßåò, ðïõ ðñïêÜëåóáí áíôéèÝóåéò óôç âÜóç ôïõ Ýèíïõò êáé ôïõ äüãìáôïò, õðÞñîáí üìùò êé áõôÜ ðïõ ôçí Ýíùóáí. Ôçí Ýíùóáí ïé ðüëåéò. Äåí õðÜñ÷åé ðïëéôéóìüò üðïõ äåí õðÜñ÷åé ðüëç, äåí õðÜñ÷åé áíèñùðüôçôá åêåß üðïõ äåí õðÜñ÷åé ðïëéôéóìüò. ¼óïé åíóôåñíßæïíôáé ôçí êïõëôïýñá ôçò ðüëçò, äåí ðñïóðáèïýí ðïôÝ íá äçìéïõñãÞóïõí ìéá ðüëç ìïíï-ðïëéôéóôéêÞ, ìïíï-åèíïôéêÞ, ìïíï-äïãìáôéêÞ. Ãéáôß áí ìéá ðüëç ãßíåé ïìïéüìïñöç, ÷Üíåé ôçí éäéüôçôá ôçò ùò ðüëç. Éäïý ëïéðüí, ôï ÌÜñíôéí üðùò Ý÷åé ìåôáöåñèåß óôï óÞìåñá, ôï ðéï üìïñöï ðáñÜäåéãìá ôïõ áñ÷áßïõ êáé ôçò ðüëçò… [ìåôáöñÜæåôáé ùò ‘áñ÷áßï’ ç ëÝîç kadim ðïõ ÷ñçóéìïðïéåß, ëÝîç áñáâéêÞò ðñïÝëåõóçò ðïõ óçìáßíåé ‘áõôü ðïõ äåí Ý÷åé áñ÷Þ’, ôï ðáëéü, ôï áíÝêáèåí, ôï Ü÷ñïíï. Óôá óýã÷ñïíá ôïõñêéêÜ ôï áñ÷áßï åêöñÜæåôáé ìå ôç ëÝîç antik, åíþ ôï kadim ÷ñçóéìåýåé ðéï ðïëý ùò ëüãéï óôïé÷åßï, üðùò óôç öñÜóç kadim dost=ðáëéüò ößëïò]
ËÝìå ‘ðáñÜäåéãìá áñ÷áßïõ’, èá ðñÝðåé íá ïñßóïõìå êáé ôï ‘áñ÷áßï’.
Ôï áñ÷áßï åßíáé ç ðéï èåìåëéþäçò Ýííïéá ôçò ïèùìáíéêÞò êïõëôïýñáò. ¼ôáí Þèåëå íá ðåñéãñÜøåé ôïí åáõôü ôïõ ï Ïèùìáíüò ÷ñçóéìïðïéïýóå ôç ëÝîç ‘áñ÷áßï’. Áñ÷áßï èá ðåé êåßíï ðïõ åßíáé ôüóï ðáëéü þóôå ç áðáñ÷Þ ôïõ äåí ìðïñåß íá åîáêñéâùèåß, üðïéï ëïãáñéáóìü êé áí êÜíåé êáíåßò. ÄçëáäÞ, åñåõíÜ êáíåßò, ìåëåôÜ, ðçãáßíåé óôá âÜèç ôùí áñ÷åßùí… åêåßíï üìùò õðÜñ÷åé ðñéí áðü áõôÜ. Ï èåóìüò ôçò ïéêïãÝíåéáò ëüãïõ ÷Üñç åßíáé áñ÷áßïò èåóìüò. Äåí åßíáé íïçôÞ ç æùÞ ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò ÷ùñßò ôçí ïéêïãÝíåéá. Áñ÷áßï åßíáé åêåßíï ðïõ áíôéðñïóùðåýåé ôï äÝíôñï ðïõ ïé ñßæåò ôïõ ðÜíå âáèéÜ. ¼ôáí ëÝìå áñ÷áßïò ðïëéôéóìüò åííïïýìå ôïí ðïëéôéóìü ðïõ åìðåñéÝ÷åé üëá ôá óôïé÷åßá ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò.
Ôï áñ÷áßï áõôü âñßóêåé ôçí åêäÞëùóÞ ôïõ óôï ÌÜñíôéí.
Ðïëëïß åñåýíçóáí ôçí éóôïñßá ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí. Êáé óôï óçìåßï áõôü ìíçìïíåýù ìå Ýðáéíï êáé åðéäïêéìáóßá ôïí Éìðñá÷ßì ìðÝç –ðñéí áðü ëßãï ìÜëéóôá áðÝêôçóá ìåñéêÜ âéâëßá ôïõ ÷Üñç óôïí ê. Ðñýôáíç. ºóùò ôï ðüóï ìåãÜëï ðáíåðéóôÞìéï èá ãßíåé ôï Áñôïõêëïý íá åîáñôÜôáé êáé ëßãï áðü ôï ðüóï èá ìåëåôÞóåé ôï ÌÜñíôéí. Ðüóï èá êáôáöÝñåé íá æùíôáíÝøåé ôéò ðáñáäüóåéò Æéíôæßñéå, Êáóßìéå, Ëáôßöéå, ×áôïýíéå (ðñüêåéôáé ãéá óçìáíôéêïýò ìåíôñåóÝäåò ðïõ éäñýèçêáí ìåôáîý 1385 êáé 1485 êáé äßäáîáí óå áõôïýò èñçóêåßá êáé åðéóôÞìåò äéÜöïñïé óðïõäáßïé äÜóêáëïé)–åëðßæïõìå üôé èá ôï êáôáöÝñåé.
Ðçãáßíåôå üóï ðáëéÜ èÝëåôå, äåí íïìßæù üôé èá ìðïñÝóåôå íá âñåßôå ìéá çìåñïìçíßá ãéá íá ðåßôå, éäïý, áõôÞ åßíáé ç áñ÷Þ ôçò éóôïñßáò ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí.
ËÝãåôáé üôé ðñéí áðü åðôÜ ÷éëéÜäåò ÷ñüíéá õðÞñ÷áí óôï ÌÜñíôéí åðôÜ äéáöïñåôéêÝò ãëþóóåò, åðôÜ äéáöïñåôéêÝò èñçóêåßåò, åðôÜ äéáöïñåôéêïß ðïëéôéóìïß. Åßíáé ðÝñáóìá ôï ÌÜñíôéí. Åßíáé ðüëç óõíïñéáêÞ áëëÜ ôáõôü÷ñïíá êåíôñéêÞ ðüëç. Ôï åßäáìå ðñéí áðü ëßãï óôçí ðñïâïëÞ. Ç ÍôÜñá (ôï âõæáíôéíü Ï÷õñü ÄÜñá) Þôáí ðüëç óôñáôüðåäï áíÜìåóá óôïõò Óáóóáíßäåò êáé ôçí ÁíáôïëéêÞ ÑùìáúêÞ Áõôïêñáôïñßá. Ãéá ðïëëïýò áéþíåò õðÞñîå óõíïñéáêÞ ðüëç áíÜìåóá óôçí ÁíáôïëéêÞ Ñþìç êáé ôïõò Óáóóáíßäåò. Êé ýóôåñá, ìåñéêïýò áéþíåò áñãüôåñá, Ýãéíå, ôïýôç ôç öïñÜ, ðñùôåýïõóá ôïõ Áñôïõêëïý. Êáé ïñèïðüäçóå ðáíôïéïôñüðùò. Èáññåßò êáé ôá áðüêïóìá ìÜôéá ðïõ êïéôïýí ôçí ðåäéÜäá ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò, åßðáí êáé ôþñá áò ãßíåé ôï ÌÜñíôéí ôï êÝíôñï ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò. Êé ýóôåñá êáé ôï ÌÜñíôéí îáíáãßíåôáé óõíïñéáêÞ ðüëç, äéáôçñþíôáò ôçí ëáìðñüôçôÜ ôïõ, áíÜìåóá óôïõò Áñôïõêëïý êáé ôïõò áíáäõüìåíïõò ïèùìáíïýò. Ç ðüëç ìáò óôï óýíïñï ìå ôï ÉñÜê êáé ôç Óõñßá.
Ðïéïò åßíáé ï óôü÷ïò ìáò; Íá êÜíïõìå ôï ÌÜñíôéí îáíÜ êåíôñéêÞ ðüëç ôçò ðåñéï÷Þò. ÈÝëïõìå üëïé ïé äñüìïé íá ðåñíïýí áðü ôï ÌÜñíôéí, üëïé ïé ðïëéôéóìïß íá ðåñíïýí áðü åäþ, üëï ôï åìðüñéï íá Ý÷åé ìå êÜðïéï ôñüðï ìéá åðáöÞ ìå ôï ÌÜñíôéí. ÈÝëïõìå ç ìåãÜëç ôÝ÷íç ðïõ Üíèéóå åäþ íá äéáäïèåß ðáíôïý. ÈÝëïõìå, üðùò êáé ç Ïýñöá ðïõ áíáöÝñèçêå ðñïçãïõìÝíùò óôç óôñáôçãéêÞ ó÷åôéêÜ ìå ôéò ãåéôïíéêÝò ÷þñåò, Ýôóé êáé ôï ÌÜñíôéí íá ìçí ÷áñáêôçñßæïíôáé áðëþò áðü ôï ãåãïíüò üôé åßíáé ðüëåéò óõíïñéáêÝò, áëëÜ íá áðïêôÞóïõí ôçí éäéüôçôá ôïõ êÝíôñïõ üëçò ôçò ÌÝóçò ÁíáôïëÞò. Ãéáôß ôï ÌÜñíôéí äåí åßíáé ìéá ðüëç ðïõ åöåõñÝèçêå åê ôùí õóôÝñùí. Åßíáé ìéá ðüëç –ìå ôçí Ýííïéá ðïõ ÷ñçóéìïðïéåßôáé óÞìåñá ãéá äéÜöïñá öõôÜ- ‘ïñãáíéêÞ’ (âéïëïãéêÞò êáëëéÝñãåéáò), åðåéäÞ åßíáé ðáëéÜ. Èá Ýëåãá ìÜëéóôá êõñéïëåêôéêÜ ïñãáíéêÞ. ÌáêÜñé íá ìðïñïýóá íá åß÷á æÞóåé ðåñéóóüôåñï êáéñü óôï ÌÜñíôéí -äåí ìðüñåóá íá ìåßíù ðáñÜ ëßãåò ìÝñåò ó’ åêåßíç ôçí åêäñïìÞ êáé îáíÜñèá ìåñéêÝò öïñÝò áêüìç ìå ôçí åõêáéñßá êÜðïéùí óõíåäñßùí.
Áí èÝëåôå íá áíáêáëýøåôå ôçí øõ÷Þ ìéáò ðüëçò ðïõ Ý÷åé øõ÷Þ, ôüôå, Þ èá ôç ãõñßóåôå íý÷ôá Þ èá âãåßôå óôï äñüìï ðñùß á÷Üñáãá êáé èá ðáñáêïëïõèÞóåôå ôçí áíáôïëÞ ôïõ Þëéïõ ìáæß ìå ôçí ðüëç. ÅéäéêÜ óå ðüëåéò üðùò ôï ÌÜñíôéí ðïõ âëÝðïõí óôçí ðåäéÜäá ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò Þ üðùò ç Éóôáìðïýë ðïõ âëÝðåé óôï Âüóðïñï. Äåí õðÜñ÷åé ôßðïôå ôï ðåñéôôü üôáí ôñéãõñíÜôå óôá Üäåéá óïêÜêéá ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí. Ôþñá öáßíåôáé ðùò Ý÷ïõí äçìéïõñãçèåß êÜðïéá ‘ðåñéôôÜ’, áëëÜ ï ÍïìÜñ÷çò ìáò Üñ÷éóå íá ôá êáèáñßæåé. ÓôñåâëÞ äüìçóç. ¼ôáí ðåñéäéáâáßíåé êáíåßò ôá óïêÜêéá áíÜìåóá óôï Ïõëïý Ôæáìß êáé ôï Æéíôæßñéå óôçí ðáëéÜ ðüëç, üëá åßíáé ôüóï åîáßóéá ôïðïèåôçìÝíá óôï öõóéêü ôïõò ÷þñï… Ôá óïêÜêéá áõôÜ åßíáé óå ôÝôïéá óôåíÞ êáé âáèéÜ åðáöÞ ìåôáîý ôïõò –íéþèåé êáíåßò óáí íá ðçãáßíåé âüëôá óå Ýíá ùñáßï äÜóïò üðïõ üëá æïõí ôï Ýíá äßðëá óôï Üëëï, óå áðüëõôç åðéêïéíùíßá êáé åðáöÞ. Ôßðïôá äåí åßíáé ðåñéôôü, ôßðïôá ôå÷íçôü.
Íá ðù êáé êÜôé áêüìá ó÷åôéêÜ ìå ôï âéïëïãéêü êáé óõíäõÜóôå áõôÞ ôçí ðáëéÜ öõóéêüôçôá ìå ôïí ìïíôåñíéóìü.
Ôï ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé åðßóçò ìéá ðüëç õãéåéíÞ. Ïé ðÝôñåò ôïõ åßíáé áóâåóôüëéèïé êáé ôïõ ðñïóäßäïõí Ýíáí áÝñá õãéåéíÞò. ¼ôáí áíáêáëýðôåôå ôï ÌÜñíôéí, áíáêáëýðôåôå óõã÷ñüíùò üëåò ôéò ïìïñöéÝò ôïõ áñ÷áßïõ ðïëéôéóìïý. Ôá ÷ñþìáôá ðïõ Üöçóáí ðßóù ôïõò ïé öõëÝò ðïõ ðÝñáóáí áðü åäþ, ôá óôïé÷åßá ðïõ Üöçóáí ïé ðïëéôéóìïß ðïõ åãêáôáóôÜèçêáí åäþ, óôïé÷åßá ðïõ ìåôáöÝñïíôáé óôéò åðüìåíåò ãåíéÝò –ôá âëÝðåôå üëá áõôÜ äéá ãõìíïý ïöèáëìïý. Ãé’ áõôü ç óçìåñéíÞ ðáãêüóìéá ôÜîç êé áí åßíáé êÜðïôå íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ìéá ôÜîç –åííïþ ìéá ôÜîç ïéêïõìåíéêÞ-, ÷ñåéÜæåôáé, üðùò åßðá êáé ðñéí ìåñéêÝò ìÝñåò óôçí Ýíáñîç áõôïý ôïõ óõíåäñßïõ, ìéá öéëïóïößá. Ãéáôß âñéóêüìáóôå áíôéìÝôùðïé ìå óïâáñÝò êñßóåéò –èá áíáöåñèþ óôï èÝìá áõôü áñãüôåñá. Áí êÜðïéá ìÝñá, êáé ç ìÝñá áõôÞ äåí åßíáé ðïëý ìáêñéÜ ãéáôß ðñüêåéôáé ðåñß âáèåéÜò áíÜãêçò, áñ÷ßóïõìå íá êáôáâÜëïõìå ðñïóðÜèåéåò ãéá íá îåðåñáóôïýí ïé êñßóåéò, ìå ôç öéëïóïöéêÞ Ýííïéá, åêåßíïé ðïõ èá ôï êÜíïõí áõôü ðñÝðåé íá êáôáíïÞóïõí ôçí øõ÷Þ êáé ôï ðíåýìá ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí. Ãéáôß ç ðüëç áõôÞ Ýæçóå ïñãáíéêÜ, ìå ôç öõóéêüôçôÜ ôçò ìå ôï áñ÷áßï, óõíõðÞñîå ì’ áõôü êáé ì’ áõôü èá äéáôçñÞóåé ôçí ýðáñîç ôçò ùò ôçí áéùíéüôçôá. Äéêü ìáò êáèÞêïí åßíáé íá ðñïóôáôÝøïõìå ôï ðíåýìá áõôü êáé ôçí øõ÷Þ. Äéêü ìáò êáèÞêïí åßíáé íá äéáóðåßñïõìå ùò ìÞíõìá óôï óýíïëï ôçò ÷þñáò ìáò áëëÜ êáé óå ïëüêëçñï ôçí êüóìï ôçí Ýìðíåõóç ðïõ ðáßñíïõìå áðü ôï ðíåýìá áõôü êáé ôçí øõ÷Þ. Åßðá ‘áñ÷áßá ôÜîç’. Óôï óçìåßï áõôü êáëü åßíáé íá êáôáëÜâåé êáíåßò ôç ó÷Ýóç áíÜìåóá óôç íïïôñïðßá êáé ôçí ôÜîç ãéá íá êáôáëÜâåé ôï ‘áñ÷áßï’.
Íïìßæïõìå –ðñÜãìá ðïõ åßíáé ìéá éóôïñéêÞ ðëÜíç- üôé áõôïß ðïõ æïýóáí ôüôå êáé ôá üóá æïýóáí, áíÞêáí óôï ôüôå, åß÷áí ôá éäéáßôåñá ÷áñáêôçñéóôéêÜ ôçò åðï÷Þò êáé ôùí ãåíåþí åêåßíùí. Åìåßò âéþíïõìå êÜôé ôþñá, ðáñáêïëïõèïýìå ôéò ìåãÜëåò ôå÷íïëïãéêÝò áëëáãÝò. Êáé ëÝìå ðùò åßìáóôå ìéá ðïëý ôõ÷åñÞ ãåíéÜ Þ ìéá Üôõ÷ç ãåíéÜ âÜóåé ôùí üóùí âéþíïõìå. ÐïëëÝò ãåíéÝò óôçí éóôïñßá, íüìéóáí, ìå ôïí ßäéï ôñüðï, üôé Þôáí ïé ðéï óðïõäáßïé ðñùôáãùóíéóôÝò ôçò éóôïñßáò.
Âñéóêüìáóôå ôþñá áíôéìÝôùðïé ìå Ýíá öáéíüìåíï ðïõ ëÝãåôáé ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáèþò êáé ìå ôá ðñïâëÞìáôá ðïõ äçìéïõñãåß… Êáé óêåðôüìáóôå üôé ìïíÜ÷á åìåßò ôï æïýìå, ðùò äåí Ý÷åé ðñïçãïýìåíï. Áõôü åßíáé Üíåõ ðñïçãïõìÝíïõ, ëÝìå. Íáé, ßóùò óôï ðëáßóéï áõôü íá ìçí Ý÷åé ðñïçãïýìåíï. ÁëëÜ, ßóùò ü÷é óôï ßäéï ðëáßóéï, áëëÜ óôï ðáñåëèüí ç áíèñùðüôçôá åß÷å óßãïõñá êÜðïéá ðáñüìïéá åìðåéñßá. Áí áõôü ôï áíôéëçöèïýìå óùóôÜ, [ôüôå] ìðïñïýìå íá ïéêïäïìÞóïõìå ôï ìÝëëïí óùóôÜ.
Ðþò äçëáäÞ, èá ðåßôå.
Ñßîôå ìéá ìáôéÜ óôïõò áéþíåò ìåôáîý ôïõ 5ïõ êáé 7ïõ áéþíá ð.×. Ðñüêåéôáé ãéá ìéá ðåñßïäï üðïõ ìåãÜëá ñåýìáôá, èñçóêåõôéêÜ, éäÝåò èñçóêåõôéêÝò äéáäüèçêáí óôï óýíïëï ôïõ ðëáíÞôç. Ç ðåñßïäïò áõôÞ ðñïóöÝñåé èáññåßò Ýíá åñãáóôçñéáêü ðáñÜäåéãìá ãéá íá ôåèåß óùóôÜ ç ó÷Ýóç áíÜìåóá óôç íïïôñïðßá êáé ôçí ôÜîç. ÔÜîç äåí ìðïñåß íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ÷ùñßò ôçí áëëáãÞ íïïôñïðßáò. Óôçí ðåñßïäï åêåßíç õðÜñ÷ïõí ôá óçìÜäéá ôïõ üôé ìéá íÝá ôÜîç ìðïñåß íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ìüíï ìå ìéá íÝá íïïôñïðßá. Ôïõò áéþíåò áõôïýò óå äéÜöïñåò ãùíéÝò ôçò ãçò, óå äéáöïñåôéêÝò ðåñéï÷Ýò üðïõ áíèïýóáí ðïëéôéóìïß ðáñïõóéÜóôçêáí óçìáíôéêÜ öéëïóïöéêÜ ñåýìáôá, çãåôéêÝò öõóéïãíùìßåò, èñçóêåõôéêïß áñ÷çãïß. Ëüãïõ ÷Üñç óôçí ðåñéï÷Þ ôïõ åëëçíéêïý ðïëéôéóìïý åß÷áìå ôïí ÓùêñÜôç, ôïí ÐëÜôùíá, ôïí ÁñéóôïôÝëç. Åðß ìåñéêÝò ãåíéÝò, ôç ìéá ìåôÜ ôçí Üëëç. Ôçí ßäéá ðåñßïäï êáé ëßãï ðñéí, ðåñßðïõ äýï áéþíåò ðñéí, Ýæçóáí ï Æáñáôïýóôñá óôï ÉñÜí, ï Âïýäáò óôçí Éíäßá, ï Êïìöïýêéïò êáé ôï Ôáü óôçí Êßíá. Êáé äýï ôñåéò áéþíåò áñãüôåñá, ç äéáíïçôéêÞ êéíçôéêüôçôá ðïõ äçìéïýñãçóáí áõôÜ ôá öéëïóïöéêÜ ñåýìáôá, Ýãéíå áéôßá íá áíáäõèïýí óçìáíôéêÜ ôïðéêÜ êáèåóôþôá (ôÜîåéò). Êé áõôÜ ôá ðåñéöåñåéáêÜ êáèåóôþôá Üñ÷éóáí íá äéá÷Ýïíôá ôï Ýíá ìÝóá óôï Üëëï. ÌáèçôÞò ôïõ ÁñéóôïôÝëç ï ÌÝãáò ÁëÝîáíäñïò, ü,ôé ðÞñå áðü ôï äÜóêáëü ôïõ, ðïëëáðëáóéÜæïíôáò ôï êáè´ïäüí -ðÝñáóå Ýîù áð’ ôï ÌÜñíôéí- ôï ìåôÝöåñå ùò ôéò Éíäßåò êáé ôçí Áßãõðôï. ÄçìéïõñãÞèçêáí ðÜìðïëëåò ðüëåéò ìå ô’ üíïìá ôïõ (ÁëåîÜíäñåéåò) êáé áíáäýèçêå ìéá ôÜîç.
Ç ÌåãÜëç ÐåñóéêÞ Áõôïêñáôïñßá, ðïõ áðüññïéá ôçò åßíáé ìéá áðü ôéò ðéï ñéæùìÝíåò áñ÷áßåò ðüëåéò, ç ÐåñóÝðïëéò, Þñèå áíôéìÝôùðç [ìå ôïí ÌåãáëÝîáíôñï] êáé áíáäýèçêå ç êéíçôéêüôçôá ôï ÉñÜí.
Óôéò Éíäßåò, ìåñéêïýò áéþíåò ìåôÜ ôïí Âïýäá åìöáíßóôçêáí ïé áõôïêñáôïñßåò ôïõ Áóüêá êáé ôùí Ìáïýñéá, óôçí Êßíá ìåñéêïýò áéþíåò ìåôÜ ôïí Êïìöïýêéï åìöáíßóôçêå ç Áõôïêñáôïñßá ôùí ÌåãÜëùí ×Üíùí. ÁõôÝò äçìéïýñãçóáí ìåãÜëá êáèåóôþôá. Ôá êáèåóôþôá áõôÜ èá äçìéïõñãïýóáí áñãüôåñá ôï Äñüìï ôïõ Ìåôáîéïý ìå ðáñåðüìåíá ôéò åìðïñéêÝò áíôáëëáãÝò êáé ôéò ðïëéôéóôéêÝò áëëçëåðéäñÜóåéò.
ÄçëáäÞ, êÜôé ðáñüìïéï ìå ôçí ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç ðïõ æïýìå óÞìåñá, âéþèçêå óå ðáëéüôåñåò åðï÷Ýò.
Ï éóëáìéêüò ðïëéôéóìüò ðÜëé ãåííÞèçêå ãýñù ‘áðü ôï äüãìá ôçò ìïíáäéêüôçôáò ôïõ Èåïý’ [ôï ÊïñÜíé] óôç Ìåäßíá. ÁëëÜ, Ý÷ôéóå ôç ÃñáíÜäá, ôçí Êüñäïâá. Ôï ÌáñáêÝò. Ôç ÂáãäÜôç. ÌåôÝöåñå ôï ðíåýìá áõôü óôçí Éóôáìðïýë. Óôç Ìðïõ÷Üñá, ôï Éóöá÷Üí, ôçí ÌðÜë÷. Áí äåí åß÷å âéþóåé ôç ìåôáìüñöùóç ôçò íïïôñïðßáò ôçò éóüôçôáò óôïí ôüðï ðïõ ãåííÞèçêå, óôç ÌÝêêá êáé ôç Ìåäßíá, äåí èá ìðïñïýóå íá ðáñïõóéÜóåé ìéá ôÝôïéá áíôßëçøç ôÜîçò.
Áí èÝëåôå íá êáôáíïÞóåôå, ìåôÝðåéôá, ôçí ÏèùìáíéêÞ Áõôïêñáôïñßá, ðñÝðåé íá Ý÷åôå êáôáëÜâåé ôçí ðåñéðÝôåéá ôùí Óåëôóïõêéäþí, ôçí ðåñéðÝôåéá ôïõ Áñôïõêëïý ðïõ ðñïçãÞèçêáí. ÐñÝðåé íá êáôáëÜâåôå ôï ôüîï ðïõ åêôÜèçêå áð’ ôçí êåíôñéêÞ Áóßá ùò ôçí Áíáôïëßá, ôï ðþò áíáìåß÷èçêáí ìå ôïõò ðïëéôéóìïýò ïé Üíèñùðïé ðïõ êéíïýíôáí ìåò óôï ôüîï êáé ôé åßäïõò óõíèÝóåéò äçìéïýñãçóå ç áíÜìåéîç áõôÞ óôçí Áíáôïëßá. Ôï ðíåýìá ôçò ôÜîçò ðïõ ëÝìå ïèùìáíéêÞ äåí ðñùôïðáñïõóéÜóôçêå ôïí 16ï áéþíá. Áíáäýèçêå áðü ôç óõíÜíôçóç åêåßíùí ôùí êéíçôéêþí áíèñþðéíùí óôïé÷åßùí êáé ôïõ óôáèåñïý ÷þñïõ. Ïé Üíèñùðïé êéíÞèçêáí áðü ôçí êåíôñéêÞ Áóßá êáôÜ ìåãÜëá ìåôáíáóôåõôéêÜ ñåýìáôá, áëëÜ Ý÷ôéóáí íÝåò ôÜîåéò óôá ìÝñç ðïõ óõíÜíôçóáí. … Ðñïúüí ìéáò ôÝôïéáò óýíèåóçò –ôçò óýíèåóçò ÉñÜí-ÔïõñÜí- åßíáé ïé Óåëôóïõêßäåò. ÄÜóêáëïò Þ âåæßñçò ôïõ ÌåëéêóÜ÷, ãéïý ôïõ ÁëðáóëÜí, Þôáí ï Íéæáìïýë-ìïõëê. Óýíèåóç äýï ðïëéôéóìþí áðü ôïõò ïðïßïõò ï Ýíáò Þôáí ðéï êéíçôéêüò ü Üëëïò ðéï åãêáôåóôçìÝíïò.
¾óôåñá, ç êéíçôéêüôçôá áõôÞ äçìéïýñãçóå ìåãÜëåò óõíèÝóåéò óôçí Áíáôïëßá. Ôï ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé ìéá áðü ôéò óõíèÝóåéò áõôÝò, ç Ìåóïðïôáìßá åßíáé ìéá Üëëç. Ïé êïéíüôçôåò ðïõ Ýöåñáí ìáæß ôïõò ôçí êéíçôéêüôçôá åíþèçêáí ìå ôéò åãêáôåóôçìÝíåò, åêåßíåò äçëáäÞ ðïõ êáôïéêïýóáí åêåßíç ôçí åðï÷Þ åäþ êáé ìáæß äçìéïýñãçóáí ìåãÜëïõò êáé éó÷õñïýò ðïëéôéóìïýò. ÂãÜëôå ìéá áðü áõôÝò [ôéò êïéíüôçôåò] åêôüò éóôïñßáò êé Ý÷åôå åîïëïèñÝøåé êáé ôçí Üëëç. ÓôáèåñÞ Þôáí ç Ìåóïðïôáìßá, ç Áíáôïëßá ôïõ Ñïõì ôçò åðï÷Þò åêåßíçò. Ãé’ áõôü êáé ôï üíïìá ôïõ ÌåâëáíÜ Þôáí ÌåâëáíÜ Ôæåëáëåíôßí Ñïõìß. ÃåííÞèçêå óôç Ìðáë÷ êáé ìÝóù ÉñÜí Þñèå êáé åãêáôáóôÜèçêå óôçí Áíáôïëßá. ÅðçñåÜóôçêå áðü ôïí ðïëéôéóìü ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò. Êáé ôéò åðï÷Ýò åêåßíåò ïé Üíèñùðïé äåí ÷ùñßæïíôáí óå ôïõñêïìÜíïõò, êïýñäïõò, Üñáâåò, éñáíïýò, ðÝñóåò. Äåí äéá÷ùñßæïíôáí âÜóåé ôçò åèíéêüôçôÜò ôïõò. Ï ôüóï éó÷õñüò ðïëéôéóìüò ôçò Ìåóïðïôáìßáò áíáäýèçêå ìÝóá áðü ôçí éóôïñéêÞ åìðåéñßá üëùí ôùí ëáþí ðïõ æïýóáí åäþ, ôùí óõñï÷áëäáßùí, ôùí ãéåëíôáíß, ôùí êåëíôáíß, ôùí ðåñóþí êáé ßäñõóå ìåãÜëá êÝíôñá áðü ôçí óõíÜíôçóç ôïõ ìå ôá êéíçôéêÜ êáé ìå âáèéÝò ñßæåò ôïõñêéêÜ êáé ôïõñáíéêÜ óôïé÷åßá.
Ç ïèùìáíéêÞ áõôïêñáôïñßá áíáäýèçêå ôïí 12ï – 13ï áéþíá åðåéäÞ êáôÜöåñå íá áîéïðïéÞóåé ôç óýíèåóç áõôÞ, åðåéäÞ ôçí áíÝìåéîå, Þ, áëëéþò, åðåéäÞ õðÞñ÷å Ýíáò ôÝôïéïò ðïëéôéóìüò åêåß, áðü ìÝóá ôïõ âãÞêå ç ÏèùìáíéêÞ áõôïêñáôïñßá. Êáé ãé’ áõôü ïé ïèùìáíïß ÷ñçóéìïðïßçóáí ôçí Ýííïéá ‘áñ÷áßï’. Åííïïýóáí ôïýôï: Åãþ ìðïñåß íá ìçí îÝñù ôï ÷ñþìá, ôç öõëÞ, ôï äüãìá óáò êáé ùò êñÜôïò äåí ÷ñåéÜæåôáé êáí íá îÝñù. ¼ìùò, üëïé óáò, ùò ìÝñïò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò êáé ùò ðñïÝêôáóç ôïõ áñ÷áßïõ åßóôå ãéá ìÝíá éåñïß. Ãé’ áõôü ï óïõëôÜíïò Ìå÷ìÝô ï ÐïñèçôÞò ðëÜé óôï ‘óïõëôÜíïò’ êáé ôï ‘÷áãÜíïò’ –áñãüôåñá ðñïóôßèåôáé ôï ‘÷áëßöçò’- ÷ñçóéìïðïßçóå ÷ùñßò áíáóôïëÞ ôïí ôßôëï ‘êáßóáñáò ôùí ñùìáßùí’. Êáßóáñáò ôùí Ñùìáßùí. Ãéáôß âñéóêüíôïõóáí åêåß. Ãéáôß åêåß ðïõ Þôáí õðÞñ÷å ôï ÉñÜí êé üëåò áõôÝò ïé äéáöïñåôéêÝò êïõëôïýñåò. Ìå ôçí áíôßëçøç áõôÞ, ç Ýííïéá ‘áñ÷áßïò’ ÷ñçóéìïðïéÞèçêå ãéá íá ïñßóåé ôçí ôÜîç ðïõ Ýíùóå üëïõò ôïõò ðñïò ôá ðßóù ðïëéôéóìïýò. Êé áõôüò [ï ÐïñèçôÞò] ðïõ êïéôïýóå ìå ôï ßäéï ìÝôñï ôï ìÝëëïí, áêñéâþò åðåéäÞ êáôáíïïýóå ôï áñ÷áßï, ïíüìáóå ôï êñÜôïò áéþíéï êñÜôïò [devleti ebed müddet], ñÞóç ðïõ óçìáßíåé ôçí áíôßëçøç ãéá Ýíá êñÜôïò ðïõ èá äéáñêÝóåé áéþíéá. Ôï áéþíéï êñÜôïò Ýðñåðå íá âáóßæåôáé óå Ýíá ñéæùìÝíï áñ÷áßï.
Ïé êïõëôïýñåò ðïõ áíáìåß÷èçêáí óôá ÷þìáôá áõôÜ, âïÞèçóáí ç ìéá ôçí Üëëç óå äýóêïëïõò êáéñïýò. Óôïí Ðüëåìï ôçò Áíåîáñôçóßáò, óôïí Ðñþôï Ðáãêüóìéï Ðüëåìï. ¼ôáí ìéëÜìå ìå ôïõò éñáêéíïýò ãéá ôçí Êïõôïýë-ÁìÜñá [óçìåñéíÞ Åë-Êïõô (160 ÷ëì áðü ôç ÂáãäÜôç) ðïõ êáôÝëáâáí ïé Üããëïé ôï 1915 êáé üðïõ ï ïèùìáíéêüò óôñáôüò êáôÞãáãå Ýíäïîç ìÜ÷ç åíáíôßïí ôïõò] óõãêéíïýíôáé êáé áõôïß, óõãêéíïýìáóôå êáé åìåßò. Äéüôé üôáí ôüôå ï ïèùìáíéêüò óôñáôüò ðïëåìïýóå ìå ôïõò Üããëïõò, óôï óôñáôü åêåßíï õðÞñ÷áí üëïé -ôïýñêïé, êïýñäïé, Üñáâåò, óõñï÷áëäáßïé, êåëíôáíß, ãéåæéíôß. ÁõôÞ åßíáé ç åíüôçôá ðïõ áðïôåëåß ôï èåìÝëéï ôçò óçìåñéíÞò ôïõñêï-éñáêéíÞò öéëßáò. ÁõôÞ ç åíüôçôá áðÝíáíôé óôï ðåðñùìÝíï.
Ãéá ôï ëüãï áõôü, óå Ýíá Üëëï Üñèñï ìïõ, ðÜëé ðñéí íá ðÜñù ôï óçìåñéíü ìïõ ðüóôï, åß÷á ÷ñçóéìïðïéÞóåé ìéá Ýííïéá ðÝñá áðü ôçí Ýííïéá ôçò õðçêïüôçôáò, ôçí Ýííïéá ôïõ ´óõìðáôñéùôéóìïý’, ìéá Ýííïéá ðïõ áðü íïìéêÞ Üðïøç ìáò ðåñéæþíåé üëïõò êáé óçìáßíåé ‘áõôïýò ðïõ Ý÷ïõí ìïéñáóôåß ôçí ßäéá éóôïñßá’. ¼ðïéïé äåí Ý÷ïõí æÞóåé ìéá êïéíÞ éóôïñßá áêüìç êé áí åßíáé óõìðáôñéþôåò, üðùò óôç Ãéïõãêïóëáâßá, äåí ìðïñïýí íá ðñïóäþóïõí íüçìá óôï ‘óõìðáôñéùôéóìü’. Ç õðçêïüôçôá äçìéïõñãåß íïìéêïýò äåóìïýò, ç Ýííïéá ‘áõôïý ðïõ Ý÷åé ìïéñáóôåß ôçí ßäéá éóôïñßá’ äçìéïõñãåß êïéíùíéêïýò äåóìïýò, ìåßîåéò. Ãéá ôï ëüãï áõôü ç âÜóç ôçò ÷þñáò ìáò, ôçò êïéíùíßáò ìáò, ç ìáãéÜ ôçò, åßíáé ðïëý éó÷õñÞ. Ìå ôçí ßäéá ëïãéêÞ, ìå ôçí ßäéá ðñïïðôéêÞ äçìéïõñãÞèçêå áðü ôçí áñ÷Þ ç Äçìïêñáôßá ìáò.
Ç Áëâáíßá óôá ÂáëêÜíéá óÞìåñá, Þ, áò ðïýìå, ôï ÁæåñìðáúôæÜí óôïí Êáýêïáóï, ç Âïóíßá Åñæåãïâßíç, ôï ÉñÜê, ç Óõñßá åßíáé äéáöïñåôéêÜ êñÜôç –ïé ëáïß ôïõ ÊáõêÜóïõ, ïé ëáïß ôùí Âáëêáíßùí, ïé ëáïß ôçò ÌÝóçò ÁíáôïëÞò åßíáé ÷ùñéóìÝíïé êáôÜ äéáöïñåôéêÜ êñÜôç. Óôçí Éóôáìðïýë üìùò Þ óå ïðïéáäÞðïôå Üëëç ìåãÜëç ðüëç ìáò, áí ìðåßôå óå ìéá ðïëõêáôïéêßá ìðïñåß íá äåßôå üôé óå Ýíá ðÜôùìá ìÝíåé Ýíáò áëâáíüò, óôï Üëëï Ýíáò âüóíéïò, Ýíáò ôóåôóÝíïò, Ýíáò áæÝñïò. ¼ëïé áõôïß, åðåéäÞ åßíáé ðñïúüíôá áõôÞò ôçò áíÜìåéîçò, åßíáé êáô’ åìÜò, éóüôéìïé ðïëßôåò ôçò ÔïõñêéêÞò Äçìïêñáôßáò. Êé åðåéäÞ óõíäÝïíôáé ìåôáîý ôïõò ìå ôá äåóìÜ áõôÜ –ôïõ ‘óõìðáôñéùôéóìïý-, èá óõíå÷ßóåé ç äçìïêñáôßá ìáò, ï ëáüò ìáò, ôï êñÜôïò ìáò íá æåé åíùìÝíï ùò üëï.
Åðéêáëïýìåíïò ôçí õðïìïíÞ óáò, èá Þèåëá íá åðéóçìÜíù áêüìç ìåñéêÜ óçìåßá êïéôþíôáò áðü áõôü ôï éóôïñéêü êáé öéëïóïöéêü öüíôï êáé ëáìâÜíïíôáò õðüøç ôéò áíôáíáêëÜóåéò ôïõ öüíôïõ áõôïý óôïí ïéêïõìåíéêü ðïëéôéóìü.
Íáé, ï êüóìïò ÷ñåéÜæåôáé ìéá íÝá ôÜîç.
Ç íÝá áõôÞ ôÜîç ìðïñåß íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ìå ìéá öéëïóïöéêÞ ïðôéêÞ ðïõ èá öÝñåé åíôüò ôçò ôá óôïé÷åßá ðïõ áíÝöåñá ðñïçãïõìÝíùò ó÷åôéêÜ ìå ôï ÌÜñíôéí. Ðïéåò èá ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé ïé áñ÷Ýò áõôÞò ôçò íÝáò ôÜîçò êáé ðïéï ñüëï èá ìðïñïýóå íá ðáßîåé óôéò áñ÷Ýò áõôÝò ç Ôïõñêßá;
Ðñþôïí, ç íÝá áõôÞ ôÜîç ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé ìéá ôÜîç ‘äåêôéêÞ’, ü÷é áðïññéðôéêÞ. Äåí ðñÝðåé íá áðïññßðôåé êáìéÜ ÷þñá, êáìéÜ Þðåéñï, êáíÝíá ëáü, êáíÝíá ÷ñþìá. ÐñÝðåé íá âáóßæåôáé óå ôáõôüôçôåò ðïõ ‘åßíáé äåêôéêÝò’. ¼÷é óôïõò Üîïíåò ÁíáôïëÞ-Äýóç, ÂïññÜò-Íüôïò. ÁíôéèÝôùò, ðñÝðåé íá ðñïóöÝñåé óôÝãç, íá êáëýðôåé üëåò ôéò ôáõôüôçôåò, üëïõò ôïõò Üîïíåò.
Ôüôå ìüíï ìðïñåß íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ìéá ôÜîç ðïõ íá åñßæåé ðùò åßíáé ïéêïõìåíéêÞ. Ðñïûðüèåóç ìéáò ‘äåêôéêÞò’ ôÜîçò åßíáé ç äçìéïõñãßá ìéáò åíïðïéçôéêÞò ôáõôüôçôáò.
ÕðÜñ÷ïõí óÞìåñá óå ðÜìðïëëá ìÝñç ôïõ êüóìï ìáò óõãêñïýóåéò ôáõôüôçôáò êáé áðïññéðôéêÝò óõìðåñéöïñÝò –ïé áðïññéðôéêÝò áõôÝò óõìðåñéöïñÝò, ìéáò ïìÜäáò ëüãïõ ÷Üñç, öÝñïõí ìáæß êáé ìÝóá ôïõò óôçí ðñáãìáôéêüôçôá ìéá ôÜîç üðïõ äåí õðÜñ÷åé êáìéÜ éóüôçôá.
Ôþñá åßìáóôå ìÝëç ôïõ Óõìâïõëßïõ Áóöáëåßáò ôùí ÇíùìÝíùí Åèíþí. Ôï óýóôçìá ôùí ÇÅ ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé ‘äåêôéêü’. ¼ëïé íá áéóèÜíïíôáé üôé åêðñïóùðïýíôáé åêåß. ÊáíÝíáò äåí ðñÝðåé íá áðïññßðôåôáé.
Ç Ôïõñêßá ßóùò íá áðïôåëåß ôï ðéï ÷ôõðçôü ðáñÜäåéãìá áõôÞò ôçò áñ÷Þò. Ôßèåíôáé äéÜöïñåò åñùôÞóåéò. ËÝíå ëüãïõ ÷Üñç ãéá ôçí Ôïõñêßá üôé åßíáé ãÝöõñá áíÜìåóá óôçí ÁíáôïëÞ êáé ôç Äýóç, Ýôóé äåí åßíáé; Åßíáé, ëÝíå åðßóçò, ñõèìéóôéêüò ðáñÜãïíôáò áíÜìåóá óå ÂïññÜ êáé Íüôï.
Áð’ ôç ìéá ìåñéÜ, ç Ôïõñêßá õðåñáóðéóôÞò ôçò áíÜìåéîçò ÁíáôïëÞò-Äýóçò êáé ôùí äéáöüñùí ðïëéôéóìþí óôï ðñüãñáììá ôïõ Óõíáóðéóìïý ôùí Ðïëéôéóìþí, áð’ ôçí Üëëç ç Ôïõñêßá Üìåóïò áíáêëáóôÞñáò ôùí ïéêïíïìéêþí áíéóïôÞôùí áíÜìåóá óå ÂïññÜ-Íüôï ùò ìÝëïò ôùí G-20.
Ôé áêñéâþò åêðñïóùðïýìå åìåßò, äçëáäÞ;
Ôï åñþôçìá áõôü ìïõ Ýèåóå, óå ìéá óõíÜíôçóç ðïõ åß÷áìå, Ýíáò ðñþçí ãåíéêüò ãñáììáôÝáò ôïõ Õðïõñãåßïõ ìáò. Èá Þèåëá ôþñá íá ôï åêöñÜóù ðéï êáèáñÜ. Åìåßò ôïõò åêðñïóùðïýìå üëïõò. Ãéáôß ï áñ÷áßïò ðëïýôïò ðïõ Ý÷ïõìå ìáò êÜíåé íá óõíáíôéüìáóôå ìå üëïõò ôïõò ðïëéôéóìïýò ôçò ÁíáôïëÞò, Ý÷ïõìå ðÜñåé êÜôé áðü üëåò áõôÝò ôéò êïõëôïýñåò, ôáõôü÷ñïíá üìùò, ìå ôçí Ýííïéá ôçò ðïëéôéêÞò êïõëôïýñáò âñéóêüìáóôå óôï êÝíôñï ôçò Äýóçò. Ç õðïøçöéüôçôÜ ìáò íá ãßíïõìå ìÝëïò ôçò ÅÅ, ïé åðáöÝò ìáò óôçí Áóßá, ïé äåóìïß ìáò óôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ äåí åßíáé, ìå ôçí Ýííïéá áõôÞ, áíôéêñïõüìåíïé, áëëÜ äçìéïõñãïýí ìéá ïëüôçôá. Ãé’ áõôü üóï ‘ãßíïõìå äåêôéêïß’ óå üëá áõôÜ, üóï ðéï äñáóôéêÜ êéíïýìáóôå ó’ áõôÜ ôá åðßðåäá, ôüóï ðéï åíåñãçôéêü ñüëï èá Ý÷åé ç Ôïõñêßá óôçí áíáæÞôçóç ôçò ïéêïõìåíéêÞò ôÜîçò.
Ãéá Ýíá ðñÜãìá íá åßóôå âÝâáéïé! Áð’ ôçí óêïðéÜ áõôÞò ôçò áñ÷Þò –ôçò äåêôéêüôçôáò-, êáìéÜ ÷þñá óôïí êüóìï äåí Ý÷åé ôçí éäéáéôåñüôçôá ôçò Ôïõñêßáò íá áíôéðñïóùðåýåé ôçí åìðåéñßá ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò. Åìåßò åßìáóôå óßãïõñïé ãé’ áõôü êáé ðñï÷ùñïýìå óôçí åîùôåñéêÞ ìáò ðïëéôéêÞ ìå áõôÞ ôçí áõôïðåðïßèçóç.
Äåýôåñï, áõôÞ ç íÝá ôÜîç ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé ‘óõììåôï÷éêÞ’.
ÄçëáäÞ, áõôïß ðïõ ðñüêåéôáé íá áðïôåëÝóïõí óôïé÷åßá áõôÞò ôçò ôÜîçò ðñÝðåé íá ëåéôïõñãïýí ßäéá üðùò ç ðüëç ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí, üðïõ äéáöïñåôéêÜ óôïé÷åßá Ýæçóáí ìáæß óå áëëçëåðßäñáóç –ôï ðáãêüóìéï óýóôçìá ìðïñåß íá åðéâéþóåé áðïêëåéóôéêÜ êáé ìüíï áí åßíáé óõììåôï÷éêü. Ôï óýóôçìá ôùí ÇÅ, äåí åßíáé áñêåôü íá âáóßæåé ôç ëåéôïõñãßá ôïõ óôá ðÝíôå ìüíéìá ìÝëç. Ïé äïìÝò ðïõ óôçñßæïíôáé óôéò ðïëéôéêÝò åîéóþóåéò ðïõ äçìéïõñãÞèçêáí ìåôÜ ôï Äåýôåñï Ðáãêüóìéï Ðüëåìï ÷Üíïõí ðëÝïí óéãÜ óéãÜ ôçí âáñýôçôá, ôçí åãêõñüôçôÜ ôïõò. ×ñåéÜæåôáé íá åðéäåé÷ôåß ìéá ðéï óõììåôï÷éêÞ ðñïóÝããéóç. Åßìáóôå õðï÷ñåùìÝíïé íá áíôéëçöèïýìå óùóôÜ ôçí áëëáãÞ ôçò åõñù-êåíôñéêÞò äïìÞò ôïõ 19ïõ áéþíá.
Èá Þèåëá íá áíáöåñèþ ãéá Üëëç ìéá öïñÜ óôï óçìåßï áõôü, óôç ó÷Ýóç áíÜìåóá óôçí ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáé ôï ìïíôåñíéóìü ðïõ áíÝöåñá ðñéí áðü ëßãï. ¼ðùò óôïõò áñ÷áßïõò ðïëéôéóìïýò õðÞñ÷å ó÷Ýóç áíÜìåóá óôç íïïôñïðßá êáé ôçí ôÜîç, áêñéâþò ôï ßäéï óõíÝâç êáé ôçí þñá ðïõ áíáäõüôáí ï ìïíôåñíéóìüò, áðü ôïí 14ï ùò ôïí 18ï áéþíá, ç ìåôáññýèìéóç, ç áíáãÝííçóç, ïé ìåãÜëåò äéáíïçôéêÝò åðáíáóôÜóåéò, ïé ìåãÜëåò áëëáãÝò óôç öõóéêÞ üðùò ç ìç÷áíéêÞ ôïõ Íåýôùíá. Ωò áíôáíÜêëáóÞ áõôþí ï 19ïò áéþíáò Ýãéíå Ýíáò åõñù-êåíôñéêüò áéþíáò. Ï 20ïò åßíáé Ýíáò áéþíáò ìå êÝíôñï ôïí Áôëáíôéêü.
ÁëëÜ ìå ôçí åìöÜíéóç ôçò ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóçò, éäïý, ïé Üíïäïé óôçí Áóßá, ïé íÝåò áíáæçôÞóåéò óôç ËáôéíéêÞ ÁìåñéêÞ, ïé áíáäåýóåéò óôçí ÁöñéêÞ, ìáò äåß÷íïõí üôé óôïí áéþíá ðïõ äéáíýïõìå, áí êáôáóôåß äõíáôüí íá äçìéïõñãçèåß ìéá óõììåôï÷éêÞ ôÜîç, ôüôå ìüíï èá åîáóöáëéóôåß ìéá ðáãêüóìéá ôÜîç êáé üðïéïé óõíôåëåóôÝò ìðïñÝóïõí íá óõíåéóöÝñïõí óôç óõììåôï÷éêÞ áõôÞ ôÜîç, áõôïß èá âãïõí óôï ðñïóêÞíéï ùò óçìáíôéêïß óõíôåëåóôÝò.
Åìåßò ïñßóáìå ìå ôçí Ýííïéá áõôÞ ôçí ÅÅ ùò óôñáôçãéêü óôü÷ï. ÁëëÜ ðïôÝ äåí èá ðáñáìåëÞóïõìå ôïõò äåóìïýò ìáò óôçí Áóßá, ôéò åðáöÝò ìáò óôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ, ôéò ñßæåò ìáò óôá ÂáëêÜíéá, ïýôå ôïí Êáýêáóï êáé ôçí ÁöñéêÞ.
Ãéáôß üóï ðéï óõììåôï÷éêÜ ìðïñÝóïõìå íá ôïõò åêðñïóùðÞóïõìå, óôïí ßäéï âáèìü èá ìðïñÝóïõìå íá Ý÷ïõìå ëüãï óôçí ðáãêüóìéá ôÜîç.
ÈÝëù íá ìïéñáóôþ ìáæß óáò Ýíá ðïëý åíäéáöÝñïí ðáñÜäåéãìá.
ÐÝñõóé, ðñéí áðü ôçí óõíÜíôçóç ôùí G-20, Þìáóôáí ìå ôïí Ðñüåäñï ôçò Äçìïêñáôßáò óôçí Ôáíæáíßá. Ï Ðñüåäñïò ôçò Ôáíæáíßáò æÞôçóå ìéá ÷Üñç áðü ôïí Ðñüåäñï ìáò: ‘Ç ÁöñéêÞ äåí åêðñïóùðåßôáé üðùò èá ôçò Üîéæå óôïõò G-20, óáò ðáñáêáëïýìå ãßíåôå åóåßò åêðñüóùðüò ìáò, åêðñüóùðïò äçëáäÞ ôçò ÁöñéêÞò óôïõò G-20’.
Åêåßíïé ðïõ äåí ìðïñïýí íá óõììåôÜó÷ïõí óôï ðáãêüóìéï óýóôçìá, åêåßíïé ðïõ ðáñáðïíïýíôáé ãéá ôçí áíéóüôçôá ôïõ ðáãêüóìéïõ óõóôÞìáôïò, åêåßíïé ðïõ ðåñéìÝíïõí ìéá öùíÞ íá ôïõò óôçñßîåé, óôñÝöïõí ôï âëÝììá ôïõò óôçí Ôïõñêßá.
Ãéá áõôü ôï ëüãï ç ðáñÝìâáóç ôïõ Ðñùèõðïõñãïý ìáò ðÝñóé ãéá ôï èÝìá ôçò Ðáëáéóôßíçò, ç äßêáéç êñáõãÞ ôïõ, âñÞêå áíôáðüêñéóç ü÷é ìüíï óôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ áëëÜ óå ïëüêëçñï ôïí êüóìï. Ãéá ôï ëüãï áõôü ôï íÝï üñáìá ðïõ èÝëïõìå íá åãêáèéäñýóïõìå óôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ âñßóêåé áðÞ÷çóç óå êÜèå ãùíéÜ ôïõ êüóìïõ. Ôçí þñá ðïõ ç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ äéáìåëßæåôáé, åìåßò ìå ôï üñáìá ðïõ Ý÷ïõìå äéáêçñýîåé, ðïõ äéáìïñöþíåôáé ìå ôçí éó÷õñÞ ðïëéôéêÞ âïýëçóç ðïõ åêöñÜæåé ï Ðñùèõðïõñãüò ìáò, ãéíüìáóôå ïé åêöñáóôÝò åíüò äéáöïñåôéêïý ïñÜìáôïò. Ç Ôïõñêßá ðñï÷ùñåß óôç äéáìüñöùóç ó÷Ýóåùí ‘åíïðïßçóçò’ ìå ôïõò ãåßôïíÝò ôçò. Êé áõôü åßíáé Ýíá èÝìá ðïõ óáò áöïñÜ ðïëý.
ÕðïãñÜøáìå, üðùò ãíùñßæåôå, ôïí ðåñáóìÝíï ìÞíá 51 óõìöùíßåò ìå ôç Óõñßá. 48 óõìöùíßåò ìå ôï ÉñÜê. Ðïéïò åßíáé ï óôü÷ïò ìáò; Ï óôü÷ïò ìáò åßíáé ï áêüëïõèïò: íá ðÜøïõí ôï ÌÜñíôéí, ç Ïýñöá, ôï ÃêáæéáíôÝð íá åßíáé ÷ùìÝíá óå ìéá ãùíéÜ óáí ðüëåéò óõíïñéáêÝò. Íá óõíáíôçèåß ôï ¢íôåð ìå ôï ×áëÝðé, ôï ÌÜñíôéí ìå ôç Ìïóïýëç, ôï ×áëÝðé ìå ôçí ËáôÜêåéá êáé áêüìá ðéï ìáêñéÜ. ÁõôÞ åßíáé ç ðñïóäïêßá ôçò ôïõñêéêÞò êïéíùíßáò, áõôüò åßíáé ï ïñßæïíôáò ôçò Ôïõñêßáò.
Êáèþò èá ðñï÷ùñÜåé ç ‘åíïðïßçóç’ èá äïýìå üôé áõôÜ ðïõ öáßíïíôáé ùò ðïëý ìåãÜëåò äéáöïñÝò, óôçí ðñáãìáôéêüôçôá äåí åßíáé êáé ôüóï ìåãÜëåò äéáöïñÝò. Ìïéñáæüìáóôå ôçí ßäéá êïõëôïýñá. Êïéôþíôáò áðü ïðïéïäÞðïôå óðßôé ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí ðñïò ôç Ìåóïðïôáìßá åßíáé áäýíáôï íá äåßôå ðïý áñ÷ßæåé ôï óýíïñï áíÜìåóá óôçí Ôïõñêßá êáé ôç Óõñßá. Ç ðåäéÜäá áõôÞ áðëþíåôáé êáé ðÜåé, ç ðåäéÜäá áõôÞ Þôáí åíùìÝíç óôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò éóôïñßáò, êáé Ýôóé èá åßíáé êáé óôï åîÞò. Êáíåßò íá ìç óêÝöôåôáé ðùò åðåéäÞ êÜðïéïò ó÷åäßáóå åêåß Ýíá óýíïñï, üôé ôá óýíïñá èá åßíáé ìüíéìá.
Êáé öõóéêÜ èá óåâüìáóôå ôá óýíïñá áëëÜ óôá ðëáßóéá ôçò öéëßáò, áêñéâþò üðùò Ýãéíå óôçí Åõñþðç, óôçí ðïñåßá ôçò äçìéïõñãßáò ôçò ÅÅ, èá íïçìáôïäïôÞóïõìå áõôÜ ôá óýíïñá óôï ðëáßóéï ôçò öéëßáò. Èá öñïíôßóïõìå þóôå íá ðÜøïõí ôá óýíïñá íá åßíáé ‘ôåß÷ç’, èá ôá ìåôáôñÝøïõìå óå áëçèéíÝò ‘ðýëåò’ ìå ôçí Ýííïéá ôùí óõíïñéáêþí ðõëþí. Ç ðýëç åßíáé ãéá íá åéóÝñ÷åôáé êáíåßò, ç ðýëç ìÝíåé áíïé÷ôÞ. Ôï ôåß÷ïò äåí ìðïñåßôå íá ôï áíïßîåôå. ¸ôóé Þôáí ùò ôþñá ôï óýíïñï Ôïõñêßáò-Óõñßáò. Óáí íá ìçí Ýöôáíå ðïõ Þôáí ôåß÷ïò, åß÷å êéüëáò íáñêïèåôçèåß -ãéá íá ðñïóôáôåýåôáé ôï ôåß÷ïò. Ëåò êáé áõôïß ðïõ æïõí åêáôÝñùèåí áõôïý ôïõ óõíüñïõ èá Þèåëáí íá æïõí ãéá ðÜíôá ÷ùñéóôÜ. Ôþñá, ïé íÜñêåò êáèáñßæïíôáé, Üñ÷éóáí íá êáèáñßæïíôáé óôï ÍïõóÜúìðéí (Íéóõâýç). Ôï ôåß÷ïò ãêñåìßóôçêå. Ç Óõñßá êáé ç Ôïõñêßá áíáìåéãíýïíôáé.
¼ôáí êáôÜ ôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò åðßóêåøçò ôïõ ÌðåóÜñ ¢óáíô óôçí Ôïõñêßá êáé ìåôÜ ôç óõíÜíôçóÞ ôïõ ìå ôïí Ðñùèõðïõñãü ìáò, áíáêïéíþóáìå ìáæß ìå ôïí Âåëßíô Ìïõáëßì ôçí åßäçóç üôé ‘êáôáñãÞèçêå ç âßæá’, ðéóôÝøôå ìå ôï ôçëÝöùíü ìïõ äåí óôáìÜôçóå íá ÷ôõðÜåé. ËÜâáìå óõã÷áñçôÞñéá áð’ üëç ôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ êáé éäßùò áðü ôéò óõíïñéáêÝò ðåñéï÷Ýò ôùí äýï ÷ùñþí. Ç åßäçóç åïñôÜóôçêå óáí íá Þôáí ãéïñôÞ. Ôï ôé óõíÝâáéíå ðñéí áðü äÝêá ÷ñüíéá, ôï îÝñåé êáëÜ ï ×ïõëïõóß ìðÝçò, Ãåíéêüò Ðñüîåíïò ìáò óôï ×áëÝðé ôçí åðï÷Þ åêåßíç, ðþò êáôÜ ìÞêïò ôùí óõíüñùí ðåôïýóáí ï Ýíáò áð’ ôç ìéá êé ï Üëëïò áð’ ôçí Üëëç ôá äþñá ôïõò ìÝóá óå ôóïõâÜëéá –áßó÷ïò. Áôáßñéáóôç åéêüíá ãéá êïéíùíßá ôïõ åéêïóôïý áéþíá… åéêüíá áôáßñéáóôç ìå ôï ðïëéôéóìü ìáò ðïõ áßñåé ôéò êáôáâïëÝò ôïõ áðü ôïõò áñ÷áßïõò ÷ñüíïõò. ÓÞìåñá ïé åéêüíåò åêåßíåò äåí õðÜñ÷ïõí ðéá. ÐïëëÜ Üëëá èá ðÜøïõí íá õðÜñ÷ïõí. Åìåßò, äåí èÝëïõìå ðïëÝìïõò óôçí ðåñéï÷Þ ìáò, äåí èÝëïõìå åíôÜóåéò. ÈÝëïõìå áäåëöïóýíç êáé åéñÞíç. ÈÝëïõìå ç ÷þñá ìáò êáé ïé ó÷Ýóåéò ìáò íá ãßíïõí Ýíá üìïñöï ìïíôÝëï ðïõ èá äéáäïèåß óôç ÌÝóç ÁíáôïëÞ.
¼÷é ìüíï ìå ôç Óõñßá êáé ôï ÉñÜê, êáôáñãÞóáìå ôç âßæá êáé ìå ôçí Éïñäáíßá. Ìå ôï ÉñÜê, Èåïý èÝëïíôïò, èá êÜíïõìå áêüìç ðéï ðñïùèçìÝíá âÞìáôá ìåôÜ ôéò åêåß åêëïãÝò. ¼ôáí åß÷á ðÜåé óôç Ìïóïýëç, ðñþôïò ôïýñêïò õðïõñãüò åîùôåñéêþí ðïõ ðÞãáéíå óôçí ðüëç áõôÞ, ìå åß÷å õðïäå÷ôåß ï íïìÜñ÷çò Ìïóïýëçò êé åß÷áìå æÞóåé ðïëý óõãêéíçôéêÝò óôéãìÝò. Ç Ìïóïýëç, ç Áñìðßë, ôï Êéñêïýê ùò ðÝñá ôç Âáóüñá åßíáé ìÝñç üðïõ åîáêïëïõèïýìå íá ìïéñáæüìáóôå ìõñùäéÝò êáé ÷ñþìáôá. ¸íáò êÜôïéêïò ôçò Âáóüñáò èá ìðïñåß íá óçêùèåß Ýíá ðñùß êáé íá öôÜóåé ÷ùñßò êáìéÜ äõóêïëßá ùò ôçí Åíôßñíå [Áäñéáíïýðïëç]–óáò ôï åããõþìáé áõôü.
¹ ðÜëé, áðü ôçí ÕåìÝíç, ðïõ óÞìåñá èåùñåßôáé üôé åßíáé ìÝóá óå êñßóç, èá ìðïñåß íá îåêéíÜåé êÜðïéïò êáé íá Ýñ÷åôáé ìÝóù ÓáïõäéêÞò Áñáâßáò, Éïñäáíßáò êáé Óõñßáò. Ç ÕåìÝíç äåí åßíáé ãéá ìáò ÷þñá ìáêñéíÞ. ÎÝñïõìå ôá ôñáãïýäéá ôçò êáé ôçí éóôïñßá ôçò. Åßíáé Ýíáò ôüðïò üðïõ åß÷áí ðÜåé ïé ðñïðÜððïé ìáò Ýíá áéþíá ðñéí. Ï ðüíïò ôçò åßíáé äéêüò ìáò ðüíïò. Ðåßôå ìïõ ôþñá, åßíáé äõíáôüí íá êïéìÜôáé Þóõ÷ïò Ýíáò ôïýñêïò õðïõñãüò åîùôåñéêþí üôáí óôçí ÕåìÝíç ãßíïíôáé áõôÝò ïé óõãêñïýóåéò;
¼,ôé áéóèáíüìáóôå ãéá ôçí ÕåìÝíç, ôï áéóèáíüìáóôå êáé ãéá ôç Âïóíßá Åñæåãïâßíç. Ôï ßäéï áéóèáíüìáóôå ãéá ôá âÜèç ôçò êåíôñéêÞò Áóßáò. Äåí îå÷ùñßæïõìå ôá ìÝñç áõôÜ. ×ùñßò íá ìáò íïéÜæïõí ïé åèíïôéêÝò êáôáâïëÝò, èåùñïýìå ìÝóá óôá ðëáßóéá ôùí åíäéáöåñüíôùí ìáò êÜèå êïéíüôçôá ðïõ ‘Ý÷åé ìïéñáóôåß ìáæß ìáò ôçí ßäéá éóôïñßá’. Áõôü óçìáßíåé ç áñ÷Þ ôçò ‘óõììåôï÷éêüôçôáò’ ðïõ áíÝöåñá ðñïçãïõìÝíùò. Äåí óêïðåýïõìå íá äéáöåíôÝøïõìå ðÜíù óå êáíÝíá êáé äåí åðéôñÝðïõìå íá ìáò äéáöåíôåýåé êáíåßò. ¼ìùò, èá äþóïõìå âáñýôçôá êáé ðñïóï÷Þ þóôå ç ôÜîç ðïõ èá äçìéïõñãÞóïõìå íá åßíáé ìéá ôÜîç üðïõ üëïé èá ìåôÝ÷ïõí éóüôéìá, üëïé ôá óõìâÜëïõí. Êé åðéèõìïýìå ç ïéêïõìåíéêÞ ôÜîç íá õéïèåôÞóåé áõôÞ ôçí áñ÷Þ ôçò ‘óõììåôï÷éêüôçôáò’.
Ôñßôç áñ÷Þ. Åßìáóôå õðï÷ñåùìÝíïé íá åßìáóôå ‘óõíèåôéêïß’. Ïé ìïíïäéÜóôáôåò, ìïíü÷ñùìåò ôÜîåéò äåí Ý÷ïõí ðéèáíüôçôá åðéâßùóçò. ÅîÜëëïõ, áõôü ðïõ ëÝìå ôÜîç Ý÷åé íüçìá ìüíï áí óõíäõÜæåé ôá ÷ñþìáôá. Óêåöôåßôå Ýíá ðßíáêá ðïõ íá Ý÷åé æùãñáöéóôåß ìå Ýíá ìïíáäéêü ÷ñþìá. ¹ âÜëôå ìå ôï íïõ óáò ìéá áñ÷éôåêôïíéêÞ ðïõ íá âáóßæåôáé óå Ýíá áðáñÜëëá÷ôï ìïôßâï. ¸íá êéëßìé ðïõ íá ìçí ðåñéÝ÷åé óôï ó÷Ýäéï ôïõ ðáñÜ Ýíá ìïíáäéêü óôïé÷åßï. ÔÜîç èá ðåé äéáöïñåôéêüôçôåò. ÏôéäÞðïôå ìïíïäéÜóôáôï ìðïñåß ìåôÜ áðü ëßãï íá ãßíåé áéôßá óýãêñïõóçò.
Äéêüò ìáò óôü÷ïò åßíáé íá ãßíïõìå åêöñáóôÝò êé åêðñüóùðïé ìéáò öéëïóïöéêÞò áíôßëçøçò ðïõ óõíäõÜæåé äéáöïñåôéêÝò åìðåéñßåò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò, ðïõ ôéò âëÝðåé ùò ìéá óýíèåóç êáé íá áíôéêáôïðôñßóïõìå ôç öéëïóïöéêÞ áõôÞ áíôßëçøç óôïí ôïìÝá ôçò åîùôåñéêÞò ðïëéôéêÞò.
Ôçí åñ÷üìåíç åâäïìÜäá èá ðÜù óôçí Êñïáôßá. Èá ðñáãìáôïðïéÞóïõìå ôçí ôñéìåñÞ óõíÜíôçóç Ôïõñêßáò-Êñïáôßáò Âïóíßáò Åñæåãïâßíçò. Ôçí Üëëç ìÝñá èá ðÜù óôï ÂåëéãñÜäé, üðïõ èá ðñáãìáôïðïéÞóïõìå ôçí óõíÜíôçóç Ôïõñêßáò-Óåñâßáò-Âïóíßáò Åñæåãïâßíçò.
Ãéáôß ãíùñßæïõìå üôé áí èÝëïõìå íá åãêáèéäñõèåß ìéáò êáéíïýñéá ôÜîç óôá ÂáëêÜíéá, ðñÝðåé ðñþôá íá ìðïñÝóïõìå íá äçìéïõñãÞóïõìå ôéò ‘óõíèÝóåéò’. Íá õéïèåôÞóïõìå ìéá ðñïóÝããéóç ü÷é âáóéóìÝíç óôéò ðñïêáôáëÞøåéò, óôéò áíáìíÞóåéò ôùí ðüíùí ôïõ ðáñåëèüíôïò, áëëÜ ìéá ðñïóÝããéóç ðïõ íá êïéôÜåé ðñïò ôï ìÝëëïí, ðïõ íá äéáìïñöþíåé Ýíáí ïñßæïíôá êáé íá öÝñíåé êïíôÜ ôá äéáöïñåôéêÜ óôïé÷åßá.
ÔÝëïò, Ýíá Üëëï ìÜèçìá ðïõ ç ïéêïõìåíéêÞ ôÜîç ðñÝðåé íá ðÜñåé áðü ôïí áñ÷áßï ðïëéôéóìü, åßíáé ç õéïèÝôçóç áðü ôïí Üíèñùðï ìéáò ðñïóÝããéóçò ðïõ íá âáóßæåôáé óôçí éóüôçôá. ¼÷é óôéò äéáöïñÝò, ü÷é óôéò ðïëþóåéò êáé ôá éåñáñ÷éêÜ êáèåóôþôá, áëëÜ Ýíá ìÝëëïí üðïõ ï êáèÝíáò èá Ý÷åé ôçí áîßá ôïõ áðëÜ ãéáôß åßíáé Üíèñùðïò, êáé êáèÝíáò èá êáôåõèýíåé ôï ìÝëëïí ôïõ óôï ðëáßóéï ôçò áëëçëåðßäñáóçò ÷ùñßò ôç ÷ñÞóç ïðïéïõäÞðïôå ìÝóïõ éó÷ýïò. ÄçëáäÞ, Ý÷ïõìå ôçí áíÜãêç ìéáò óõììåôï÷éêÞò, óõíèåôéêÞò êáé âáóéóìÝíçò óôçí éóüôçôá äéåèíïýò ôÜîçò. Ôá óçìÜäéá ìéáò ôÝôïéáò ôÜîçò ìðïñïýìå íá ôá âñïýìå ìüíï óôá âÜèç ôçò éóôïñßáò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò. Åßíáé åõôõ÷Ýò ôï ãåãïíüò üôé æïýìå óå ìéá ÷þñá ðïõ åìðåñéÝ÷åé ôá êÜèå åßäïõò ðáñåëèüíôá ôçò éóôïñßáò ôçò áíèñùðüôçôáò. ¸÷ïõìå ìéá åêðëçêôéêÞ ðåßñá ðïõ âáóßæåôáé áðü ôïí åëëçíéêü ðïëéôéóìü ùò ôçí Ìåóïðïôáìßá, áðü ôïí éñáíéêü ðïëéôéóìü ùò ôéò åðéññïÝò áðü ôçí Áßãõðôï, áðü ôï ÷áñìÜíé ðïõ äçìéïýñãçóáí ïé ôåñÜóôéåò ìåôáêéíÞóåéò áðü ôéò Éíäßåò êáé ôçí Êßíá, áðü ôçí ãåìÜôç äõíáìéóìü åìðåéñßá ðïõ Ý÷åé Ýñèåé áðü ôá ÂáëêÜíéá êáé ôïí Êáýêáóï. Åêåßíï ðïõ ôþñá ìáò ÷ñåéÜæåôáé êé åêåßíï ðïõ èá áðïôåëÝóåé Üîïíá ãéá ôçí åîùôåñéêÞ ìáò ðïëéôéêÞ, ðïõ èá áðïôåëÝóåé êßíçôñï, êáôáöýãéï êáé åóôéáêü óçìåßï ôçò øõ÷ïëïãßáò ìáò åßíáé ôï áßóèçìá ôçò áõôïðåðïßèçóçò.
Ðéóôåýïõìå óôçí éóôïñßá áðü ôçí ïðïßá ðñïåñ÷üìáóôå. Åìåßò, åíóôåñíéæüìáóôå ôçí ôáõôüôçôÜ ìáò ìå üëá ôá óôïé÷åßá ðïõ ôçí áðïôåëïýí êáé ôçí äïìïýí.
Êáé Ý÷ïõìå åìðéóôïóýíç óå åóÜò, åìðéóôåõüìáóôå ôç äõíáôÞ öùíÞ ðïõ öôÜíåé ùò åìÜò áðü üëá ôá ìÝñç ôçò ÁíáôïëÞò, üëá ôá ìÝñç ôçò ÂáëêáíéêÞò, ôç öùíÞ ðïõ Ýñ÷åôáé áðü ôá âÜèç ôçò éóôïñßáò, ôç öùíÞ ðïõ èá óôåßëåé ìÞíõìá óôçí áíèñùðüôçôá, ãéáôß åìðéóôåõüìáóôå ôï ÌÜñíôéí. Ðéóôåýïõìå óôï ðíåýìá êáé ôçí øõ÷Þ ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí. Ôï ðíåýìá ôïõ ÌÜñíôéí åßíáé ôï ðíåýìá ôçò Ôïõñêßáò. Êáé ôï ðíåýìá ôçò Ôïõñêßáò áðïôåëåß ôï êÝíôñï ôïõ ðíåýìáôïò ðïõ óôï ìÝëëïí ðñüêåéôáé íá áðïôåëÝóåé ôï ðíåýìá ôçò ðáãêüóìéáò ôÜîçò. Ìå ôçí áõôïðåðïßèçóç áõôÞ ðñïóðáèïýìå íá áóêÞóïõìå ôçí åîùôåñéêÞ ìáò ðïëéôéêÞ. Óáò åõ÷áñéóôïýìå îáíÜ ðïõ ìáò öéëïîåíÞóáôå. Êáé èÝëù ãéá Üëëç ìéá öïñÜ íá ôïíßóù üôé üëï ôï Õðïõñãåßï Åîùôåñéêþí èá åîáêïëïõèÞóåé íá åßíáé óôçí õðçñåóßá üëùí ôùí Ìáñíôéíëßäùí êáé ïëüêëçñïõ ôïõ ëáïý ìáò».
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Óýíäåóìïé ïìéëéþí Ôïýñêïõ ÕÐÅÎ Íôáâïýôïãëïõ
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Óçì. ôï Üñèñï ðåñéãñÜöåé ôçí ôïõñêéêÞ äéðëùìáôßá ôùí Ãêéïýë, Åñôïãáí, Íôáâïýôïãëïõ.
Turkey's Transformers
The AKP Sees Big
Published on Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com)
November/December 2009
Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey
MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, a Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, was U.S. Ambassador to Turkey in 1989-91. HENRI J. BARKEY is a nonresident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University.
In recent years, Turkey has earned kudos from the international community for its economic dynamism, its energetic and confident diplomacy, and its attempts to confront some of its deepest foreign policy problems, such as in northern Iraq and Cyprus. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that Turkey is one of seven rising powers with which the United States will actively collaborate to resolve global problems. But Turkey has not yet become the global, or even regional, player that its government declares it to be. These days, as always, daunting domestic issues are bedeviling Turkey's progress. Increasingly polarized views about the leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party (known as the AKP) have undermined the government's ability to spearhead profound political change. Even some of the AKP's traditional supporters have begun to question whether the party will follow through on its goals, including that of getting Turkey to join the European Union.
There are two camps. The first, and largest, group, which includes center-right politicians, liberals, and the religious, fully supports the AKP. It sees the party as fighting the dead hand of the past to free Turkish politics from subjugation by the military and the judiciary. To most AKP supporters, the party is genuinely committed to instituting a much greater measure of democracy and tackling Turkey's most difficult issue: recognizing the democratic rights of its large Kurdish population. According to them, the party is serious about meeting the difficult requirements for EU accession and about launching fresh and constructive diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. And they interpret the widespread claims that the AKP wants to establish a religious state as both fanciful and retrograde.
The other camp is primarily composed of staunch secularists, the military and civilian bureaucratic elites, and various types of nationalists. And they, remembering the AKP's roots in Islamist movements, claim that the party is increasingly contemptuous of its political opposition, authoritarian, interested in destroying the opposition press, and determined to weaken the Turkish military despite the country's unstable neighborhood. These skeptics argue that the party cares mostly about winning the next election and that the AKP's commitment to the EU's membership requirements is largely a pretext for passing measures that eviscerate the military. To them, as well as to many Turkey watchers, the AKP is making the country more religious, partly in order to consolidate its position in the Muslim world even at the expense of its traditional alliance with the West. The AKP, they charge, has consistently overlooked the appalling behavior of Muslim governments toward their own people even as they have ferociously pointed out other countries' mistreatment of Muslims.
PARTY TIME
Much can be cited to support either view, but the reality of Turkish politics is more complex. The basic question is whether the AKP, by far the country's dominant party, both in terms of power and in terms of popularity, can avoid being held back by its Islamist past and the culturally conservative inclinations of its core constituents.
The AKP's success in achieving rapid economic growth since its first electoral victory, in 2002, won the party vast political support and propelled it to a spectacular reelection victory in July 2007. It was the first time since 1954 that an incumbent in Turkey had increased its share of the vote, and the AKP did so by an astonishing 14 percentage points. The global economic crisis, however, stopped growth in its tracks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan downplayed the crisis' impact at first and so was slow in stimulating the economy. By the first quarter of 2009, GDP had declined by more than 14 percent since the first quarter of 2008 and unemployment had risen to 15 percent. It now seems that Turkey has survived the worst, but the bloom is off the rose of the Turkish "miracle." The AKP has grown cautious about enacting controversial political reforms, most important, passing a badly needed constitution to replace the one imposed by the military in 1982. Real change is on the chopping block.
Turkey has always been a conservative country, and the vast majority of Turks have traditionally voted for center-right parties. The rise of the AKP represents a struggle between the military and civilian bureaucratic elites -- which have controlled the state and the economy since independence -- and the new, largely provincial and pious middle class. This new bourgeoisie took advantage of the market reforms of the 1980s to build an export-driven industrial base in the backwater of Anatolia. As its wealth grew, it began to challenge the economic elites traditionally favored by the state and its military backers.
And in 2002, the new middle class helped elect the AKP, a party whose piety and relative indifference to the legacy of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish republic, challenged the ideological underpinnings of the Turkish state: secularism, nationalism, and centralization. Since then, the AKP has allowed for more public manifestations of Islam and expressed its attachment to hot-button issues, for example, by supporting the right of women to wear headscarves in universities, which is currently prohibited. More headscarves can be seen today than ten or 20 years ago, and their visibility disturbs the secularist elites. To them, it indicates that the AKP government is indeed using its influence, locally and nationally, to facilitate religious practices. The AKP's attempt to lift the headscarf ban landed the party leadership in front of the Constitutional Court in 2008, when the state prosecutor attempted to have the party banned for challenging the country's secular constitution. The AKP narrowly won that fight, but secularists are convinced that the party is unlikely to mend its ways, and rumors occasionally circulate about another court case being brought to try to finish off the party.
Since coming to power, the AKP has managed to reduce the political influence of the generals. It has pushed through legal changes that limit the military's power over politics. Erdogan brushed aside the military's effort to prevent Abdullah Gül, a leading AKP member, from assuming the presidency in 2007. Erdogan brought civilians to the National Security Council, which had long been dominated by the military. In July, he spearheaded legislation that subjects active-duty soldiers to review by civilian courts for crimes not related to their military duties. The days of military coups are likely over, partly because the country has become far more diverse and complex and power is now more diffuse, and partly because of these AKP-led reforms.
To be sure, much of this development is also the officers' doing. They have intervened four times since 1960 to depose civilian governments but have resisted change themselves. On civil-military relations and the questions of religion and Kurdish identity, the military has refused to countenance any vision other than its own. It has been wedded to a very strict definition of secularism, for example, and until very recently, it completely rejected even the Kurds' most basic demands for cultural rights. A recent investigation into an extensive secret effort by some officers and civilian leaders to destroy the AKP has been a revelation to many Turks. Although the handling of this so-called Ergenekon inquiry has been criticized, it has already landed many officers, academics, and others in jail. Whatever facts are eventually unearthed, the investigation has already tarnished the military's reputation.
The AKP will live or die by its policies toward the Kurds. So far, it has managed, courageously and skillfully, to modify Turkey's long-standing policy toward the Iraqi Kurds. For years, the Turkish government had treated the quasi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government as a danger to Iraq's unity and an instigator of Kurdish separatism in Turkey. But the AKP has now engaged the Kurdistan Regional Government in an attempt to win the confidence and cooperation of the Iraqi Kurds on a slew of issues, ranging from security to economic exchanges.
On the harder question of how to treat the estimated 12-14 million Kurds who live in Turkey, however, the AKP government has promised much and done little. This issue is now the biggest drag on Turkey's political life, undermining the political and administrative reforms, constraining the country's foreign policy choices, and requiring huge military expenditures to combat the decades-old insurgency led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Turkish Kurdish rebel group known as the PKK. After years of promising that it would bring a fresh approach to the Kurdish question, the AKP government sparked a charged debate this summer by calling for a "democratic opening" (sometimes referred to as a "Kurdish opening") and launching a series of conversations with Kurdish and Turkish political and civil-society groups. The perspectives of both Turkey's Kurds and influential elements in the AKP appear to be changing, but nothing can be taken for granted. The country is too divided. Many Turkish Kurds still take their cue from Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, whom the Turkish military, most Turks, and most Western governments consider to be a terrorist. Although Erdogan has promised to unveil a new comprehensive policy, as of this writing, no specifics had yet been revealed. Erdogan will probably propose incremental changes allowing the Kurds to express their cultural identity more freely, such as easing the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. But this is unlikely to satisfy many Kurds; real reform will require a long-drawn-out process. The most difficult short-term issue is whether to consider granting amnesty to PKK fighters, particularly the group's leaders. How the government handles this question may determine the scope of change possible on the broader Kurdish question. It remains to be seen whether Erdogan has the stamina and the political fortitude to carry out measures to end the PKK's 25-year insurrection that will enable most of the PKK fighters to return home and release the many prisoners associated with the organization without necessarily legitimizing its stance. Nevertheless, Erdogan has opened the door to truly radical change, and this will continue to generate fractious debate and uncertain consequences for Turkey's political stability.
ANKARA'S AMBITIONS
Turkey has never before had a foreign minister with the drive, vigor, and vision of Ahmet Davutoglu. Even before he acceded to the post, last May, Davutoglu had been promoting a forceful vision of Turkey's role in the world. He has gathered an A list of senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has set forth an ambitious policy advocating "zero problems with neighbors," with the hope of settling long-standing differences through a high degree of engagement with the leaders and the peoples of Turkey's neighbors. The aim is to turn Turkey from a "central," or regional, power into a global one in the new international order. Implicitly, this is also a project to demonstrate to the world that a Muslim country can be a constructive democratic member of the international community.
More explicit is Turkey's ambition to better deal with the Muslim nations of the Middle East and beyond, whether friends or foes of the West. The AKP government has been enormously active -- but with mixed results, despite the acclaim it showers on itself. It has been most successful in expanding its trade and investment abroad. It has been far less so in making progress toward satisfying the EU's accession requirements and has failed to come to grips with the question of whether the Ottomans' treatment of the Armenians a century ago constituted a genocide. It is still unclear whether the AKP has the will to break much domestic crockery on matters of foreign policy.
Its major breakthrough so far has been to end Turkey's political isolation of Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara no longer pretends the region does not exist and that it need only deal with Baghdad. This 180-degree turn was in part prompted by the recent U.S. decision to begin withdrawing its troops from Iraq. Turkey is trying to anticipate the evolution of Iraqi politics in the absence of U.S. combat units in the country. The AKP government wants Iraq to remain whole, but it realizes that if tensions in Iraq devolve into all-out violence and the country breaks apart, Turkey would be better off with a friendly partner in Iraq's energy-rich north. The AKP government managed to convince the Turkish military that an opening to the Iraqi Kurds would not exacerbate existing difficulties with the Turkish Kurds and would increase Turkey's influence in Iraq. The Turks have come to understand that for the Iraqi Kurds, having better relations with Ankara is a strategic choice: Turkey is their door to the West. Yet the Turkish authorities and their Kurdish counterparts in Iraq still have to sort out some explosive issues, such as the contested status of the oil-rich area of Kirkuk. The Turks believe that it is essential to keep the city's control out of the hands of the Kurdistan Regional Government, both to help prevent the breakup of Iraq and to limit the aspirations of the Iraqi Kurds.
The Turkish government also made an impressive move earlier this year when it reversed its long-standing policy of isolating Armenia. In April, despite an apparent promise to U.S. President Barack Obama, Erdogan delayed opening Turkey's border with Armenia after nationalists in Turkey and Azerbaijan protested. But in another surprising about-face, in August, Turkey approved the text of two protocols establishing diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries and an agreement on opening the Turkish-Armenian border. This is a major step forward for diplomacy in the Caucasus. Turkey also hopes that the initiative will help its case with the EU and reduce the pressure on the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution on the Armenian genocide next year. It remains to be seen whether the AKP will stand up to opposition. Erdogan has promised the government of Azerbaijan that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia until Armenia relinquishes control over the regions it holds surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, a landlocked province in Azerbaijan. Erdogan seems to be betting that a diplomatic solution to this issue will somehow be found this fall. But it is quite possible that Erdogan's deals with Armenia will fail to pass in the Turkish parliament because of Azeri and Turkish nationalist pressures.
SORES ON THE SIDE
The issue of Cyprus continues to be the main hurdle to Turkey's accession to the EU. Despite Turkey's renewing negotiations with the two Cypriot parties for the umpteenth time, there is no great hope for settling the island's contested status. The Turkish government will also have to decide soon whether it will open its ports to shipping from the Greek part of Cyprus, as it has pledged it will do to under its agreement with the EU. The European Commission is expected to release a report on Turkey's progress in November, and that could set the stage for recriminations. The fact that in 2003 the Turkish government displayed the courage, at least in domestic political terms, to drop its traditional obstructionist stance in favor of a pro-European one seems to hold little water today. The EU failed to reward the Cypriot Turks for the dramatic change in their patron's policy by providing them with trade opportunities, thereby undermining the AKP government's diplomacy and its credibility on this issue at home. Until its recent Armenian initiative, the Turkish government seemed to have grown mostly inert when it came to enhancing its standing with the EU.
Turkey did score a big win last July by signing an agreement with six other countries to build a pipeline that would bring natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia through Turkey to Europe. Whether the Nabucco pipeline will ever be built is uncertain: the costs of construction and whether enough gas will be available to fill the pipeline are issues that still need to be worked out, and the Turkish government will have to maneuver delicately with both the West and Russia. But the pipeline project has already raised Turkey's importance in the eyes of the EU's energy-hungry countries.
Several Turkish foreign policy initiatives have given Western governments pause. One is Turkey's closer relationship with Russia, a rapprochement driven by a vast expansion in Turkish-Russian trade. During a highly publicized visit to Ankara by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin soon after the Nabucco pipeline deal was signed this summer, the Turkish and Russian governments struck a potentially conflicting agreement to develop the South Stream pipeline to bring Russian gas to Europe through Turkish territory. As soon as the Georgian crisis hit in August 2008, Erdogan jumped on a plane and tried to broker negotiations between Moscow and Tbilisi. His intervention, which was notably uncoordinated with Turkey's allies in NATO and the EU, yielded little more than Turkey's call for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact -- an idea that pleased the Russians but appeared to vex Western governments. Whatever suspicions of Russia Turkey may continue to harbor, Erdogan has significantly improved the tenor of the two states' relations. He is also in no hurry to see Georgia's NATO aspirations fulfilled.
Perhaps the AKP government's most ballyhooed effort has been its diplomatic activism in the Middle East. The Turkish government took advantage of the vacuum created by President George W. Bush's unpopular policies in the region to participate in indirect talks between Israel and Syria. It injected itself into the negotiations following the crises in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009. French President Nicolas Sarkozy invited Davutoglu, then a foreign policy adviser, to join the French delegation that traveled to Damascus to discuss the Gaza crisis. Ankara has taken partial credit for the agreement governing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq; it reportedly deserves some for hosting talks between U.S. representatives and Iraqi insurgents earlier this year. And Foreign Minister Davutoglu jumped at the opportunity to mediate Iraq and Syria's recent dispute (Iraq claims that bombings in Baghdad's Green Zone in August were carried out by insurgents from Syria).
Supporters of the AKP's new foreign policy argue that Turkey is finally finding its voice in international politics, but this may be weakening its ties with the United States and the EU. These traditional partners are now just one pillar in Turkey's new so-called multidimensional foreign policy. On the other hand, Turkey's diplomatic efforts in its immediate neighborhood often appear to be influence-seeking for its own sake. Aside from its successful brokering in Iraq and its ability to secure a seat in the UN Security Council this year, Ankara's diplomatic efforts have yielded little, especially in the Middle East. Turkey has become adept at transmitting messages, but such symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones.
Some of the AKP's foreign policy initiatives have also been clumsy and irksome. At the Davos meeting early this year, Erdogan reprimanded Israeli President Shimon Peres, who has spent much effort advocating Turkey's cause with Europe, for Israel's recent military campaign in Gaza. Yet Erdogan apparently has had no problem welcoming Sudan's president, who faces an indictment for war crimes, to Ankara several times since early 2008. When asked whether the extensive killings in Darfur constitute genocide, the Turkish government invokes a cliché about the value of closed-door diplomatic undertakings on sensitive matters. Erdogan was one of only a few leaders, along with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and representatives of Hamas and Hezbollah, to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on winning Iran's contested presidential election in the spring.
And yet, somewhat incredibly, Erdogan has criticized the Chinese government for committing "almost a genocide" in China's western province of Xinjiang. However reprehensible the Chinese authorities' treatment of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, the fact is that Turkey, which has been fighting off charges that it committed genocide of its own, against the Armenians, should be careful when it uses such a loaded word. In one of its biggest blunders, the AKP government opposed the appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as chief of NATO because he had defended, on free-speech grounds, a Danish newspaper's decision to publish cartoons that offended Muslims. Turkey thereby alienated many Europeans by seeming to favor Muslim sensibilities over liberal democratic values. The Turkish government eventually settled the matter by accepting the appointment of a Turk to the new post of deputy secretary-general for NATO, but the incident so irked French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner that he publicly renounced his support for Turkey's accession to the EU.
None of this is to indict Erdogan or the AKP; it is simply to explain why Turkey's strongest allies view its considerable progress with increasing unease. Turkey used to punch below its weight; now, it seems to be punching above it. This would be an unmitigated advantage for Turkey if the AKP were not so quick to call every one of its foreign policy initiatives a resounding success. Turkish foreign policy officials have even said that by suggesting China had committed genocide against the Uighurs, Erdogan actually increased Ankara's influence with Beijing. The Turkish government has also claimed credit for getting the Syrians out of Lebanon (angering the Americans and the French, who parented a UN Security Council resolution arguing for their exit) and for getting Hamas to accept a cease-fire with Israel (upsetting the Egyptians, who were the primary brokers). The Turkish government now runs the risk of believing its own grandiose rhetoric and of dangerously overreaching. Some also fear that Turkey's leaders might stop being able to divorce the country's foreign policy aims from their own cultural (and perhaps religious) sensibilities. Erdogan and Davutoglu sometimes appear to be conflicted: Do they hope to participate in global politics as practitioners of realpolitik or as representatives of an Islamic culture?
ASPIRING TO GRANDEUR
Erdogan dominates Turkish politics today not only because he is a dynamic leader but also because, as the head of a majority party, he can usually run roughshod over the opposition (the military aside). It helps him that the Turkish opposition is incompetent and that Turkish political parties are often essentially fiefdoms, with individual leaders deciding every issue and appointing every party representative in parliament. But even Erdogan must deliver. Many of the policy changes he has spearheaded will endure, but fractious politics could endanger his legacy. If somehow the AKP lost the next election, for instance, progress on the question of the Turkish Kurds' rights would likely be set back for a long time.
Turkey has become a far more complex country than it once was. Washington should not assume it knows it. The endless rhetoric about the "strategic" closeness between Turkey and the United States cannot substitute for concrete policy. Despite Turkey's Armenian initiative, tensions over the Armenian genocide issue could escalate next year. Ankara's position is getting increasingly difficult to maintain, particularly with a U.S. president who has said repeatedly that he thinks the killings of 1915 amounted to genocide. And as Turkey's economy has become more dynamic over the past decade, the AKP has walked in lockstep with the West less and less. Erdogan is his own man.
The increasing independence of Turkey's foreign policy is reinforced by the population's nativism. A recent poll by a Turkish university showed the Turks' deep mistrust and dislike of foreigners, especially their country's closest allies, the Americans and the Europeans. By very large majorities, they also indicated that they would not want to have atheists, Jews, or Christians for neighbors. A poll on transatlantic trends by the German Marshall Fund released in September suggests that despite their high regard for Obama, the Turks have a more negative image of the United States than do Europeans. Only 22 percent of the Turks polled said that they were positively disposed toward the United States, compared with 74 percent of the western European respondents. And the Turkish government is not doing much to change its citizens' views.
Turkey has problems with the EU, too, partly because of the distance between the EU's and Turkey's conceptions of liberal democracy. This gap might narrow over time, but that will require conviction and effort on the part of Turkey's leaders. Both the government and the opposition have failed to educate themselves or the public about the rule of law. Recent draconian measures against the press are one indication of the country's underlying illiberal penchant. Conversely, Washington and most other democratic governments have always had a tendency to ignore the long-term issues and focus on the immediate. Turkey's relations with Armenia may be the flavor of the day because Obama needs to manage the Armenian American constituency. Focusing on that without also acknowledging the AKP's Kurdish opening -- which offers a chance to transform Turkey in major ways -- would be a terrible mistake. The United States should help the AKP's efforts along by staying out of the reform debate in Turkey and encouraging the demobilization of the PKK in northern Iraq.
The AKP has a unique opportunity to change Turkish society, change the country's constitution and its archaic political system, and make peace with both its neighbors and its own people. It seems ready to seize it. But it needs assistance. The West should not act as if Turkey is moving in the right direction in all respects, but it can help keep Turkey on track to becoming a tolerant liberal democracy. Turkey's leaders, for their part, must not think that they can expand the country's influence without first having a firm footing in the West. Without a successful reform effort, Turkey will continue to be just an aspirant to grandeur.
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Source URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65464/morton-abramowitz-and-henri-j-barkey/turkeys-transformers
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Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu by Guillaume Perrier in Ankara; date not given: "Ankara Wants To Be Pole of 'Regional Stability'"
Paris LeMonde.fr in French 07 Nov 09
Ankara -- On Friday 6 November Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu began a visit to France, the first since he entered office, in May 2009. He is due to be received Friday by his counterpart, Bernard Kouchner, at a time when bilateral relations are hampered by France's opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. The disagreement on Europe will be on the agenda for the talks. The two countries will also discuss recent developments in the Middle East and Afghanistan, in which areas Mr Davutoglu has adopted numerous initiatives in recent months. Having been the architect of Turkey's ambitious foreign policy -- described as "neo-Ottoman" -- during his term as advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and then as minister, he has implemented in his theory of "zero problems with neighbors" and granted Turkey a new regional dimension.
[Perrier] What kind of relations can Turkey maintain with France, the leading opponent of its accession to the EU?
[Davutoglu] Ever since the 16th century we have had strong relations with France. No other nation in Europe can understand Turkey's importance as well as it can. Even now France and Turkey have influence in the same regions. Genuine cooperation could impart a new boost in the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This would benefit the EU, too. This is why there he is no foundation, either historical or political, for all the misunderstandings and misconceptions sometimes expressed in France.
[Perrier] Do you hope to modify Paris' viewpoint concerning membership?
[Davutoglu] The EU's most important value is observance of commitments: pacta sunt servanda. It is thanks to this principle that the EU has become a pole of attraction. If it loses it, it loses its entire legitimacy. If you remove this cornerstone of the European edifice, because of prejudices about Turkey, then you will weaken the EU more than Turkey. We expect no favors, no special treatment. Only that commitments be honored. Without a strong political will on our government's part, we could have halted the process, heeding the arguments of some of our European friends, who claimed that Turkey is not European or that it is not destined to become a member... Nobody can impose on us an options such as the special partnership. This kind of alternative has never been put forward for any other candidate country.
[Perrier] The Cyprus question remains the main obstacle. Will you open up your ports and airports to Greek Cypriots, as Brussels demands?
[Davutoglu] No, that would not be right. In 2004 the Greek Cypriots rejected Kopi Annan's peace plan, supported by the EU. As a reward, they secured this rejection of EU membership! As for the Turkish Cypriots, they voted for peace and accepted the plan. But they were punished by isolation. The European promise to allow Turkish Cypriots direct trade has not been honored. Unlike Armenia, with Cyprus we see no resolve to progress toward peace. For the past year the island's two leaders have met 50 times. Mehmet Ali Tat (the Turkish Cypriot president) is pressing for a peace agreement by April. On the other side (the Greek Cypriots) do not want to accelerate the process. You cannot make peace on your own: you need a strong partner. In 2004 they missed a historic opportunity by rejecting the Annan plan. We hope that they will not waste a second opportunity
[Perrier] Turkish diplomacy has been very active on numerous fronts in recent months. What is the objective?
[Davutoglu] On 1 October I met in Brussels with Jose Manuel Barroso and Olli Rehn (European Commission president and enlargement commissioner.) I said that October would be "the month of peace" for Turkish diplomacy. We have launched several initiatives -- in the Balkans between Serbia and Bosnia; in the Caucasus, by signing an agreement with Armenia; in Syria and in Iraq, where a few days ago I met with Masud Barzani, president of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq; and so forth. All this pursues one single objective: peace. What we want is to create a zone of stability and prosperity in the region. We want to eliminate all tensions between ourselves and our neighbors, but also among our neighbors themselves. Hence our mediation between Syria and Israel, and between Syria and Iraq. With chaos in Iraq or elsewhere, Turkey cannot be a safe and stable country.
[Perrier] Does Turkey still enjoy Israel's confidence to act as mediator with Syria, following the recent Turkish-Israeli tensions?
[Davutoglu] I am sure of it. They are very well aware how honestly were performed our mediation mission last year. An alliance with a country does not rule out criticizing it when it makes a mistake. Yes, we did criticize Israel for the bombardments of Gaza. We will similarly criticize any country that commits such an attack. This does not mean that we are changing our objective in the region.
[Perrier] Is Turkey not changing its diplomatic axis, turning its back on the West and turning more to the East?
[Davutoglu] No. Turkish foreign policy is built on certain pillars -- relations with NATO and our EU candidacy. These are Turkey's strongest international ties. But at the same time Turkey is a country with a multidimensional geography. Is it wrong to improve relations with your neighbors? We are normalizing our relations with Syria -- with which we were on the verge of war 10 years ago -- as we are with Armenia.. Why are we not criticized for looking to the East, in connection with Armenia? And yet it is further to the east than Syria. Some Westerners still have the view that if we move closer to a Christian country, it is a good thing, but that if we move closer to a Muslim country, it is a diplomatic change of course... No! Everyone can live in peace, side by side. These efforts are compatible with European values, with the EU's experience. Peace, cultural coexistence, pluralism, stability, and so forth. These are our common values with the Europeans.
------------------------------
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU, Turkish foreign policy vision
O AHMET DAVUTOĞLU Ýãéíå ìüëéò ðñï÷èÝò Õðïõñãüò Åîùôåñéêþí. Óå ëßãåò åâäïìÜäåò, áð' üôé ãíùñßæù êõêëïöïñåß óôá åëëçíéêÜ ôï âéâëßï ôïõ Óôñáôçãéêü âÜèïò (Åêäüóåéò Ðïéüôçôá). Åäþ ðáñáèÝôù ðñüóöáôï åíäéáöÝñïí êåßìåíï. ÐïëëÜ áëëÜæïõí óôïí ðåñßãõñü ìáò êáé êõñßùò ç Ôïõñêßá. Åìåßò åäþ âñéóêüìáóôå óôïí êáôÞöïñï ðïõ ìáò Ýèåóáí êÜðïéïé ðïõ Ýðåéóáí ôçí åëëçíéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ çãåóßá üôé ïé äéáêñáôéêÝò äéåíÝîåéò åðéëýïíôáé ìå æåéìðÝêéêá êáé êïõìðáñéÝò. Äåí Ý÷åé êáé ðïëëÞ óçìáóßá ãéáôß ï êáèåßò ðáèáßíåé üôé ôïõ áîßæåé. ÅðåéäÞ ï êüóìïò ðÜåé êáé Ýñ÷åôáé êáé ï ôñï÷üò ãõñßæåé åìåßò èá ðñÝðåé íá åôïéìáæüìáóôå ãéá ôçí åðüìåíç öÜóç, üôáí èá ðåñÜóåé ç êáôáéãßäá.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision:
An Assessment of 2007*
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU**
* Th is essay is based on the transcript of a CNN Turk program
with Prof. Davutoğlu on January 2, 2008.
** Professor of International Relations, Ambassador and Chief
Advisor to Turkish PM
I
f a map of the complex web of global relationsduring the Cold War had been
drawn, Turkey would have been considered
a frontier country. As part of the Western
block, it was a means of control in the South
among the Western powers extending to the
East and at the edge of the West. It was institutionally
in the West, and was considered
the most important country in NATO; it still
preserves this position. Aft er the end of Cold
War in the early 1990s, a new notion of Turkey
emerged as a bridge country. As many new
problems emerged in the post-Cold War era,
among them the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and
the crises in the Balkans, Turkey’s main objective
became the protection of its own stability.
Turkey maintained its stability amid the chaos
that engulfed many of its near neighbors, and
the international community began to look to
Turkey as an island of stability and a bridge
country between east and west.
Today, in the new era marked by the
aft ermath of September 11
th, an accurateredefi nition of Turkey’s position is
urgently needed. Turkey’s new position
has both an ideational and a geographical
basis. In terms of geography, Turkey
occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast
landmass, it may be defi ned as a central country with multiple regional identities
that cannot be reduced to one unifi ed character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and
Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it
with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability
of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an
area of infl uence in its immediate environs.
Th ere are continental countries such as the United States and Australia. Countries
in this category, which are continents themselves in some cases, are located
away from Afro-Eurasian heartland. One may include even Europe, India and
China in this category. In territorial terms, they are geographically big enough
so that they are not defi ned by reference to an external geographical region. Th ey
are self-suffi cient in many respects and have developed distinct cultures of their
own. Another cluster of countries could be considered island countries such as
Japan and the United Kingdom. Situated at the edges of a continent, they maintain
special relations with the continental powers. Peripheral countries constitute
a distinct category in that they belong to a region and could be defi ned by the
characteristics of that region.
Among all these classifi cations, Turkey holds a special position. Turkey’s geography
gives it a specifi c central country status, which diff ers from other central
countries. For example, Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is
far from Asia and Africa. Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe
and Asia, which is far from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far
from Europe and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal
place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close
to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal
geographic location can not defi ne itself in a defensive manner. It should be
seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier
country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim
world or the West.
Turkey’s diverse regional
composition lends it the
capability of maneuvering in
several regions simultaneously
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
79
Just as geography, history, too, may
come to constitute a country as a central
country. Some countries play the central
country role in their region as a refl ection of their cultural and historical heritage.
For instance, Russia has a peculiar position of being a center of attraction because
of its historical role. Germany has played such a role since the Roman-Germanic
Empire. Turkey historically has been one of such centers of attraction. It was for
this reason that when Turkey embarked on a successful nation-building process
in the aft ermath of the Ottoman Empire, it gained population dynamism through
immigration from neighboring regions. Th e eff ects of having diverse Caucasian,
Balkan, Middle Eastern, Iraqi Turcoman and Anatolian elements, even in small
groups, are seen in everyday life in today’s Turkey, where diverse cultural elements
meet under the umbrella of the Turkish state. Turkey’s geography harmonizes
these elements. Turkey occupies a center of attraction in its region; its cultural
capital, Istanbul, spans two continents and is at once a Middle Eastern, Black Sea
and a Mediterranean city. In terms of its area of infl uence, Turkey is a Middle
Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and
Black Sea country. Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral
country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security
and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should
guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive
role to provide order, stability and security in its environs.
Principles of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy
Since the year 2002, Turkey has begun to structure its policies on the basis of
this new vision, keeping in mind well-defi ned targets, and looking to benefi t from
its geographical position and historical assets. Five principles of Turkey’s foreign
policy making process need to be mentioned here. First, if there is not a balance
between security and democracy in a country, it may not have a chance to establish
an area of infl uence in its environs. Th e legitimacy of any political regime
comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens; this security should not
be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country. Administrations
that substantially restrict liberties in order to provide security are or soon become
authoritarian regimes. Since 2002, Turkey has maintained a position of promoting
civil liberties without undermining security. Th is is an ambitious yet worthy
aim, particularly in the post-September 11 environment, under the threat of terrorism,
in which the general tendency has been to restrict liberties for the sake of
Turkey’s geography gives it a
specifi c central country status
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
80
security. Turkey has protected civil liberties under all conditions, despite a serious
challenge to it in 2007. Th e challenge was to carry out the struggle against terror
without narrowing the sphere of liberties. Turkey successfully overcame this challenge.
In the fall of 2007, the Turkish military pursued a military operation against
terrorist formations in Iraq for several weeks, with no negative impact on liberties
in İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, or Van. Normal life continues, even while
Turkey wages a war against terror. Th is successful balance is a matter of political
culture. Turkish authorities did not declare state of emergency, elections were not
postponed, and the election results did not infl uence the process in a negative way.
Th ese results support the notion that Turkey’s most important soft power is its
democracy. Th e election resulted in a parliament that fostered the struggle against
terror. Despite concerns in early 2007, this experience demonstrated that the balance
between democracy and security is settled in Turkey.
Second, a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors” has been successfully
implemented for the past four years. Turkey’s relations with its neighbors
now follow the right track in comparison to previous years. Th e most striking
examples of Turkey’s success in the region are its relations with Syria and Georgia.
Th ere is an intense economic interdependence with these countries. In contrast
to that of 5-10 years ago, Turkey’s level of relations with Syria today stands as a
model of progress for the rest of the region. It is the same with Georgia. Developments
such as the use of Batum airport as a domestic airport, and the growth of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project, which were furthered without creating any
fear of imperial expansion, are exemplary. Th e economies of Syria and Turkey are
now integrated as a result of a free trade agreement. In addition, aft er Bulgaria’s
entry into the EU, Turkey’s relations with this country further improved in a striking
way. Turkish-Iranian relations did not face diffi culties during this sensitive
period, and the Solana-Larijani talk in Turkey created a meaningful channel for
discussion of the nuclear issue. All of these achievements indicate that Turkey has
developed a substantial trust in its relations with its neighbors.
Th e Iraqi challenge in 2007 sparked fears that the crisis would have a negative
impact on Turkey’s relations with the rest of its neighbors. Turkey has so far
been successful in tackling Iraq-related risks. Th e PKK had aimed to create a wave
of terror in order to bring Turkey face to face with Kurdish groups in Northern
Iraq, and to instigate confl ict between Turkey and the Iraqi central administration,
the Arab world, and if possible with the whole Middle East and the United
States. If Turkey had not responded with fi ne-tuned diplomacy and correct tim
Turkey’sForeign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
81
ing, a crisis with the Iraqi government
would surely have ensued. Instead, Turkey’s
operations against the PKK continued
for more than a month and the
Iraqi government responded reasonably
with an understanding that the PKK is a
common enemy. Th is outcome demonstrates
how two neighboring countries
can cooperate against a common threat.
Th e third principle is to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond.
Turkey’s regional impact extends to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Turkey became active in the Balkans, in particular, due to
the Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina crises. Providing infrastructure for this active
policy were Turkey’s relations with NATO, the European Union, and the West
in general. Turkey also enjoys close relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia in the
Caucasus. To date, however, there have been only limited possibilities for Turkey
to extend its infl uence to the Middle East. Th e PKK factor, as well as the existence
of mutual negative images on both sides, have been a stumbling block in the form
of a mutual psychological barrier. Nevertheless, thanks to our eff orts in the last
fi ve years, we have helped to overcome some of these barriers. Now, whatever may
happen in the Middle East, Turkey has channels to follow these developments immediately.
Despite its limitations, Turkey does have infl uence in Middle Eastern
aff airs, and not only at the state level but also at the societal level. For example,
during the recent Lebanon crisis, Prime Minister Erdoğan talked on the phone
with Nebih Berri and Saad Hariri, as well as with Siniora and Hezbollah. In 2004,
then Foreign Minister Gül’s visit to Lebanon was the fi rst foreign ministerial visit
to Lebanon for the past 25 years. Turkey has since become one of the most active
countries in Lebanon recently, providing it with a fi rm diplomatic base. In this
sense, Turkey’s infl uence in the region has increased.
As a second example of such progress, in early 2007, a Sunni-Shia division occurred
due to tensions between Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq. Turkey assumed an
active role in seeking to bridge this divide and maintained a balanced policy toward
both sides. Pakistan’s President Musharraf organized a seven country meeting
in Pakistan, which was perceived as an attempt against Iran. Turkey joined this
group, but did not severe its relations with Shia groups in Iraq, the Iraqi government,
or with Iran. Turkey thus involved itself, but did not take sides in this dangerous
division. If one remembers the visits of Prime Minister Erdoğan to Iran,
Turkey should guarantee its
own security and stability
by taking on a more active,
constructive role to provide
order, stability and security in
its environs
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
82
Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in December 2006, and his speech at the Arab
League in 2007, it becomes clear that Turkish policy is to remain outside the Shia-
Sunni division. At the same time, Turkey does not follow a passive line; rather, it
pursues an active policy in regard to this tension in the region. Th is policy has
helped Turkey to develop good relations with the Shia-backed Maliki government
in Iraq. Moreover, Turkey has also developed good relations with the Sunni opposition
in the region. Likewise, Turkey is close to both the Sunni establishment
and the Shia opposition in Lebanon.
Th e fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey’s
relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition.
Such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relations with the United States
through the two countries’ bilateral ties and through NATO, and considers its
membership process to the EU, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its
synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves
to complete each other. Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy has been fi rmly
established for the past 4-5 years, and has been largely successful. Th e most signifi
cant threat to this policy came when the relations with the United States were
expected to collapse in 2007. A serious problem with the United States seemed
imminent, due to the developments concerning the Armenian resolution and the
Iraqi situation. Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, Turkish-American relations had
evolved such that both sides emerged with a better understanding of each other;
channels of communication continue to remain open on both sides. In regard to
the EU, although the integration process slowed down, a serious deadlock was
avoided and the process was not suspended. And although relations with France
seemed to have problems aft er the French elections, the expected crisis was managed
in a pragmatic manner. Overall, the relations with the EU did not progress
to an extent that we would like to see, but the relationship has continued, let alone
being suspended, as many feared. Also, an institutionalized pattern of relations
with Russia emerged.
Th e fi ft h principle in this framework is rhythmic diplomacy. Turkey’s serious
and sustained development in the fi eld of diplomacy becomes evident if we look at
the international meetings and organizations it has hosted since 2003. Th e NATO
Summit and the OIC Summit are just two examples: clearly Turkey has gained
more infl uence in international organizations. Interesting developments in this
regard took place in 2007. For instance, Turkey now has an observer status in the
African Union, a natural result of Turkey’s opening to Africa in 2005. Turkey has
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
83
been invited to the Arab League twice,
both at the level of foreign minister and
prime minister. Turkey signed a special
agreement with the Arab countries during
a meeting of Iraq’s neighbors held
in Istanbul on November 2 2007. Th is
agreement includes the plans for institutionalizing
the relations among Iraq’s neighbors, and constituting a Turkish-Arab
forum. As this line of important meetings continued, a meeting bringing together
the least developed 50 countries convened in Istanbul in July. On a diff erent note,
Solana and Larijani met in Turkey to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. Similarly,
the only functional channel between Pakistan and Afghanistan was created by the
initiatives of Mr. Gül; later, with the initiatives of Turkey’s President and Prime
Minister, Pakistani President Musharraf and Afghan President Karzai met in Turkey
in May. Th is dialogue will continue aft er Pakistan has resolved its current
instability. Similarly, the Palestinian and Israeli Presidents Mahmoud Abbas and
Shimon Peres came together in Ankara before going to the Annapolis meeting in
the US.
Turkish foreign policy anticipates a continuation of this pace with reliance on
the successful strategy of rhythmic diplomacy. It is important to recognize the
change in Turkey’s image brought about by its intense diplomatic activities from
2002 to 2007. Turkey now enjoys an image as a responsible state which provides
order and security to the region, one that prioritizes democracy and liberties,
while dealing competently with security problems at home. Turkey’s aim is to intervene
consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifi es
a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power. It should
also be underlined that this transformation is the result of the performance of all
actors involved in foreign policy. Turkey’s success is not only the result of state
policies, but also the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous
other organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision.
Th e state’s macro strategy is in conformity with the micro strategies of individual
people, corporations, and civil society organizations. To list just a few examples,
one of Turkey’s business confederations, TUSKON (Confederation of Businessman
and Industrialists of Turkiye), organizes the Africa Summit in conformity
with the Africa policy and brings high numbers of African ministers to Turkey.
TUSIAD (Th e Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) pursues lobby
activities to facilitate Turkey’s entry into the EU. MUSIAD (Th e Independent
If there is not a balance between
security and democracy in
a country, it may not have a
chance to establish an area of
infl uence in its environs
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
84
Industrialists and Businessman’s Association)
is actively involved in organizing
business events in the Gulf, bringing
together leading players in global economy and fi nance. And there are many other
civil society organizations whose activities further Turkey’s international aspirations,
like those that reached out to the devastated areas aft er the 2005 earthquake
in Pakistan and the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Turkish civil society organizations
form an integral part of the bigger picture defi ned as foreign policy. All of
these elements have become part of Turkey’s new international vision.
Iraq Policy
Turkey has been one of the most infl uential actors involved in solving the
question of Iraq’s future, during and aft er the invasion of Iraq. Th e meetings of
the Extended Neighboring Countries of Iraq have made a serious contribution to
the Iraqi question in the international arena. Turkey’s eff orts have not only helped
to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, but also paved way for Iraq to
be not solely an American but an international issue to be dealt with within the
framework of the United Nations. Th is ‘neighboring countries’ process was initiated
by Turkey. Due to the presidential election in the Turkish agenda, the fi rst
meeting for bringing together the expanded neighboring countries of Iraq was
convened in Sharm al-Sheikh at the beginning of May 2007. Th e second meeting
was convened in Istanbul in early November of the same year. Th ese two meetings
defi ned a common international attitude toward Iraq. Replacing speculative
scenarios about Iraq’s fragmentation, these meetings have also provided the international
community with a way to commit itself to the territorial integrity and
unity of Iraq.
Today, it is important for Turkey to further establish its position in the Middle
East. Th is position must rest on four main principles. First of all, security for everyone,
not only for this group or that group, this country or that country, but
common security for the entire region. Second, priority must be given to dialogue
as a means of solving crises. Here Turkey’s role as a facilitator is already wellestablished.
Aft er all, why are Turkey’s prime minister, president, and minister of
foreign aff airs paying continuous visits to the Middle East? Because they are the
only leaders who can contact all Middle Eastern leaders. If, for instance, there
were no diplomatic relationship between two powerful countries such as Iran and
Egypt, and if their leaders did not meet, there would be little possibility for establishing
order in the Middle East. Would it be possible to establish order in Europe
Turkey’s most important soft
power is its democracy
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
85
if France and Britain did not have any
relations? In such a case, a country like
Germany or another important third actor
would have to intervene and set up
channels for political dialogue, just as
Turkey has done and continues to do in
the Middle East. Turkey has undertaken many positive promoter roles among
Middle Eastern states in recent years, some of which have been visible and some
invisible to the public eye. Th ose countries have found every confi dence in Turkey.
Today, Turkey and its diplomatic means have proven to be the strongest and
most reliable channels, not only between states, but also between communities
and non-state actors. All parties acknowledge this. When a message or a concern
has to be delivered from one place to another, Turkish channels are utilized.
Th e third principle is economic interdependence. Order in the Middle East
cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of isolated economies. Th is holds true for
Iraq, Syria, and others. Th e fourth principle is cultural coexistence and plurality.
Historically, none of the Middle Eastern cities have been composed of a homogenous
ethnic and sectarian fabric. Neither Basra, nor Damascus, İstanbul or
Kirkuk is a homogenous city. Th erefore, in order to establish order in the Middle
East, it is essential to maintain this composition in one way or another.
Th e fourth principle of cultural coexistence and plurality is especially important
for Iraq’s future. As ethnic disputes continue in the region, the international
community can take on an advisory role in establishing a multi-cultural and viable
Iraqi government. Several of Iraq’s neighbors have already weighed in on
Iraq’s future. As an important actor in Iraq, Iran prefers an undivided Iraq that is
governed by Shiite dominance. As an equally important actor, Turkey also prefers
Iraq to be undivided, to sustain its balancing role, and not to fall into chaos as a
result of successive surges of instability that would destroy its borders. Jordan considers
possible individual states that would emerge out of an Iraqi disintegration
to be a major threat. Saudi Arabia sees a potential Shiite state that would emerge
out of a fragmented Iraq as an arm stretching right towards the Gulf. Syria believes
that Iraqi disintegration would constitute a heavy blow to Arab nationalism.
In Iraq itself, there are no parties that would benefi t from disintegration. When
all these concerns are gathered together, even if the neighboring countries do not
seem to be able to establish a common ground in a positive and constructive way,
they share a common attitude towards the potentially dangerous consequences
Turkey’s regional impact
extends to the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Caucasus and
Central Asia
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
86
of the disintegration of Iraq. Th rough its
Neighboring Countries initiative, Turkey
has kept the ground for constructive
dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors
afl oat since 2003.
Unfortunately there is, at present, no political mechanism that would guarantee
a working political system in Iraq. Turkey’s eff orts to integrate the Sunni community
into the system are well recognized. Beyond that, Turkey maintains close
contacts even with the smallest groups in Iraqi society. According to what has
been observed through these channels until now, these groups remain unable to
compromise on a mutual agreement that would hold the political system in good
working order. Nevertheless, each of these groups is fully aware that they would
suff er from Iraq’s disintegration. Today, looking from this perspective (as opposed
to that of disintegration scenarios that had consistently risen to the agenda in
2005 and 2006) eff orts to centralize Iraq these days focus not on the best possible
structure, but on the most optimal structure. Turkey’s infl uence on the fragmented
groups within Iraqi society, its eff orts to bring together Iraq’s neighbors around
a common platform, its persuasive diplomacy over the USA, and its principled
relationship with the Iraqi government have all played an unprecedented role in
these eff orts.
In 2007, Turkey’s primary concerns over Iraq concentrated on two issues: fi rst,
the rising PKK terror in the region and the likelihood of Northern Iraq becoming
its breeding ground; and secondly, the Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 which had
set the deadline for the referendum in Kirkuk to be held by December of 2007. For
Turkey, the risks in 2007 involved the referendum in Kirkuk and the possibility of
a backlash of internal confl ict, particularly the emergence of a security risk.
Given this context, it was crucial for Turkey to break down this plot in the
making. In light of the political use of the PKK, Turkey had a clear course of action:
building an international and Iraqi coalition and a common stance against
the PKK, and attempting to fi nd a solution that will be acceptable to diff erent
ethnic and sectarian groups in Kirkuk. Today, as was the case by late 2007, it can
be easily said that Turkey has achieved its aims. Moreover, it has become clear
that soft power and military power must be employed in coherence. If these forms
of power are not managed together, even the most successful operation would
bring about damaging results. As a matter of fact, the ascendance of violence during
2006-2007 and its prolongation until October 2007 had a pretty clear target:
Turkey’s multi-dimensional
foreign policy has been fi rmly
established for the past 4-5
years
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
87
Kirkuk’s rise to the agenda. Th e apparent plan was to set Turkey initially against
the communities in Northern Iraq, and then against the Iraqi government, and
fi nally against the Arab World and America, thus ensuring Turkey’s isolation. Turkey’s
ensuing diplomacy to counter this scheme has been the following. On the
one hand, Turkey legitimized hard power through parliamentary resolution. On
the other hand, Turkey hosted almost all of the regional leaders between September
and December, following the presidential nomination. When the resolution
was approved in parliament, the Syrian President visited Turkey and gave his full
support to Turkey’s possible operations against the PKK. Following the approval,
Turkey engaged in intensive contacts with the Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian and
Saudi Arabian heads of state, and their supports were secured.
Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Iraq also deepened. Iraqi president
Maliki visited Turkey two times and had phone conversations with the Turkish
Prime Minister many times. At the beginning of 2007, the two shared a normal
level of trust; by the end of 2007, their relationship had developed into full-fl edged
confi dence. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan took trips all over the region;
he became the fi rst Turkish Foreign Minister to visit Baghdad. Th e Prime Minister’s
contacts should also be situated at the center of these eff orts.
Against the tactics used by the PKK and other forces behind them, Turkey
has gradually drawn the Iraqi government, regional actors, the United States, the
European Union and Sunni-Shiite and Syriac communities in Iraq closer to itself.
Turkey is in contact with all these groups. In sharp contrast to its initial plans of
isolating Turkey, the PKK has become the party being isolated. Th is reversal demonstrates
how diplomacy, soft power, and hard power can be reconciled in the best
and most consistent manner possible. Owing to the correct timing of diplomacy
and military strategy, there was no piece in the Arab or Western media that disfavored
Turkey. Moreover, no state or international organization confronted Turkey
in an open way. Compared to Turkey’s bitter experience in the 1990s, when its
military actions came under heavy international criticism, the recent developments
indicate a remarkable success on Turkey’s part. Turkey’s success in this matter,
however, was not achieved instantly. Turkey’s total performance was based
on a variety of diff erent eff orts, on diff erent levels, all shaped by its new vision. If
this had not been the case, and Turkey had adopted a less cohesive strategy, the
Syrian president would not have chosen the day of the parliamentary resolution
for his visit to Turkey, nor would he have declared his support for the approval of
the resolution while he was in Turkey. Th e U.S. President would have adopted a
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
88
more critical attitude toward Turkey. In reality, due to the eff ectiveness of Turkey’s
eff orts, everyone has come to understand that losing Turkey would be more costly
than loosing the PKK.
Relations with the United States
Turkish-American relations has a solid geopolitical foundation, a strong historic
background and an institutionalized framework. From geopolitical perspective,
it carries almost all characteristics of a relationship between a continental superpower
and a central country having the most optimal geopolitical position in
Afro-Euroasia. Being a continental power located far from Afro-Eurasia landmass
which contains 80-85% of the global population, with its major energy resources,
cultural fortunes, and trade routes and being a superpower in the international
system are the fundamental dialectic of American foreign policy. A superpower
as such can only retain its status by means of alliances within the Afro-Eurasian
continent. For this reason, since the period of Mahan in 1905, there have been
two major components of the US strategy. First, maintaining an eff ective naval
force. Second, implementing regional strategies based on system of alliances
such as the Cold War era’s containment policy, which makes central countries
of Afro-Euroasia, such as Turkey, vital actors of American strategy. Turkey, as a
middle-size central country, on the other hand, needs the strategic weight of a
continental superpower within the parameters of the internal balances of power
of Afro-Euroasia.
Th e strategic alliance between two countries throughout the Cold War has
strengthened historic and institutional dimensions of this geopolitical foundation.
Th ere was a need for the re-adjustment of this foundation in post-Cold War
era in the 90s due to the radical changes in the international system. When we
analyze the fl ashpoints of world politics and the areas of military confrontation
in the post-Cold War era, we can see an intensifi cation in those regions where
three basic factors intersect: the geopolitical areas of strategic vacuum, geo-economic
transportation routes (including energy transfer), and geo-cultural zones
of encounter. Th e end of bipolarity has created sensitive regions where there is a
vacuum of power needed to control the strategic capabilities of the geopolitical
core areas as well as the vast resource-production-trade capabilities of the international
political economy and ethnic/secterian confrontations. US had to face this
challenge as the superpower of the unipolar system while Turkey, as a country at
the heart of all these sensitive regions, had to respond to the risks they pose.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
89
Th e delay in re-adjusting Turkish-
American relations in the new dynamic
international/regional environment in
post-Cold War era made Iraq a critical
litmus test for this strategic relation
because all of these three factors were
directly relevant. Th e war in Iraq was
necessary for American strategists to
reframe regional and global order aft er
9/11. Such a war, on the other hand, was a source of great risks for Turkey from
the perspective of all the three factors. Th e negotiations before the Turkish Parliament’s
rejection of the March 1
st motion in 2003 and the developments thatfollowed created mutual hesitations. Th ese hesitations were not only in the minds
of Americans but also in the minds of Turkish policy makers who had serious
concerns regarding the post-War conditions in Iraq due to the ambiguity of the
American plans. Th e rise of the consolidation and activities of the PKK terror in
northern Iraq aft er the Iraqi invasion has also increased these concerns.
Th e period between March 1
st of 2003 and November 5th of 2007 was not asudden leap but a process. Both sides have reached certain conclusions in the
process. First of all, the Iraqi territorial integrity and political unity is essential
for the national, regional and global interests of both sides, and common eff orts
are needed in this direction. Th e rising threat of PKK to the stability of Turkey
and Iraq, increasing Turkish role in the reconciliation process in Iraq especially
through the political integration of the Sunni Arab elements, the signifi cance of
the regional engagement in Iraq through the process of neighboring countries
meetings, the interdependency between the situation in Iraq and the regional balance
of power proved the necessity of a joint approach. Secondly, there is a wide
scope of common strategic issues which should not be overshadowed by the disagreements
on individual concerns regarding Iraqi policy, such as stability in the
Middle East, Balkans, Caucasia and Central Asia, energy security, enlargement
of NATO, and fi ghting against terrorism. Th e transformation in the Balkans and
the role of NATO presence in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the completion
of Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan energy project in 2006 and other joint energy projects,
the increasing role of Turkey in the Middle East issues especially in Lebanon and
Palestine have demonstrated the need for a much more institutionalized channel
of consultation and cooperation. Th e fact that President Bush and Prime Minister
Erdoğan have consulted on the situation in Darfur in their meeting in October
Turkey now enjoys an image
as a responsible state which
provides order and security to
the region, one that prioritizes
democracy and liberties, while
dealing competently with
security problems at home
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
90
2006 indicates the diversifi cation of common agenda. Th irdly, there is a need of
new methodology and mechanisms for the readjustment of bilateral strategic relation.
Th e document entitled “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance
the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership” declared by the then Foreign Minister
Gül and Secretary of State Rice in July 2006 refl ected these conclusions and
priorities of both sides as an attempt of re-adjustment of bilateral relations.
Despite this common ground, 2007 was seen by some circles as a year of risk
in the Turkish-American relations at the beginning of the year due to the challenges
of PKK terror and Armenian resolution. Rational approaches on both sides
regarding these issues, however, did not only prevent a turbulence in bilateral
relations, but also prepared the ground for a new era of cooperation based on
frank and constructive consultation. In this sense, the Erdoğan-Bush summit
in November 2007 became a historic turning point. I regard the amelioration of
attitudes and creation of a common ground in Turkish-American relations as a
great achievement in 2007, and a step in the right direction for both parties. Th e
psychological ground on which Turkish-American relations is now moving has
been reconstituted. In this framework, Turkey is no longer a sole alliance nation
whose support is taken for granted, but a signifi cant country with regional and
global infl uence whose strong vision and the proven capacity to make meaningful
contributions need to be taken into account by a healthier communication and a
cooperative dialogue.
Th is new understanding is a natural consequence of Turkey’s foreign policy
performance. For instance, Turkey’s eff orts to integrate the Sunnis into the political
process in Iraq have been the most important success story among the
many other reconciliatory attempts made in the last fi ve years. In consequence,
the United States noticed that Turkey’s unseen soft power cannot be disregarded.
No one was expecting this outcome at that time. Over time, it has also been observed
in relation to Iraq that Turkey’s Iraqi policy does not depend merely on a
bare security refl ex, with all the obstacles that would encumber such a stance. On
the contrary, Turkey has a constructive attitude towards Iraq. Turkey developed
meaningful and rational projects on diverse issues in Iraq including Kirkuk, and
shared those with the Iraqi government, Iraqi groups, Americans and neighboring
countries. As for the Palestinian question, it is imperative to see and appreciate
the picture that Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres exhibited during the Ankara
Forum meetings. All these new structures of relationship are products of Turkey’s
foreign policy performance. Th e United States has recently been making a good
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
91
assessment of this potential. Against this
background, a Turkish-American alliance
that relies on a solid geopolitical
basis and bears no historical prejudices
can be successfully sustained at diplomatic
and political levels.
Energy Security
Turkey is neither a country that has an excess of energy nor a country that produces
energy. Th anks to the geographical position Turkey enjoys, part of its national
strategy involves facilitating the transit of energy across its territory, which
is central to the East-West energy corridor. Th e most signifi cant oil pipeline project
in this regard, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, initially travels to the West and later
descends to the south. It connects the trans-Caspian to Turkey and enables Turkish
access to Central Asia. Among Turkey’s mid-term targets is to link Kazakh
oil to this route. Secondly, “Şah Deniz”, a natural gas project that will connect the
energy routes of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with Greece, will create a new
East-West belt. With the Nabucco gas pipeline project, the Turkish energy corridor
stretching from East to West will be expanded.
Turkey’s energy agreements with Iran go back to 1996. During the present
government’s tenure, there has been no retreat from these energy agreements;
on the contrary, there have been continual eff orts toward improvement. Here all
our allies should take into consideration Turkey’s unique position. As a growing
economy and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey needs Iranian energy as a
natural extension of its national interests. Th erefore, Turkey’s energy agreements
with Iran cannot be dependent upon its relationships with other countries.
It is oft en claimed that energy projects engaging Iran and other neighbors
bypass and upset Russia. To the contrary, the route that extends from the Blue
Stream in the North and to the Eastern Mediterranean, through Aqaba, and all
those routes that descend from the North to the South actually safeguard Russia’s
interests. With that in mind, it is important to manage the East-West routes
in a way that takes the interest of international community into consideration.
Looking to the future, another route that is less anticipated but that could become
important in the future is a potential South-North route that would carry Arab
natural gas through Egypt-Syria-Jordan. Secondly, the most optimum transit corridor
for oil and natural gas for Iraqi energy resources would be a route over Ana-
Turkey is now a country that
has original thoughts extending
from Ankara to Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia to Latin America
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
92
tolia to the East Mediterranean, Europe
or Black Sea. Parallel to this, another
potential project to consider seriously in
the future is the transit of oil and natural
gas from the Gulf to Europe in a South-
North direction. Carrying liquefi ed
natural gas (LNG) from a risky region
like the Gulf to the European markets has tremendous risks, especially due to the
unstable balance of power in the Gulf.
Turkey’s national interest lies in the proper utilization of its geography. Here,
what disappoints and surprises us is the EU’s inability to grasp this vision. Some
Europeans seem to have this thought in mind: the Turkish state and its people are
not European but Turkey’s geography is freely open to European use. Such logic
does not provide a solid ground for managing Turkish-European relations. Th e
fact that the countries most opposed to Turkey’s integration into the EU are also
those that hold high expectations for these energy projects is a great contradiction.
Th e EU will comprehend this fact at some point. Turkey is patiently waiting
for the EU to appreciate its indispensable position with regard to energy security,
cultural politics and transit routes. When they acknowledge Turkey’s value
in these terms, they will realize that Europe’s global power can only be attained
through Turkey’s full integration into Europe. Turkey shares common interests
with Russia, Iran, and the United States for the successful operation of natural
gas and oil pipelines that run in various directions through the Turkish territory.
Hence, Turkish analysts try to combine all these interests in one single picture.
Th is is a rational calculation, not an ideological account. Turkey’s relations with
Iran will continue, and eff orts will be made to preserve its understanding with
Russia, based on mutual interest. As far as cooperation with the United States in
the fi eld of energy concerns, the joint projects on the Trans-Caspian as well as
strategic approach for energy security in global economy will be maintained in
the most eff ective way.
Th e European Union and Cyprus
Four processes are crucial for putting Turkey’s relations with the EU on the
right track. First is Turkey’s integration process into the EU. Because this has been
a process of modernization and reform for domestic transformation, it is impor-
As a growing economy
and surrounded by energy
resources, Turkey needs Iranian
energy as a natural extension of
its national interests
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
93
tant for Turkey to pursue it independently,
even if the EU freezes all its relations
with Turkey. Th e Turkish government
has shown its will to do this. It declared
at the beginning of 2007 that it would
do so until 2013. Th is determination on
Turkey’s part could not be implemented
much in 2007. Why? When this declaration
came to the fore in February, it meant that Turkey will continue to pursue
progress in the reform process without becoming discouraged by the suspension
of eight chapters because of Cyprus question. Aft er making this declaration of its
strong will to move forward along the road of accession, however, Turkey became
entangled in domestic political issues. Th e year was marked by presidential elections,
parliamentary elections, and a surge of PKK terror. In spite of these events,
the reform process did not stop and some progress was made. International attention
turned to Turkey, as many expected a crisis in April and May. Th e ‘sick man’
image again rose to the fore. In Europe, Turkey’s critics considered the situation
as strengthening their hands. Th ey were not expecting Turkey to overcome the
crisis so easily. Yet Turkey’s successful handling of the crisis ultimately served only
to increase trust in Turkey; even the French elections could not have a negative
impact on this confi dence. It is now time for Turkey to acknowledge its success in
this matter and to step forward in its revision of the constitution. Th is and other
reforms should be realized independently of the voices in Europe.
Th e second process involves a technical dimension, namely relations with the
EU Commission. Turkey has not had a serious problem with the Commission
since November 2005. On a technical level, the opening of negotiation chapters
and the following of this process was successful. Six chapters are opened, one is
closed and two are waiting. Education and culture is one of them. Th e technical
process is going smoothly since the Commission’s behavior is based on objective
criteria. Turkey’s real problem is the political negotiations at the level of the
European Council, which constitute the third necessary process. Whatever steps
Turkey takes toward improving its record, some actors would continue to set obstacles
before Turkey, which will slow down the process. Th ey consider the political
process as an opportunity to exploit for their own benefi t.
Th e fourth process is in the strategic dimension. Th e integration process and
its component reforms are prerequisites. However, a strategic vision is necessary
Turkey is patiently waiting
for the EU to appreciate its
indispensable position with
regard to energy security,
cultural politics and transit
routes
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
94
to guarantee Turkey’s future in Europe. If
there is a defi cit in this vision, it will not
be possible to overcome the resistance
of certain countries. During the last EU
summit, a play of words led to ambiguity
over Turkey’s participation, and we were
not part of this setting. If Turkey were to
respond harshly to the negative developments,
as was expected by some circles
in Europe, relations would have been suspended by now. Th e process continues
in a critical way, largely due to developments in Europe, beyond our own control.
We have had a paradoxical situation as far as the domestic setting in France and
Germany is concerned. During periods when the Turkish-EU relations were on
a smooth path, actors critical of Turkey were in power in France and Germany.
When Turkey’s integration with the EU was going through diffi cult times, actors
close to Turkey dominated the political scene in these countries.
Nevertheless, the trauma expected to aff ect Turkish-EU relations aft er French
elections did not materialize. Th is is due to the fact that a dialogue channel was
established between the leaders of the two countries. Th is diplomatic channel of
dialogue remains open and provides continuous contact between Turkey and
France. Turkey made clear to the French administration that their approach of
seeking good bilateral relations and cooperation in regional aff airs while setting
obstacles to Turkey on the European level is not acceptable. Turkey’s policy has
three components in regard to relations not only with France but also with all
other European countries. Th ese are bilateral relations, EU-level relations, and
regional/global relations. None of them can be compromised at the expense of
the other. It is not possible to cooperate with an actor in the Middle East, which
is simultaneously pursuing a critical stance toward Turkey at the EU level. Turkey
will not allow such a problematic form of relationship to develop in its dealings
with France and other countries.
A major reason why the French acted prudently was their appreciation of the
weight of democratic process in Turkey. Moreover, they also came to understand
that if Turkish-French relations evolved in a positive direction, there would be
great potential for cooperation in many areas especially in the Middle East. Turkey
is in this geography and will stay here. Countries that wish to have an active role in
this geography should take Turkey seriously into consideration with all its weight.
Turkey shares common
interests with Russia, Iran,
and the United States for the
successful operation of natural
gas and oil pipelines that run in
various directions through the
Turkish territory
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007
95
Turkey cannot demand EU membership
from a position of waiting outside
the door. We need to undertake diplomatic
initiatives to prepare the ground
and foster the psychological atmosphere to achieve this goal. It is important to
take stock of the new situation; the EU has changed the process to a technical and
routine one due to the suspension of eight chapters. Nevertheless, the process is
continuing between technical teams. Th e last EU progress report was both appreciative
and critical of the current developments in Turkey. Such assessments of
the reform process are necessary and it is pointless to oppose them. Th ey indicate
what to do and their purpose is to expedite Turkey’s smooth progress toward integration.
Th e section of the Progress Report, however, contained a misguided interpretation
about Cyprus. No new and comprehensive peace for Cyprus is on the horizon
under the current conditions. Greek Cypriots are aware of this situation and
they try to strengthen their position within the EU accordingly. Turkey has sought
every possible way to explain its just position. One possible way to persuade the
EU would be to capitalize on Turkey’s increasing strategic weight. A second policy
could be to intensify the exchanges of Northern Cyprus with other actors so that
it is increasingly integrated to outside world. Indeed, 2007 was a good year for
Northern Cyprus, and four openings now present themselves. Th e fi rst is in the
Council of Europe. Th e second is the opening of trade offi ces in Gulf countries.
Th e third is the start of mutual sea cruises to Syria’s Lazkiye port. And the fourth
is the offi cial state visits. President Talat has been received as head of state in Pakistan.
Th e OIC General Secretary and OIC teams visited Northern Cyprus with
offi cial status. Promisingly, the economic gap between the North Cyprus and the
South has decreased. A point may come when it may be necessary to persuade
the Northern Cypriots to unify with the South, for their recognition by the international
community and growing standards of life in the North will remove the
rationale for doing so. Th eir conditions are indeed improving.
Conclusion
First of all, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate
the diff erences within its society, and strengthen the coordination and balance
within its institutions in 2008 and the years that follow. In this way, Turkey’s internal
situation will be considered an asset by external actors. Furthermore, Turkey
should avoid crises like the ones that occurred in April and May of 2007,
Strategic vision is necessary to
guarantee Turkey’s future in
Europe
AHMET DAVUTOĞLU
96
which undermined the country’s image
and reputation outside. Secondly, Turkey
needs to deepen its participation
in regional matters. Specifi cally, Turkey
should contribute to peace, security, and
prosperity in its region. Obviously, Turkey
would benefi t from such a positive
environment; working toward it would
raise Turkey to an internationally proactive
position. Th is elevation could occur via Turkey’s implementation of energy,
transportation, and cultural policies. Turkey could pursue a more infl uential policy
line in international politics aft er asserting itself in its regional setting. When
these principles take roots, the relations with the United States will be pursued in
a more mutually benefi cial and meaningful way and the relations with the EU will
have a stronger base. Aft er all, Turkey is the rising actor in the region and will be
sensitive to the concerns of other regional players. In that respect, it will develop
a balanced relationship with Russia. Th e activities of civil society and Turkish
intellectuals will contribute to the attainment of those common goals. Turkey’s
engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from EU
to OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. Th ese initiatives will
make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary
of the establishment of the Turkish republic.
Turkey needs to deepen
and enrich its democracy,
accommodate the diff erences
within its society, and
strengthen the coordination
and balance within its
institutions